Commanders in Control:Disarmament Demobilisation and Reintegration in Afghanistan under the Karzai administration by Derksen, Linde Dorien
This electronic thesis or dissertation has been 











The copyright of this thesis rests with the author and no quotation from it or information derived from it 
may be published without proper acknowledgement. 
 
Take down policy 
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact librarypure@kcl.ac.uk providing 
details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and investigate your claim. 
END USER LICENCE AGREEMENT                                                                         
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 
International licence. https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ 
You are free to: 
 Share: to copy, distribute and transmit the work  
 
Under the following conditions: 
 Attribution: You must attribute the work in the manner specified by the author (but not in any 
way that suggests that they endorse you or your use of the work).  
 Non Commercial: You may not use this work for commercial purposes. 
 No Derivative Works - You may not alter, transform, or build upon this work. 
 
Any of these conditions can be waived if you receive permission from the author. Your fair dealings and 














Download date: 06. Nov. 2017
© Linde Dorien Derksen 2017  1	  
Commanders in Control 
Disarmament Demobilisation and Reintegration in 
Afghanistan under the Karzai administration 
 
ABSTRACT Commanders in Control examines the four internationally-funded 
disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR) programmes in Afghanistan 
between 2003 and 2014. It argues that although on paper they were part of Western 
powers’ ambitious state building project, in reality they served the U.S.-led military 
campaign against the Taliban as one of the mechanisms through which foreign 
support to armed groups was either given or withheld. By targeting different groups in 
different ways and at different times, DDR programmes were shaped by the wider 
political context – namely the fight against the Taliban and the movement’s continued 
political exclusion. By examining the programmes’ impact on individual commanders 
in four provinces – two in the northeast and two in the southwest – this study shows 
that the programmes deepened this pattern of exclusion. Local allies of international 
troops used them to reinforce their own position and target rivals. Those targeted 
often sought alternative ways of remaining armed, including by joining the 
insurgency. Thus, DDR – which was largely used to strengthen those winning and 
demobilise those losing – promoted not peace, as some foreign donors expected, but 
war. The main lesson from the Afghan experience is that DDR amidst war can 
generate instability and violence. This is especially the case when significant armed 
groups are excluded and portrayed as irreconcilable even when representing 
communities’ genuine grievances – the case in Afghanistan and other countries on the 
sharp end of the War on Terror like Iraq and Somalia. The state in these places is too 
weak to permanently exclude large groups, even with international military support. 
This means that to gain more control over the use of force – which is usually the 
objective of DDR – it must find a way to accommodate, not exclude, the main 
militarised patronage networks. In Afghanistan this means including the Taliban.  
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
 
In March 2008 Uruzgan governor Assadullah Hamdam convened a jirga, or meeting 
of elders. Hundreds of tribesmen from across the province crowded into his 
compound in Tirin Kot. The governor had convened the jirga to convince angry 
elders who were backing the Taliban to instead support the government.   
 
Securing the meeting was vital. The threat of violence was so high that even the 
elders’ turbans were searched. Only one man in the province was up to the job. This 
man was not the bulky police chief Juma Gul, but the slim and soft-spoken warlord 
Matiullah Khan – ironically one of people who had driven elders to back the Taliban 
in the first place. Matiullah, then in his early thirties, commanded an estimated 1,500 
to 2000 men. He had built up his militia with money he had received for securing 
foreign military convoys; his income was estimated at some $340,000 each month.1  
 
Ties between Matiullah and the American forces dated back to 2001. Right at the start 
of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in October of that year, he had helped soon-
to-be president Hamid Karzai, who had just crossed into Afghanistan from Quetta, 
oust the Taliban from Uruzgan. Since then, he had worked closely with American 
troops to eliminate Taliban and al-Qaeda remnants (or at least those he and his uncle 
Jan Mohammad chose to portray as such). He was widely thought to have committed 
grave human rights abuses in these first years after the fall of the Taliban regime. 
Some thought he was involved in the drugs trade. But a U.S. Special Operations 
Forces (SOF) commander in Uruzgan in 2008 was enthusiastic about him: ‘He is one 
of the few Afghans who also hunts down the Taliban without our help’.2  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Based on the report that Matiullah protected 200 trucks per month going from 
Kandahar to Camp Holland near Tirin Kot for $1,700 per truck. Kelly, “The Long 
Road”. The Ministry of Interior (MoI) officially paid 300 to 600 fighters of the 1,500 
to 2,000 fighters to operate as the highway police (Kandak-e-Amniat-e Uruzgan), but 
in reality Matiullah’s army was completely beyond government control (Jeremy 
Kelly, “The Long Road to Tarin Kowt,” The Australian April 28, 2009; Dexter 
Filkins, “With U.S. Aid, Warlord Builds Afghan Empire,” New York Times, June 5, 
2010); Deedee Derksen, Thee met de Taliban: Oorlogsverslaggeving voor Beginners, 
(Breda: De Geus, 2010), 155.	  2	  Derksen, Thee, 134; Susanne Schmeidl, “The Man Who Would Be King: The 
Challenges to Strengthening Governance in Uruzgan,” Netherlands Institute of 
International Relations Clingendael, 2010, 34; Filkins, “Warlord”; Susanne 
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That the U.S. military backed a local warlord suspected of human rights abuses and 
drug trafficking and provided him with money to pay his fighters was, perhaps, 
surprising. The U.S. government had officially endorsed – even lobbied for – 
programmes to disband militias like Matiullah’s. In fact, Matiullah himself had 
participated in one such programme. He handed in 264 weapons on 18 January 2007, 
a year before the peace jirga at the governor’s compound left Uruzgani tribal elders in 
no doubt as to who was the most powerful man in the province.  
 
Official statistics logged Matiullah as an effective case of demobilisation. The UN 
agency involved paraded his participation proudly in its monthly newsletter.3 But in 
reality he was a hugely successful warlord. He did so well out of the American (and 
after 2006 also Dutch and Australian) financial and military support that a 2010 report 
labelled him ‘the uncontested King of Uruzgan’.4 In summer 2011 this defacto power 
was transformed into an official position: he was appointed as the new provincial 
chief of police. His ability to fight the Taliban (or, again, those he portrayed as such) 
trumped concerns about his background or the imperative of disarming his militia.5  
 
Matiullah’s case is one of many examples of flawed Disarmament, Demobilisation 
and Reintegration (DDR) in Afghanistan. This thesis studies these flaws by 
examining how DDR played out on the ground. It tells the stories behind the official 
statistics – like those that logged Matiullah handing over a few old kalashnikovs as a 
disarmament success. What happened to the commanders after they handed in their 
guns? Did they reintegrate into civilian life as the DDR programme prescribed or did 
they rearm like Matiullah? I argue that those commanders who were politically well 
connected were able to rearm, leaving smaller commanders frustrated and seeking 
ways to get weapons elsewhere – in many cases joining the insurgency. In this way 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Schmeidl, “Uruzgan’s New Chief of Police: Matiullah’s Dream Come True,” 
Afghanistan Analysts Network, August 8, 2011; U.S. Embassy in Afghanistan, 
“PRT/Tarin Kowt – Security Programs Getting Traction in Uruzgan Province,” U.S 
Embassy Cable 06KABUL1669, April 12, 2006. Published by Wikileaks.org.	  3	  Afghan New Beginnings Programme newsletter, issue 5, January 2007.	  4	  Schmeidl, “The Man Who,” 35. 	  5	  He was appointed despite the U.S. blocking his appointment several times 
previously (Schmeidl, “Matiullah’s Dream”).  	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DDR programmes played into local conflict dynamics, often widening existing 
political fault lines.  
 
Four DDR programmes were initiated in Afghanistan from 2001 within the broader 
context of the international intervention. The first, which started in 2003, was simply 
called DDR. The second, the Disbandment of Illegal Militias (DIAG), ran from 2005 
to 2011. The third, the Programme Takhim Sulh (PTS) was launched in 2005 as the 
insurgency expanded. Last came the more comprehensive Afghanistan Peace and 
Reintegration Programme (APRP), which started in 2010. In May 2016 the APRP, 
which had cost some $200 million, was suspended, after failing to deliver on its 
promises of ‘deradicalising Islamist militants’ and reintegrating them into civilian 
society.6    
 
Data in Afghanistan are generally unreliable, but the four programmes have probably 
demobilised tens of thousands of armed men over the past decade. They led to the 
cantonment of some heavy weaponry. They may also have meant temporary 
improvements in security, especially through the dismantlement of checkpoints where 
militias harassed locals. But if the programmes’ goal was to stabilise Afghanistan by 
reducing the number of armed groups, then the country’s current insecurity, numerous 
non-state militias, insurgents and vast numbers of men with guns show that 
collectively they have failed.  
 
This thesis, that covers the time of the Karzai administrations from 2001 to 2014, 
argues that the U.S.-led military campaign against the Taliban, Taliban leaders’ 
political exclusion and the arming of militias to fight the movement posed the main 
constraints on an effective DDR process. It shows that DDR programmes not only 
reflected existing power dynamics but also deepened them, contributing to the 
proliferation of irregular militias and to the growing insurgency in the second half of 
the decade. How did programmes that were designed to encourage armed men to lay 
down their weapons instead have the opposite effect?  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  Tim Craig and Mohammad Sharif, “A U.S.-Afghan plan to buy peace may be 
failing”, Reuters, May 17, 2016. 	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In answering these questions this thesis aims to contribute to the debate on 
international interventions in countries in conflict and emerging from conflict. 
‘Afghanistan’ is viewed in much academic literature as the most ambitious 
internationally-led state building project ever.7 Whereas the U.S. had initially pursued 
a light footprint strategy that did not involve nation building and that envisioned 
controlling territory through the use of militias, in the years after its intervention in 
2001 a broad coalition of multilateral institutions and donor countries nonetheless 
embarked on a project to rebuild the collapsed Afghan state.  
 
This project resulted in the deployment of NATO’s International Security Assistance 
Force (ISAF), established to support the Afghan government in the provision of 
security. In 2011, at its height, 150,000 troops of forty-seven countries were stationed 
in Afghanistan and around sixty governmental donors were working supposedly to 
further the international community’s goals of establishing ‘a stable, internationally 
‘responsible’ and internally liberal, political order’ in the country. ‘There were 
parallel structures of administration on virtually all levels of government’.8 DDR 
programmes were a key part of this agenda, at least on paper. 
 
If the international community put so much effort into rebuilding the Afghan state, 
what explains the current levels of violence and political instability? This question has 
preoccupied many scholars in recent times. It has led to a host of criticisms on the 
‘state building approach’, which will be discussed below. This thesis interacts with 
both proponents of the conventional state building agenda – building up state 
institutions in countries transitioning from war to peace – and its critics, who argue 
that state building is too state-centric and top-down and who seek a revalorisation of 
the informal and local. It proposes another lens through which to view the failure of 
the international community to contribute towards a more peaceful and stable 
Afghanistan – that of the political inclusion and exclusion of local leaders and local 
armed groups. In this argument it interacts with literature on spoilers, but broadens its 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  See, for example, Michael Barnett and Christoph Zuercher, “The Peacebuilders 
Contract: How External Statebuilding Reinforces Weak Statehood” in Dilemmas of 
Statebuilding, Confronting the Contradictions of Postwar Peace Operations, ed. 
Roland Paris and Timothy D. Sisk, (New York: Routledge, 2009), 41.  8	  Astri Suhrke, When More is Less; the International Project in Afghanistan (New 
York: Colombia University Press, 2011), 1, 3, 6, 79.	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scope from a narrow focus on peace agreements to the whole political impact of 
international interventions in countries emerging from conflict.  
 
This introduction is divided in three parts. The first examines the concept of state 
building, the place of DDR in this concept and critiques on state building that view 
the approach as too top-down, state centric and technical. The second tests the 
literature on state building and state formation in Afghanistan against what I argue are 
the three most relevant contextual factors to DDR programmes: the state’s historical 
development and its relationship with society; traditional patterns in dealing with 
armed groups as a conflicts’ main phase ends and the nature of international 
involvement since 2001. These contextual factors to the DDR programmes lead to 
three key points of departure – assumptions underpinning this thesis that are tested 
throughout and revisited in the conclusion – and a hypothesis on what these 
assumptions mean for the process of state formation in Afghanistan, a process that the 
DDR programmes were ostensibly meant to advance. The third part of this 
introduction lays out the thesis’ methodological approach and its structure.  
 
1.1. State building: proponents and critics 
 
Much of the recent literature on international interventions in countries emerging 
from conflict, including Afghanistan, has centred on the issue of state building. The 
early days of state building, after the end of the Cold War, was marked by optimism 
about the ability of foreign donors to help countries transition from war to peace 
through a recipe of liberal democracy, economic liberalisation and the rule of law. 
The 2000s, with the interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan challenged by a strong 
insurgency, and several unsuccessful state building efforts in Africa, brought the 
realisation that state building is fraught with difficulties.  
 
This realisation was apparent in the reluctance of European governments and the U.S. 
in becoming deeply involved in post-Gaddafi Libya or committing large numbers of 
ground troops to fight ISIS in its strongholds in Syria and Iraq. Western governments 
began to question the wisdom of overthrowing a regime, however authoritarian or 
violent it was. What would follow? Can foreign actors really play much of role in 
building a more democratic and just society in a post-authoritarian or post-conflict 
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situation? An interview with President Obama in The Atlantic showed how much he 
doubted a favourable outcome of a major intervention in Syria. ‘If there had been no 
Iraq, no Afghanistan, and no Libya, Obama told me, he might be more apt to take 
risks in Syria’, wrote interviewer Jeffrey Goldberg.9  
 
In academic literature a rich debate developed over the virtues of state building. Some 
scholars and other observers proposed ways in which the bilateral donors and 
multilateral organisations could improve the approach. Another strand of literature 
questioned the whole enterprise, calling it too state-centric, top-down and technical. 
Instead, some argued, there should be a revalorisation of the local and the informal. 
This led to the concept of hybrid governance, which acknowledges the existence of 
potentially legitimate authorities alongside the state and offers ways of international 
actors of understanding these and working with them.10 These arguments were clearly 
juxtaposed against the state building agenda, which focused on formal institutions. In 
sum, state building as a concept has been central to the thinking on international 
involvement in countries in conflict and post-conflict; either as an agenda to support 
and improve, or as an agenda to resist or reshape by proposing ideas juxtaposed to it.  
 
This thesis takes another approach. By examining how one of the most central aspects 
of the state building agenda, DDR, played out in Afghanistan, it shows the limited 
relevance of the state building framework to analyse what went wrong and to 
understand why it is now a more militarised and violent country than it was in 2001. 
International actors framed their intervention as state building for their own purposes, 
particularly to legitimise their presence in Afghanistan. The literature on Afghanistan 
– both from those supportive of state building and those opposed – has to a great 
extent followed that lead, examining what the intervention means for state building. 
This thesis instead argues that while these strands of literature offer valuable insights, 
some of which this thesis draws on, state building is not the right starting point for the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  Jeffrey Goldberg, “The Obama Doctrine,” The Atlantic, April 2016.  
10 Kate Meagher, Tom De Herdt and Kristof Titeca write that ‘[r]ather than looking at 
state-building as something that focuses on the state one is seeking to build, hybrid 
governance focuses on the process through which state and non-state institutions 
coalesce around stable forms of order and authority.’ Kate Meagher, Tom De Herdt 
and Kristof Titeca, “Hybrid Governance in Africa: Buzzword or Paradigm Shift?,” 
African Arguments, April 25, 2014.  
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discussion on the legacy of the international intervention in Afghanistan, and on the 
possible lessons to draw from it for elsewhere.  
 




The origins of the international state building agenda date back to the end of the Cold 
War. Whereas beforehand United Nations (UN) peacekeepers had tried to stay out of 
domestic politics in the countries in which they operated, new geopolitical realities 
opened up opportunities and a demand for the UN to launch more operations and 
become more involved in internal affairs. UN operations in Namibia, Angola, El 
Salvador, Western Sahara, Cambodia, Bosnia and Somalia, Mozambique exemplified 
this new agenda, which could include support in disarming ex-combatants, in 
organising elections and in drafting new constitutions. In 1992 UN Secretary-General 
Boutros-Ghali conceptualised these new missions in An Agenda For Peace. He 
differentiated between peacekeeping, peace enforcement and post-conflict peace 
building.11 
 
Post-conflict peace building – the most relevant of the three concepts for this study – 
sought ‘to strengthen and solidify peace’ in the aftermath of ‘civil strife’.  It could 
include disarming ex-combatants, restoring order, weapon destruction, refugee 
repatriation, supporting security personnel, monitoring elections, advancing efforts to 
protect human rights, strengthening government institutions and promoting political 
participation.12  
 
Peace building aimed to promote liberalisation (democratisation and marketisation), 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, “An Agenda For Peace, Preventive 
Diplomacy, Peacemaking and Peace-keeping,” United Nations, January 31, 1992. 
Roland Paris and Timothy D. Sisk, “Introduction – Understanding the contradictions 
of postwar statebuilding,” in Dilemmas of Statebuilding, Confronting the 
Contradictions of Postwar Peace Operations, ed. Roland Paris and Timothy D. Sisk, 
(New York: Routledge, 2009), 1-5; Roland Paris, At War’s End, Building Peace after 
Civil Conflict (Boulder: Cambridge University Press, 2004).	  12	  Boutros-Ghali, “An Agenda”, paragraph 55. See also Paris and Sisk, 
“Understanding the contradictions”. 	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which was seen as the remedy for civil conflict.13 Jonathan Goodhand and Oliver 
Walton define liberal peace building as the ‘simultaneous pursuit of conflict 
resolution, market sovereignty, and liberal democracy’.14 In that sense peace building 
was a reflection of ‘the perceived triumph after the Cold War of market democracy as 
the prevailing standard of enlightened governance across much of the world’ (which 
had Francis Fukuyama as its most prominent proponent).15 
 
State building emerged as a new approach to peace building. Roland Paris and 
Timothy D. Sisk view state building as ‘a particular approach to peace building’ that 
emphasises ‘the construction or strengthening of legitimate governmental institutions 
in countries emerging from civil conflict’.16 This shift in peacebuilding strategy, 
which occurred in the late 1990s and early 2000s, was informed by the view that the 
first generation of peace building activities, between 1989 and 1997, were too limited, 
both in time and scope.17  
 
Initial mandates tended to be for very limited periods, focusing primarily on 
holding a successful post-conflict election, usually within the first one or two 
years of peace, after which it was hoped that the host societies would be on 




State building would instead focus on building up the institutional structures that were 
‘necessary for democratic governance and market reforms – and, arguably, a durable 
peace – to take root’.19 Whereas Paris and Sisk see peace building and state building 
as fundamentally different, other authors have argued that the dividing line has faded. 
Indeed, ‘Afghanistan’, is defined as a ‘peace building project’ by some, and a ‘state 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13	  Paris, At War’s End, 5.  14	  Jonathan Goodhand and Oliver Wanton, “The Limits of Liberal Peacebuilding? 
International Engagement in the Sri Lankan Peace Process,” Journal of Intervention 
and Statebuilding, 3:3 (2009), 303.  15	  Paris, At War’s End, 19.	  	  16	  Paris and Sisk, “Understanding the contradictions,” 1.	  17	  Paris and Sisk, Ibid., 1, 6. 	  18	  Paris and Sisk, Ibid., 6.	  19	  Paris and Sisk, Ibid., 6. 	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building project’ by others, though generally the latter term is used.20 
 
Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration 
 
The four DDR programmes that were initiated in Afghanistan since 2003 were all 
largely based on a UN template that had been a central component of the peace 
building and state building agendas. Around sixty DDR programmes have been 
implemented since the early 1990s – the majority in Africa, but also in Latin America, 
the Caribbean, South Eastern Europe, Central and South Asia and the South Pacific. . 
Most have been mandated by a peace agreement, a UN Security Council resolution, or 
unilaterally by a government. Robert Muggah describes DDR as a ‘growth industry’, 
in which over a million former combatants have participated, with an annual 
aggregate expenditure surpassing $630 million.21  
 
The UN, arguably the principal implementing agency, consolidated its DDR policies 
around the turn of the century. Of particular importance was the 2000 report of the 
High Level Panel on Peace Operations (or Brahimi Report) that stressed the 
importance of DDR and made recommendations how to plan, finance and organise it. 
In 2006 the UN published its Operational Guide to the Integrated Disarmament, 
Demobilization and Reintegration Standards (IDDRS), which lays forth the UN’s 
definition of DDR and provided a ‘coherent, broadly supported framework’.22 The 
IDDRS included among the goals of DDR ‘to contribute to security and stability in 
post-conflict environments so that recovery and development can begin’. The 
disarmament of ex-combatants includes the registration and disposal of their weapons. 
Demobilisation involves the discharge of combatants from armed forces or non-state 
armed groups, which can be done in ways ranging from processing combatants in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  20	  Paris and Sisk, Ibid., 6; Jonathan Goodhand and Mark Sedra, “Rethinking Liberal 
Peacebuilding, Statebuilding and Transition in Afghanistan,” Central Asia Survey, 
32:3, 29 (2013): 240. Suhrke, When More is Less.	  	  21	  Robert Muggah, “Innovations in Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration 
Policy, Reflections on the Last Decade,” Norsk Utenrikspolitisk Institutt (NUPI), 1-
13.   22	  Bart Klem et al.,“The Struggle After Combat; The Role of NGOs in DDR 
Processes,” Cordaid, 2008, 8,9. “Second Generation Disarmament, Demobilization 
and Reintegration (DDR) Practices in Peace Operations,” United Nations, February 
2010, 9.  
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temporary centres to massing troops in cantonment sites or other camps. Demobilised 
fighters can then receive a short-term support, or ‘reinsertion’ package.  This package 
can include food, shelter, training, employment, tools or cash. The last phase of DDR, 
reintegration, involves combatants acquiring a civilian status and gaining sustainable 
employment. Reintegration is ‘essentially a social and economic process with an open 
time frame, primarily taking place in communities at a local level’.23 
 
The thinking on DDR has evolved with lessons learnt from peacekeeping operations, 
like those in Central America (ONUCA, 1989-1992, ONUSAL 1991-1995), Namibia 
(UNTAG, 1989-1990) and Cambodia (UNTAC, 1992-1993).24 Of particular 
importance were challenges in bringing to a close the Angolan conflict of four 
decades (an independence war from 1961 to 1974 followed by a civil war that ended 
in 2002). Angola’s troubles focused ‘the attention of international organisations, 
NGOs [non-governmental organisations] and policy analysts on the overriding 
importance of meeting the challenges posed by the continued presence of military 
personnel, arms and organisational structures within a war-torn society following the 
formal end of hostilities’. International peacebuilding actors came to see DDR as the 
‘single most important precondition for post-war stability’.25  
 
In the course of the 1990s DDR policies evolved in the same direction as the broader 
agenda of UN interventions, from minimalist to maximalist. The DDR concept 
changed accordingly from being seen as a purely military question, narrowly 
preoccupied with ex-combatants (or spoilers) to a development one with ‘a concerted 
emphasis on consolidating peace and promoting reconstruction and development’.26 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  23 United Nations, “Operational Guide to the Integrated Disarmament, 
Demobilization and Reintegration Standards (IDDRS),” United Nations, 2010, 24, 25. 24	  Muggah, “Innovations,” 1, 2. 25	  Mats Berdal and David H. Ucko, “Introduction – The political reintegration of 
armed groups after war,” in Reintegrating Armed Groups After Conflict; Politics, 
Violence and Transition, ed. Mats Berdal and David H. Ucko. (Abingdon/New York: 
Routledge, 2009), 1.  26	  Ministry for Foreign Affairs Sweden, “Stockholm Initiative on Disarmament 
Demobilisation Reintegration (SIDDR),” Ministry for Foreign Affairs Sweden, 
February 2006, 9. Two different perspectives can be distinguished within this new 
development focus. A ‘transitional perspective’ concentrates on the reintegration of 
ex-combatants, and tries to improve their longer-term social and economic position 
rather than focusing on immediate stability in their role as spoilers.  The 
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Nowadays a DDR process is supposed to do many things: stem war recurrence; 
reduce military expenditure; stimulate spending on social welfare; prevent spoilers 
from disrupting peace processes; enhance opportunities for their livelihoods; disrupt 
command and control of armed groups and prevent resort to the weapons of war.27 
 
1.1.2. Critics of state building 
 
The international intervention in Afghanistan has clearly not fulfilled these ambitions. 
The experience there has influenced the wider debate on state building, which has 
also been informed by simultaneous failures to fulfil state building aims elsewhere, 
including in Iraq and in several African states. Though critics approach the topic from 
different angles and propose different remedies, the general tendency is to criticise the 
international state building agenda for being too state-centric, too top-down and too 
technical. They propose that international efforts to support a transition from war to 
peace should take the local political, military and social context into account, which 
means acknowledging that in these environments the state is generally weak and 
exists side by side with other, informal, authorities.  
 
Two, interlinked, issues are of particular relevance to this thesis. The first is the 
critique that DDR (and the wider state building agenda) in Afghanistan and elsewhere 
has been approached as a technical process; an approach that ignored the fact that the 
demobilisation of armed groups inevitably generates winners and losers and is thus 
inherently political. The second is the continued prominence of warlords, strongmen 
and militias in Afghanistan and the question of what to do with them – an issue that 
the first two DDR programmes ostensibly tried to address by demobilising them.  
 
First, prominent scholars argue that the state building agenda has been approached as 
a technical process, ignoring the local political, military and social context. Mats 
Berdal argues that Western attempts at state building in Afghanistan, ‘while hardly 
coherent, have followed a liberal script’. He criticises the tendency to abstract the 
challenges of state and peace building. ‘Put simply, there has been a failure to deal 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
‘transformational perspective’ defines the success of a DDR programme in terms of 
the extent to which it resolves the underlying factors that caused the ex-combatants to 
take up arms (Klem et al., “The Struggle,” 10). 27	  Muggah, “Innovations,” 2. 
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with societies on their own terms and, quite especially, to seek to acquire a deeper 
understanding of the local context and local conflict dynamics’. 
 
The focus has been on building the capacity of state institutions, whereas, as also 
explored above, ‘there are alternative systems of power, influence and economic 
activity that crystallise within conflict zones’. Berdal argues that state builders should 
therefore not simply focus on building institutional capacity but on finding and 
supporting a political settlement (by which he means not just a peace agreement) ‘that 
reflects and takes into account the formal as well as the informal distribution of 
power, influence and resources within society’.28  
 
Regarding the DDR component of state building Berdal has been at the forefront of 
the critique that practitioners have applied standard templates to wildly varying post-
war situations. This technical approach is, according to him, reflected in the UN 
Integrated DDR Standard, which ‘has tended to concentrate on the “mechanics”: how 
to best plan, organise, coordinate and fund what are often formidable logistical and 
technical challenges’. While this literature may help improve the ‘mechanics’ of 
programmes, its focus is ‘almost bound to underplay qualitative differences in the 
historical, cultural and political context that necessarily exist among different DDR 
processes’. Critical factors bearing on the ‘DDR challenge’ are the interests of foreign 
donors and neighbouring countries; the political economy in the conflict zone; 
characteristics of armed groups and ‘the evolving global and normative environment 
in which DDR is conceived and carried out’. These, Berdal argues, impact ‘the 
political complexity of DDR’.29  
 
DDR inherently aims to change power relations (by aiming to endow the state with a 
monopoly of force) and will thus ‘invariably be contentious and generate spoilers’.30 
Post-war security transition should therefore be understood as a politically driven 
undertaking, ‘the implementation of which is heavily conditioned by the parties’ 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  28	  Mats Berdal, “Afghanistan and After – Reflections on Western Interventionism and 
State Fragility” in Rethinking State Fragility, British Academy for Humanities and 
Social Sciences, April 2015, 17, 14, 11, 12.  29	  Berdal and Ucko “Introduction – The political reintegration,” 2, 3, 8. 	  
30	  Mark Sedra, “Afghanistan and the Folly of Apolitical Demilitarisation,” Conflict, 
Security & Development 11: 4 (2011): 476.	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political will and the general climate throughout the peace process’.31 The sequencing 
of the main elements of the peace process should be flexible enough to accommodate 
the political interests of the warring parties.  
 
In practice, however, DDR ‘has continued to be divorced from political 
considerations and neglected as a political tool of a peace process’.32 They have 
usually been ‘externally run, biased, short-sighted and implemented in artificial 
isolation ... from other areas of structural transformation….’33 Designers of DDR 
programmes, and implementing agencies, often view post-war situations as blank 
slates, assuming – incorrectly – ‘the disappearance of power dynamics, interests, 
authority structures and traditions’.34 DDR is treated as a quick process, in some cases 
even a precondition for talks or followed sequentially by SSR.35 
 
Instead, DDR should be embedded in the broader peace process, with its sequencing 
and symmetry with other components of the process vital in creating and maintaining 
political will.36 Most scholars agree that a consensus among the major stakeholders on 
demilitarisation institutionalised in the peace treaty that ends hostilities is the 
foundation for successful DDR. ‘Such an agreement, if it contains mechanisms to 
bind parties to its provisions and police non-compliance, can facilitate the 
implementation of demilitarisation’.37  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  31	  Véronique Dudouet, “Nonstate Armed Groups and the Politics of Postwar Security 
Governance” and Jennifer M. Hazen, “Understanding ‘Reintegration’ within 
Postconflict Peacebuilding: Making the Case for ‘Reinsertion’ First and Better 
Linkages Thereafter” in Monopoly of Force; the Nexus of DDR and SSR, ed. Melanie 
A. Civic and Michael Miklaucic (Washington D. C.: National Defense University 
Press, 2011), 3. 	  32	  Ministry for Foreign Affairs Sweden, SIDDR, 9.	  33	  Dudouet, “Nonstate Armed Groups,” 3. 	  34	  Mark Sedra “Afghanistan and the Folly of Apolitical Demilitarisation,” Conflict, 
Security & Development. 11: 4 (2011): 477. 35	  Véronique Dudouet, Hans J. Giessmann and Katrin Planta,“From Combatants to 
Peacebuilders; a Case for Inclusive, Participatory and Holistic Security Transitions”, 
Policy Report, Berghof Foundation, 2012, 18, 20. 	  36	  Political will comes in four forms according to Sedra: ‘an elite pact among the 
principal parties to the conflict; the support or acquiescence of the general population 
and the engagement of civil society; government ownership; and an external 
champion’ (Sedra, “Afghanistan and the Folly”, 479). 37	  Sedra, “Afghanistan and the Folly”, 477.	  
© Linde Dorien Derksen 2017  21	  
However, from the perspective of rebel troops such an agreement on DDR would 
usually be conditional on the peace treaty’s other provisions – which could imply a 
new approach to the sequencing of the peace process’s main elements. The 
conventional sequence envisages rebel armies dismantled immediately after the 
cessation of hostilities.38 In Véronique Dudouet’s view, rebels will usually only agree 
to disarm ‘once they are confident that they can ensure the safety of their demobilized 
combatants, that comprehensive agreements have been reached over the substantive 
conflict issues, and that their political aims will be achieved’.39  
 
In other words, a consensus between stakeholders on DDR, and its subsequent 
formalisation in a peace treaty, can only take place if the warring parties’ reciprocal 
claims to structural reform, ‘including the transformation of the security, political, 
socio-economic and justice systems of governance’ are planned for and met in 
parallel. All sides from the start should see progress in addressing their grievances. 
Dudouet argues that agreements in peace negotiations to establish power-sharing 
provisions can improve confidence.40  
 
Caroline Hartzell and Matthew Hoddie argue that the security dilemma is central to 
the calculations of negotiating parties. Without assurances that disarmament or 
reorganisation will not leave them vulnerable to future aggression, parties to the 
conflict often prove reluctant to either reach or honour negotiated settlements. ‘The 
government rather than rival groups must be invested with a monopoly on the 
legitimate use of force. Yet it is precisely this consolidation of state power that raises 
the spectre of the security dilemma for groups emerging from conflict’. The greatest 
degree of reassurance, they conclude, lies in peace deals that create as many 
institutions as possible to share, divide or balance power among competing groups. 41 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 Security measures implemented by state and non-state conflict parties throughout 
peace processes include the cessation of hostilities and unilateral or bilateral 
ceasefires, the release of prisoners, amnesties, registration, cantonment, disarmament, 
and the demobilization of combatants (Dudouet, “Nonstate Armed Groups,” 8).  39	  Dudouet, “Nonstate Armed Groups,” 9, 10.	  40	  Dudouet, “Nonstate Armed Groups,” 8, 10.	  41	  Caroline Hartzell and Matthew Hoddie, “From Anarchy to Security; Comparing 
Theoretical Approaches to the Process of Disarmament Following Civil War,” 
Contemporary Security Policy, 27:01 (2006): 155-167; Caroline Hartzell and 
Matthew Hoddie, Crafting Peace; Powersharing Institutions and the Negotiated 
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The criticism that DDR has been approached as a technical process divorced from the 
local context in which it is initiated can also be applied to other aspects of the DDR 
process. First, though on paper policy makers view national ownership as central to 
DDR, in reality the input of local actors is often limited. Moreover, state institutions 
tend to be perceived as the main local actors that constitute that national ownership. 
Instead, according to some critics, the term national ownership should be defined 
much more broadly, and should include former combatants, NGOs and civil society, 
especially seeing that state institutions often have limited legitimacy.42 
 
Second, the focus of DDR programmes has been on disarmament and demobilisation. 
These two components tend to be the most important for foreign donors and 
governments as they take away security threats. Little attention is then paid to 
reintegration, which is key for the targeted groups. Whereas some scholars, like 
Jennifer Hazen, in response to this problem propose to limit the R in DDR to 
reinsertion and deal with long-term reintegration separately, others, like Dudouet, in 
contrast, adopt a maximalist approach, advocating for a comprehensive, ‘holistic 
approach’, to reintegration as part of DDR. This would include the integration of 
disarmed and demobilised ex-combatants ‘into the security, political, and 
socioeconomic system of governance, and the transformation of militant structures 
into functioning and sustainable organisations that pursue the “struggle” through 
nonviolent means’. 43 
 
Another topic in the literature on state formation and state building that is relevant to 
this thesis concerns the continued presence of warlords, strongmen and other non-
state armed actors such as insurgents in Afghanistan, despite DDR programmes 
aiming to demobilise them. The accommodation of warlords and strongmen in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Settlement of Civil Wars (Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 
2007), 121, 124.	  42	  Muggah, “Innovations,” 3, 6; UN,	  IDDRS, 78; Dudouet, Giessmann and Planta, 
“From Combatants,” 7, 12, 18, 21, 23, 28; 	  43	  UN, IDDRS, 157, 158; Kathleen M. Jennings, “Unclear Ends, Unclear Means: 
Reintegration in Postwar Societies – The Case of Liberia,” Global Governance 14 
(2008), 327-341; Jennifer Hazen, “Understanding “Reintegration,” 113-124; Dudouet, 
“Nonstate Armed Groups,” 14, 23; Berdal and Ucko, “Introduction – The political 
reintegration,” 6.	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Afghanistan after 2001 is a recurrent theme in analysis of why the international 
intervention failed in creating a stable country. Naazneen H. Barma argues that the 
international community has compromised the state building process by co-opting 
domestic elites ‘who use the legitimacy and power resources granted by transitional 
governance, and the subsequent aid economy, to turn the state into an arena of rent-
seeking and distribution that is then employed in the struggle for political power’.44  
 
But in recent years other state building critics have pointed to the fact that informal 
actors like warlords and strongmen are in fact ubiquitous in places like Afghanistan 
and may even become part of the process of state formation. Dipali Mukhopadhyay, 
for example, points to the fact that ‘[t]he Afghan state building project is often 
distilled into a struggle on the part of a feeble center to tame its wild periphery’. She 
examines the conditions ‘in which warlords are actually able and inclined to govern 
on behalf of a central government as subnational representatives of the regime’.45 
 
DDR literature increasingly acknowledges that simply seeking to demobilise 
warlords, strongmen and other non-state actors is in many cases not feasible, or even 
desirable in the short term after a war is over. In many places the conditions for 
conventional DDR – such as a peace agreement and minimum level security – do not 
exist.  
 
The UN department of peacekeeping operations published a report on these themes in 
2010, suggesting that without minimum security, command structures of non-state 
armed groups could be left intact, implementing disarmament and demobilisation 
after reintegration, instead of before as in conventional DDR.46 Colletta and Muggah 
view so-called interim stabilisation measures as means to create and sustain a 
‘holding pattern’; keeping former combatant units intact while buying time for 
political negotiations to proceed. These measures can include the establishment of a 
civilian peace corps; the creation of ‘transitional security forces’ (militias) and various 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  44	  Naazneen Barma, “Peace-building and the Predatory Political Economy of 
Insecurity: Evidence from Cambodia, East Timor and Afghanistan,” Conflict, Security 
& Development, 12:3, 2012: 274.	  45	  Dipali Mukhopadhyay, Warlords, Strongmen Governors, and the State of 
Afghanistan (New York: Cambridge University, 2016), 1, 11.	  46	  UN, “Second Generation,” 5. 	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forms of transitional autonomy. These are temporary measures, however, and there is 
no suggestion in the conventional state building literature to leave armed informal 
actors indeterminably in place. The central aim of DDR remains the demobilisation of 
non-state armed groups, including warlords’ militias, and the strengthening of the 
state’s capacity to control the means of violence in its territory.47 
 
At the heart of the debate on state building lies the concept of the state and what it can 
aspire to be in places like Afghanistan; countries that historically never had a strong 
central state and that are now caught up in seemingly endless conflicts. As explored 
above, the state building agenda focuses on building up the central state through a 
focus on strengthening its institutions. Important instruments, besides constitution 
writing, macro-economic reforms, rule of law initiatives and other activities, are 
security sector reform (SSR) and DDR. These security-related state building 
instruments are meant, by bolstering the state’s security forces and by taking out the 
armed competition, to endow the state with a monopoly on the legitimate use of 
violence. This state building aim results from viewing the state, in Max Weber’s 
definition, as a ‘claimant to the “monopoly of the legitimate use of violence within a 
given territory”’.48 Current-day western states, where many of the proponents of state 
building come from, mostly conform to this model. 
 
The literature critiquing the state building approach includes two major arguments 
against using this strategy in countries in conflict or transitioning from conflict to 
peace in the Global South. The first is that the state building agenda is based on a 
misreading of history.  Western states arrived at their liberal position today not 
through liberal state building including democratic elections but through a process of 
co-opting and accommodating illiberal warlords and, where possible, brutally 
suppressing them. Ariel Ahram, for example, writes: 
 
Charles Tilly (1985) famously describes the state as a glorified organized 
crime syndicate. Legitimacy in the form of popular acquiescence to state rule 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  47	  Nat J. Colletta and Robert Muggah, “Context Matters: Interim Stabilisation and 
Second Generation Approaches to Security Promotion,” Conflict, Security & 
Development, 9:4 (17 December 2009): 439.	  48	  Max Weber, “Politics as vocation” in From Max Weber: essays in sociology, ed. 
H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), 85.  
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typically arises subsequent to and as a consequence of long periods of 




Ahram laments that, as he sees it, international actors in Afghanistan were committed 
for too long to liberal state building, including operational training that emphasised 
force centralisation. In his view, international actors only tried to devolve violence to 
non-state actors (support militias) belatedly, after all other policy options were 
exhausted. In other words, the implication is that Afghanistan would be less of a mess 
today had non-state actors been supported and accommodated from the beginning.50 
 
The second argument against the conventional state building agenda is that in places 
like Afghanistan, that have ‘a feeble center’ and a ‘wild periphery’, a strong central 
state is an unattainable ideal.51 These states were historically not strong and will never 
be so. In their focus on the state, state builders also ignore the rich informal 
landscape; a landscape that includes non-state actors providing basic public goods, 
such as security, justice and education; services that the state can’t provide anymore 
because of the ongoing conflict, or perhaps has never provided. These countries 
should not only be seen through a lens of state failure and anarchy but rather as places 
where multiple authorities exist side by side.52 
 
The state itself should not be viewed in the narrow terms of whether or not it has a 
monopoly on the use of violence, according the state building critics. Mukhopadhyay 
writes: ‘Ubiquity of informal politics ... should not be mistaken for the absence of 
statehood’.53 She argues that the Afghan state is simultaneously ‘illusory’ and 
‘substantial’, referring to Patrick Chabal and Jean-Pascal Daloz, who wrote about 
African states: 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  49	  Ariel I. Ahram, “Learning to Live with Militias: Towards a Critical Policy on State 
Frailty,” Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding, 5:2 (2011): 178. 50	  Ahram, “Learning to Live with Militias”.	  51	  Mukhopadhyay, Warlords, Strongmen Governors, 1.	  52	  Timothy Raeymakers, Ken Menkhaus, Koen Vlassenroot, “State and Non-state 
Regulation in African Protracted Crises: Governance without Government?,” Afrika 
Focus, 21:2 (2008); Mukhopadhyay, Warlords, Strongmen Governors. 53	  Mukhopadhyay, Warlords, Strongmen Governors, 11. 
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It is illusory because its modus operandi is essentially informal, the rule of law 
is feebly enforced and the ability to implement public policy remains most 
limited. It is substantial because its control is the ultimate prize for all political 
elites: indeed, it is the chief instrument of patrimonialism. The state is thus 
both strong and powerless.54 
 
 
Timothy Raeymakers, Ken Menkhaus and Koen Vlassenroot point to what ‘probably 
constitutes the greatest paradox of African politics today’. On the one hand there is 
the ‘thundering erosion of African state capacity’, but on the other hand ‘the state in 
Africa continues to play a preponderant role both as an objective of contemporary 
interventions in the domain of (transnational) conflict resolution, and in the brokerage 
of local decision-making processes through street-level bureaucracies and everyday 
political interaction’.55 
 
Jonathan Goodhand and Mark Sedra, like many other state building critics, invoke the 
words of Joel Migdal, who wrote that ‘the state can be viewed in dual terms as a 
“field of power”: first as a powerful image of a clearly bounded, unified organization 
that can be spoken of in singular terms; and second, as the practices of a heap of 
loosely connected parts or fragments, often with ill-defined boundaries between 
them’.56 Goodhand and Sedra argue that: 
 
In analysing the Afghan state in transition, we should therefore not restrict 
ourselves to studying the formal apparatus of government. The state can also 
be viewed as an amorphous ensemble of forces, institutional forms, relations, 
actors, and practices, in which the boundaries between public and private, 
state and non-state, legal and illegal are fuzzy and contested.57 
 
 
In this sense, as Sarah Lister argues, ‘state building initiatives can be viewed as 
attempting to replace one type of rules with another, so that formal bureaucratic rules 
of a Weberian type take precedence over informal rules rooted in patronage and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  54	  Patrick Chabal and Jean-Pascal Daloz, Africa Works, Disorder as Political 
Instrument, (London: The International African Institute, 1999), 9.	  55	  Raeymakers, Menkhaus, Vlassenroot, “State and Non-state Regulation”, 9. 	  56	  Goodhand and Sedra, “Rethinking Liberal Peacebuilding”, 242 quoting Joel 
Migdal, State in Society, Studying How States and Societies Transform and Constitute 
One Another (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 22, 23. 57	  Goodhand and Sedra, “Rethinking Liberal Peacebuilding”, 242.	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clientelism’.58   
 
The continued importance of the state – whether as the objective of international 
conflict resolution initiatives, the ultimate prize for local powerbrokers in a 
patrimonial system or the broker of local decision-making – means that for many state 
building critics it should not be discarded. Mukhopadhyay, for example, points to the 
‘undeniable transition’ that a number of actors have made in Afghanistan from 
fighting commanders to strongman bureaucrats. She argues that the ‘weak state’ 
should be brought ‘back in’.59 
 
What are the symbioses and synergies to be captured through a fusion of weak 
formal institutions and resilient informal power politics? The outcome will be, 
to borrow [Karen] Barkey’s phrase, more of “a ‘negotiated’ enterprise” than a 
Weberian state; it will be a kind of “hybrid political order,” marked by “a 
connection, an intermingling and an interpenetration of the norms and 
institutions of the formal state on the one hand and the norms and institutions 
of the informal... sphere on the other”. The demonstrable presence of 
government (“hollow”, frail, ephemeral, and fickly as it may be) at the 
periphery suggests, however, that the state is, indeed, emerging in terms that 
are both material and symbolic.60 
 
 
In sum, while state building is focused on endowing the state with a monopoly on the 
legitimate use of force through DDR and SSR, its critics argue that this is an 
unattainable ideal. The state in places like Afghanistan exists side by side next to a 
host of informal, authorities claiming legitimacy, and, in fact, is itself ‘a heap of 
loosely connected parts and fragments’.61 Most critics, however, argue that the weak 
state is still important.  
 	  
1.1.3. State building as a framework of analysis 
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  Sarah Lister, “Understanding State-Building and Local Government in 
Afghanistan”, Crisis States Research Centre, London School of Economics, 2007, 3.	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  Mukhopadhyay, Warlords, Strongmen Governors, 12, 318. 	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By presenting their involvement in Afghanistan so clearly as a state building effort, 
naming programmes SSR, DDR, strengthening rule of law and so forth, governments 
and multilateral organisations have made the notion of state building central to policy 
and academic discussions on Afghanistan. Thus much of the literature on Afghanistan 
also portrays the international intervention as state building, even if it increasingly 
acknowledges and emphasises that the international intervention also had another 
agenda, namely the War on Terror.62  
 
That state building is the predominant framework of analysis is clear, for example, in 
titles such as “State-building in Afghanistan: a case showing its limits?” (about ‘the 
appropriateness of replicating a Weberian state-building model onto more traditional 
societies such as Afghanistan’)63; “Warlords and the Liberal Peace: State building in 
Afghanistan” (about the ‘contradictions in the liberal peace that have become 
apparent in post-Taliban state-building in Afghanistan’)64 and “Closing the 
Sovereignty Gap: An Approach to State building”.65 Hundreds if not thousands of 
publications on Afghanistan have similar titles. The assumption that the international 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  62	  Several scholars and analysts have in recent years argued that that the international 
military campaign was in fact prioritised over the state building agenda. Nevertheless, 
the state building agenda remains prominent in the analysis of the international 
intervention in Afghanistan, in most cases more so than the military campaign. See, 
for example, Michael Barnett and Christoph Zuercher, “The Peacebuilders Contract: 
How External Statebuilding Reinforces Weak Statehood” in Dilemmas of 
Statebuilding, Confronting the Contradictions of Postwar Peace Operations, ed. 
Roland Paris and Timothy D. Sisk, (New York: Routledge, 2009); Jonathan 
Goodhand and Mark Sedra, “Rethinking Liberal Peacebuilding, Statebuilding and 
Transition in Afghanistan: An Introduction”, Central Asia Survey, 32:3, 2013, 239-
254; Astri Suhrke, “The Dangers of a Tight Embrace: Externally Assisted 
Statebuilding in Afghanistan” in Dilemmas of Statebuilding, Confronting the 
Contradictions of Postwar Peace Operations, ed. Roland Paris and Timothy D. Sisk, 
(New York: Routledge, 2009); Suhrke, When More is Less. 63	  Lucy Morgan Edwards, “Statebuilding in Afghanistan: a case showing its limits?,” 
International Review of the Red Cross, 2010, 1.  64 Roger MacGinty, “Warlords and the Liberal Peace: State-building in Afghanistan”, 
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Afghanistan. Ashraf Ghani, Clare Lockhart, Fixing Failed States: A Framework for 
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intervention was primarily a state building venture is also clear from the 
recommendations that the literature on Afghanistan makes, whether to improve the 
state building agenda or alternatively to discard it and instead look towards more 
informal, bottom-up solutions.66 
 
Indeed, this thesis is itself on the topic of DDR, one component of state building, in 
Afghanistan, even if one of its central arguments is that the state building agenda has 
limited value as a framework of analysis for the international intervention. I thus fully 
recognise how difficult it is to escape the notion of state building when discussing 
post-2001 Afghanistan. Yet this thesis argues that only by doing so can the 
international intervention be portrayed accurately and the right lessons drawn from it.  
 
1.2. Reconceptualising the international intervention part 1 
 
I propose three alternative points of departure to analyse the international intervention 
in Afghanistan, and in particular attempts to disarm, demobilise and reintegrate ex-
combatants. In this section I provide the background to these points, by exploring the 
political-military context in which the DDR programmes took place. The three most 
relevant elements of that context were: the historically weak state; traditional patterns 
of dealing with enemies after the main phase of the conflict ends; and the nature of 
the international intervention after 2001.  
 
1.2.1. Historically weak state 
 
First, a DDR process ultimately seeking to endow the Afghan state with a monopoly 
on the use of violence would always be a difficult enterprise. Since it came into 
existence in the 18th century the Afghan state had been challenged in asserting its 
authority over its territory by a strong society. Decades of war since the 1970s had, by 
2001, led to a collapse of whatever had existed of the army, the police, the judiciary 
and the fiscal system. They also meant a proliferation of local commanders and 
fighters in the countryside. The weakness of the Afghan state, its lack of territorial 
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  See, for example, Ahram, “Learning to Live” (on informal, bottom-up solutions) 
and Barma, “Predatory Political Economy” (on improving the state-building agenda).	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control and the proliferation of militias meant that any DDR would face significant 
challenges.  
 
The state’s search for legitimacy  
 
Historically any Afghan regime ‘rests on shaky foundations, because of the shallow 
roots of the state’.67 The Afghan state is comparatively young, dating from the 18th 
century. Until 1747, when the leader of the Abdali tribal confederation (later called 
the Durrani confederation) Ahmad Shah established the first empire that covered the 
territory of modern day Afghanistan, ‘the lands of the Hindu Kush’ had been mostly 
part of larger empires, with a strong Turko-Mongolian influence from the mid-10th 
century. Foreign invaders were primarily interested in this area not for its wealth but 
because it gave them access to India or central Asia or because it gave them control of 
regional trade routes.68 
 
Rulers adopted what Thomas Barfield calls the Swiss-cheese approach: they tried to 
control the best bits of the territory and leave at arm’s length territories deemed 
unprofitable or of little strategic value. In the peripheries people had nominal 
sovereignty and in case of trouble rulers either placated them through alliances and 
subsidies or repressed them through punitive campaigns or trade embargos. In short, 
the government had direct control at the core and indirect control at the margins.69 
 
The Swiss cheese approach was inherited by the Durrani tribal confederation that 
came to power in the mid-18th century and developed into a dynastic state.70 Initially 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  67	  William Maley, “Political Legitimation in Contemporary Afghanistan,” Asian 
Survey 27:6 (June 1987): 707, 708. 	  68	  It was not the first Afghan empire but the first that covered the territory of the 
modern day Afghanistan (and beyond, for when Ahmad Shah died in 1772 the 
Durrani Empire also included Baluchistan, Iranian Khorasan, and the former Mughal 
territories of Sind, Punjab, and Kashmir). Thomas Barfield, Afghanistan, A Cultural 
and Political History, (Princeton/Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2010), 66, 67, 
99. See also Barnett R. Rubin, The Fragmentation of Afghanistan, State Formation 
and Collapse in the International System (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002), 
second edition, 49. 69	  Barfield, Afghanistan, 68. 	  70	  Barfield, Afghanistan; Olivier Roy, Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990, second edition),13.	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the Saddozay clan of the Popalzai tribe held the reigns of power. In 1818 the 
Saddozay dynasty was to be followed by another Durrani dynasty, the Muhammadzai 
clan of the Barakzai tribe, which held power until 1978.71 Roy and Rubin argue that 
the state never escaped its tribal roots and the implications of the original principle 
that gave it legitimacy.72 ‘[E]ven when it became most Westernised, it was to remain 
tribal and Pashtun’.73 
 
The historical mission of the Afghan state has been to reverse the relationship with 
tribal leaders in the periphery, who view the state as redundant and unnecessary with 
regards to their own territory and only allow it a function as their external 
representative, according to Roy.74 It was not until the reign of Amir Abdur Rahman 
Khan (1880-1901) that a standing army was created through indirect conscription, and 
that something like a bureaucracy was established, on paper at least. Even then the 
general population remained armed, however, and as David Edwards writes:  
 
[A] man’s rifle was categorized along with his land and his wife as his namus, 
which can be translated as both the substance of a man’s honor and that which 
is subject to violation and must be defended.75  
 
Foreign relations could only be independently decided upon after the Third Anglo-
Afghan war.76  
 
The expanding state bureaucracy was financed with foreign aid. However, foreign aid 
was a mixed blessing from a state building perspective. It enabled Rahman Khan and 
Afghan rulers after him to modernise the army, the tax system, the means of 
transportation and communication, and to expand education and introduce 
industrialisation.77 Yet at the same time it weakened the relationship between state 	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and society, as it removed the need for the state to struggle with civil society ‘over 
extraction and compliance’, a struggle that is ‘at the heart of the legitimacy of the 
modern state’.78  
 
The massive mobilisation of troops for religious jihad during Anglo-Afghan wars in 
the 19th century again changed the relationship between the population and the central 
government. Whereas the state had previously been seen as the property of the ruling 
elite, the wars triggered growing participation in politics by non-elite groups, like the 
Tajiks from the north and the Ghilzai Pashtuns from the east. The Anglo-Afghan wars 
also led to the incorporation of Afghanistan into the international state system.79   
The increased participation of non-elite groups led to the short-lived rule of 
Habibullah Kalakani, an ethnic Tajik who was also called Bacha-e Saqaow (Son of a 
Water Carrier) from January to October 1929. But the Durrani dynasty regained 
power and continued to rule until 1978. The state’s structure ‘created a recognizable 
pattern of tribal-ethnic stratification with the national political arena’. The head of 
state came from the Muhammadzai clan of the Barakzai tribe of the Durrani 
confederation. Below the Muhammadzai came the Durranis, and after them the rest of 
the Pashtuns. Then came other Sunni ethnic groups, the Persian-speakers and the 
Uzbeks. Hazaras, who were Shia Muslims, came last in the social hierarchy.80 
 
The Saur Revolution – as the 1978 communist coup against the government of 
President Daud Khan was called – not only paved the way for radical social reform 
but also changed the face of politics in Afghanistan. The presidency of the leader of 
the Marxist People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan, Nur Muhammad Taraki, a 
Ghilzai Pashtun from a poor family in the province of Ghazni, ‘forever changed the 
nature of leadership in Afghanistan’.81  
 
[I]n Afghanistan, especially among Afghan Pakhtuns, who make up the 
majority of the population, kinship is inescapable and vitally important in 
reckoning who a man is and where he properly belongs. The most profound 
innovation introduced by the PDPA [People’s Democratic Party of 	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Afghanistan] was not in the area of land reform or women’s rights … Far 
more radical for Afghan society was the notion that kinship didn’t matter, that 
literally anyone could lead the nation.82 
 
The fall from political power of the Durrani elite, who had for centuries been 
considered to have a special right to the throne, meant President Taraki had to 
establish a new kind of political legitimacy – all the more urgent in the context of the 
ongoing modernisation of the state, which required ‘not only capital and weapons but 
trained officials and a doctrine of legitimacy’.83 Taraki and other Afghan presidents 
and governments after him, including the administrations of former president Hamid 
Karzai, the period that this thesis covers, ultimately failed in this respect.84   
 
Challenges to state formation: Sharia and Pashtunwali 
 
In spite of the growth of the state bureaucracy and the emergence of new social strata 
linked to it, the Afghan state would always remain a broker rather than a 
monopolist.85 For example, writing about the southern province Helmand in the 1960s 
Carter Malkasian describes the state as the most powerful actor within a system of 
tribal and religious leaders who also wielded substantial power. ‘Like the government, 
the tribal and religious leaders could resolve disputes, tax and field armed men’. They 
viewed the state as ‘another very powerful actor – somewhat like another very 
powerful tribe – rather than as an entity that deserved their allegiance’.86 
 
The forces challenging the expansion of the state bureaucracy did not, however, 
reside primarily in a locality (the countryside) or in people (tribal and religious 
leaders) but in traditional legal and social codes ‘which stood as direct competitors to 
any attempt at comprehensive social reorganisation of Afghan society by the central 
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government’. The most important of these codes were the Sharia (Islamic law) and 
Pashtunwali (the social code of Pashtuns).87 
 
Islam is present everywhere in Afghanistan. Muslims comprise more than 99 per cent 
of its population, of which an estimated 80 per cent are Sunni (85 per cent of which 
from the Hanafi school) and 20 per cent Shia.88 Islam is not only the official religion 
of the country, but also ‘the moral basis and reference for its diverse cultures, the 
foundation of national unity and a hegemonic presence in every Afghan’s life’, 
according to Abdulkader Sinno.89 It is not just an ideology but also an ‘all-
encompassing way of life’.90  
 
Many Afghans pray five times a day, either alone or in the village mosque under 
leadership of the mullah – whose authority derives from knowledge on the Islamic 
law’s texts and traditions. The Islamic law is interpreted, applied and transmitted by a 
body of Islamic scholars – the ulema. Although many Afghan rulers tried to weaken 
the ulema they sometimes also pushed (at least on paper) for the implementation of 
Sharia law and Sharia courts to enhance the Islamic credentials of the state and curtail 
the influence of tribalism.91 
 
The Sharia code existed parallel to and competed with tribal codes, in particular the 
code of the Pashtuns. Ibn Khaldun differentiates between different tribal models: a 
hierarchical tribal model on the one hand and on the other hand the egalitarian type 
‘structured according to a segmentary lineage system’. In Afghanistan the first model 
‘formed the basis of the military power of such great Turkic and Mongolian dynasties 
as the Mongol, Timurid, Ottoman, Mughal, and Safavid empires’. Ethnic groups in 
the north, west and centre, including Tajiks (the second largest group in Afghanistan), 
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Uzbeks, Turkmens and the Shia Hazaras, have been relatively exposed to the 
hierarchical Turko-Mongolian tradition.92 
 
In contrast, the Pashtuns living in the south and east, who in 1978 had provided all 
heads of state save one since 1747, are organised according to the second model. 
‘Groups contain subgroups, which in turn contain other subgroups, whose relationship 
to each other is once again similar. There is no preeminent or crucial level of social 
organization’.93 The gathering of tribal elders called a jirga and the mediation of one 
tribal elder who is designated a salis ul khair are important traditional justice 
mechanisms in Pashtunwali. ‘Any deal concluded by a salis or a jirga could be 
ritualized and guaranteed through the use of traditional instruments, such as nagha 
(fine), machalgo (surety), yarghamal (hostage), or swara (political marriage)’.94  
 
These traditional justice mechanisms existed alongside the Sharia law that was 
implemented by Islamic judges, qazis, who could be viewed as competitors of the 
jirga and the tribal leaders in dispute settlement.95 
 
Islam, tribe and the state 
 
The weakness of the egalitarian Pashtun tribal model, from a state building 
perspective, is that large-scale political leadership is difficult to achieve. A tribal 
leader lacked the right of command and so depended on the ability to persuade others 
to follow, while being continuously undermined by rivals who felt they also had the 
right to his position. This undermined the potential of tribes to evolve into larger 
political organisations. Pashtun kings were never able to bring the tribes fully under 
state control; they continued to exist in interaction with the state, giving ‘primacy to 
ties of kinship and patrilineal descent’. Tribesmen would choose at any given moment 
if they would follow the state model of social organization or a tribal model.96  
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Religious leaders were often more successful than tribal leaders in uniting large 
groups, according to Rubin, Roy and Barfield. ‘Coming from outside the system and 
calling on God’s authority, they could better circumvent tribal rivalries’, writes 
Barfield.97 Therefore Islam traditionally played a crucial role in times of crises, with a 
call for jihad by mullahs and ulema transcending tribal divisions. In contrast to tribal 
warfare, jihad was always waged against an ‘alien’ enemy, for example a foreign 
invader or a government deemed non-Islamic.98 
 
However, before the ascent of the Islamists in the 1970s religious leaders focused 
primarily on civil society and not on the state. Several times they mobilised people for 
protest or rebellion against the state but it would be a tribal leader who would then 
assume leadership over those forces and would eventually take state power. Tribal 
leaders then sought to curtail the ulema’s political influence, which they saw as a 
threat to tribal identity. In sum, Islam and tribalism acted as the ‘twin engines’ of 
actions against the government, which was unable to establish a fully functioning 
bureaucratic administration covering its whole territory.99  
  
Fragmentation of the state and society in the second half of the 20th century  
 
Internal, regional and international dynamics leading to war 
 
The effort to modernise the state with external financial aid, which included the 
expansion and professionalisation of the military and the civilian bureaucracy, created 
in the second half of the 20th century a newly educated class of people cut off from 
their rural roots. These actors became frustrated as a result of often being unable to 
find a job despite their education – because the economy remained to a great extent 
based on subsistence farming.100   
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Kabul University became the epicentre of political radicalism. The most important 
groups were communists and Islamists, clashes between which often took place in the 
streets. The communists formed the Marxist People’s Democratic Party of 
Afghanistan (PDPA) in 1965 under leadership of Taraki and Babrak Karmal – who by 
1967 became the leaders of opposing factions, Khalq (Masses) and Parcham (Banner). 
The Khalq faction of the PDPA would win state power after the 1978 coup.  
 
Students from the Sharia Law Faculty formed the Muslim Youth Organisation, later 
renamed Jamiat-e Islami-ye Afghanistan (Islamic Society of Afghanistan), which 
became an official party in 1973. They drew their inspiration from the Muslim 
Brotherhood in Egypt and envisioned a state based on Sharia law, linking politics and 
religion. Its founders, like Burhanaddin Rabbani, Ghulam Rasul Sayyaf and 
Gulbuddin Hekmatyar emerged from the modern state educational system instead of 
the traditional madrassas. They or their sons still play important roles in the conflict 
today.101 
 
The Saur Revolution and the ensuing armed resistance from Islamist parties against 
the communist government intensified the struggle over the direction of social change 
in Afghanistan. The secular and anticlerical Khalq government confronted the rural 
elite through radical economic and social programmes. These programmes ranged 
from land reform to improving women’s rights – initiatives antagonizing the 
conservative rural majority. The government’s internal disunity (the PDPA 
government consisted of the rivalling Khalq and Parcham factions whose leaders, 
writes Barfield, ‘hated each other’) and its extreme violence towards Islamists and all 
other dissidents further delegitimised it in the eyes of many Afghans.102 
 
The internal struggle in Afghanistan was fuelled by international and regional 
developments, which meant foreign powers lent ‘covert support for alternative 
political elites plotting to seize state power’.103 The Soviet Union had previously been 
a main supporter of the government of Daud Khan (who also received aid from the 
Shah of Iran) and became the main supporter of the PDPA after the Saur Revolution 	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in 1978. After the Soviet invasion in 1979 the cost of the Soviet Union’s Afghanistan 
engagement went up to $5 billion per year. 
 
Meanwhile however, Pakistan had started funding the Islamists (also called the 
mujahedeen) to arm themselves, mostly because of Daud’s pressure on the 
Pashtunistan issue.104 In the context of the Cold War the United States and Saudi 
Arabia also provided aid to the Islamists through the Pakistani Inter-Services 
Intelligence (ISI). After the Soviet invasion the U.S. increased its financial help to the 
mujahedeen – from $80 million in 1980 to more than $600 million per year from 
1986-1989.105  
 
The immediate cause of the state disintegration after the 1978 coup was not, however, 
the foreign funded resistance. Instead, internal problems, like the disintegration of the 
communist army, plagued by ethnic and factional rifts, drove the collapse of the state. 
Under Soviet supervision the Karmal government (1979-1987) reorganised the party 
and tried to stem antigovernment sentiments through a new set of measures, including 
a declaration of the regime’s allegiance to Islam and financial help for the clergy and 
the building of mosques. But these efforts met with little success.106 
 
The failure of National Reconciliation and civil war 
 
The next president Dr. Najibullah, who succeeded Babrak Karmal in 1987, intensified 
the government’s efforts at reconciliation with the launch of the National 
Reconciliation Programme in that same year. The programme aimed to gain new 
political legitimacy for his regime (see more on this programme later in this section). 
It was successful in that it reduced the number of mujahedeen and brought militias 
into the government payroll, who then wanted to see its existence continue. But this 
meant the money had to keep flowing. Indeed, Najibullah planned to preserve his 	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regime through patronage and the redistribution of Soviet aid. When Soviet aid 
stopped in December 1991, his regime collapsed. Its components defected to various 
mujahedeen factions.107   
 
During the civil war following the ousting of Dr. Najibullah in 1992 the former 
mujahedeen ‘coalesced into several ethno-regional political-military coalitions’.108 
These coalitions may have fragmented through the years of war but the roots of many 
armed groups operating today in Afghanistan can be traced back to them.  
 
The militarisation of the country in the eighties and nineties fundamentally changed 
rural society and its relation with the state. Barfield argues that the collapse of central 
authority in rural areas and the rise of locally based resistance groups ‘transferred real 
power into the hands of communities previously administered by distant officials 
assigned there by the central government’.109  
 
Within the communities power had also shifted. Before the rise of Islamist figures 
leading the new political-military parties or tanzims110, the main local actor had been 
the khan. The khan’s power depended on the consensus of his qaum, or solidarity 
group111 – a key concept in Afghan society. Solidarity groups can be based on 
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familial, ethnic, tribal and sub-tribal relations, but also on other shared interests (for 
example religious or economic interests) and experiences (for instance on the 
battlefield) or ties through marriage. The khan strove to enlarge his patronage of his 
solidarity group, to be deferred to as a judge in local disputes and thus increase his 
wealth and extend his family connections.112   
 
The war eroded the influence of the khans, and increased that of commanders with a 
background in the ulema or the detribalised military or educational institutions – 
although  ‘a single individual could bring to bear a diversity of resources’, according 
to Gilles Dorronsoro.113 In contrast to the traditional khans, new commanders did not 
have to seek approval from their communities, but – thanks to the external funding of 
the jihadi parties – could rule by force. In other words, for the first time in 
Afghanistan’s modern history, local leaders could rule through force without 
worrying about their relations with communities under their control, a pattern 
repeated after 2001 when flows of foreign funding to local commanders resumed. 
 
The civil war after 1992 opened more space for these new strongmen to assert 
themselves locally – in many cases strengthened by former communist army units. 
With the loss of aid from the U.S. and the Soviet Union, new alliances emerged with 
neighbouring countries, especially Pakistan, Iran and Saudi Arabia. The new local 
warlords, powerful enough to resist the state in their own area but not strong enough 
to capture state power, became a symbol of the ‘breakdown, indeed the fragmentation, 
of social control and social power in Afghanistan’, writes Barnett Rubin.114  
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The Taliban movement 
 
The Taliban movement emerged as a new force in this fragmented political landscape 
around 1994. Its organisation was based on the madrassa networks of mullahs and 
their students who had become more autonomous from rural powerbrokers as ‘both 
the state and the rural economy that had sustained tribal leaders collapsed’.115 Their 
Islamic identity meant they could rise above tribal rivalries, but they ‘squandered this 
advantage by failing to expand their core leadership beyond a parochial Pashtun 
base’, according to Barfield. He, and others, asserts that their ideology was not only 
influenced by religion but also by Pashtunwali.116  
 
With Pakistan’s help the Taliban captured Kabul on 26 September 1996, creating an 
Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. However, they had no clear vision what their state 
should look like, and did not develop from a social movement into a government. 
Although initially the Taliban enjoyed local support, particularly in their southern 
heartlands, due to their improving security throughout most of the country, this 
quickly dissipated thanks to its strict social edicts, harsh rule, its decree to eliminate 
opium in 2000 and because of conscription issues.117 
 
Conclusion: the state is weak but still important 
 
International attempts at disarming armed groups after the ousting of the Taliban 
would always be challenging against this background of structural state weakness and 
collapse. The western model of a state’s monopoly on the use of force, the model on 
which the state building approach is based, seems indeed an unattainable ideal as its 
critics suggest. In this the Afghan state is no different than many other states in the 
Global South. In the Afghan case, however, its weakness is compounded by its 
extreme reliance on foreign aid, which complicates its search for legitimacy.  
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Yet, while the state has been unable to establish a new type of legitimacy that is not 
tribally based, commanders challenging the state have also not developed into 
legitimate actors. To look for alternatives to the state in the informal sector, as some 
state building critics do, gives the latter too much credit. Social codes have been 
eroded throughout thirty-five years of war. The old tribal establishment no longer 
exists, and Islam, though still the religious staple of Afghans, has also become part of 
politicised agendas of the Taliban and former jihadi leaders. The countryside has been 
militarised and drawn into the struggle for state power – blurring lines between state 
and non-state. New powerbrokers often lack local legitimacy, as they are externally 
funded and thus focused more on winning external support to reward immediate 
followers than on winning support from local communities.  
 
The state, though weak, should not be discarded. It is still important, whether as the 
objective of international conflict resolution initiatives, as the ultimate prize for local 
powerbrokers in a patrimonial system or as the broker of local decision-making 
processes. It should not, however, be viewed only through its institutional presence as 
state builders do. Instead, it should be regarded as ‘an amorphous ensemble of forces, 
institutional forms, relations, actors, and practices, in which the boundaries between 
public and private, state and non-state, legal and illegal are fuzzy and contested’, as 
Goodhand and Sedra phrased it.118 
 
Though the state incorporates much more than just institutions, at the same time 
institutional development is important. After all, the dominance of factional loyalties 
makes the recourse to war relatively easy, as the recent Afghan history shows. The 
state building agenda’s emphasis on institution building – though its focus is too 
narrow – makes more sense than suggestions from critics such as Ahram, cited above, 
who proposes to devolve power to non-state actors such as militias. 
 
1.2.2. Long history of reintegrating former combatants 
 
The second point regarding the wider political context in which DDR programmes 
were initiated after 2003 relates to Afghanistan’s long history of reintegrating armed 
groups into the state apparatus or civilian life. This history, which could have 	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informed the design of DDR programmes and the international intervention more 
broadly, was largely ignored. Instead the four DDR programmes were largely based 
on the UN DDR template described above, with an emphasis on demobilisation and 
comparatively little effort going into the long-term reintegration of targeted groups.119   
 
Switching sides normal occurrence in war 
 
During hostilities in Afghanistan – both in the period studied and in the past – 
enemies typically remain in contact with each other, with many commanders hedging 
their bets. When one side appears to be winning, commanders on their opponents’ 
side often seek to jump ship, or at least deepen ties with those winning. Resources and 
the chances of winning tend to inform decision-making more than ideology. The 
commanders who feature in the case studies in the second half of this thesis, for 
example, all switched sides multiple times.  
 
Reintegration, possibly after disarmament in return for amnesty, can also occur after 
hostilities ended, depending on the attitude of the victorious commanders (who could 
also choose to abuse the defeated or disarm them in return for amnesty). These 
characteristics of armed actors are arguably grounded in the way society works more 
broadly. As Whitney Azoy argues:  
 
Social relations are temporary rather than permanent, flexible rather than 
fixed. Success in social undertakings comes less though moral rectitude than 
through influential friends. Man is less a passive recipient of social fate than 
an active entrepreneur.120  
 
 
The Dr. Najibullah government, for example, used these opportunities when, in 1987, 
it launched the National Reconciliation Programme. This programme, which led to 40 
per cent of the rebel commanders making peace with Kabul, was the historical 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  119	  The approaches that victorious commanders have taken to their former enemies 
have ranged from abuse to accommodation. Of these approaches, those that tended to 
contribute to stability, at least in the short term, after the main phase of a conflict 
were: a honourable surrender (disarmament in return for amnesty); co-optation 
(integration into the victorious army or new administration); or accommodation 
(negotiated concessions by the state). Semple, Reconciliation, 13-15; Van Bijlert, 
“Uruzgan,” 102. 120	  Azoy, Buzkashi, 30.	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precursor to efforts by the Karzai government about two decades later.  
 
But his Soviet backers granted Najibullah much more room for manoeuvre than the 
Americans would give Karzai after 2001 and the programme went much further than 
either the PTS or the APRP programme. The main tool in Dr. Najibullah’s National 
Reconciliation Programme were militias. One option for commanders willing to stop 
fighting against the government was enrolment in militias, where they would be paid 
and given land holdings121 The militias offered ‘an honourable and convenient way of 
giving up opposition to the regime’, according to Antonio Giustozzi.122 Therefore by 
1990 no less than 60,000 former mujahedeen had become members of militias.123  
 
In 1992, when Najibullah’s government collapsed, mostly thanks to the army’s 
disintegration, many commanders, including the current Vice-President General 
Abdul Rashid Dostum, joined the mujahedeen. The Taliban are ‘mainly remembered 
for an uncompromising stance, often humiliating and executing their defeated 
opponents’, writes Michael Semple.124 But the movement also gained ground in the 
1990s through the co-option and accommodation of militias that had been affiliated 
with their enemies, especially after the battle in Herat in 1995 when a 6,000 man 
Taliban army was defeated by government troops after it ran short of ammunition and 
other logistical support.125  
  
Everywhere, they selectively absorbed the rank and file of their former 
adversaries, sometimes even commanders who were not mullahs, particularly 
once the need to establish a functional army asserted itself. They even 
absorbed hundreds of specialists from what had been the pro-Soviet army, 
although they ended up purging a number of them on ideological grounds.126 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  121	  Semple, Reconciliation, 19; Giustozzi, War, 163, 164, 186, 187. Enrollment in the 
ALP was an option in the cases of some commanders participating in the APRP, but 
this was not originally official policy. The support of militias as a reintegration tool 
was used often in informal reintegration initiatives, for example by the NDS.	  122	  Giustozzi, War, 226. 	  123	  Giustozzi, War, 205.	  124	  Semple, Reconciliation, 22. 	  125	  HRW, “Afghanistan. Crisis Of Impunity. The Role of Pakistan, Russia and Iran in 
Fueling the Civil War,” Human Rights Watch, 13: 3, (2001), 26.  126	  Antonio Giustozzi, “Thirty Years of Conflict: Drivers of Anti-Government 
Mobilisation in Afghanistan 2008-2011”, Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit, 
(2012), 23; Semple, Reconciliation, 23. 
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Mujahedeen commanders who were integrated into the Taliban movement 
individually or with their militia in some cases had to disarm before joining, ‘except 
the big commanders they really needed’, according to a tribal elder in Kunduz.127 In 
these cases commanders were issued new weapons. Similarly, in 2001, when the U.S. 
led Operation of Enduring Freedom swiftly toppled the Islamic Emirate of 
Afghanistan through a combination of US airpower and friendly troops on the ground, 
many Taliban commanders joined the U.S.-funded anti-Taliban militias en masse.  
 
The U.S.-led coalition invading Afghanistan in 2001, however, did not want to 
engage in any form of political engagement with the Taliban. For future Afghan 
leaders such as President Karzai and Governor Gul Agha Shirzai operating in the 
south in 2001 and having to deal with surrendering Taliban there was no clear 
international policy on the issue. When they attempted to strike deals with their 
adversaries, the U.S. message was that the Taliban were not welcome in the post-2001 
order, as chapter 3 shows in more detail. 
 
This stance was at odds with the traditional Afghan way of dealing with adversaries 
after fighting ends. It was also at odds with the West’s own long and rich history on 
this issue, which should have been a reminder that local practices develop over a long 
period of time and should not be ignored.128 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  127	  013.  128	  In pre-Weberian Europe there were well-developed ways of dealing with former 
adversaries, which changed over time. For example, during the Thirty Years War 
(1618-1648) there was no stigma attached to switching sides (unless in the case of 
sieges) or surrendering. Cartel agreements came into force that provided for regular 
prisoner exchanges and payment of ransoms. This phase came after the ‘age of 
chivalry’ in Medieval Europe in which the knightly class had come to recognise 
‘circumstances in which surrender was both sensible and honorable’. Before that time, 
it was shameful for a warrior to surrender, and thus very rare. The systemic killing of 
adult males was routine. Regarding early America, William J. Campbell argues that 
for indigenous combatants in the northeastern borderlands ‘surrender and defeat could 
be honourable, and did not always signal weakness’. If objectives of communities 
could not be met through warfare, combatants ‘often retreated and sought to benefit 
from terms of surrender’. Lothar Höbelt, “Surrender in the Thirty Years War”; John 
Gillingham, “Surrender in Europe – An Indirect Approach” and William J. Campbell, 
“Surrender in the Northeastern Borderlands of Native America” in Holger Afflerbach 
and Hew Strachan, How Fighting Ends: A History of Surrender, (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2012).  
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Conclusion: local practices should have informed intervention 
 
Mats Berdal points to the importance of a political settlement that takes into account 
the formal and informal distribution of ‘power, influence and resources within 
society’.129 In Afghanistan the U.S.-led coalition could claim victory in 2001, but 
considering the vast international support to the Northern Alliance necessary to defeat 
a regime that had beforehand controlled around 80 per cent of the country, and 
bearing in mind that the international actors were not aiming to remain forever, it 
would have made sense to offer those defeated at least an honourable surrender. But a 
formal offer of such a surrender, which was eventually formalised through the PTS 
and APRP programmes, came too late, at a time when the Taliban had reorganised as 
an potent insurgency and thus expected – not unreasonably – much more. It also only 
extended to the rank-and-file, not the leadership.  
 
Local practices of dealing with adversaries after the main phase of conflict ends 
should have informed the international intervention in Afghanistan, as they are key to 
the local context that Berdal and others identify is vital for state builders to 
understand. This point is crucial to this thesis’s examination of the impact of DDR 
programmes on local commanders in four provinces. But, as Berdal argues, the 
political complexity of DDR also includes the interests of foreign donors.130 Berdal 
writes that Western attempts at state building in Afghanistan ‘while hardly coherent, 
have followed a liberal script’.131 This is a view shared by many if not most scholars 
writing on Afghanistan. I argue instead that liberal state building was not the Wests’ 
leading agenda in Afghanistan.     
 
1.2.3. Military campaign against the Taliban and their political exclusion 
 
The third point on the wider political context for DDR in Afghanistan concerns the 
constraints imposed by the U.S.-led military campaign against the Taliban and the 
movement’s political exclusion.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  129	  Mats Berdal, “Afghanistan and After – Reflections on Western Interventionism 
and State Fragility” in Rethinking State Fragility, British Academy for Humanities 
and Social Sciences, April 2015, 12.	  130	  Berdal and Ucko, “Introduction – The political reintegration,” 8.	  131	  Berdal, “Afghanistan and After,” 12. See also 17, 14, 11, 12.  
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Military campaign driver intervention 
 
Operation Enduring Freedom, after starting on 7 October 2001, swiftly toppled the 
Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan through a combination of U.S. airpower and friendly 
troops on the ground. The Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan 
Pending the Re-establishment of Permanent Government Institutions, better known as 
the Bonn Agreement, which was the result of the first post-Taliban conference in 
December 2001 of prominent Afghans meeting under the auspices of the United 
Nations, paved the way for a political future of Afghanistan without the Taliban.132 
President Bush declared: ‘[N]o cave is deep enough to escape the patient justice of the 
United States of America’.133 Seeking retribution for the 9/11 attacks and preventing 
future terrorist strikes from Afghan soil remained the overriding concern of the 
American military engagement. ‘[O]ur coalition is leading aggressive raids against the 
surviving members of the Taliban and al Qaeda’ President Bush said two years after 
9/11.134  
 
As Astri Suhrke shows, by this time the international project in Afghanistan rested on 
two pillars: a military campaign and a state building project. The U.S. initially 
pursued a light footprint strategy that did not involve nation building and that 
envisioned controlling the territory through the use of militias. But in the years after 
2001 a broad coalition of multilateral institutions and donor countries embarked on a 
project to rebuild the collapsed Afghan state. This project included the deployment of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  132	  Also absent from the Bonn conference were the former predominantly Pashtun 
mujahedeen parties Hezb-e Islami and the Haqqani network, both of whom, like the 
Taliban, eventually started operating against the government. 	  133	  President George W. Bush, “Speech to The Citadel Military College of South 
Carolina” (Washington, DC, December 11, 2001) in Selected Speeches of President 
George W. Bush 2001-2008, White House Archives, 91. https://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/infocus/bushrecord/documents/Selected_Speeches_George_
W_Bush.pdf (accessed 28 July 2014). 	  134	  President George W. Bush, “State of the Union Address to the 108th Congress” 
(Washington, DC, January 20, 2004), Selected Speeches of President George W. Bush 
2001-2008, White House Archives, 199. https://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/infocus/bushrecord/documents/Selected_Speeches_George_
W_Bush.pdf (accessed 28 July 2014); Bush, “Speech to The Citadel Military College 
of South Carolina”. 
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the ISAF, established to support the Afghan government in the provision of 
security.135  
 
Suhrke argues that from the start tensions existed between, on one side, the state 
building effort, which included holding elections, reforms of the judicial system SSR 
and DDR, and on the other side the military campaign. These tensions grew after 
2005 as the security situation deteriorated. In response to the full-scale insurgency in 
2008, the new Obama administration mounted a ‘surge’; including an unprecedented 
number of capture-or-kill operations and drone strikes aimed at ‘decapitating’ the 
Taliban. Between 2006 and 2011 the number of American troops also increased from 
around 20,000 to almost 100,000 men and women.136 The supposedly separate lines 
of responsibility between ISAF and coalition forces were muddied on the ground, as 
both fought the Taliban.  During the second half of the decade the international 
community increased efforts to train the Afghan National Police (ANP) and the 
Afghan National Army (ANA). But meanwhile, in places where the ANP and the 
ANA were not yet on adequate levels, foreign forces employed local militias to 
defend villages and guard convoys against Taliban attacks. The arming of local 
militias ran contrary to DDR and SSR aims.  
 
Notwithstanding the very real tensions between the state building effort and the 
military campaign, this thesis is based on a different assumption – namely that the 
U.S government throughout the whole period this study covers (2001-2014) 
prioritised its military campaign (that changed over time as described above) over its 
state building efforts, despite its frequent public statements to the contrary.  This was 
especially noticeable in the provinces, as the case studies in the second half of this 
study show.137 Barnett Rubin, a long-term observer of Afghanistan who has also 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  135	  Suhrke, When More is Less, 1, 3, 6, 79.	  
136	  Between 2001 and 2012 the U.S. spent $557 billion on the war in Afghanistan, of 
which the bulk went to its military effort. Amy Belasco, “The Cost of Iraq, 
Afghanistan and Other Global War on Terror Operations Since 9/11,” Congressional 
Research Service, March 29, 2011, 3;	  Matthieu Aikins, “Contracting the 
Commanders: Transition and the Political Economy of Afghanistan’s Private Security 
Industry,” Center on International Cooperation, New York University (October 
2012), 7. 	  137	  The prioritisation of the military campaign becomes also clear, for example, from 
the detailed and excellent accounts of Mike Martin, An Intimate War: An Oral 
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served in the Obama administration, summarised the U.S. stance during the 16-17 
March 2015 conference ‘State-Strengthening in Afghanistan 2001-2014’, at the 
United States Institute of Peace in Washington D.C. on lessons from the international 
state building effort in Afghanistan:  
 
It was not just that there were different goals that had to be reconciled. There 
was one goal [counter terrorism] and that was the reason that the United States 
was there; the reason that it had so much money allocated to the operation by 
the Congress and the reason that the troops were there. And the other goal 
[state building] was secondary and was justified within the high levels of 
government insofar as it helped to achieve the primary goal.138   
 
 
To argue that the military campaign against the Taliban took precedence is of course 
not the same as saying that the state building project did not happen, though many 
scholars and analysts rightfully point to the fact that many projects were only partially 
implemented. DDR did happen, even if it was partial, and many international 
resources were spent on it. Suhrke points to the tensions between the state building 
and military goals, but Rubin’s point is different. According to him state building was 
secondary and ‘was justified within the high levels of government insofar as it helped 
to achieve the primary goal’ – the military campaign. 
 
This thesis goes a step further. I argue in the following chapters that the DDR 
programmes were not only justified insofar as they helped to achieve the military 
campaign, but were conceived precisely with that primary goal in mind. Thus tools 
that should have furthered state building – DDR programmes – were actually used to 
attempt to further military goals. Potential contradictions between, for example, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
History of the Helmand Conflict, (London: Hurst, 2014) and Anand Gopal, No Good 
Men Among the Living, America, the Taliban and the War Through Afghan Eyes 
(Metropolitan Books/Henry Holt & Company, 2014). This study differs from these 
accounts in the sense that its focal point is the interaction between what were 
ostensibly state building programmes on the one hand and the military campaign on 
the other. 	  138	  Rubin quoted the goal of the Obama-administration ‘to disrupt, dismantle and 
defeat al-Qaeda in Pakistan and Afghanistan and to prevent their return to either 
country in the future’, [which] appears in many government documents’. Barnett 
Rubin, speech during conference on State-Strengthening in Afghanistan 2001-2014 
convened by Stanford University, Chatham House and the United States Institute of 
Peace at the United States Institute of Peace (Washington, D.C., March 20, 2015) 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=htbuEvPi5GY.  
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disarming warlords as part of DDR but arming them again to fight the Taliban, were 
rendered irrelevant, as DDR programmes were fully subordinated (through U.S. 
pressure) to the military campaign. It was not a question of disarming all warlords 
versus arming them all – two objectives that were mutually exclusive. Instead, it was 
a question of disarming some warlords (that were no longer militarily needed) and 
arming others (that were still needed). These military needs could thus both be 
successfully addressed at the same time by initiating DDR programmes for some 
warlords, while funnelling weapons and ammunition to others.  
 
Therefore, DDR was a highly political process, not only in the way it played out but 
also in the way it was conceived. It was doubly removed from being the technical 
exercise that UN language made it seem; not only in the sense of being an inherently 
political process, as state building critics argue, but also in the sense of it actually 
being conceived as such, in contrast to what state building critics claim. The U.S. 
government, the main international actor in Afghanistan and main funder of DDR 
programmes, never approached DDR as a technical exercise but as a way of dealing 
with unwanted state and non-state armed groups in the larger context of a military 
campaign against the Taliban.  
 
Conclusion: fight against Taliban leading, not state building 
 
In sum, much literature on ‘Afghanistan’ implicitly or explicitly assumes that the 
international community’s primary project was state building, despite the prominence 
of the war against the Taliban. Policy recommendations are often focused on state 
builders; international actors are shown ways to improve state building, or are 
recommended to look beyond state institutions towards informal actors and processes.  
This thesis explores in depth what was ostensibly one of the primary state building 
projects, DDR. It shows that the U.S.-led military campaign was leading in deciding 
on the timing of the DDR programmes, their design, their objectives and the manner 
in which they were implemented – much of which went against state building 
conventions. Of course many officials, both international and Afghan, were 
committed to state building and genuinely working to strengthen the state’s 
institutions. But in the larger picture, the U.S. focus on its military campaign was 
paramount, including for DDR. How that worked is examined in detail in this thesis.  
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Viewing the international intervention in Afghanistan primarily from the perspective 
of the military campaign rather than from a state building angle has implications for 
policy recommendations. Many academics, analysts and practitioners view 
‘Afghanistan’ as a failure of the international community to rebuild state institutions 
of a country transitioning from war to peace – a failure of state building. But it is 
questionable if this particular international intervention holds arguments on the rights 
or wrongs of that agenda. State building was never the primary goal in Afghanistan; 
defeating the Taliban was. One could perhaps argue that foreign powers always have 
other agendas alongside those of building state institutions, and that state building 
goals always compete with other foreign policy aims and interests. But in Afghanistan 
these other interests and the contradiction between those and state building goals were 
particularly stark. 
  
The argument of some of the state building critics that the international actors made a 
mistake in focusing on state-centric, top-down and technical interventions is in my 
view moot. That was not primarily what those international actors were actually 
doing. My research findings show that in fact the main international actors, especially 
the military, prioritised supporting militias and accommodating warlords over 
strengthening state institutions. So arguing that a better path to state building is for 
foreign powers to focus not on strengthening state institutions but on alternatives in 
the informal sector is misleading – that is precisely what happened in many cases. The 
real issue is who they did support and who was excluded. 
 
1.3. Reconceptualising the international intervention part 2 
 
1.3.1. Points of departure 
 
This leads me to the points of departure for this thesis. What key assumptions will it 
test?  
 
1. Everyone wants to be included in the state as a source of patronage 
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Afghanistan’s militarised patronage networks are primarily focused on capturing state 
power. Their leaders aim to use the state apparatus to expend not only formal but also 
informal power. The combined forces of war and society’s modernisation have 
militarised the countryside and drawn it into the orbit of the state, blurring lines 
between state and non-state and eroding the legitimacy of traditional non-state 
authorities. The massive flow of funds from foreign donors since 2001 increased the 
stakes of state power in a patrimonial system. At the same time, it undermined the 
state’s quest for legitimacy by isolating it from civil society. Despite the state’s 
weakness, however, it is more present than ever. Communities expect patrons in the 
national or subnational government to provide protection and jobs. For those patrons 
state power is the ultimate prize, as it gives them access to international funds, 
impunity for any illegal business, prestige and a way to distribute patronage to 
followers.  
 
2. International intervention limited access to state power for some groups 
 
The international intervention was driven by a military campaign against the Taliban. 
While on paper a liberal agenda was ostensibly meant to strengthen a democratic and 
inclusive state, in reality the international intervention created an exclusionary 
political order that strengthened powerbrokers and their followers who were seen as a 
bulwark against the Taliban. By branding the Taliban as irreconcilable (a stance that 
was at odds with traditional patterns of dealing with adversaries in Afghanistan, 
which included negotiation, accommodation and honourable surrender) international 
actors created a narrative that these local partners could use to exclude personal rivals 
from state power and prey on them – regardless of whether these rivals had previously 
allied with the Taliban. DDR played into this dynamic by aiming to demobilise some 
non-state armed groups while keeping intact others (such as militias operating 
alongside international troops). The state building agenda – and especially the DDR 
programmes this thesis examines – because it was employed in aid of the military 
campaign, thus reflected and strengthened political exclusion. 
 
3. Failure to be included in state power leads to spoiler behaviour 
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Spoiling has often proven successful in Afghanistan, as the state is not strong enough 
to supress serious armed challenges. The only way for the state, or whichever factions 
control it at a given time, to survive is by accommodating strong armed contenders 
(contenders who in recent decades include foreign funded commanders, warlords and 
strongmen or ‘entrepreneurs of violence’, who use violence to further their goals). 
The past decades have seen various attempts at accommodation. But these have never 
led to a political settlement that is sufficiently inclusive and consensual to be lasting. 
The universalistic agendas of the regimes over the past thirty-five years (communism, 
political Islamism, the Taliban’s own particular brand of Islamism and, finally, liberal 
democracy) perhaps created, on paper at least, the potential for an inclusive political 
order that could replace the narrow and contested tribal base of the old state. Yet the 
regimes in reality all relied on parochial interests to remain in office. As a result, they 
were met with armed challenges that they were unable to effectively counter, leading 
to full or partial state collapse. The increasing demand for political participation of 
various groups in Afghan society and the failure of the state to supress or 
accommodate them, is thus closely tied up with the process of state formation and 
collapse. With more groups are vying for power, forging an inclusive political 
settlement has become more difficult.  
 
1.3.2. State builders or spoilers? A hypothesis 
 
What do these three points of departure mean for the process of state formation in 
Afghanistan? How has the international involvement in Afghanistan impacted this 
process and which lessons can be drawn from that for other interventions? On one 
hand, perhaps prioritising the military campaign over state building squandered an 
opportunity to rid the country of warlords and other challengers to state power 
through DDR and SSR? On the other, some argue that warlords and strongmen can 
help build a state. Trying to demobilise them is thus not always beneficial for the 
process of state formation, and in some cases unrealistic when the state is too weak to 
supress them by force. Some form of accommodation needs to be reached that is 
mutually beneficial.  
 
This thesis argues, in line with much of the recent literature on spoilers in countries 
transitioning from war to peace, that the attitude of local actors towards the state, and, 
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ultimately, their ability to contribute to state formation, depend on local conditions; 
conditions that DDR programmes have the potential to radically change. This view 
differs from the early spoiler literature, which defined the actors in static terms, for 
example as ‘total spoilers’, ‘greedy spoilers’ and ‘limited spoilers’.139  International 
interventions are in some cases still informed by this perspective. For example, the 
U.S. approach in Afghanistan was informed by the notion that the Taliban were 
irreconcilable, or total spoilers.  
 
My hypothesis, by contrast, is that there are no total spoilers, or, for that matter, total 
state builders, in Afghanistan. Instead, local actors responded to the 2001 
international intervention and the new political order that it created based on their 
calculations of the opportunities and obstacles that it posed for them. Based on the 
three points of departure above, I make a prediction here that the following chapters 
test and the conclusion revisits.   
 
Being included in or excluded from the post-2001 government, on the national or sub-
national level, was among the most important factors in determining the response of 
Afghan actors. Those included had an interest in keeping the system in place; those 
excluded did not. Mukhopadhyay has written extensively on strongman governor Atta 
Mohammad Noor in Balkh, who combined formal and informal power. There were 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  139	  Stephen John Stedman identifies three ‘spoiler types’. Total spoilers, who want 
total power and hold immutable preferences, must be defeated or marginalised. 
Limited spoilers have limited goals but no limited commitment to those goals so they 
will under no condition stop their struggle to achieve them, and can thus be 
accommodated. Greedy spoilers hold goals that expand or contract based on their 
calculation of cost and risk, and should be set clear limits through socialisation 
(establishing a set of norms and making them the basis to judge the parties’ demands, 
thereby changing their behaviour). Stephen John Stedman, “Spoiler Problems in 
Peace Processes,” International Security, 22: 2 (Fall 1997): 5-53. Critiquing 
Stedman’s work on spoilers, Kelly Greenhill and Solomon Major argue that no 
fundamental differences exist between spoilers. Rather, their behaviour is informed 
by structural factors in a peace process, such as the role of international actors; the 
relative power of indigenous parties to the conflict; their willingness to accept the 
risks and costs they would incur from a return to the battlefield; and, last, their 
varying policy preferences. All spoilers are greedy and will adapt demands based on 
the environment. If actors believe they can achieve more unilaterally they are more 
likely to resort to spoiling behaviour. Kelly M. Greenhill, and Solomon Major, “The 
Perils Of Profiling Civil War Spoilers and the Collapse of Intrastate Peace Accords,” 
International Security, 31: 3 (Winter 2006/2007): 7-40. 
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tensions between him and President Karzai, and many of their interests diverged, but, 
as Mukhopadhyay convincingly argues, ultimately Atta was committed to the post-
2001 political order. He worked to create a local political order that was authoritarian 
but nevertheless included powerbrokers from different ethnic and jihadi backgrounds 
and that had a reasonable amount of local support.140   
 
On the other side, others were excluded from the government. As mentioned above, 
exclusion from the post-2001 political order did not only mean that it was harder to 
access international funds, to advance illegal interests and to get a prestigious 
position, it also exposed individuals or groups to being targeted as Taliban, regardless 
of their relationship to the movement. The loss of protection, prestige and 
opportunities for dispending patronage would be a strong reason to join the 
insurgency, especially if the actor in question had pre-existing ties to Taliban leaders 
and they were actively recruiting in his area.  
 
This variable – inclusion or exclusion – does not alone explain why some strongmen 
governors had more widespread local support and created fairly stable local political 
orders that supported the strengthening of the central state, and others did not. Nor 
does it explain why some armed powerbrokers who were excluded from government 
joined the insurgency and others did not, but operated as pro-government militias.  
 
The other crucial factors are support from international troops and political backing 
from patrons in Kabul. President Karzai appointed Atta not because he was an ally but 
because he saw him, compared with General Dostum, as the lesser evil in the north. 
Later on Atta became unassailable because he had built a strong local powerbase.141 
Other strongmen governors or police chiefs, however, failed to put down local roots 
but primarily relied on strong political backing from patrons in Kabul and/or support 
from international troops after 2001. These men were liable to create personalised, 
predatory and exclusionary local political orders. They had capital and coercive 
powers, which Tilly describes as key ingredients in the process of state formation in 
Europe. But, in contrast to pre-Weberian European rulers, they did not need to 
bargain with the local population over extraction, and could enforce their will on 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  140	  Mukhopadhyay, Warlords, 104, 111-114, 136-138, 152, 153. 	  141	  Mukhopadhyay, Warlords, 97, 104, 111-114, 132, 134, 135, 163, 164.  	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communities. They followed the agendas of outside supporters (or, rather, used those 
agendas to pursue their own interests), who had short-term goals that differed from 
those of the local communities (for example fighting the Taliban instead of 
establishing law and order and solving local disputes). The short-term nature of their 
rule and the fact that it did not depend on the consent of the local population meant 
they put in place no durable local political structures. They did not, therefore, 
contribute towards state formation.142 
 
For those excluded from government, again a key variable was whether or not they 
enjoyed political backing from patrons in Kabul and/or support from international 
troops. If not, they were likely to seek refuge in the insurgency. If they did, they 
would often operate as pro-government militias. However, even then they were rarely 
state builders, as their commitment to the state was fickle, and could easily change to 
the insurgency if resources from Kabul or international troops dried up. They 
provided limited services to communities (mostly security) and were engaged in 
taxation. However, political backing from Kabul or support from international troops 
also allowed them to engage in predatory behaviour as they were accountable to 
external agendas and could operate with impunity. This limited their potential to 
obtain local legitimacy.  
 
These factors in the calculations of local actors – inclusion or exclusion and the 
support from political patrons in Kabul and international troops – do not explain 
everything. Other factors also play a role: for example, whether powerbrokers were 
operating on home turf or not (which could partly explain the difference in the view 
of governor Gul Agha Shirzai as limited state builder in Nangarhar against the view 
of him as divisive warlord in his native Kandahar, where predatory activities of his 
men was one of the main drivers of the insurgency, according to Anand Gopal).143 
But this thesis argues that they are critical in local actors’ calculations and that DDR 
programmes heavily affected these factors, especially if programmes are used to aid a 
military campaign. The provincial case studies in the second part of this thesis explore 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  142	  Charles Tilly, Coercion, Capital and European States AD 990-1992, (Cambridge 
MA, Oxford UK: Blackwell, 1992), 85, 86. 143	  For the first view see Mukhopadhyay, Warlords, for the second Anand Gopal, 
“The Battle for Afghanistan, Militancy and Conflict in Kandahar,” New America 
Foundation, November 2010.	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in depth how these programmes impacted the calculations of targeted groups around 




1.4.1. Sources, structure and focus 
 
This thesis includes findings from both primary and secondary sources. Primary 
source material was gathered mainly in Afghanistan but also in Europe and the U.S. It 
includes more than 250 interviews with Afghan and western officials, analysts and 
journalists, tribal leaders, villagers, senior officials in the Afghan National Security 
Forces (ANSF), militia and insurgent commanders and fighters on all sides. 
Interviews were conducted in different ways: most in person, in Kabul, Helmand, 
Uruzgan, Baghlan and Kunduz and in various European and U.S. locations; some by 
telephone or Skype, for security reasons or because of the geographical distance. I 
conducted most myself, though accompanied by a translator. Local assistants 
conducted the rest. The interviews did not follow a standard list of questions. They 
were instead free-flowing so interviewees could tell their own stories. Plus 
information from earlier interviews had to be doublechecked, so questions evolved 
over time.144  
 
Primary source material also includes unpublished documents on the DDR 
programmes in Afghanistan from ISAF, the UN and governments. These have not 
been used in publications on DDR before. I also draw on dispatches from the U.S. 
embassy in Kabul published by Wikileaks and personal observations from living and 
travelling in Afghanistan between 2005 and 2010. Secondary source material includes 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  144	  Some of the material and arguments in this thesis have appeared previously in 
publications, including in Deedee Derksen, “Transition in Uruzgan (2): Power at the 
Centre,” Afghanistan Analysts Network, June 12, 2013; Deedee Derksen, “Armed, 
disarmed, rearmed: How Nahr-e Seraj in Helmand Became One of the Deadliest 
Districts in Afghanistan,” Afghanistan Analysts Network, January 6, 2014; Deedee 
Derksen, “Reintegrating Armed Groups in Afghanistan,” United States Institute of 
Peace, February, 2014; Deedee Derksen, “All the President’s Strongmen,” Foreign 
Policy online, December 8, 2014; Deedee Derksen, “The Politics of Disarmament and 
Rearmament in Afghanistan,” United States Institute of Peace, May 2015; Deedee 
Derksen, “Non-State Security Providers and Political Formation in Afghanistan,” 
Centre for Security Governance, March 2016. 
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the wider DDR and state building literature discussed above, and critiques thereof. It 
also includes books, reports, press releases and journal and newspaper articles on 
Afghanistan and DDR there. The emphasis in the study of secondary source material 
has been on the period from 2001 to 2014.  
 
The bulk of the thesis – the main narrative outside this introduction and the 
conclusion – is subdivided in two parts; each containing two chapters. First, two 
chapters explore the four DDR programmes (two on disarming U.S.’ allies; two on 
disarming its enemies); how they were originally conceived; the political agendas that 
drove them and what this meant for their design and implemention. Chapters 4 and 5 
focus on the local politics of DDR, examining the programmes’ impact at the level 
where they were supposed to have most effect. I use case studies in two regions: the 
northeast (Kunduz and Baghlan provinces in Chapter 4) and the southwest (Uruzgan 
and Helmand provinces in Chapter 5). I examine the local political economy in these 
regions and then assess the impact of the DDR programmes on it.  
 
I chose these two regions because in many ways they are polar opposites. The 
Pashtun-dominated southwest is the Taliban’s heartland. There, contestation has 
revolved around U.S. funds to fight the Taliban and control over the profits from 
opium production. In contrast, the ethnically diverse and economically richer 
northeast is the birthplace of many former Northern Alliance leaders. It hosts the main 
smuggling routes to Central Asia and Russia. 
 
Unlike most previous analysis of DDR in Afghanistan, my research focuses on low- 
and mid-level commanders rather than footsoldiers. Footsoldiers are relatively easy to 
mobilise because of the abundance of unemployed young men, and because of their 
social and kinship ties to commanders that remain in place in peacetime. For any 
decisions, including on mobilising or demobilising, they look to the lower-level 
commanders (commanding the smallest units of five to 25 men), who in turn look to 
the district- and provincial level commanders or strongmen. The last group maintains 
the external relations, with patrons in Kabul or Quetta or with the international PRTs. 
Their decision making, partly based on available resources, is vital in the 
militarisation or demilitarisation of any area outside of the cities.  
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The examination of each programme and the case studies together help answer the 
main question of this thesis. How have conditions in Afghanistan after 2001 shaped 
the DDR programmes? And how, in turn, have the programmes impacted the political 
order – at the local and the national level? The main answers to these questions are 
laid out in the conclusion.  
 
1.4.2. Researching in Afghanistan 
 
The research environment in Afghanistan presents a number of significant challenges. 
Some revolve around conducting research in a war zone: village politics are 
extremely polarised and complex and many areas were dangerous to visit. I not only 
had the safety of my driver, local assistant and myself to think about but also that of 
my interviewees. How could I ensure that there would be no negative repercussions 
from their participation in my research project? How, in adverse security conditions, 
could I still spend enough time in the provinces to understand complex local politics?  
 
Other challenges related to my position as a researcher from a country that was a 
member of the international coalition intervening in Afghanistan. I could easily have 
been perceived as part of the Dutch government’s or security forces’ involvement in 
Afghanistan, even potentially as a spy rather than an independent researcher. I also 
had to factor in that if my interviewees saw me through the lens of their biases and 
perceptions, I too approached them from my own point of view.  
 
My research followed a number of principles aimed at accessing the most accurate 
information possible in these complex circumstances, while also protecting 
interviewees. These principles took time to develop. When I started conducting my 
PhD research, I benefitted from already having spent years in Afghanistan as a Dutch 
newspaper correspondent. I knew excellent local assistants, who helped me navigate 
the Afghan research landscape. The section below explores both the challenges to my 




Researching local politics in a warzone 
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Researching politics is difficult under any circumstances, but in rural Afghanistan this 
challenge is complicated by decades of war. Afghan village politics often involves 
rivals trying to exclude each other from power – or even kill each other – through 
different means, including forming local alliances and manipulating foreign donors. 
The experience of war means all hedge their bets. Even villagers tended to keep ties 
to as many potential patrons as possible. The higher up the provincial food chain, the 
more complicated the web of alliances becomes. Researching provincial-level 
strongmen was fascinating but frustrating.  
 
This was exacerbated by the difficulty of travelling remote areas because of the 
security risks involved. Frequently I could not travel to villages I wanted to visit or 
could only stay for half an hour maximum. The main threat was kidnapping, 
especially when I was travelling by car to a particular place (within villages 
trustworthy hosts could often provide protection). This is a challenge that is relatively 
new for foreigners in warzones. Before the War on Terror the greatest risk for 
reporters and researchers in warzones was becoming collateral damage. Now 
foreigners are targets, which makes covering wars accurately extremely difficult.  
 
That said, Afghanistan offered more opportunities for research in the period this thesis 
covers than Syria, Iraq and Libya (and even Afghanistan itself) do today. This access 
was generated by the massive international military presence, which was both a 
blessing and a curse. The presence of international troops, while providing an 
incentive to target foreigners (as ‘invaders’), also offered a degree of protection. This 
was especially true in areas under the control of international forces, usually in and 
around provincial capitals. In these areas reporters and researchers could quite easily 
gather information. The information gathered, however, tended to be one-sided and 
pro-government. Villages controlled by Taliban were harder to reach because of the 
security risks involved.  
 
The security of interviewees was another concern, particularly ensuring that they 
would not suffer reprisals for having spoken with me. Most wanted to participate 
anonymously; some because they feared for their safety, officials were restricted by 
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institutional rules. The only interviewees whose identity is revealed are those who 




As a western researcher I initially assumed that non-Taliban interviewees would 
automatically feed me a pro-government narrative, as my country was part of the 
international coalition supporting the government. But I was struck by how fiercely 
critical Afghan interviewees often were of their government. If anything, they were 
determined to stress the mistakes that my government and its allies were making. 
What they would not say in a first interview was that they sympathised with the 
Taliban, if they did. It usually took time for people to open up about sympathy for or 
participation in the insurgency.  
 
In Uruzgan it mattered that I was Dutch. The Dutch-led PRT had chosen sides in 
provincial politics, and interviewees automatically put me in the Dutch camp. This 
meant that those who criticized Popalzai strongmen like provincial governor Jan 
Mohammed or his nephew Matiullah, a militia commander, and had the ear of the 
Dutch PRT were happy to talk to me. Those strongmen and their followers, however, 
were more difficult to interview and suspicious of my agenda.  This was particularly 
true with Matiullah, whom I interviewed four times. The last time I got an interview 
only after three days of calling his assistants and, when that yielded nothing, going to 
his compound and knocking on his door. In the end we spoke for a long time but 
throughout he kept reminding me how badly he had been treated by the Dutch and 
closely monitored my reaction.  
 
What of my own perception of interviewees?  I struggled most with two views that 
dominated the discourse on Afghanistan in Holland. The first was the generally held 
western view that the war in Afghanistan was a conflict between a foreign-backed 
“moderate” government and a “religious extremist” Taliban insurgency, with the 
Afghan population divided along similar lines. The second was the notion that 
international actors could or should remove from office powerbrokers who engaged in 
human rights abuses, a view that dominated among Dutch interlocutors.  
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Through my research, and particularly my ability to spend time on the ground, outside 
cities and towns and not constricted by government rules on who I could interact with, 
I began to see the problems with these perspectives. It became clear that the conflict 
was not binary. Rather, many fault lines exist in Afghanistan, and divisions are 
seldom absolute.  
 
To regard anyone with blood on their hands as unfit for office was a position 
impossible to maintain in war-torn Afghanistan. Most powerbrokers had already been 
fighting for decades. Plus, those who would be removed from government would start 
opposing it, either by joining the insurgency or by provoking instability in other ways 
to show their value as stabilisers. At the same time, assuming that government 
officials’ human rights violations mattered less for Afghans than they did for the 
Dutch was also mistaken – not only from a principled point of view but also knowing 
that the insurgency against the government was driven to a great extent by anger 
about those abuses.  
 
Perhaps most dangerous was to view local allies’ attitudes on human rights as fixed. 
Research showed me the extent to which foreign patronage influenced their behaviour 
on human rights; mostly, unfortunately, negatively. To remove human rights 
offenders from office – the Dutch official policy – did not stop abuses. If anything 
powerbrokers would operate with greater impunity, provided they maintained their 
support from foreign military, patrons in Kabul or Taliban leaders. Potential for 




To navigate these challenges I followed a number of principles, drawing on the years 
I had been working in Afghanistan as a reporter.  
 
Interview all sides 
 
The first was to seek information from all sides. As mentioned, information from the 
international actors and their local allies was relatively easy to access. More 
challenging was to get information from villages under Taliban control. Interviews 
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with Taliban commanders often involved travelling to the grey areas between those 
dominated by the government and those under Taliban control. Only such areas could 
offer relative safety to both sides. We would usually meet in the house of a trusted 
third party. Another way was by phone, though interviewees would say far less than 
they would in person. Village elders living in Taliban-controlled areas I could usually 
interview in areas controlled by the government. Those who could not travel could be 
reached by phone, though again those interviews would usually yield less than 
meeting face-to-face. But they could still be a good complement to in-person 
interviews, especially if the interviewees knew me or my assistant personally.  
 
Talking to ‘all sides’ took me, however, beyond the international government-versus-
Taliban narrative; a narrative that local groups perhaps used as cover to fight each 
other but that masked an array of constantly shifting rivalries and alliances. Often it 
was hard to even know what ‘all sides’ even were. The only way was often to simply 
talk to as many people as possible. Even then, it often felt that was only scratching the 
surface. But nonetheless, hearing from as many sides as possible gave me different 
narratives and challenged my Western perspectives.  
 
This meant talking to all relevant actors, included to some of the worst human rights 
violators, whether Taliban commanders, officials or strongmen. From a ‘Dutch’ 
perspective it would have been easier to just talk to victims. But not taking into 
account the view of armed actors would have rendered this study on DDR in 
Afghanistan worthless. Listening to their views helped me understand their motives. It 
helped me understanding why Afghanistan is today more militarised than it was at the 
start of the international intervention in 2001; the first step to knowing what, if 
anything, can be done about it.  
 
Conduct follow-up interviews 
 
My second principle was to interview people more than once. Most interviewees in 
Annex 1 I interviewed several times. This allowed me to build trust (or at least partial 
trust), which led to better information. Interviewees would often open up about local 
rivalries or about ties to the Taliban movement only after more than one interview. 
This also enabled me to ‘weigh’ their words better. Some interviewees were naturally 
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more nuanced and truthful than others – like anywhere in the world. This would only 
become apparent over time, by comparing their assertions with those of others. Last, 
having time intervals between interviews could also give me an insight into changing 
alliances, into the fluidity of Afghan village politics.  
 
Interview in different locations 
 
My third principle was to try and talk to each interviewee in different locations. Much 
information could be gleaned from the interviewee’s immediate environment: the 
compound, cars, land, spouses and children, armed bodyguards, people in the 
guesthouse, the way other villagers treated the interviewee, the way he or she carried 
himself or herself around the village. Interviewing someone in his or her village 
carried the disadvantage, however, that he or she would be restricted in what they 
could say, as others were always around. Thus I also tried to meet up with 
interviewees in provincial capitals or Kabul, as a one-to-one interview (with a 
translator present) could yield more information and complement what I had seen in 
the village.  
 
Meeting interviewees in their village and in a provincial capital or Kabul was, 
however, a best-case scenario. In many cases I could not travel to home villages 
because of security risks (more on the road there than in the village itself). Or, 
alternatively, if I could visit a village it was rarely guaranteed that I would later catch 
people travelling from that village to Kabul. But I tried to do so.  
 
The interview team 
 
The fourth principle concerned the interviewing team. Here there were no hard and 
fast rules. On the contrary, it varied. The only real rule was to reflect on what would 
be the best set up for each interview, factoring in interviewees’ perceptions of me, of 
my local assistants and, in turn, our perceptions of them. I usually conducted 
interviews together with a local assistant, who would set up the interview and 
translate, though on some occasions local assistants or I conducted interviews alone. 
Other factors considered were language, with some assistants speaking both Dari and 
Pashtu and some only Dari; whether an assistant lived in the area of the interviewee or 
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out of town; whether they had links to the same powerbrokers as the interviewee or 
whether it was better to have someone neutral and so forth. I always reflected on 
which set up an interviewee would be most comfortable with, and most likely to talk 
freely.  
 
Check, check and double check 
 
The fifth principle was to triangulate each piece of information by seeking more 
sources and confirmation from different sides of the political spectrum. This was 
painstaking work, considering the security challenges, the fact that little is 
documented and the long-running blame game in Afghanistan. Everyone proclaims to 
be the victim of their rival’s predation. And indeed, most people are victims, even if 
they are often also perpetrators. Stories also tended to change slightly with each 
interation. In some cases, they fell apart under scrutiny and to my dismay I had to 
discard some of the best ones. In other instances, extra interviews strengthened and 
added nuance to a story. This thesis thus only incorporates those findings that 




The last and perhaps most important principle was to make sure interviewees were 
fully informed about my project and protected from negative repercussions from their 
participation. When these priorities clashed I put interviewees’ interests first. For 
example, most stories – and their sources – in this thesis are anonymous. This has 
meant that I have often not provided all the details of every story, even though this 
has meant in some cases weakening the narrative.   
 
Before each interview, interlocutors were fully informed of the research project: the 
institution I was conducting research for; my role as a PhD student; the purpose of the 
research; its topic, the main hypotheses, questions; its geographical reach, research 
methodology and that the thesis would ultimately be published. I did not, however, 
divulge the names or other personal information of other interviewees, even though 
people often asked. At most I would give general descriptions of the type of people I 
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had interviewed previously (for example, ‘parliamentarians’; ‘police’; ‘religious 
leaders’ or ‘tribal elders’).  
 
I gave interviewees the possibility to speak on or off the record. Most chose to speak 
off record, either for security reasons (for many Afghans) or because their status as 
officials did not permit them to speak publicly (for many internationals). Only the 
identities of those who explicitly asked to speak on the record are revealed.  
 
Making sure that interviewees could really speak anonymously, and thereby ensuring 
their safety, was extremely hard, especially in the countryside. Every villager knew 
about the presence of a foreigner shorty after her or his arrival. Moreover, interviews 
usually took place in the presence of the entourage of the person in question. In these 
cases, I would ask non-sensitive questions and try and follow-up with the person 
when he or she travelled to the provincial capital or Kabul.  
 
Before conducting interviews local assistants working with me had to agree to keep 
all information confidential. In addition, I would select local assistants that 
interviewees were comfortable with. Sometimes this mean someone from the same 
area; sometimes someone from elsewhere.  
 
Conducting research in Afghanistan was challenging for several reasons: complicated 
village politics; insecurity; my origins in a country that was part of the international 
coalition intervening in Afghanistan, which influenced interviewees’ perceptions of 
me and my perceptions of them. The principles above – talking to all sides; talking to 
the same person more than once; interviewing people in different locations; reflecting 
on and flexibility with the composition of the interview team; triangulating findings; 
and putting the safety of interlocutors foremost – helped navigate those challenges in 
a manner that was ethical and responsible.  
  
 
© Linde Dorien Derksen 2017  67	  
Chapter 2 Demobilising Friends: DDR and DIAG 
 
2.1. Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) 
 
In the years after the Bonn Conference, the U.S. and its international allies gradually 
realised that their early accommodation of Northern Alliance leaders could prove 
problematic. While the UN Security Council had in 2001 mandated a multinational 
force, ISAF, to provide security in Kabul, Defense Minister Mohammad Qasim 
Fahim’s militias remained in the capital. The president of the interim government, 
Hamid Karzai, a Pashtun from the south, was ‘a virtual prisoner in the palace, guarded 
by U.S. personnel because the Northern Alliance troops of his defense minister, 
General Mohammed Fahim, could not be sufficiently trusted with his life’.145 
 
Outside the capital, especially in the north and west, Northern Alliance warlords and 
strongmen (and some former commanders from Najibullah’s militias) carved out 
fiefs, levied taxes on the local population and took control of the growing drugs 
business, weapons smuggling and customs. In the absence of a functioning army and 
police, the international community had become fully reliant on warlords and 
strongmen to provide security. The initial emphasis of the U.S. and UN on a ‘light 
footprint’ in Afghanistan meant the UN Security Council had not authorised ISAF to 
expand beyond Kabul and help secure the countryside until 2003.146 By that time 
governor Ismael Khan held ‘near-total sway’ over Herat province in the west and 
General Dostum and Atta were battling for control in the north, which eventually led 
to several violent clashes and numerous deaths. 147  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  145	   Tony Karon, “The U.S. Says the Afghanistan War is Over. The Taliban Aren’t So 
Sure,” Time Magazine, May 6, 2003. Mohammad Qasim Fahim (1957-2014), who 
was nicknamed Marshal Fahim because of his rank of Field Marshal, served as 
Minister of Defense (2001-2004) and Vice-President (2002-2004 and 2009-2014) in 
the Karzai administrations.  146 Even then, ISAF would only deploy 250 personnel to the quiet Kunduz province. 
It was not until 2006 that ISAF expanded to the most restive areas (the south and 
southeast).	  Suhrke, When More is Less, 29-31. 147	  Suhrke When More is Less, 77; Mukhodadhyay, Warlords, 93-94; Barnett R. 
Rubin, “Identifying Options and Entry Points for Disarmament, Demobilization and 
Reintegration in Afghanistan,” in Confronting Afghanistan’s Security Dilemma, 
Reforming the Security Sector, ed. Mark Sedra. (Bonn: Bonn International Center for 
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The preeminent role of the Shura-e Nazar faction of Jamiat – the faction led by 
Ahmad Shah Massoud until he was assassinated two days before 9/11 – in the post-
2001 security landscape was of particular concern to many foreign officials. Fahim, 
who was the former right-hand man of Massoud, wasted no time to insert loyalists in 
the Ministry of Defense (MoD), and by early 2002 some ninety of the hundred army 
generals were Tajiks from the Panjshir province. He also used his position to appoint 
Shura-e Nazar affiliated commanders in the new Afghan Military Force (AMF), an 
eight corps structure that was superimposed on the militias of the Northern Alliance 
(the Northern Alliance was formally dissolved in April 2002 during a meeting of 
donor nations in Geneva). Kabul and the northeast, the Panjshiri heartland, ‘saw an 
almost immediate proliferation of military units, with no less than fourteen divisions 
and several smaller units in existence by the end of 2002’. The west was given only 
four divisions and the south another four.148  
 
The AMF thus became a ‘parking area’ for a variety of armed former Northern 
Alliance militias; keeping them armed and providing commanders with some funding 
and a claim on a future position in the new security forces or the government.149 
Michael Semple writes: 
 
In the war between the Northern Alliance and the Taliban the only substantial 
fronts of the Northern Alliance in the north got smaller and smaller over time. 
Yet what happened in the days of the collapse of the Taliban was that the old 
mujahideen commanders reassembled many of their men, [even though] they 
had not been involved in resistance. These forces were [meant to] strengthen 
the hands of the commanders to be political leaders. They set up new militias 
with impressive sounding unit numbers; not as fighters to fight enemies but as 
followers of strong men, who had entitlement. Fahim’s achievement was to 
bring that entitlement into public sector. A clause of the Bonn Agreement 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Conversion, 2002); Pamela Constable, “Karzai Fires Militia Leader Who Resisted His 
Authority,” Washington Post, September 12, 2004. 148	  UNAMA, “DDR in Kabul,” code cable from the then head of UN Assistance 
Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), Lakhdar Brahimi, to UN headquarters in New 
York, August 18, 2003; Suhrke, When More is Less, 76; Anja Manuel and P.W. 
Singer, “A New Model Army”, Foreign Affairs, July/August 2002; Antonio 
Giustozzi, “Military Reform in Afghanistan”, in Confronting Afghanistan’s Security 
Dilemma, Reforming the Security Sector, ed. Mark Sedra, (Bonn: Bonn International 
Center for Conversion, 2002).	  149	  Giustozzi, “Military Reform”; 556; 428. 	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[said that] all forces must recognise the authority of the Ministry of Defense. 
By gathering up all his old friends Fahim tried to consolidate his power by 
writing them up in books of the Defense ministry. For this, he relied on the 
largesse of the international community. 
 
 
‘Fahim made units in all provinces for his relatives and commanders and gave them 
weapons, money and fuel’, said a high-ranking Shura-ye Nazar member, who was 
Ministry of Defense official at the time. ‘In the meantime he promised the 
international community that he would dismantle them. It was a game. I was against 
it, because if you give privileges to a division commander you essentially give 
privileges to a hundred sub-commanders. When you take these privileges away there 
is trouble.’150  
 
While diplomats and policy-makers saw the disarmament of the AMF militias as a 
precondition for security, they still feared that it would provoke a ‘negative reaction’ 
from Panjshiris151. They recognized that the Shura-ye Nazar faction was in 2003 
‘already under considerable pressure to release their stranglehold on the Ministry of 
Defence’.152 It was one of many times foreigners in Afghanistan deliberated between 
short-term stability and long-term democratic reform.  
 
Problematically, the Bonn Agreement did not contain a provision on DDR. This was 
mostly because in 2001 the international community had chosen to not antagonise the 
Northern Alliance leaders – by calling for their demobilisation – and instead 
accommodate them. Attempts by drafters to include a detailed DDR provision in the 
Bonn Agreement resulted in furious reactions from jihadi leaders, according to 
Barnett Rubin. In the end the Bonn Agreement had hailed them as heroes and the final 
text only read that all armed groups would come under the authority of the interim 
administration and that they would be ‘reorganized according to the requirements of 
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  428.	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  Called after the Panjshir Valley many members of the Shura-ye Nazar faction of 
Jamiat – which was once led by Ahmad Shah Massoud – came from. 	  152	  UNAMA, “DDR in Kabul,” code cable from the then head of UN Assistance 
Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), Lakhdar Brahimi, to UN headquarters in New 
York, August 18, 2003. 	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the new Afghan security and armed forces’.153 Rubin argues that participants of the 
Bonn Conference took this to mean eventual demobilisation, but ‘this was not 
explicit’.154  
 
Security concerns about warlords and strongmen destabilising the countryside led the 
international community to gradually confront former Northern Alliance leaders 
throughout 2002 and 2003. Foreign donors, ISAF and the UN especially, feared that 
these men and their militias could disrupt the Afghan presidential elections in 2004. 
The U.S. government, which had been distracted by the push towards war in Iraq, also 
wanted to show progress in Afghanistan ahead of U.S. presidential elections that same 
year. Meeting with diplomats and UN and ISAF officials in August 2003 to discuss 
the continued presence of Fahim’s militia in Kabul, the Deputy Special 
Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) and Deputy Head of the UN’s 
Assistance Mission to Afghanistan (UNAMA), Jean Arnault, stated that the 
demilitarisation of the main population centers by June 2004 was ‘a necessary 
condition for the holding of free and fair elections’.155  
 
The 2003 debate on the reform of the security sector  ‘dragged on for several 
months’.156 Fahim’s group, which also included Deputy Defense Minister Atiqullah 
Baryalai and Army Chief of Staff Bismullah Khan, proposed a 200,000 to 250,000 
men army including ‘demobilised, reorganized, retrained and winnowed-down’ AMF 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  153	  UN, “Agreement on Provisional Arrangements in Afghanistan Pending the Re-
establishment of Permanent Government Institutions,” United Nations, December 5, 
2001, or ‘Bonn Agreement’. Avalaible at 
http://www.un.org/News/dh/latest/afghan/afghan-agree.htm (accessed 17 June 2014). 
The final text read: ‘Upon the official transfer of power, all mujahidin, Afghan armed 
forces and armed groups in the country shall come under the command and control of 
the Interim Authority, and be reorganized according to the requirements of the new 
Afghan security and armed forces’. The agreement also contained a pledge by the 
conference’s participants ‘to withdraw all military units from Kabul and other urban 
centers or other areas in which the UN mandated force is deployed’. The agreement 
also urged the UN and the international community ‘in recognition of the heroic role 
played by the mujahidin in protecting the independence of Afghanistan and the 
dignity of the people’ in coordination with the Interim Authority ‘to assist in the 
reintegration of the mujahidin into the new Afghan security and armed forces’. 	  154	  Rubin, “Identifying Options,” 39, 40. 	  155	  As quoted in UN Code Cable on “DDR in Kabul”. See also Suhrke, When More is 
Less, 76. 558. 	  156	  Giustozzi, “Military Reform,” 26. 	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units.157 The Ministry of Defense would be in charge of the DDR process. ‘My 
suggestion was that any suitable mujahedeen could go into the ANA and the ANP’, 
said a high-ranking Shura-ye Nazar and Defense official at the time.158 As Rubin 
noted, this model would have meant the Panjshiris retainining their power and having 
it further legitimised by the international community’s support for the DDR 
programme and the ANA, which they would control.159 
 
Initially Fahim’s faction had some success in seizing control over the DDR process. 
In January 2003 President Karzai appointed four Defense Commissions, including a 
National Disarmament Commission headed by Baryalai. The year before he had 
already launched a weapon collection and registration programme targeting the AMF 
in five northern provinces (Badakhshan, Takhar, Kunduz, Parwan, Kapisa), though it 
was not clear how many weapons were collected and in whose hands they ended up. 
The problem was that although many militia commanders and fighters were tired of 
fighting, and seemed interested in reintegration opportunities in civilian society, they 
were reluctant to disarm with the security ministries in the hands of a single faction, 
Shura-e-Nazar. The weapons collection had stopped when it had become clear the 
Shura-e Nazar faction ‘would control Kabul and the central army’.160 
 
On the other side of the debate sat a westernised faction of the Afghan government, 
which included Finance Minister (and future President) Ashraf Ghani and Interior 
Minister Ali Jalali and members of UNAMA, the government of Japan (that became 
the ‘lead nation’ on DDR as explained below) and the U.S. governments. This group, 
though lacking a single alternative proposal (on the international side there were 	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  Rubin, “Identifying Options,” 41. See also Giustozzi, “Military Reform,” 26. 	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  428.  159	  Rubin, “Identifying Options”.	  	  160	  Rubin, “Identifying Options”, 43. See also Bhatia and Sedra, Afghanistan, Arms 
and Conflict, 120-122; 428. There seemed to be widespread support for disarmament 
among the broader population in Afghanistan in 2003. In a 2003 survey participants 
prioritised disarmament as the most important thing to do to improve security. They 
thought that without disarmament it would be “extremely difficult” to hold free and 
fair elections and to make progress with reconstruction. “Speaking Out: Afghan 
Opinions on Rights and Responsibilities,” The Human Rights Research and Advocacy 
Consortium, November 19, 2003. See also “Take the Guns Away, Afghan Voices on 
Security and Elections,” The Human Rights Research and Advocacy Consortium, 
September, 2004. 	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differences of opinion between UNAMA, the Japanese and U.S. governments on how 
to proceed, though the U.S. view generally won), favoured of a 60,000 men strong 
army made up of new recruits, untainted by factional allegiances.161 The AMF would 
be demobilised, with a small percentage, 10 to 15 per cent, allowed into the new 
army.162 In addition, Japan, the UN, and later the U.S. envisaged reforming the 
Defense Ministry, with the ultimate aim of removing Fahim.163 The first UN-led DDR 
programme thus became an attempt to push back against the influence of former 
Northern Alliance powerbrokers, particularly Fahim, paving the way for a new army, 
and also securing the Afghan presidential elections, scheduled for 2004.164 
 
The DDR concept, as the international community had promoted it in peacekeeping 
and state building operations around the world, provided neutral language for these 
politically controversial goals. Indeed, in a 2003 meeting of foreign diplomats in 
Kabul, UN Deputy SRSG Jean Arnault said that disarmament ‘be discussed within the 
framework of state-building rather than “defactionalisation”, an approach that was 
likely to provoke a negative reaction’ among the Panjshiris, according to a UN cable 
to New York headquarters.165 However, while state building language was used 
because it sounded more neutral, the first UN-led DDR programme nonetheless 
seemed less about long-term goals like establishing the state’s monopoly on the use of 
force and more about short-term political expediency, namely securing the elections.  
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Michael Bhatia, Emile LeBrun, Robert Muggah, Mark Sedra, “DDR in Afghanistan 
when state-building and insecurity collide” in Small Arms Survey 2009: Shadows of 
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This led to two main problems. First, DDR became in effect a stand-alone programme 
because the other elements of the state building agenda were not in place – most 
importantly a new army and police force. There was a general state-building 
framework for Afghanistan had been developed by 2003. During conferences in 
Tokyo, Geneva and Petersburg through 2002 international policymakers had agreed a 
broad SSR package. It included DDR, police training, army training, counter narcotics 
and justice. Lead nations would take responsibility for each component: the U.S. for 
training a new army, Germany for the police, Italy for justice and the UK for counter 
narcotics. Japan became the responsible nation for DDR.  
 
In a series of international meetings and conferences and behind-the-scene 
negotiations the UN and the U.S. donors used this framework to wrestle the control 
over the DDR process from Fahim and his men and set the agenda for reform of the 
security sector; helped by the fact that no donor funding would be available for 
Baryalai’s DDR plans.166 But by 2003 there has been little progress on the other 
elements of the security sector reform agenda, which in the UN state building concept 
were seen as closely linked. A ‘variety of sometimes contradictory’ counter-narcotics 
approaches had failed to stem the major increase in opium production, which 
bolstered AMF commanders’ wealth and influence.167 Italian-led judicial reform, 
crucial to tackling the culture of impunity that benefitted militia commanders, 
suffered from ‘weak leadership and lack of attention within the government, UNAMA 
and the donor community’ and was ‘drifting rudderless’.168  
 
Afghanistan’s security sector had collapsed and faced a shortage of resources and 
human capacity. During decades of war ministries had fallen prey to the patronage of 	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conventional DDR programme.514; Rubin, “Identifying Options”, 42. 	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Investment, Minimal Results: The Failure of Security Policy in Afghanistan,” 
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those in charge at any given time. While the ANA was being built from scratch the 
police service was not, and included many ethnic-based factional militias. A formerly 
high-ranking MoI official said: ‘The international community did not invest in good 
police. Germany had a limited amount of money and the U.S. was not interested in 
nation building but only in counter terrorism so it only started paying attention to the 
police after a few years’.169 
 
A senior former DDR official said: 
 
At times there was a lack of cohesiveness in the overall strategic direction. 
The supporting nations had different objectives. To give each country [one 
particular area to work on] was not helpful. I don’t think Italians produced one 
law; there was lots of talking but no action. The Germans sent a dozen police 
men oversees to study law, while what country needed was 100,000 police. 
The UK was in Mazar-e Sharif [it established a Provincial Reconstruction 
Team or PRT170 there as part of the ISAF expansion], and saw that counter 
narcotics was in Helmand, and got sucked into COIN [counterinsurgency] 
there. Nations didn’t get it together.171  
 
 
Even the expedient, short-term training of troops and police progressed more slowly 
than planned. The original aim was to train 18,000 troops by October 2003, but by 
mid-2004 that number was still not reached. Rubin wrote at the time: ‘The idea of 
supplying security through the ANA and the new Afghan police is an excellent one, if 
one is prepared to wait five to ten years’.172 Thus, when the international community 
started to discuss seriously the disarmament of the AMF in 2003, the UN had only 
just mandated ISAF to expand its presence and no viable alternative Afghan security 
forces could provide security in place of warlords. 
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Planning still went ahead. The UN would lead the first DDR programme on behalf of 
the Afghan government, with the Afghanistan New Beginnings Programme (ANBP) -
- costing almost $150 million, mainly paid by Japan – created for this purpose at the 
Tokyo Conference in April 2003. ‘There was a lot of pressure to get things moving, 
from everyone; UNAMA pressured UNDP [United Nations Development 
Programme] and donors were pressuring the UN’, said a former UN official. Doubts 
about the army and police being unpreprared to provide security were put aside, he 
said. ‘We were going before the rest of SSR. In mid-2003 we were advising Brahimi 
not to launch DDR in October. The other SSR pillars should have matured, so that the 
ANP and the ANA would have prevented a security vacuum from occurring’.173  
 
The ANBP was initially headed by UN official Sultan Aziz, who was replaced at a 
later stage by retired British army officer Peter Babbington, who had been involved in 
DDR in Sierra Leone. The DDR programme that was eventually decided upon only 
targeted members of the AMF. Its two overarching goals were ‘(1) to break the 
historic patriarchal chain of command existing between the former commanders and 
their men; and (2) to provide the demobilised personnel with the ability to become 
economically independent - the ultimate objective being to reinforce the authority of 
the government’.174 Analysts wrote at the time:  
 
The basic objective is to break the power of the second and third level 
commanders by reintegrating their soldiers into the civilian economy and 
giving them something better to do. By providing reintegration benefits and 
alternative livelihoods through its reintegration programs, the commanders’ 
ability to mobilise their militias through the provision of economic incentives 
is expected to be reduced.175 
 
 
Another problem with using the state building framework to legitimise and finance an 
attempt to reverse former Northern Alliance commanders’ influence was that this 
effort was forced into the mould of a conventional DDR programme, as it had been 
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developed by the UN over the years; a concept that did not fit well with Afghan 
traditions in dealing with militias and with the post-2001 political realities.  
 
The design of the first Afghan DDR programme thus mostly followed the sequential 
UN template; disarmament followed by demobilisation followed by reintegration. It 
also focused primarily on the first two elements, in spite of main donor Japan’s policy 
interest in the reintegration phase, in particular human security and ‘bottom-up’ 
development and dialogue.176 The Defense Ministry would select individuals and 
units for participation in the ANBP. These individuals would then be vetted by 
Regional Verification Committees, consisting of one government official, one ANBP 
official and three to five village elders.  
 
While in other countries disarmament took place in camp-like settings, Afghanistan’s 
geography made this unrealistic. Instead, former combatants would hand in weapons 
in mobile disarmament units, then the subsequent day go to ANBP regional offices 
for demobilisation. Ex-combatants were provided with clothes and sacks of rice or 
flour and cooking oil. Initially the reinsertion package included money ($200) but this 
led to problems as commanders forced participants to hand over their cash.  
 
The participant was also presented with employment and educational options, and 
advised to come back in a fortnight to select one of the reintegration packages on 
offer.177 The reintegration element was copied from elsewhere, according to the 
former DDR official. ‘We analysed the type of reintegration programmes established 
elsewhere and their success rates. All reintegration programmes we looked at were in 
Africa’. According him the designers of the programme were ‘learning and 
developing’ as they went along. ‘We didn’t know what the end product would be. But 
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  The Japanese government, thinking that ‘the security environment was not 
conducive for disarmament’, proposed dropping the disarmament component and 
focusing on reintegration. However, the Japanese eventually accepted the U.S. 
position that disarmament had to come first ‘because they wanted to be part of the 
War on Terror. Rossi and Giustozzi, page 5. Bhatia and Sedra, page 131; 547; Dennis 
T. Yasumoto, Japan’s Civil-Military Diplomacy: The Banks of the Rubicon, (New 
York/Abingdon: Routledge, 2014) page 42.  177	  500; 512; 513; 514. See Bhatia and Sedra, 2008, 127.  
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we did research into previous DDR literature and lessons learned. Of course the UN 
was institutionally well aware of DDR’.178  
 
That DDR in Afghanistan was mostly copied from elsewhere was problematic for 
several reasons. First, the DDR template informing donors support to African post-
conflict disarmament efforts was already flawed. As Sabiiti Mutengesa argues, DDR 
is an instance of ‘doctrinal stretching’, ‘i.e., the creation of distortions by applying an 
aspect of doctrine developed in a specific historical and organizational set-up to new 
contexts’. The DDR recipe as bilateral and multilateral donors have promoted it in 
countries emerging from civil war in Latin America, Africa and Asia has been taken 
from western experiences of war between states. In that context mobilisation meant 
bringing ‘skeletal units and combat formations from peace time to wartime strength’ 
and demobilisation ‘the release of skilled individuals from service on the basis of the 
needs of the industry’. This had little to do with mobilisation and demobilisation in 
the context of civil wars, in which fighters may be mobilised along ethnic or tribal 
lines to fight their countrymen, and may be forcibly recruited, in some cases 
abducted.179 
 
Second, ‘lessons learned’ from the African DDR programmes may not have been 
necessarily the right ones. The Ugandan DDR process, which took place from 1992 
until 1996, was relatively successful precisely because it deviated from the 
conventional approach. But this was not sufficiently acknowledged as a lesson 
learned, according to Mutengesa.180 DDR in Mozambique was seen as a major 	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spite of donors pushing for quick demobilisation in 1986 the new government took an 
inclusionary approach and integrated soldiers from the old and defeated army into the 
new official security forces. According to Mutensega the government approach, 
which ‘remained the NRM’s primary avenue of managing armed groups’, worked 
better in creating stability than immediate demobilisation. Those who were being 
reintegrated expressed commitment to the new government by submitting fighters and 
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politico-military groups jostling for power throughout the early 1980s, co-optation 
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success in UN circles around the time the first DDR programme in Afghanistan was 
designed, as in the years following the 1992 deal between the government and 
opposition that ended the war peace was firmly established. However, according to 
analysts, the short-term minimalist approach to reintegration that was adopted in 
Mozambique (aimed at ‘removing former fighters as an immediate threat to peace’ 
instead of aimed at ‘finding jobs for the demobilized through training and credit 
projects’), which had been decided on after a fierce debate among donors, the UN and 
agencies and which the UN Secretary-General had hailed as a success, did not prevent 
severe long-term security and socio-economic challenges. Therefore Mozambique, 
like other African countries, including the Central African Republic, Republic of 
Congo, Liberia and Zimbabwe, had to repeat reintegration efforts. This was exactly 
the sort of help that was originally proposed by those advocating a long-term view to 
reintegration.181   
 
Third, vast differences existed between armed groups in Africa and those in 
Afghanistan (in terms of goals, organisation, membership and so forth). Equally the 
political, military, economical and social environments in which they operated 
differed enormously. What worked in one place would not necessarily work 
elsewhere.  
 
For example the RUF (Revolutionary United Front) insurgency in Sierra Leone, 
which was ‘far less a political movement with a definite goal as it was an environment 
facilitating modes of behaviour perceived as beneficial by combatants’, included 
many rebel fighters who joined up ‘not through some cost-benefit analysis but 
through direct abduction into RUF ranks’.182 The Sierra Leonean DDR programme 
ran from September 1998 to January 2002, and UN officials in Kabul studied it, along 	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with other demobilisation processes in Africa, when they designed the first DDR 
programme for Afghanistan. Some Japanese officials involved in the first DDR 
programme in Afghanistan had also worked on DDR in Sierra Leone. But critical 
differences existed in the nature of armed groups. In Afghanistan abduction was not a 
common recruitment tool. Moreover, ex-combatants had often kept ties to the 
communities they originated from. Many even fought part-time, returning to help 
their families harvest. They were not alienated from their communities, and thus 
required a different approach than for ex-combatants in Sierra Leone.   
 
Cash handouts to ex-combatants, which worked in Mozambique, were also tried in 
Afghanistan in the pilot phase of the first DDR programme in 2003. However, this 
approach did not account for the continued influence commanders enjoyed over their 
fighters. Not only did they usually know their fighters from their time on the 
battlefield, but many also hailed from the same village, belonged to the same sub-tribe 
or even the same family. In Kunduz, where the DDR programme started, commanders 
simply claimed the cash handouts and the lower-rank fighters were left with nothing. 
Handouts, which the UN had seen as key to the perceived success of DDR in 
Mozambique and an element to be replicated elsewhere, had to be phased out in 
Afghanistan.  
 
Last, DDR templates as they had been developed in African countries were also 
limited relevance to Afghanistan because of different political contexts. In 1996 Mats 
Berdal situated DDR efforts since 1989 in three different categories. Most large-scale 
efforts by that time, like those in Namibia, Cambodia, Mozambique and El Salvador, 
had been part of ‘comprehensive political settlements’, agreed and negotiated under 
internal auspices after years of inconclusive fighting between guerrilla and 
government forces. By contrast in Uganda, Ethiopia and Eritrea ‘responsibility for 
demobilization and military reform had been assumed by governments victorious in 
civil war or otherwise not under direct military threat’. The final category covered a 
limited number of cases where external actors had engaged in coercive disarmament 
after political settlement proved elusive – like the UN’s disarmament effort in 
Somalia in 1993.183 	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In Afghanistan DDR was not part of a peace agreement, as members of the former 
regime did not participate in the Bonn Conference and did not sign the eventual 
agreement. Instead, it was a military victory of one side of the war. But in contrast to 
the African cases where one side had won, the victory in Afghanistan had been 
achieved primarily because of the help of a U.S.-led coalition; a coalition that exerted 
great influence over the new political order, which excluded the Taliban, and 
continued a military campaign against them. By contrast, in Uganda, where DDR was 
considered to be relatively successful, the new government integrated soldiers of the 
former regime into its army.  
 
Afghanistan lacked the ‘preconditions’ for successful DDR described later by the 
United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations: a negotiated peace deal that 
provides a legal framework for DDR, trust in the peace process, willingness of the 
parties to the conflict to disarm and minimum security guarantees.184 Another 2010 
UN report mentions that if traditional DDR is initiated in a setting that lacks these 
preconditions its impact could be adverse – following on widespread criticisms of 
analysts and observers arguing this point. It mentions (but does not elaborate on) 
alternative strategies, including changing the sequence from DDR to RDD, so starting 
with reintegration. Only later would they be demobilised and disarmed, with 
command structures initially kept intact.185 
 
Shura-ye Nazar leaders proposed some similar adjustments to the DDR programme in 
Afghanistan – largely to protect their own interests – but these were rejected.  MoD 
Chief of Staff Bismullah Khan proposed that the reintegration phase take place before 
disarmament and demobilisation. He also proposed to include in the programme 
‘mujaheds’ who were not part of the AMF and giving ex-combatants $50 a month 
until they found a job, rather than a one-off payment of $200. Fahim’s Deputy 
Minister Baryalai on several occasions proposed keeping a residual army of 30,000 	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men. Donors rejected all these proposals. Although DDR was already done through a 
‘salami-slicing’ method, gradually downsizing many units instead of simply 
decommissioning them, MoD officials also tried to convince the donor community 
that DDR should be done more the ‘Afghan way’, meaning even more emphasis on 
downsizing.186 
 
UN officials negotiated with Fahim and his men behind closed doors on which 
commander should demobilise when and with how many men. The numbers MoD 
officials quoted were more or less fictitious, as most commanders and fighters had 
self-demobilised after the Taliban regime was ousted in 2001. The MoD payroll was 
hugely inflated with ‘ghost soldiers’, who only existed on paper. Officials claimed 
‘outrageous figures’ of up to 230,000 AMF, according to a former high-level DDR 
official.187 The MoD and the UN settled on 100,000 AMF for the DDR programme, 
which was later downsized to 50,000.188 The DDR programme was about buying off 
the sense of entitlement of the top leadership, according to analysts.189 ‘Fahim didn’t 
have too much of a choice than to go along with DDR because ISAF was there. He 
agreed grudgingly because he stood to lose money. There were allegations that he was 
paid off, but those were not confirmed’.190 
 
The fact that DDR was mainly aimed at one political-military group was clearly 
visible in its implementation and was keenly felt by Panjshiris. First, it targeted only 
the AMF. The strategic implications of that were obvious, particularly to the Shura-ye 
Nazar faction, which dominated the AMF, and its allied commanders across the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  186	  Afghan New Beginnings Programme, “Weekly Summary Report, 4-10 January 
2004” (unpublished); Letter from Bismullah Khan, on behalf of the Ministry of 
Defense, to President Karzai, cabinet members and foreign diplomats, August 9, 2004 
(unpublished); Minutes of a Special National Security Council Security Sector 
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country. Non-AMF militias would remain armed (including private armed groups 
from factional leaders and militias employed by the coalition forces to fight the 
Taliban, particularly in the south), as would the thousands of Talibs who had fled the 
country with their weapons.  
 
Second, DDR mostly targeted former Northern Alliance commanders in the northern 
and western heartland. In the south, U.S-led coalition forces were hunting Taliban and 
al-Qaeda. Without official Afghan security forces, they relied on AMF militias for 
combat operations and to secure military bases, and opposed including these militias 
in DDR. ‘The Americans refused to let us do DDR in southern Afghanistan in the first 
year and a half’, said Babbington. ‘That created suspicion among the Tajiks that the 
U.S. was supporting the Pashtuns’.191 A high-ranking Shura-ye Nazar member 
confirms:  
 
The constitution praised the mujahedeen but in reality it was insulting them by 
taking their weapons. It was a zero-sum game for the mujahedeen. They 
thought they were the targets of this process.  A small minority were prepared 
to give up their weapons. But the majority did not want to do it at all, or said 
that they would only submit their weapons if they could get a government 
position. My suggestion was to reintegrate any suitable mujahedeen in the 
ANA and ANP. Those who are not capable for the army should join the civil 
sector. Other people should be paid, an amount consummate with their rank.192  
 
 
Third, as DDR was meant to pave the way for a new army, with recruits untainted 
with past factional affiliations, there were few reintegration opportunities in the ANA 
for the AMF commanders. This would have been the most logical route for many of 
them, as they had little work experience off the battlefield. U.S. general Karl 
Eikenberry, responsible for SSR and aiming to build a new army, insisted on a 10 per 
cent cap on DDR participants entering the ANA.193  
 
Former ANBP officials say this was a ‘strategic mistake’.194 One said: ‘We proposed 
to mix them up. Take a person from Kunduz and send him to Jalalabad, for example. 	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Of course you need to justify the size of the army, but I thought already at the time 
that the target number of 70,000 was naïve. We had our first suicide bombing in 2003; 
the writing was on the wall’.195 A former senior DDR official said: ‘They [the 
Americans] were not in Afghanistan [to make it a] democratic country. The initial 
reason was the War on Terror’.196 
 
This lack of reintegration opportunities in the new ANA was compounded by the 
overall insufficient attention to reintegration. Afghan factional leaders pushed for 
more reintegration incentives but donors and the ANBP, which was managed by ex-
military figures, focused more on disarmament and demobilisation. ‘When the 
programme was set up we were very focused on preparing the groundwork for 
disarmament and demobilisation, at the expense of reintegration’, said a former senior 
DDR official. ‘In hindsight we should have focused much more on reintegration 
before disarmament and demobilisation’.197   
 
A former high-ranking government official, who, for the PDPA regime, had been 
involved in Dr. Najibullah’s National Reconciliation Programme, said it was a major 
mistake to not offer more reintegration options: 
 
They should have given the mujahedeen money and a position. The 
government should have made a course for them to study how to be good 
government officials. We needed those people. But they never thought about 
the dignity of these people.198 
 
 
In sum, AMF commanders were asked to give up their weapons without guarantees 
that they would be safe and while rivals remained armed. They were offered the same 
reintegration opportunities (farming, small businesses etc.) as their fighters, which 
angered many commanders. In October 2004 the Commander Incentive Program was 
introduced, providing financial incentives and training opportunities for senior 
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commanders. But this measure still left out the many lower level commanders, who 
still faced the same options as the rank and file.199 
 
A former DDR official who had to negotiate with commanders on their disarmament 
remembers that they were ‘very unhappy’:  
 
I think it was because we were developing the programme on the fly. There 
were no packages for commanders. Karzai would tell them I will make you 
governor or police chief, but they couldn’t be sure of that. We also flew some 
commanders to Malaysia [for training]. We were desperate to get their good 
will, and if that meant taking them to a nice hotel in Malaysia that was fine as 
far as we were concerned. But even at an early stage we knew it would be 
complicated. We were coming in promising change, and the commanders, 
who had been fighting for decades, were more cynical and in retrospect more 
realistic. They were extremely difficult.200 
 
 
The unfavourable conditions of the DDR programme motivated commanders to keep 
as many weapons and men as they could. The most powerful among them could 
manipulate the process because of the limited knowledge within the UN on their 
militias and command and control structures. ‘It was about figuring out who was who 
and what they needed’, said a former analyst. ‘But the UN didn’t have that level of 
intelligence. It had no idea of command structures’.201   
 
Commanders therefore ‘controlled more or less’ who to put forward and which 
weapons to hand in. ‘We were continuously negotiating with commanders’, said a 
former DDR official who travelled around the countryside, supposedly disarming 
commanders.202 But they only allowed the disarmament of weak or rival sub-
commanders, and kept their best men armed, according to the same official and 
former colleagues. DDR officials ‘took whatever they brought in’, confirmed another 
former DDR official. ‘This was a great weakness of DDR. People received benefits 
on the basis of the junk they had retrieved from their grandfather’s backyard’.203  
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According to official figures, as the programme ended in July 2005, 63,380 ex-
combatants had been demobilised and 55,054 of them received reintegration 
benefits.204 Analyst Caroline Hartzell estimates that 80 per cent of them were, 
however, ‘members of self-defense groups selected to participate in the process by 
commanders who sought to retain control of seasoned troops’.205 DDR could not 
break the link between mid-level commanders and their men – its primary goal. Often 
it even reinforced patron-client relations between commanders and their men.206  
 
The case studies below show that permanently separating commanders from fighters 
was always going to be complicated in Afghanistan, where bonds between 
commanders and their men – usually from the same family or sub-tribe or who lived 
in the same village – usually preceded their shared battlefield experience. That said, 
many commanders and fighters were tired of fighting. Many seemed at least open to 
the possibility of reintegration into civilian life.  
 
The unfavourable conditions of the first DDR programme (the targeting of only one 
group in an insecure environment; the sequencing of disarmament and demobilisation 
before reintegration and the lack of attractive reintegration opportunities) meant, 
however, that most commanders actively resisted disarmament and made sure to 
retain ties to their former fighters. Most sought to obtain government positions 	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and the Folly,” 485-486; Bhatia and Sedra, Afghanistan, Arms, 129, 133, 134, 114. 205	  Hartzell, “Missed Opportunities,” 9.  206	  Hartzell, “Missed Opportunities,” 8; Barbara Stapleton, “Disarming the Militias” 
(paper presented at conference of the Swedish Committee for Afghanistan 
Conference, 2009), republished by the Afghanistan Analysts Network in 2013. 
http://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/20130428BS-
Disarming_the_Militias_w_Preface_FINAL.pdf (accessed 14 February 2014). 
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through patronage – which often meant taking their followers with them – rather than 
through DDR procedures, which would have favoured individual reintegration. As a 
result the first DDR programme increased the factionalisation of the government. 
 
The commanders who were most successful in obtaining sought-after government 
positions were those with good connections in the Karzai government (mostly those at 
the senior – regional and provincial – level). Many of these former AMF commanders 
ended up in the ANP. But because this happened through personal connections rather 
than the DDR programme, they did not reintegrate individually but with their militias, 
with command structures still intact. A former high-ranking MoI official said: 
 
The problem with DDR was that the government accepted the warlords. The 
wartime political structures were not destroyed. They only allowed 10 per cent 




This undermined DDR’s priority of breaking the ties between commanders and their 
fighters and increased factionalisation of the government, undermining its legitimacy 
in the eyes of Afghans. ‘DDR was a joke. The commanders just took their fighters 
into the police, but they were not under control of the MoI’, said former USAID 
official Richard Scarth. ‘Divisions slipped into MoI’.208 ‘The government gave the 
bad guys to the MoI’, confirms a former high-level MoI official.209 
 
There were differences among the international community and the Afghan 
government. One group [President Karzai and U.S. Ambassador Khalilzad] 
wanted stability first and the other ones [the westernised faction of the Karzai 
government, which at that time included MoI minister Jalali] wanted the rule 
of law first. But the last group was sidelined. We compromised for short-term 
stability and we can see the consequences in the long run, the bad rule of law, 
the instability. 
 
There were also many AMF commanders who were unable to obtain a government 
position because they lacked good connections in Kabul. The case studies indicate 
that especially mid-level and low-level commanders struggled to find a new place in 
the post-Taliban order. Their non-AMF rivals remained armed so they also sought to 	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remain armed. Moreover, while most foot soldiers had self-demobilised after 2001 
and had gone home to a life of farming, the commanders’ careers had been made on 
the battlefield.210 As a high-ranking member of one of the former Northern Alliance 
parties said: 
 
Before DDR the political command of the former jihadi parties was the same 
as the military command. That changed; the chain of command shifted to the 
political as they transitioned from military-political organisations into 
political-military organisations. Mid-level and low-level commanders were in 
a vacuum. Before DDR they had been authorities with bodyguards. Overnight 
they became Mr. Nobodies.211 
 
 
Some commanders in the south rearmed as Afghan Security Guards, which were 
militias working with SOF to secure bases and assist in combat. Other commanders 
who lost out through DDR started operating against the government, with some 
joining the insurgency – examples run throughout the case studies. This development 
contributed significantly to rising insecurity in Afghanistan after 2004, at about the 
time when the Taliban was reorganising in Pakistan; a factor that so far received scant 
attention in analysis of Afghanistan’s destabilisation.  
 
This meant that not only did the DDR programme increase the factionalisation of the 
government, but it also deepened the political exclusion that was the main driver of 
the insurgency, other violence and of increasing militarisation. ‘For three years (after 
the Bonn Conference) we had everything, there was peace and security’, said Fahim, 
who died in March 2014, in a 2008 interview. ‘When Karzai tried to make his own 
government and ousted the mujahedeen [this led to] insecurity. Now there is fighting 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  210	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everywhere’.212 Another high-ranking Shura-ye Nazar member was more direct: ‘The 
generation that fought against the communists started fighting against the 
government’.213  
 
Overall, therefore, although DDR was part of the conventional international state 
building agenda that was pursued in Afghanistan after 2001, at least according to 
statements of foreign officials, the first DDR programme was only initiated when 
foreign powers and the UN wanted to reverse the political and military influence of 
one faction. Northern Alliance commanders had helped oust the Taliban regime, but 
had afterwards become a liability, especially in the run-up to the 2004 presidential 
elections that many diplomats hoped interim president Hamid Karzai, a Pashtun from 
the south seen as a firm ally of the West, would win.  
 
To provide cover and funding to this push back against former Northern Alliance 
leaders, particularly those of the Shura-ye Nazar faction, the international community 
used the language and practice of state building. The fact that a state building 
framework was already in place helped facilitate this. ‘Lead-nations’ had so far, 
however, not delivered on the promises made in the framework. This situation 
presented two problems for the first internationally funded attempt to disarm, 
demobilise and reintegrate militia commanders and fighters. First, the DDR 
programme was based on a UN template ill-suited to Afghan traditions in dealing 
with militias and to the post-2001 political reality. Second, the programme started 
before other state building elements were in place, most importantly a significantly 
sized army and police. 
 
The initiation of DDR as a stand-alone programme reflected the fact that the U.S. was 
in Afghanistan in the first place to pursue a military campaign against the Taliban 
rather than rebuild the state. In this context, the first DDR programme deepened the 
pattern of political exclusion by cutting armed commanders loose from the 
government. Only the most powerful were able to obtain positions in the ANSF or 	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local administrations. The programme succeeding DDR aiming to disband illegal 
militias (DIAG) ended up repeating this pattern, as the next section of this chapter 
shows. Both programmes undermined the project of building a stronger state in 
Afghanistan, of which they were supposed to be part, by contributing to the 
government’s factionalisation and to growing violence and insurgency.  
 
2.2. Disbanding Illegal Armed Groups (DIAG) 
 
In December 2004 the top American commander in Afghanistan, Lt. Gen. David W. 
Barno, overseeing 17,000 coalition troops, argued three wars were raging: the hunt for 
Taliban and al-Qaeda leaders; the campaign against Taliban and al-Qaeda networks; 
and the battle against provincial warlords, drugs traffickers and other ‘centrifugal 
forces’.214 This last group included former AMF commanders who had been able to 
keep their now illegal militia intact despite the first DDR programme. The UN wrote: 
‘The groups supporting illegal weapons ownership perpetuate the drug industry, 
impose illegal taxes on individuals in reconstruction projects and impede the progress 
of state expansion’.215  
 
The initiative for a programme targeting ‘illegal militias’ (the term ‘illegal armed 
groups’, IAGs, was adopted later) appears to have come from the westernised faction 
of the Karzai administration, which included former Communication Minister 
Mohammad Masoom Stanekzai and Minister of Interior Ali Ahmad Jalali. 
Presidential Decree 50 from July 2004 defined all groups outside the AMF as illegal 
and called for their disbandment. A planning cell within the ANBP identified in 2005 
1,870 illegal militias, with around 129,000 men and some 336,000 small arms and 
light weapons. The problem was probably graver. An internal ISAF document on 
DIAG estimated there were 4 to 6 million small arms in Afghanistan.216 A later 
internal DIAG study listed 3,200 commanders, each with between five and 300 men.  
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The DIAG programme was more Afghan-owned than the internationally-driven DDR. 
The Disarmament and Reintegration Commission (including representatives of the 
relevant ministries, foreign donors, the UN, the European Union (EU), ISAF and the 
coalition forces, chaired by then-Vice-President Mohammad Karim Khalili) assumed 
‘the dual role of DIAG steering committee and high-level policy lead for the process, 
giving it strategic direction and coordinating the various actors engaged in it at the 
political level’. The Joint Secretariat (JS), including representatives from security 
institutions, UNAMA and ISAF, and DIAG provincial committees (chaired by the 
governor, and with provincial representatives from relevant ministries) were 
principally responsible for implementation. The blueprint was flexible, allowing for 
regionally-specific implementation.217 
 
In its first five years, the programme received more than $36 million – again Japan 
paid for much of it.218 Publicly, the UNDP – involved through its management of the 
ANBP – stated that DIAG aimed to be more than a nationwide weapons collection. It 
aimed to rid the country of parallel-armed structures. ‘Its ultimate objective is to 
allow the re-establishment of the rule of law through the promotion of good 
governance’.219 Internally, however, DIAG was seen as ‘a weapons collection 
programme supported by community development incentives’.220 
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Ahead of its main phase, DIAG aimed to reduce the number of public officials with 
links to IAGs. First, it targeted commanders who had registered as candidates in the 
parliamentary elections in September 2005. The JS had compiled a list of 1,108 
candidates with potential links to armed groups and passed it to the Electoral 
Complaints Commission (ECC), the electoral dispute resolution body responsible for 
adjudicating disputes related to candidates’ eligibility to run for office, which 
provisionally disqualified 207 candidates, leading to the submission of 4,857 weapons 
from 124 candidates. 
 
Eventually, however, the ECC, under pressure from the government and foreign 
donors chose to exclude only thirty-four of the remaining eighty-three from the ballot. 
After the vote, the Afghanistan Human Rights Commission argued that more than 80 
per cent of winning candidates (in Kabul 60 per cent) maintained ties to IAGs. The 
effort to reduce the number of government officials with links to such groups was 
similarly inauspicious. The JS compiled a list of 600 suspected cases, but it could 
only reach consensus on forty-one, of whom five were dismissed and eight partially 
or fully complied with the request to disarm.221 
 
DIAG’s initial failures showed again how ‘deeply entrenched’ patronage networks 
were in the Afghan government and society.222 A senior DIAG official appeared near 
the top of DIAG’s list of ten most politically-influential commanders, according to a 
former DIAG official.223 
 
As with DDR, DIAG suffered from the accommodation approach of the Karzai 
government and its international allies. Especially in the run-up to the 2005 
parliamentary polls they preferred to avoid confronting those commanders they 
believed could cause instability. This ‘sent a signal to non-state actors that the 
government was not serious about disarmament’.224 
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The same problems reappeared during the 2009 presidential and provincial council 
elections (when the ECC received 302 challenges and excluded fifty-four people for 
ties with illegal armed groups) and the 2010 parliamentary elections (when initially 
around 300 nominees were accused of having links with armed groups, but the ECC 
excluded thirty-six people, a little more than 1 per cent of the total number of 
candidates). Both vetting processes suffered from a lack of support from key 
international and Afghan ministries – who often failed to provide information – and 
from political interference.225 
 
Key actors such as foreign donors, ISAF and Afghan factional leaders ultimately 
decided who could and could not run, instead of electoral legislation or DIAG rules. 
DIAG therefore was a deeply political process, rather than the technical exercise it 
appeared on paper. The real failure of candidate vetting before elections was not just 
that too few candidates were disqualified but that the criteria were manipulated for 
political purposes, conclude Patricia Gossman and Sari Kouvo on the 2005 
parliamentary elections:  
 
The procedures for verifying who was a member of an illegal armed group 
were easily manipulated for political purposes, with no system for 
distinguishing reliable from fabricated reports. The only candidates eventually 
disqualified were those who had no powerful supporters in the institutions 
overseeing the vetting. The law was not enforced against prominent candidates 




An insight into the manipulation of vetting ahead of the 2009 vote is provided by 
some of the U.S. embassy cables around that time. Two of the cables document a 
fierce struggle between the U.S., UK and Canada on one side and President Karzai on 
the other over Helmandi powerbrokers and Karzai allies former police chief Abdul 
Rahman Jan (aka ARJ) and former district governor Amir Mohammad Akhundzada 
(aka AMA), with JS chief Mohammad Masoom Stanekzai caught in the middle. 	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According to a cable of May 2009 the U.S. and UK had successfully lobbied to 
include ARJ and AMA on a new DIAG list, which included 3,200 people each with 
between five and three hundred armed men and had been drawn up as result of a 
‘remapping’ exercise. The remapping was meant to reinvigorate DIAG ahead of the 
2009 elections. A media campaign warned people that if they were found to have 
links with armed groups they would not be able to participate in the elections.227  
 
After ARJ and AMA had been included on the list (for ‘strong ties to illegal armed 
groups, in addition to their narcotics trafficking links’228) Stanekzai told a U.S. 
official that he had been summoned more than ten times to the presidential palace and 
requested by Karzai to remove them and other Karzai supporters in Helmand. 
Stanekzai reported that after his refusal he was ‘inundated with overt and implied 
threats by individuals ranging from mullahs to ministers who have flooded his office, 
he believes, at Karzai’s behest. ARJ and AMA brought a 54-person militia during one 
of their four visits’ to Stanekzai’s office. They were not the only candidates lobbying 
to be dropped off the list. The cables also mention former Interior Minister Moqbel 
Zarar visiting Stanekzai with a ‘fleet of armed men’ requesting him to remove several 
names. Christian Lamarre, DIAG’s JS Coordination Manager said: ‘We’ve basically 
had the illegal armed groups we’ve been going after in our own parking lot’.229  
 
Key considerations for international and national level actors involved in the 
manipulation of vetting seem to have run along two lines: first, a powerbroker’s 
spoiler potential; and second, his loyalty or support to the actor in question. Their 
links to armed groups – the DIAG rule for exclusion from participation in elections – 
was thus a secondary consideration. In fact, it often worked the other way around; if 
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strongmen were heavily armed it was usually considered to be all the more reason to 
not exclude them from participating.  
 
The U.S. cables show how Karzai used the first argument, the threat that ‘the tribes’ 
of ARJ and AMA would turn against the government, to warn against disqualify them 
from the 2009 elections.230 This may have been a consideration, and one that local 
powerbrokers often used to pressure patrons in Kabul. Presumably, though, his main 
motivation was their ability to muster votes for his re-election campaign.  In this 
particular case, donors regarded ARJ and AMA as spoilers who should not be 
accommodated (the UK had been behind the removal of AMA’s brother Sher 
Mohammad Akhundzada as governor of Helmand). But in other cases foreign donors 
were often swayed by the threat of potential spoilers. They were also protective of 
commanders who supported them in the fight against the Taliban, a consideration that 
gained increasing weight as insurgency grew rapidly after 2005 and spread across the 
country. These considerations obviously ran counter to the aims of DIAG.  
 
DIAG rules thus did little to prevent well-connected strongmen obtaining a seat in 
local councils or parliament (much like the first DDR programme had not prevented 
the most powerful AMF commanders of obtaining an ANSF position and moving 
their militias in wholesale). Only weaker commanders without ties to foreign forces or 
patrons in Kabul were excluded; again reflecting and deepening the dynamic of 
political exclusion that became the main driver of violence in Afghanistan. As the 
case study of Baghlan in chapter 4 shows, former AMF commander Amir Gul 
reportedly became engaged in anti-government activities after he was disqualified 
from running in the 2005 parliamentary elections because of his ties to illegal armed 
groups. His exclusion reflected the weakened position at the time of his main patron 
Fahim (who had been fired as defense minister and dropped from the Karzai’s ticket 
in the 2004 presidential elections). Because he had not been genuinely disarmed under 
the first DDR programme, he still had the means to cause trouble, which he did.  
 
For local powerbrokers like Gul and others in the case studies, a seat in parliament 
was an attractive reintegration opportunity. It gave them prestige, while also allowing 	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them to obtain patronage opportunities emanating from the international aid flowing 
into the government. The provision on links to armed groups in the electoral law 
should have been an incentive to sever ties with local armed groups before 
participating in elections. There were, however, strong incentives, running contrary, 
to retaining ties to illegal armed groups – even though those links usually loosened 
over time once a strongman entered parliament. Maintaining the threat of violence 
secured support back home, including during election campaigns. Militias employed 
followers, who gained income from the illegal taxation of villagers, narcotics and 
from foreign aid to militias; a percentage of which had to be kicked up to the political 
patron, in this case the new parliamentarian, in Kabul. Access to armed men also 
served as insurance in case the democratic experiment failed and foreigners left 
Afghanistan, as they had done before. 
 
The strongmen could thus keep one foot in government and one out; hedging their 
bets as they had done throughout decades of war. This development, while it fitted in 
Afghanistan’s history of strong informal networks and a weak state, bode poorly for 
the international state building project, of which DIAG was nominally part. Rather 
than dismantling informal networks and transferring to state institutions the loyalty of 
their members, the integration of strongmen with links to armed groups in parliament 
and other government positions meant that instead informal networks took over the 
state. Rather than the state subsuming informal networks, those networks captured the 
state.  
 
The question remains if breaking the links and command structures between 
commanders and their fighters, a key target of DIAG, was ever feasible. Most militias 
were based on pre-existing social networks – the solidarity networks or qaum 
mentioned in the introduction. The case studies show that commanders and fighters 
often had ethnic or sub-tribal ties, came from the same area or had fought side by side 
during the jihad. Demobilising the militias was not hard, but remobilising was just as 
easy, as men continued to see each other. As a 2009 evaluation observed: 
 
Virtually all Afghan qomanders are tied to their men by the concept of qawm. 
… Even if an IAG is formally disbanded, its members will still drink tea 
together because they probably all live in the same village as their qomander 
who will be a local farmer or the brother of the mullah, or indeed he may be 
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the mullah himself.231 
 
 
Even former comrades who had been apart for many years were relatively easy to 
remobilise for a new fight, provided someone could pay. This was of course what had 
already happened in October 2001 at the time of the U.S.-led intervention. The case 
studies include the examples of Malem Mir Wali in Helmand and Mir Alam in 
Kunduz, two former jihadi commanders who, with international aid, simply revived 
their old mujahedeen networks to fight the Taliban. Malem Mir Wali mustered his old 
Hezb-e Islami sub-commanders, some of whom he had not seen for years as he had 
fled Helmand in the 1990s. Mir Alam brought together his former sub commanders 
from Jamiat. 
 
In October 2001, before the fall of the Taliban regime, Hamid Karzai travelled to 
Uruzgan, to start an uprising against the Taliban – aided by the CIA. He knocked on 
the doors of the old jihadi commanders he knew from his visit to Uruzgan in the 
1980s when he was working for a non-governmental organisation. These commanders 
were linked to his main ally, former governor and jihadi commander Jan Mohammad, 
who at the time was in prison in Kandahar (but was soon released as a result of high-
level negotiations between Karzai and Taliban leaders). He also recruited Jan 
Mohammad’s nephew Matiullah, at the time a Taliban conscript.  
In order to help Karzai’s uprising, Matiullah in his turn recruited many family 
members and friends from his home village. Later, thanks to the president’s 
patronage, his half-brother in Kandahar and SOF, Matiullah became militia 
commander and eventually provincial police chief, and his family and friends were 
promoted alongside him. Their ties existed before Matiullah started working for 
Karzai (because they were family or friends from his village) and would therefore 
have continued to exist were those men ever demobilised (Matiullah was assassinated 
in March 2015).  
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  Robin-Edward Poulton, “DIAG Evaluation, Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups 
in Afghanistan, A Project of the United Nations Development Programme & the 
Afghanistan’s New Beginnings Programme,” study commissioned by the United 
Nations Development Programme, EPES Mandala Consulting, April 22, 2009; see 
also case studies; 311.	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Strongman Amir Gul in Baghlan kept his men in place in Baghlan-e Jadid district 
during decades of war by changing allegiances. He started out with Hezb-e Islami in 
the 1980s, switched to the Taliban as part of commander Bashir Baghlani’s force in 
the 1990s and then, in 2001, he switched to Jamiat. In a 2014 interview, he claimed 
that his former sub-commanders and fighters—his andiwal (comrades)—were still 
loyal to him.232 Of course, strongmen’s claims about the undying loyalty of their men 
are frequently contradicted by complaints from subordinates of mismanagement, 
abuse and lack of payment. Short of leaving the province or even the country, it 
would, however, be impossible for subordinates to break all ties and remain safe.  
In sum, long-standing ties between commanders and their men were difficult, if not 
impossible, to break, especially through a relatively superficial DIAG procedure. But 
more pressure from foreign donors and the Afghan government on all local 
strongmen, including the most powerful, would have made it more difficult for them 
to retain active links while in office, which would have bought time to establish 
stronger state institutions. Moreover, as the next section shows, despite the rhetoric on 
disarming illegal armed groups, the large-scale support of international and Afghan 
actors to non-state militia kept armed networks very much alive. In fact many 
networks massively expanded.  
DIAG was thus unable to break patronage links – between commanders and their 
fighters, but also between commanders and their patrons in government, who helped 
them to evade disarmament. During the programme’s main phase, which targeted 
IAGs across the country, high-profile government ministries, even those directly 
involved in the programme, obstructed and subverted it. Locally, the composition of 
the DIAG provincial committees often included governors or chiefs of police whose 
close ties to IAGs were widely known.  
 
Complicating this further, ISAF also had strong reservations about the forced 
disarmament of militias, which was an element of DIAG that its predecessor, the first 
DDR programme, did not envisage.233 As early as January 2005, ISAF officials 	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  Derksen, “The Politics,” 41.  233	  The main part of the programme was threefold: comprising voluntary compliance; 
negotiated compliance; and enforced compliance. Compliance was defined as the 
submission of 70 per cent of the weapons of the group in question. In a first stage 
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warned that without reinforcements of Afghan police, ‘the destabilization of whole 
regions is at stake’.234 International forces encountered more resistance than expected 
during their expansion into the southern provinces in 2006, and were immediately 
drawn into intensive counterinsurgency operations. From 2 until 17 September 2006 
around 1,400 regular ISAF troops fought in Operation Medusa in Kandahar, the 
largest battle in Afghanistan since the fall of the Taliban. But they were only able to 
beat back the Taliban temporarily, as follow-up operations showed.235  
 
With such effort expended on fighting the growing insurgency, ISAF was reluctant to 
support the forceful disarmament of IAGs. A former DIAG official said that ISAF’s 
unwillingness to contribute to DIAG significantly weighed on its failure. ‘They did 
not want to upset the balance of power in their area; they were thinking in six-month 
terms. They torpedoed us in any way they could’, said a former DIAG official.236  
 
An internal planning document from DIAG’s Joint Planning and Coordination Cell 
(JPCC) from April 2005 identified 395 high threat groups (high threat to the 
parliamentary elections planned for the fall of 2005, to counter narcotics efforts, and 
to good governance). Of these, twenty-five groups were deemed to threaten all three 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
illegally armed groups could voluntarily disarm. Development projects would serve as 
a motivation to persuade the illegal armed group to comply. If the group did not 
voluntarily disarm in a second phase it would be engaged in negotiations at the 
national, provincial and village level, including officials, mullahs and elders. In a 
third phase the group would be targeted for enforced compliance by the MoI and the 
ANP. In ‘extreme circumstances’ the ANA and the international security forces 
‘could be called in to assist’. Bhatia and Sedra, Arms and Conflict, 142. Barbara 
Stapleton points out that ISAF support in extremis was agreed in principle in 2006 via 
the PRT Executive Steering Committee’s Policy Note No 2 “PRT engagement in 
DIAG”. However, neither ISAF officials nor international staff ‘working within 
DIAG mechanisms’ were aware of its existence one-and-a-half year after its creation. 
She concludes ‘the enforcement phase has never been implemented’. Stapleton, 
“Disarming the Militias”. Forced disbandment of militias was also not acceptable to 
factions of the Afghan government. This became clear when a pilot operation 
targeting a very minor Jombesh-e Melli Islami-ye Afghanistan (National Islamic 
Movement of Afghanistan) commander was stopped in 2007 and the topic of forced 
disbandment was not raised again by the management of the DIAG programme; 502.  234	  ANBP, “Discussion Paper – draft 2”. ANBP, “Discussion paper – draft 3”.	  235	  Graeme Smith, The Dogs Are Eating Them Now, Our War in Afghanistan, 
(Toronto: Alfred A. Knopf, 2013), p 60, 77; Adam Day, “Operation Medusa, The 
Battle for Panjwai,” Legion Magazine, September 1, 2007. 236	  502.	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areas ‘and would likely not comply’ with DIAG. The document recommended 
targeting a few high threat groups, which would send a signal to others.237 But 
without the buy-in of key actors, like ISAF and high-level Afghan officials, DIAG 
officials ended up just targeting ‘low hanging fruit’, focusing on districts ‘which 
could easily be brought up to DIAG compliance levels’.238 These were generally areas 
with low levels of violence, where militias were weak, and little was at stake for 
international actors. Therefore, as with DDR, efforts focused on northern and western 
provinces.239 Like DDR, former Northern Alliance commanders saw the programme 
as a one-sided move against them, only now coming as the threat from the Taliban 
escalated. 
 
Another reason behind ISAF’s and the coalition forces’ reluctance to support DIAG 
was their frequent collaboration with unofficial militias targeted for disbandment. As 
the training of a new army and police progressed more slowly than expected and the 
insurgency staged ever more violent attacks, international forces increasingly relied 
on militias for combat operations and securing bases. Internal DIAG documents 
reveal how desperate ISAF and coalition forces were for additional troops. One, an 
ANBP discussion document from 25 January 2005, which included comments from 
donors, the UN, the MoD, ISAF and the coalition forces, discusses the DIAG 
category of local militias, or ‘small armed groups protecting villages against raiders’. 
ISAF comments: ‘In order to come up with security gaps, could some of those local 
militias be temporarily registered and assist ANP? They would promise to follow a 
code of conduct and obey the governor’.240  
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  DIAG Joint Planning and Coordination Cell, “Planning Document – draft 3” 
(planning document, April 17, 2005.	  238	  DIAG progress report first quarter 2007. See for term low-hanging fruit 
http://www.undp.org.af/whoweare/undpinafghanistan/Projects/Reports/DIAG/Q1%20
2007%20DIAG%20Report.pdf) During the planning for DIAG it was expected that 
especially ‘high threat’ groups would ‘require a more robust capacity than a voluntary 
local militia’. ANBP, “Discussion Paper – draft 2”. ANBP, “Discussion Paper – draft 
3”. 	  239	  Giustozzi shows the north, northeast and western provinces account for 71 per cent 
of the weapons collected, and the south, southeast and east for only 16 per cent. 
Giustiozzi, “Bureaucratic Façade”.	  	  240	  ANBP, “Discussion Paper – draft 3”.	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Another internal ISAF document from 16 March 2005 says that these militias can be 
disbanded ‘only after Afghan National Police (ANP) reaches the capability to provide 
security throughout Afghanistan’.241 Later documents list militias working for foreign 
troops and international security companies separately from other IAGs. They suggest 
that the Afghan government would legitimise these particular militias: ‘By giving 
these groups legitimacy they can immediately be discounted as far as an illegal 
militias disbandment programme is concerned’.242 
 
The discussion documents show tensions between the Afghan government and the 
international community over control of militias working with the international 
military and their disbandment under DIAG. For example, in a paper dated 25 January 
2005 featuring comments from Afghan MoD, American coalition forces, ISAF, 
Canadian embassy, British embassy, Afghan MoD officials request more influence 
regarding the Afghan Security Forces [also called Afghan Security Guards, militias 
working with coalition forces to secure bases and assist in combat], as they ‘have 
committed crimes against Afghan citizens, perhaps using their position with the 
Coalition Forces to fulfill [sic] ethnic vendettas’. The Canadian embassy, however, 
replies: ‘Attention needs to be given to activities of these groups when not under CF 
[Coalition Forces] command and control’. The comments of ‘CFC’, referring to 
Combined Forces Command Afghanistan (CFC-A), or the coalition forces, emphasise 
the difference between the Afghan Security Forces and the other militia categories, 
and says that it will plan the disbandment of the Afghan Security Forces ‘quite 
separately’ from that of other militias.243  
 
Through this type of manoeuvring, for militias working with the international military 
troops or operating in areas where they were deployed, DIAG resulted not in their 
disbandment but in a push for their legalisation. This happened mostly through the 
registration of private security companies and a series of militia programmes that the 
U.S. started supporting from 2006 onwards: the Afghan National Auxiliary Police 
(ANAP) in 2006; the Afghan Public Protection Program (APPP or AP3); the 
Community Defense Initiative (CDI); the Local Defense Initiative (LDI), the Critical 	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  International Security Assistance Force, “Concept of Operations”.	  242	  ANBP, “Discussion Paper – draft 3”.  243	  ANBP, “Discussion Paper – draft 3”. 
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Infrastructure Program (CIP) and, the latest, the Afghan Local Police (ALP), which 
started in 2010 and continues now. International forces did not initiate all programmes 
and formally many were managed by the government. In reality, though, militias 
‘often had closer relationships with foreign forces than with the government’.244 
 
From the perspective of commanders of those illegal armed groups targeted by DIAG 
it was more interesting to join a militia programme than to comply with DIAG, for 
two main reasons. First, the growing Taliban insurgency – which was, as the case 
studies show, to a great extent the result of their own predatory behaviour – made it 
more important than ever to keep their weapons and men close by.  
 
Second, DIAG offered no reintegration alternative. After some debate between the 
ANBP, ISAF, American coalition forces, main donors and the Defense Ministry 
during the programme’s design stage, it had been decided that participants should not 
get individual reintegration packages. This was major shift from DDR and reflected 
Western reluctance to reward ‘criminals’. 245 Instead, DIAG provided only 
development projects ‘to those districts which become compliant and free of IAGs’, 
assuming that communities could influence the mobilisation and demobilisation of 
militias. 246 This assumption, however – which both DIAG and the later ALP 
programme were based on – was out-dated. As a former DIAG official says: ‘That 
idea was based on the Afghan social structure before 1978’.247 Wars since had 
disrupted this structure and community enforcement was not feasible.   
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  Jonathan Goodhand and Aziz Hakimi, “Counterinsurgency, Local Militias and 
Statebuilding in Afghanistan,” United States Institute of Peace, 2014, 9. Afghan and 
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team; 301. 	  245	  Dennys, “Disarmament, Demobilization and Rearmament”, 9; DIAG Joint 
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245 Introduction to DIAG on the ANBP website: 
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e&id=2&Itemid=17 (Accessed 8 June).	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  Introduction to DIAG on the ANBP website: 
http://www.anbp.af.undp.org/homepage/index.php?option=com_content&view=articl
e&id=2&Itemid=17 (Accessed 8 June).	  247	  502.	  
© Linde Dorien Derksen 2017  102	  
By the beginning of 2011, DIAG had collected 49,786 weapons. They represented 
less than 15 per cent of the programme’s target and fewer than half those surrendered 
were categorised as usable.248 The last United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP) annual report from the end of 2010 said in total 759 IAGs had been 
disbanded. It claimed this was 94 per cent of its target, even though initial estimations 
put the number of militias between 1,870 and 3,200. The DIAG programme, 
originally planned to end in 2007, still exists as part of the Afghan Peace and 
Reintegration Programme, discussed below, and has cells in the MoI and the MoD. 
According to Afghan officials, DIAG collects only weapons from participants in the 
APRP and from defeated insurgents. However, a well-informed high-level Afghan 
government official says: ‘DIAG still exists on paper but in term of content and 
quality it does not exist anymore’. His view, which is shared by others, is that:  
 
Everyone has a different perception about DIAG but I believe the increasing 
insurgency and the widening corruption are rooted in the poor implementation 
of DIAG and the presence of irresponsible armed groups in Afghanistan.249 
 
 
On paper, DIAG had perhaps most potential of all DDR programmes in that it 
covered all illegal armed groups in Afghanistan. It came at a critical time, when some 
former commanders were deciding whether join the expanding insurgency—
especially in the south and the east. It offered, however, no benefits to individual 
participants, who were viewed as criminals. At the same time many were not 
disarmed, because both Afghan factions and foreign troops protected commanders 
linked to them. ISAF was also wary of rocking the boat in an already insecure 
environment and thus refrained from assisting the ANSF in enforcing compliance. 
DIAG thus lacked both carrots and sticks. It has had very little impact on 
Afghanistan’s informal security sector. The commanders featured in the case studies, 
who participated in DIAG, were actually more heavily armed after DIAG than they 
had been before. Some benefited from the legalisation of their militias – arguably 
DIAG’s main impact. 
 
DDR had reinforced political exclusion because it enabled powerful commanders to 
disarm and weaken their rivals and obtain attractive government positions. DIAG 	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targeted illegal militias, many of whom were ex-AMF commanders who had not been 
sufficiently well-connected to enter government after DDR, but who had not been 
effectively disarmed. The most powerful among this group entered provincial 
councils and parliament without severing ties to their illegal armed groups. As the 
insurgency gathered pace, other relatively well-connected commanders benefited 
from programmes that legalised militias, the most prominent of which was the ALP, 
which enabled them to prey on weaker commanders. In short, after DDR had led to 
the inclusion in government of the most powerful commanders and the exclusion of 
weaker ones, DIAG repeated this dynamic, again reinforcing political exclusion. 
© Linde Dorien Derksen 2017  104	  
Chapter 3 Demobilising Enemies: PTS and APRP 
 
3.1. Programme Tahkim Sulh (PTS) 
 
In 2005, the year that DIAG was created, a separate DDR programme was established 
for the Taliban, called Programme Takhim Sulh (PTS), or the Strengthening Peace 
Program. The Taliban’s separate treatment was rooted in the fact that the post-2001 
political order was based not on a peace agreement between the warring parties, but 
on the victory of U.S. allies and the exclusion of the Taliban. Though Taliban 
commanders had been targeted for ad-hoc disarmament after the fall of their regime 
they were not included in any official DDR programme until the PTS in 2005.  
 
Faced with a growing insurgency in 2004 and at the same time wanting to free up 
troops for Iraq, the U.S. had started supporting plans to offer amnesty to mid-level 
insurgent commanders and their fighters in exchange for their surrender. In 
anticipation of the Afghan government’s launch of the PTS, the U.S. military started 
to register low-level Taliban willing to disarm and return home. ‘By next summer 
we’ll have a much better sense if the security threat is diminished as a result of, say, a 
significant reconciliation with large numbers of Taliban’, Lieutenant-General David 
Barno, the head of the U.S. led troops in Afghanistan (Combined Forces Command –
Afghanistan) said in December 2004.250 
 
In the meantime Karzai, contending with strong former Northern Alliance factions in 
the transitional administration, tried to reach out to marginalised Pashtuns.251 In a 
speech to a gathering of ulema in Kabul in April 2003 he said ‘the ordinary Taliban 
who are real and honest sons of this country’ were different to those ‘who still use the 
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  “Countries draw up Taliban proposal,” Chicago Tribune, 2004. See also Colonel 
David Lamm, “Success in Afghanistan Means Fighting Several Wars at Once,” 
Armed Forces Journal, November 2005. Between the summer of 2003 and the 
summer of 2004 close to 1,000 people were killed in attacks mostly linked to Taliban. 
Less than a year later the insurgency was estimated to be 2,000 strong. Sayed 
Salahuddin, “U.S. Military Worried by Afghan Infighting in West,” Reuters, August 
16, 2004; “Top US general in Afghanistan sees major Taliban attacks in coming 
months,” Agence France Presse, April 17, 2005.	  251	  On Pashtun alienation also see ICG, “Afghanistan: The Problem of Pashtun 
Alienation,” International Crisis Group, August 5, 2003. 	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Taliban cover to disturb peace and security in the country’. No one had ‘the right to 
harass/persecute anyone under the name of Talib/Taliban anymore’.252  
 
The PTS was established in March 2005 by presidential decree. It had twelve offices, 
mostly in the south and east, and was supported by the U.S., the UK and The 
Netherlands. Participants had to disarm and accept the constitution in exchange for 
guarantees they would not be arrested. The programme also saw detainees released 
from the U.S.-controlled Parwan detention centre and Guantanamo (529 detainees 
were released, according to the Small Wars Journal).253 
 
American Lieutenant-General Barno predicted that the Taliban insurgency would 
collapse in a few months time as rank and file Taliban accepted the government’s 
reconciliation offer. But the expanding insurgency and an increase in suicide attacks 
quickly disproved him. Despite the growing insurgency, PTS administrators’ claimed 
to have brought in 8,700 militants by the programme’s end in July 2011. The 
International Crisis Group quoted UK and U.S. officials saying that figure was highly 
inflated. Also, half of those benefiting from PTS support were not actually insurgents, 
according to an unreleased UN study cited in a report from Harvard and Tufts 
Universities. Research for this report supports these findings. Another indication that 
the programme had not worked was the fact that, as with its successor the APRP, 
numbers were higher in the northeast than in the southwest, the Taliban heartland. In 
fact in Kunduz and Baghlan, which both had high numbers of participants on paper, at 
the time of the start of the PTS in 2005 there was no insurgency.254 	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  Amin Terzi, “Afghanistan: Is Reconciliation With The Neo-Taliban Working?,” 
Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty, June 2, 2005. See also Derksen, “The Politics”; On 
Pashtun alienation also see ICG, “Afghanistan: The Problem of Pashtun Alienation,” 
International Crisis Group, August 5, 2003.  
253 The Afghanistan National Independent Peace and Reconciliation Commission’s 
official website (now taken offline) did not feature a description of the reintegration 
procedure therefore the description of the International Crisis Group is used. ICG, 
“Talking about Talks: Towards a Political Settlement in Afghanistan,” International 
Crisis Group, 2012. For more on the PTS programme see also Joanna Nathan, “A 
Review of Reconciliation Efforts in Afghanistan,” CTC Sentinel, August 15, 2009.  254	  The estimated number of insurgents grew to around 12,000 in 2006 according to 
the Taliban’s own estimate, half that according to NATO countries and the number of 
suicide attacks, a new method, increased from 17 in 2005 to 123 in 2006. Carlotta 
Gall, “Taliban Surges as U.S. Shifts some Tasks to NATO,” New York Times, June 
11, 2006; David Rohde, “Afghan Suicide Attacks Rising, Report Shows,” New York 
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What went wrong? Why did the PTS seemingly fail to attract many Taliban 
commanders and fighters? Although, in contrast to DDR, the programme was 
Afghan-owned, its influence seemed limited to the patronage network of its head, 
Sibghatullah Mojadeddi (a former speaker of the National Assembly’s upper house, 
former acting president (after the fall of the Najibullah government in 1992) and 
leader of Jebh-e Nejat-e Milli (National Liberation Front)). PTS also suffered from 
weak institutional arrangements. It had few offices, was understaffed, under-
resourced and opaque, according to a 2009 report by the Chr. Michelsen Institute.255 
 
According to PTS officials, outreach to the Taliban was left to elders in each area, 
who also functioned as a vetting committee. If they believed a candidate qualified, 
they sent a letter guaranteeing his cooperation to Kabul. In response the commission 
would issue a letter signed by Mojadeddi, and with a fingerprint from the participant, 
which stated that he accepted the constitution. The commission would also request 
that the governor help him, for example by giving him land. 
 
However, interviews in June 2008 with participants, who were in the Kabul PTS 
office and claimed to be with the Taliban or Hezb-e Islami in Helmand, Kunar and 
Uruzgan, suggest that the PTS programme offered little beyond the letter. Participants 
had no place to stay in Kabul but could not return to their home provinces. Fighting 
was still raging there and the letter from the PTS head Mojadeddi would not 
guarantee help from local governments who, until recently, participants had been 
fighting. Instead, they said, they feared for their lives.256 
 
The issues with PTS clearly went beyond technical problems with management and 
funding. Instead, the causes for its failure should be sought in the political 
environment in which it took place. Crucial to understanding this environment, both 	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on national and subnational level, is to take a closer look at the Taliban’s genesis 
between their 2001 ousting from power and the programme’s launch in 2005.  
 
Taliban representatives were excluded from the Bonn Conference in 2001, which laid 
the foundations for Afghanistan’s new political order. The head of the UN delegation 
to the conference, Lakhdar Brahimi, later said their exclusion was a mistake.  But 
‘[a]ny talk about reaching out to the Taliban or those of them who might agree to join 
the Bonn process was unceremoniously dismissed’. 257 Francesc Vendrell, the 
Personal Representative of the Secretary-General in Afghanistan at the time of the 
Bonn Conference, said everyone knew that inviting Taliban leaders would be 
unacceptable to the U.S. As a result no party to the talks suggested doing so.258 The 
overriding concern of the U.S. was to seek retribution for the September 11 attacks 
and prevent ‘terrorists’ sheltering in Afghanistan. President Bush declared: ‘[N]o cave 
is deep enough to escape the patient justice of the United States of America’.259 
 
Were it not for the hawkish U.S. stance, opportunities for the reintegration of high-
level Taliban did exist, especially in the south. On the Taliban side, a number of 
senior figures, with the ‘prominent exception’ of the movement’s leader Mullah 
Omar, were willing to accept the new government, writes former CIA Islamabad 
station chief Robert Grenier. Senior Taliban members approached Karzai to negotiate 
their surrender. He was at the time in Uruzgan, where he had tried to foment a tribal 
uprising against the Taliban with help from the CIA. En route to Kandahar, Karzai 
met with Taliban delegations on 5 and 6 December, while the international 
community and anti-Taliban Afghan factions met in Bonn to discuss Afghanistan’s 
future.260  
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According to Grenier, Karzai, who was appointed on 6 December as the head of the 
interim government, tended towards generosity in promises to Taliban officials. But at 
the same time he did not want to jeopardise American support. ‘To the extent he 
could intuit U.S. attitudes, they were reflexively hostile toward anyone associated 
with the Taliban. Karzai’s political room for manoeuvre was extremely limited….’261  
 
The U.S. government also appeared to have no clear policy on dealing with Taliban 
leaders. Grenier: ‘There were never, to my knowledge, any clear discussions, let alone 
any agreement, between Karzai and any American authority concerning the status or 
potential reintegration of senior Taliban members into Afghan political life’. 
Regarding his own role, Grenier notes: ‘From the collapse of the Taliban government 
in December 2001 until my departure from Pakistan in June 2002, I neither sought nor 
received any sort of policy guidance regarding senior Taliban figures, many of whom 
were thought to have fled to Pakistan’.262 
 
Participants of the first meeting between Karzai and Taliban senior figures on 5 
December 2001 recount that Karzai promised the Taliban delegation that he would be 
able to hold off airstrikes to allow them to reach Pakistan, in return for the release of 
prisoners (including former jihadi commander Jan Mohammad profiled in the 
Uruzgan case study). According to one participant, airstrikes ceased when the meeting 
was taking place, but resumed immediately the prisoners were handed over; an 
indication that Karzai could not deliver on his promises.263 
 
The following day Karzai met with a larger group, who claimed to be acting on 
Mullah Omar’s behalf.264 They agreed to a truce with Karzai in return for an amnesty 
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that ‘would allow them to live in security and dignity’.265 However, Defence 
Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld said amnesty was unacceptable. To the Americans, 
‘and particularly the Department of Defence’, most if not all senior members of the 
Taliban had al-Qaeda connections, ‘and their detention therefore an imperative of the 
“War on Terror”’.266 Taliban leaders, some of whom returned to their villages and 
sent letters of support to President Karzai after he was inaugurated on 22 December 
2001, were ‘were soon hunted down by U.S. Special Operations Forces’.267 
 
Many senior Taliban figures were able to escape to Pakistan, some under the cover of 
the surrender agreement with Karzai on 6 December, which had been brokered by 
Kandahari powerbroker Mullah Naqibullah. Numerous others were arrested and 
ended up in Guantanamo or detention centres in Afghanistan, including Mullah Abdul 
Salam Zaeef, the Taliban ambassador to Pakistan who was arrested by the ISI and 
Wakil Ahmed Muttawakil, the former foreign minister, who had surrendered to 
Kandahar governor Gul Agha Shirzai’s men and was turned over to the Americans.268 
 
American hostility towards the Taliban, combinated with a lack of a clear policy on 
what to do with senior figures, resulted in their arbitrary treatment and contributed to 
their ‘early alienation’.269 Many observers and western officials, even some within the 
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U.S. government, believe that the U.S. should have taken a more reconciliatory 
approach towards the Taliban leaders in 2001 and 2002, many of whom ended up as 




It seemed clear that there would have to be some process of reconciliation 
with the rank-and-file of the Taliban, and for that to be credible, reconciliation 
would have to extend to members of the leadership who were neither under 
indictment for crimes nor had any continuing relations with al-Qa’ida.271 
 
 
The U.S. government wasn’t as overtly hostile to the idea of reintegrating lower-level 
Taliban in 2001, though again a clear policy was lacking. There seemed to be little 
awareness that the high-level discussions between Karzai and Taliban leaders were 
replicated in villages all over Afghanistan between mid-level commanders and village 
elders or U.S. backed commanders. In fact, the Taliban regime was toppled without 
much fighting partly thanks to the massive defection of the regime’s rank and file. 
Thomas Barfield writes:  
 
The war did not have any decisive battles. Just as the Taliban had come to 
power by persuading people that they were winners without fighting and 
buying the defection of wavering commanders with suitcases full of hundred 
dollar bills, they lost the war in the reverse process.272 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
spokesman went to Yale. Some former Taliban leaders were detained at Guantanamo 
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decisions’. Nathan, “A Review”.  
Kate Clark explored the backgrounds of the five Guantanamo detainees who were 
swapped for POW Bowe Bergdahl in June 2014. Clark notes that three of the five 
detainees “were taken to Guantanamo after they had either surrendered peacefully in 
return for promised safe passage home or had reached out to the new administration 
in Kabul”. Former chief of the army staff Fazl Mazlum was the “only one of the five 
to face accusations of explicit war crimes and they are, indeed, extremely serious”. 
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Indeed, loyalties were much more fluid and complex than the simplistic view, which 
tended to guide the American leadership’s thinking, of Taliban versus anti-Taliban. 
Over decades of war, warring commanders tended to remain in contact with each 
other. Many hedged their bets, jumping ship when the other side appeared to be 
winning. Contacts on the other side could run along, for example, sub-tribal or 
familial lines or could have been established when commanders had been fighting on 
the same side previously. Someone trusted by both sides could broker talks between 
commanders or between commanders and other community leaders.  
 
Examples of defections in the provincial case studies abound. For example, Taliban 
commander Amir Gul from Baghlan district Baghlan-e Jadid joined Jamiat troops 
before they entered Kunduz. In Kunduz former Hezb-e Islami commanders from an 
influential Uzbek family, the Ibrahimis, incorporated fighters who had previously 
defected to the Taliban into their militias. In Helmand many Taliban fighters joined 
the militias of former jihadi commanders Sher Mohammad Akhundzada and Malem 
Mir Wali. Even the armed group that Karzai mobilised in Uruzgan included Taliban 
fighters. In fact the most successful reintegration of Taliban mid-level commanders 
and foot soldiers since 2001 almost certainly took place not in official programmes in 
the second half of the decade but informally and around this time.273 
 
The U.S. government, however, appears to have largely missed the main implication 
of this mass defection – that it could easily be reversed. Sure enough, as the political 
climate for many defectors changed, so did their loyalty. U.S.–backed commanders 
welcomed defecting Taliban commanders only as long as they were still fighting the 
Taliban regime. Once it was toppled and a scramble for posts in the new government 
began, calculations changed. U.S. support went not to those who adopted a 
conciliatory approach towards former regime members, but to the most effective 
Taliban and al-Qaeda hunters (commanders even received bounties for catching 
senior Taliban).  
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New government officials thus ‘benefited from maintaining the Taliban as a hostile 
force and the main threat to the regime’.274 New powerbrokers targeted even those 
former Taliban who had surrendered for disarmament. In the best-case scenario, ex-
combatants could strike a deal, hand over their weapons to a trusted tribal elder or to 
the local strongman, and then go home or escape to Pakistan. But for many 
surrendering Taliban, disarmament happened at gunpoint and was accompanied by 
looting, beatings and killings.275 
The new governors, police chiefs and other government officials effectively exploited 
the anti-Taliban climate to disarm and harass people from or connected to rival armed 
networks – often made up of people belonging to other ethnic groups, tribes or sub-
tribes – by labelling them as Taliban, even if they had not been part of the former 
regime. The provincial case studies on Kunduz and Baghlan illustrate how, in the 
ethnically diverse north, revenge was taken on Pashtuns seen as associated with the 
Taliban rule. A minority ethnic group in the north (and majority ethnic group in the 
south, the Taliban heartland), estimated to number around one million in that area, 
Pashtuns had been relatively safe under the Taliban regime. But after the Taliban’s 
fall, non-Pashtun militias harassed them under the guise of disarmament. As early as 
2002 Human Rights Watch highlighted the ‘killings, sexual violence, beatings, 
extortion, and looting’ in northern Pashtun villages.276 
A tribal elder from Kunduz recalls how most important positions in the local 
administration were taken by non-Pashtuns. ‘Everyone was looking at the Pashtuns as 
Taliban’.277 A Pashtun member of the Baghlan provincial council, says:  
 
The Pashtuns had a horrible life after the fall of the Taliban in Baghlan. Even 
those with no connection to the Taliban, who were never with the Taliban 
were accused of affiliation. I remember a shopkeeper paid $2000 to escape 
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In the predominantly Pashtun south, new powerbrokers often portrayed personal 
rivals from other sub-tribes and clans as Taliban. These men were then targeted for 
‘disarmament’. As the case studies on Uruzgan and Helmand show, this often 
included violent repression. In Uruzgan, governor Jan Mohammad’s men killed, 
tortured and unlawfully detained those from rival armed networks who they labelled 
as Taliban supporters, even though many were not. Their victims knew there was no 
way to pursue justice legally, as Jan Mohammad enjoyed the backing of both the 
Karzai government and SOF. In Helmand, the Kabul government’s and U.S. 
patronage was divided among several groups. As a result they fiercely competed and 
used the cover of the Taliban hunt to try and take out commanders from the rival 
groups.  
 
In the meantime, many Taliban commanders and fighters who had quickly switched 
sides in the fall of 2001, when fighting was ongoing, had become part of the AMF. 
This was – as Chapter 1 suggests – a parking area for Fahim’s patronage network, 
which was stronger in the north and west than in the south and southeast, the Taliban 
heartland. So long as the AMF commanders in the south had some claim on a place in 
the new government, they kept relatively quiet. Moreover, in addition to the AMF, in 
the south U.S. patronage in the form of positions in the Afghan Security Guards; 
militias helping them to guard military bases and fight the Taliban provided other 
opportunities.  
 
Former Taliban in the AMF, or commanders from sub-tribes or clans that had been 
supportive of the Taliban regime, were generally in the weakest positions. This was 
unsurprising given that Taliban leaders had not been reintegrated in the new political 
order, but, instead, were on the run in Pakistan or imprisoned. When the first DDR 
programme was rolled out in the south in 2004, these AMF commanders were the first 
to lose out. Their lack of patrons meant that unlike other former AMF commanders, 
they could not find a new position that offered them protection. This meant that they 
were vulnerable to harassment. They started looking for new protectors.  	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Had the U.S.–led coalition in Afghanistan been more aware of how quickly loyalties 
could shift as circumstances changed, the increasing violence around 2004 and 2005 
would have come as less of a surprise. In fact Taliban leaders in Pakistan easily found 
recruits to launch an insurgency. Among them were former Taliban commanders who 
had been harassed since 2001, humiliated by disarmament in the immediate aftermath 
of the intervention or who had switched sides in 2001, reintegrated in the AMF but 
then left vulnerable after the first DDR programme to the predation of new 
powerbrokers. Then there were former mujahedeen commanders, village elders and 
others who had been falsely accused by their rivals of having supported the Taliban 
regime and were persecuted as a result.  
 
New insurgents were indirectly helped in many places in the south and east by 
powerbrokers who felt disgruntled after losing their jobs in the Karzai government, 
the result of efforts to weed out warlords from the government, including through the 
first DDR programme. Again, Uruzgan and Helmand provide excellent case studies. 
The wider perception among Pashtun leaders in the south and southeast that Pashtuns 
were marginalised in the new political order, with Shura-ye Nazar dominating the 
important security ministries, did not help.279 
 
The PTS programme addressed none of the conditions that led insurgents to mobilise 
against the government. Nor in itself could it. The only way in which the programme 
could have potentially met any success is as part of a more comprehensive political 
strategy to create a more inclusive and less predatory government, both on the 
national and on the subnational level. Such a strategy would have had to include 
engagement with Taliban leaders.  
 
But on neither side of the battlefield did there appear to be any real interest in coming 
to the negotiating table. Nor did coherent policy on the issue exist. By 2005, when the 
PTS programme started, the Taliban leadership, now operating as an insurgency, had 
grown in confidence and seemed less reconciliatory than in 2001. They blocked the 
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PTS scheme and Mullah Obaidullah Akhund, a deputy of Mullah Omar, told Reuters 
that the Taliban would ‘never surrender’.280  
 
In reality the movement was divided, with hardliners intent on the armed struggle 
while a more politically-oriented faction ‘hoped for encouragement from the Afghan 
government, and in its absence were paralyzed’.281 An initiative from this faction to 
create a political party faltered.282 By the time the Karzai government started to show 
some interest in the politically oriented faction’s political party initiative, in 2005, the 
growing insurgency meant it was too late for ‘potential peace-makers’ on the 
insurgent side to play a major role in reconciliation. 
 
Karzai himself had an ad-hoc approach to negotiations with insurgent leaders. He 
used appeals to Mullah Omar and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, a former rival of Omar who 
had joined the insurgency after 2001, mostly to his own advantage. He ‘jealously 
guarded his primacy in reconciliation’, which led to clashes with foreign officials on 
international efforts to talk to the Taliban.283 Meanwhile, those international efforts 
‘suffered from too many external actors with diverse interests and divergent 
strategies’. There were many bilateral, but informal and uncoordinated, contacts with 
insurgents by U.S., UK, German and other European officials.284 The U.S. officially 
opposed talks with the Taliban until 2010.   
 
The introduction of the PTS programme in 2005 again showed a lack of a coherent 
approach on the side of the Afghan government and its international allies to the 
Taliban leadership. Initially Mujaddedi reportedly said that ‘there was no bar to the 
inclusion [in the PTS programme] of even Mullah Omar and Hekmatyar for 
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reconciliation’.285 He retracted his words, however, and Karzai and U.S. Ambassador 
Zalmai Khalilzad made a list of around 150 Taliban who were not eligible for 
amnesty. Later that too was reversed.286  
 
No high-level Taliban joined the PTS and the programme focused on low-level 
commanders and fighters. Senior Taliban who did reconcile (as happened with twelve 
of the 142 Taliban figures named in the UN Security Council sanctions list by 2008) 
usually did so not through official programmes but through what Semple calls 
‘political sponsorship’; an informal process in which Taliban leaders sought the 
protection and support of a senior figure in the administration, based on an old 
acquaintance or network links. The Afghan National Security Council, which 
included officials close to Karzai, played a central role in holding secret talks and 
reconciling insurgent commanders. President Karzai’s brother, Abdul Qayum Karzai, 
was also closely involved.287 
 
Attempts to cultivate members of Hekmatyar’s Hezb-e Islami faction yielded more 
promising results. Hezb-e Islami registered as a party in 2005 and by 2012 
negotiations had led to almost fifty members of its political wing ‘holding positions in 
the cabinet, parliament and civilian ministries or serve as provincial governors and in 
district-level government offices’, even though an armed wing under Hekmatyar’s 
command kept operating against the Karzai government.288 
 
How, in these conditions, did the PTS play out on the ground? The provincial case 
studies explore its failure in specific provinces in more detail. In general, though, a 
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few major obstacles prevented the Taliban commanders and fighters laying down 
their weapons under the PTS.289 
 
First and foremost, by 2005 local administrations remained exclusive and predatory. 
If anything, power was even more concentrated in the hands of a few than four years 
earlier. The U.S. backed commanders that had taken over in 2001 had consolidated 
their position by moving allies into the police, the local branches of the NDS or 
provincial councils. The first DDR programme allowed them to disarm weaker rivals. 
Everyone in the provinces knew the strongmen could act with impunity, harassing and 
even killing those they labelled as Taliban, as they were backed by factions in Kabul 
and, in the south, by SOF. It was hardly surprising that the PTS participants whom the 
author met in Kabul feared for their lives if they returned home.  
 
Second, the PTS programme offered the Taliban only surrender in return for amnesty. 
While in 2001 this would have been acceptable for many, by 2005 the situation had 
changed. Taliban commanders had fresh memories of how they had been treated in 
2001 and since. They were operating in a resurgent insurgency movement. Their 
position was thus very different from when they were scattered and on the run in 
2001. The removal in 2006 of some provincial powerbrokers from their positions, 
following donor pressure, gave the insurgency further room for manoeuvre, as the 
disgruntled strongmen did everything they could to show that with them ‘their’ 
province would become unstable – in some cases even by helping the Taliban.  
 
Taliban leaders’ price for laying down their arms had, therefore, only gone up since 
2001. Without a political settlement with the leadership lower level Taliban 
commanders had no chance to find a place in the local administration, let alone to 
distribute patronage from that position to their fighters. On the contrary, in a context 
of worsening warfare, they would more likely face assassination, either by former 
comrades as a punishment for their defection, or by former enemies. They would also 
risk international troops mistaking them for an insurgent or local commanders taking 
revenge. All in all, it was hardly a tempting prospect.  	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Third, the U.S. military, in 2005 still the main international actor in the provinces, 
understood poorly, if at all, that exclusionary and predatory local governance was a 
main drivers of the insurgency. In a media interview in the autumn of 2004 
Lieutenant-General Barno said of the motivations of the Taliban: ‘In a different kind 
of guerrilla war, you might see ideology motivating your fighters or some other type 
of commitment, but here we’re seeing money being a significant factor. Which is very 
interesting to us. To me, it reflects that there is no passion, no commitment, no 
nationalistic streak that this thing is being driven by’.290  
 
The U.S. therefore approached the PTS with unrealistic expectations and a non-
conciliatory attitude. Colonel David Lamm, who served as chief of staff of the 
Combined Forces Command in Afghanistan in 2004 and 2005, expressed the U.S. 
views when he wrote about the U.S. efforts to release Taliban detainees from the 
Parwan detention center and Guantanamo: ‘The purpose was not simply one of 
goodwill, but sound strategy: We sought to create seams, fissures and doubt among 
the insurgent groups, al-Qaeda, the Taliban and the home-grown organization of 
Afghan Islamist warlord Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’.291  
 
Fourth, the Afghan government and its international allies had no clear and consistent 
policy on how to reintegrate lower-level Taliban. Though the PTS offered a plan on 
paper, in reality international troops and Afghan officials in the provinces adopted ad-
hoc measures, the content of which could vary greatly from place to place. Although 
some adaption to local circumstances made sense, a major problem was that Afghan 
and international officials disagreed on the best approach to reintegrate Taliban, even 
internally. The examples of the Musa Qala and Sangin peace deals, respectively in 
2006 and 2010, explored in more detail in the Helmand provincial case study, show 
how they failed partly because of these divisions and even competition.  
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Fifth, given these circumstances – no comprehensive political strategy on national and 
subnational level; no coherent plan for how to reintegrate Taliban commanders and 
fighters; no clear idea of why they had joined the insurgency – those involved in 
financing and implementing the programme saw it as a means to achieve short-term 
and narrow goals. 
 
The UK and U.S. viewed the PTS as a national security instrument used to encourage 
insurgents to surrender and yield intelligence, rather than reconcile. The Chr. 
Michelsen Institute wrote in 2009 that ‘virtually all the countries’ that had troops in 
the south of Afghanistan were ‘trying to talk to actual or potential opponents at the 
local level’. The initiatives were, however, ‘essentially tactical manoeuvres designed 
to protect the troops of the countries that have committed military forces to fight the 
insurgency’.292  
 
In the provinces, local elites may have appropriated PTS resources meant for Taliban. 
According to a tribal elder who supported the PTS, the head of its Uruzgan office to 
this end compiled lists of fake Taliban. ‘They registered “fake Taliban” – no one 
knew them. It was a total lie. In reality the PTS head was bringing his men from his 
own tribe. I didn’t know even one of those so-called Taliban’.293 A former employee 
of the PTS office in Helmand claims the same thing happened there. ‘PTS was a total 
failure. We had fake Taliban with fake names. The Taliban did not trust us. I 
emphasise that the PTS was a total failure’.294 
 
The issues with PTS were, therefore, not only technical but lay in the wider political 
order established in Afghanistan after the U.S.-led intervention in 2001. Taliban 
commanders’ disinterest in the programme mainly resulted from the unwillingness of 
all their opponents to pursue a more inclusive and less predatory government, on both 
the national and on subnational level. Warring parties were also internally divided on 
the issue of how to deal with their enemy. Divisions and competition within and 
between the Afghan government and the international coalition meant there was no 
coherent approach to reintegration of either Taliban leaders and the rank and file.  	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The lack of an overarching political strategy including engagement with Taliban 
leaders and a clear and undisputed approach to the reintegration of the rank and file 
led Afghan factions and international actors in the provinces to use the PTS for short-
term and narrow, often personal, goals, ranging from short-term security to pocketing 
money. This meant that for Taliban commanders and fighters there was very little to 
come home for. As a result, few did.  
 
3.2. Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Programme (APRP) 
 
After the PTS started, the insurgency expanded and adopted new tactics, such as 
suicide bombings and improvised explosive devices (IEDs). By 2008, the U.S. 
military started to request more troops to Afghanistan. In 2009 newly inaugurated 
U.S. President Barack Obama decided on a ‘surge’ of 30,000 U.S. troops, bringing 
their total to just over 100,000 in 2011. However, he also put a deadline on their 
deployment, stating they would start coming home by July 2011.  
 
Commander of ISAF and of U.S. forces in Afghanistan, General Stanley McChristal, 
whose command started in June 2009, introduced a kill capture campaign in 
Afghanistan designed to sow ‘distrust and discontent inside the ranks of insurgent 
groups, ultimately persuading them they have no chance of succeeding militarily’.295 
To accompany this, he thought there should be a dignified alternative for insurgents 
besides surrender or death or capture on the battlefield.296 Foreign donors had long 
lost hope that the PTS was capable of demobilising significant numbers of Taliban 
and the programme was on its last legs as their funding dried up. A new programme 
was designed in 2009, called the Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Programme.  
 
At the January 2010 London Conference on Afghanistan, Western donors pledged 
$140 million to reintegrate ‘reconcilable’ insurgent commanders and their foot 
soldiers. The APRP, which started in June 2010, combined (at least on paper) the 
‘reintegration’ of mid-level Taliban commanders and fighters with high-level talks, 	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known as ‘reconciliation’. At strategic and political levels, efforts would focus on the 
leadership of the insurgency. At operational level, they would be geared towards the 
reintegration of foot soldiers, small groups, and local leaders.  
 
The APRP was led by the seventy-member High Peace Council (HPC), the public 
face of negotiations with insurgents, headed first by Professor Burhanuddin Rabbani 
and, after his assassination in 2011, his son. It was implemented by the same Joint 
Secretariat (under the Karzai administration under the direction of its chief executive 
officer Minister Mohammad Masoom Stanekzai), which worked on DIAG. The 
official APRP documents listed ISAF and UNAMA as participants in the JS to assist 
with information, security operations, strategic communications and government 
delivery down to the local level. 
 
Provincial peace councils and technical teams to support provincial and district 
governors replicated this set-up in the provinces. Governors played a central role ‘in 
coordinating the support of line ministries with local peace and reintegration 
processes’.297 The UN and ISAF (through its Force Reintegration Cell, F-RIC) were 
responsible for coordinating international support for the APRP, though the F-RIC 
was disbanded towards the end of the Karzai administration. 
 
The programme aimed to incorporate lessons from its predecessors. Reintegration 
assistance was more comprehensive than that of previous programmes. APRP would 
offer not only provide employment to participants but also better protection, 
opportunities for grievance resolution for both them and the communities into which 
they would reintegrate – an acknowledgement that insurgents did not fight only for 
economic reasons as Lieutenant-General Barno had assumed at the start of the PTS298 
— and a ninety-day period of ‘de-radicalisation’. 
 
Reintegration as described in the APRP documentation consisted of three phases. The 
first—social outreach, confidence building, and negotiation— involved district and 	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provincial officials and peace council members reaching out to interested insurgents. 
It also involved them mediating between those insurgents and the communities into 
which they would reintegrate to resolve grievances that may generate violence, often 
referred to as ‘grievance resolution’.  
 
The second phase—demobilisation—included vetting (a review of both identity and 
past actions), registration (including the collection of biometric data), assessment of 
the individual and community, management of weaponry, protection from targeting 
by government or international forces, and the provision of security and transition 
assistance to meet basic needs ($120 monthly for three months). The individual was 
eligible for political amnesty if he agreed to respect the Afghan constitution and 
renounces violence and terrorism. 
 
The third phase—consolidation of peace—presented demobilised combatants and 
communities with ‘community recovery packages based on a standard needs 
assessment’. Options included integration into the Afghan National Security Forces, 
vocational and literacy training, religious mentoring, education and enrolment in a 
public works or agriculture conservation corps, and work on local projects.299 
 
Besides offering a more comprehensive reintegration route, the main APRP’s main 
innovation, particularly when compared with the PTS, was the reintegration track’s 
rollout, at least on paper, in tandem with high-level negotiations with the Taliban. 
This could have potentially helped to create a more favourable environment for the 
reintegration of the rank-and-file. However, although donors, the UN and the Afghan 
government were more interested in pursuing peace talks than in 2005, they still 
disagreed over the best way to do so, including internally. As a result a clear policy 
was, again, absent.  
 
Key members of the new Obama administration disagreed on overall strategy in 
Afghanistan, leading to bitter rivalries. The new U.S. Special Representative for 
Afghanistan and Pakistan Richard Holbrooke aimed ‘to midwife’ a negotiated 
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settlement between the Taliban, the Afghan government and the United States.300 
Obama, in a departure from his predecessor President Bush’s approach, initially 
seemed open to negotiations. But military officials such as Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen, ISAF commander General Stanley McChrystal 
and his successor General David Petreaus wanted first to increase the number of 
forces, or ‘surge’ – a path they were able to persuade Obama to move along – and 
then accept the surrender of senior Taliban, rather than talk. In the meantime they 
were willing to offer incentives for the rank-and-file to lay down their weapons.301 
 
ISAF, which after McChrystal’s dismissal in June 2010 came under command of 
Petreaus, and those donors funding the APRP hoped that the reintegration of low- and 
mid-level fighters would help convince insurgent leaders to negotiate. It would thus 
initially only complement the military surge, while higher-level talks with Taliban 
leaders would come later, though only with those who wanted to surrender.302 In 
contrast, many UN and Afghan officials believed that the two tracks should run in 
parallel, or that the rank-and-file’s reintegration should even follow talks with high-
level Taliban.  
 
One HPC member said: ‘You need to start talking with high-level Taliban and only 
when you have their consent reintegrate lower level commanders. Reintegration 
before talks doesn’t work. It’s the wrong way to spend money’.303 A UN official 
observed: ‘It is very difficult to have reintegration without a peace process’. 
According to him ISAF’s view on reintegration understood it as ‘a COIN 
[counterinsurgency] instrument, a military-driven surrender mechanism, but not a 
serious mechanism to make peace’. But a senior F-RIC official defended ISAF’s 
view: ‘There is a resilient view that reintegration is bogus and that it goes against high 
level talking. But in Afghanistan we see the strength of reintegration. A bottom-up 
process has a great strength to it’.304  
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The APRP thus evolved based on divergent conceptions of how reintegration should 
relate to military and political processes. During a National Consultative Peace Jirga 
in early June 2010 that preceded Karzai’s signing off on the APRP, major donors, 
especially ISAF, pressed for quick implementation of the reintegration component. ‘If 
we don’t get it going soon we will start missing the boat,’ said F-RIC head Major 
General Philip Jones in an interview with the New York Times at the time. ‘We have 
to catch this moment here in every sense’. The newspaper reported that though the 
reintegration plan was nominally an Afghan one, drafted by Stanekzai, it had been 
designed with close collaboration of ISAF officials as it was seen as a vital part of the 
coalition’s counterinsurgency strategy.305 
 
Four years later, by the end of the Karzai administration in September 2014, the 
APRP had around 9,000 participants.306 Analysts, diplomats, and some donors 
expressed, however, concerns about its output: numbers were low; they included 
many non-insurgents; and most came from the north and west of the country—not the 
Taliban heartlands.307 Results were particularly disappointing given that on paper the 	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APRP offers the most comprehensive reintegration package of all four DDR 
programmes, and that its design includes lessons from the others. ‘We took the 
lessons into account and still it is not working’, one diplomat said.308 
 
A primary initial challenge was setting up the APRP’s ambitious infrastructure. Both 
the HPC and the JS were established in the autumn of 2010. Setting up the peace 
councils and local secretariats in the provinces took much longer than anticipated, 
partly hindered by a slow disbursement of funds and difficulties with coordination 
within the APRP structure. According to one researcher: 
 
There is a lack of communication from the district to the provincial 
government, from the provincial government to the centre, from the Afghan 
government to ISAF, and from ISAF to the embassies. There is a total lack of 
transparency. Until roles are clearer, it will be a mess.309  
 
 
The profiles of APRP officials also raised concerns. Observers and officials 
questioned the prominence of former mujahedeen factional leaders and the lack of 
neutral figures in the High Peace Council. Some of the Council’s (non-mujahedeen) 
members agreed. ‘The HPC is a compromise’, said one. ‘Northern Alliance groups 
are included because otherwise they will take up their arms. It is a very clever policy 
of the government. But we are not very trustable for the opposition’.310 There were 
also concerns about the continuity between the sluggish administration for past DDR 
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participants were members of small militia, at best operating in the periphery of the 
insurgency.  308	  505. 	  309	  Derksen, “Peace from the Bottom-Up?,” 7, 11. In May 2011, the JS was still 
opening provincial bank accounts and setting up provincial peace councils, though 
this should have been finished within the first hundred days. In Kabul it took longer 
than anticipated for the ministries involved in APRP to recruit dedicated staff and set 
up ‘cells’ to process project proposals from the provinces.  310	  404.	  On 5 November 2015 Yunus Qanoni, another former jihadi leader, was 
appointed as head of the HPC.  
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initiatives and the APRP Joint Secretariat.311 In some places provincial and district 
peace councils were regarded as vehicles of patronage for local authorities rather than 
instruments of genuine outreach. According to a peace council head in a northern 
province: 
 
Our peace council has no-one who can talk with the Taliban. Most of its 
members have always opposed the Taliban. There are some Pashtuns on the 




Despite these obstacles, ISAF began reintegrating insurgents from the outset under 
the APRP programme, at first in northern and western provinces (the first 
reintegration under the APRP already took place in March 2010 in Baghlan, even 
before Karzai signed the decree, and is described in more detail in the provincial case 
study).313 ‘We felt the market was there and different forms of reintegration started 
quickly, so we had to put instruments in place while it was being rolled out’, said one 
ISAF officer working in the F-RIC. ‘That’s setting yourself up for multiple crises. It 
is a stumbling block. But what do you do? Do you say: come back in one and a half 
years? No’.314  
 
However, reintegrating insurgents under the new programme before all its elements 
were in place led to a number of problems. First, each of the three phases of 
reintegration was only partially implemented, leaving little room for grievance 
resolution, problems with vetting, a lack of clarity regarding amnesties, no 
functioning database and only short-term reintegration assistance (food, clothes) 
available. For those who wished to participate it was unclear how to actually sign up. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  311	  See for example, Patricia Gossman, “Afghan High Peace Council Fails to Reflect 
Afghan Civil Society,” United States Institute of Peace, January 10, 2011. On 5 
November 2015 Yunus Qanoni, another former jihadi leader, was appointed as head 
of the High Peace Council.  312	  Derksen, “Peace from the Bottom-Up?,” 12.	  313	  The first APRP participants were admitted in the programme as early as March 
2010, but President Karzai signed the APRP document only in June, and established 
the HPC and the JS in September. As of May 2011 29 provincial bank accounts and 
28 provincial peace councils had been established (of 34). Derksen, “Peace from the 
Bottom-Up?” 314	  516.	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One reintegrated Taliban commander from the south explained his difficulties in 
approaching government officials: 
 
I kidnapped four police and told them I would free them on the condition that 
they give my telephone number to a government official. I didn’t hear 
anything after their release. Then I kidnapped two police and told them the 
same. Again I didn’t hear anything. Then I kidnapped one police, but this time 
I told him that if he didn’t give my telephone number to a government official 
I would kill his family. A few weeks later I got a call.315 
 
 
Members of the JS and of the HPC visited several provinces, but without provincial 
peace councils or guidelines for governors, there was little outreach at the local level, 
which negatively affected the first phase of the programme. Grievance resolution was, 
on paper, also an important element of the first phase. But a F-RIC official 
acknowledged more than a year into the programme: ‘We haven’t seen much of it yet, 
absolutely. Grievance resolution is very important, but how do you formalise it? 
Grievance resolution is easy to say, hard to do’.  
 
APRP’s second phase, demobilisation, also suffered problems. Potential participants 
were often not vetted. When they were, conclusions were often not communicated to 
other implementing partners. The registration of participants was also limited. People 
who came over were afraid to use their real names; people disappeared; there were a 
number of different lists; more than one set of biometrics was taken; paperwork 
disappeared because the Afghan government took it without returning it. An official 
working in a northern province called it ‘a mess’.316 
 
The central Reintegration Tracking and Monitoring Database, which ISAF would 
construct and the JS would manage, was not ready in time for the start of the 
programme. (In a later interview in 2013 a JS official said that the database never saw 
the daylight and that the JS developed its own, simpler, database instead.)317 Database 
problems were illustrated by the fact that ISAF officials and JS officials continued to 
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provide different numbers on APRP participants.318  
 
Complicating the vetting process was the fact that from the outset there was no 
agreement between F-RIC officials and the JS on who was eligible for APRP. In the 
programme document the APRP focused ‘on local peace processes with the foot 
soldiers, small groups and local leaders who form the bulk of the insurgency’.319 A F-
RIC official, on the other hand, said: ‘the programme is for all Afghans, not only the 
Taliban’. 320 
 
The second phase was further challenged by the fact that no clear amnesty policy was 
ready by the time the APRP started. The programme envisaged that reintegrating 
commanders and fighters were eligible for amnesty if they agreed to respect the 
Afghan constitution and renounce violence and terrorism. But international and 
Afghan officials involved in the programme seemed reluctant to engage in such a 
thorny issue and formulate more detailed policy. They described amnesties as a 
Pandora’s box that could kill the programme or as an 800-pound gorilla in the room.  
They referred to the controversy surrounding the 2007 Amnesty Law—formally the 
National Reconciliation, General Amnesty, and Stability Law—which provides 
blanket amnesties for human rights violations during recent conflicts, as contravening 
Afghanistan’s international commitments in treaties.321 
 
The third phase, ‘consolidation of peace’, suffered from a lack of job opportunities for 
participants, due to the fact that much of the programme’s infrastructure was lacking 
at the local level and in the main line ministries. A former international ISAF officer 
working on reintegration in the spring of 2011 in Kunduz said that the only form of 
reintegration assistance they could offer participants were cooking oil, rice, clothes, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  318	  In April 2011, Western officials involved in APRP said they thought around 900 
people had reintegrated, while an Afghan official also involved put the number 
between 1,000 and 1,500; similarly an unclassified ISAF overview from May 2011 
(1,680 participants) was inconsistent with a classified overview from the Afghan 
government from the same month (1,809 participants). Derksen, “Peace from the 
Bottom-Up?” 319 National Security Council Disarmament and Reintegration Commission, 
“Afghanistan Peace and Reintegration Program,” 9,10. 320	  516.	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  Derksen, “Peace from the Bottom-up,” 10; Derksen, “The Politics,” 21.  	  
© Linde Dorien Derksen 2017  129	  
and, in some cases, shelter.322 In other places participants had by that time been 
offered jobs, ‘but on a very limited scale and mostly in mine action’.323 Moreover, 
participants expressed mainly interest in jobs in the security sector, not in civilian 
jobs, which had been the focus of the programme.324  
 
Next to the programme’s partial implementation, a second problem resulting from its 
start before all elements were in place was that ISAF instead of local peace councils 
assumed many reintegration responsibilities. International troops used an American 
National Defence Authorization Act fund of $50 million to fund short-term aid, such 
as food, clothes and short-term employment. This happened especially in the north, 
which had just seen a resurgence of Taliban activity and an influx of SOF pushing the 
insurgents back with the help of ISAF troops, Afghan National Security Forces and 
local militias. For example, an ISAF commander working on APRP in 2011 in one 
northern province said that they started reintegrating Taliban commanders and 
fighters even though no local peace council or joint secretariat had been established. 
‘We tried to get funding from Kabul to get them a safe house, money, projects, but we 
didn’t receive anything. Instead we used American funds to give them rice and 
cooking oil’.325 
 
The lead of ISAF forces reinforced perceptions that the programme was driven by 
international military imperatives.326 Numerous Afghan officials and village elders 
said in interviews that they thought the Afghan government and the international 
community, who were seen as party to the conflict, would not tackle politically 
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sensitive issues.327 Insurgents said participation in the APRP amounted to surrender. 
A Taliban commander in Nad-e Ali said:  
 
I heard about the peace process [APRP], but I don’t have interest in this 
process. Because joining with the government, means joining to American 
troops. I fought around three years against of American troops, so how is it 
possible to join with them?328 
 
 
Third, ISAF’s lead, its insistence on proceeding with reintegration in the absence of a 
high level political process, and the lack of guidance and financial assistance from 
Kabul, alienated potential key partners, such as local government officials, tribal 
elders, and civil society organizations. A governor from a northern province said: 
 
We have promised the Taliban lots of things, like a safe house, food, work and 
security. But the central government has not supported us in this, so I can’t 
deliver anything. As a result the number of Taliban interested in this 
programme became smaller and smaller.329 
 
 
The governor of Kandahar, Tooryalai Weesa, after being approached by emissaries 
for mid-level insurgent commanders, told reporters that 
 
We are not prepared the way we should be. We are telling them to wait a little 
bit. They are looking at how we are treating them, what services we’re 
offering them, how they are being protected. If we don’t treat them well, that 
will leave a bad impression on other groups.330 
 
 
Although the participation of civil society organisations was supposed to be a 
fundamental element of the reintegration programme, especially concerning vetting of 
candidates and grievance resolution with communities, there was no structure in place 
to enable this. Some civil society actors expressed doubts about the APRP.331 A 
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member of the F-RIC team said in an interview: ‘NGO’s? They don’t like us’.332 
There were also considerable doubts within the UN, especially within its political 
mission UNAMA, over how much it should be involved in reintegration, due to a 
conviction that reintegration would not be successful in the absence of broader 
reconciliation: ‘From the very beginning when the APRP was emerging, the UN was 
against it’, said one UN official.333 
 
Many Afghan officials shared this suspicion. Several HPC members, who were 
supposed to provide strategic vision to the APRP, indicated in interviews they did not 
believe in the reintegration programme and wanted nothing to do with it.  
One said: 
My personal opinion on the reintegration process is that it shouldn’t take place 
before reconciliation [with Taliban leaders]. It can be useful after 
reconciliation, to settle people. Unfortunately now there is a reintegration 
process and it is not productive: it doesn’t do anything while it will not finish 
the war. It will increase and prolong the war. In the context of a corrupt 
government we are afraid that reintegration will be business through the local 




Some technical problems with the reintegration programme were resolved at a later 
stage. By the end of the Karzai administration in September 2014 the programme’s 
infrastructure seemed to be in place, allowing for a higher level of Afghan ownership. 
Research for the four case studies on Uruzgan, Helmand, Kunduz, and Baghlan in 
2014 found peace councils and local secretariats up and running. A mid-term 
evaluation report commissioned by the UN reported in February 2013 that: 
 
The APRP has made noteworthy progress in developing its 
structures, policies and methodologies for the past 2 years, all from 
the ground up. APRP has established itself with a strong but as yet 
unrealized potential to serve all corners of Afghanistan . . . 
Because APRP is not reaching its potential, there is too little social 
outreach, too few armed groups joining the program, and to few 
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communities, namely those in rural areas where insurgents wield 
influence, are receiving recovery projects.335 
 
 
But despite progress in setting up the APRP infrastructure, problems with grievance 
resolution, amnesties, a lack of interest in civilian jobs and of buy-in from key 
partners remained. Few genuine Taliban seemed interested. These challenges were 
indicative of a structural problem. Since the programme’s start until the end of the 
Karzai administration, the differences of opinion described above on the sequencing 
of mid-level commanders’ and fighters’ reintegration and peace talks with the Taliban 
leadership hindered its progress.  
 
Western donors, most importantly the United States, publicly shifted their stance on 
talks, accepting their necessity, which led to meetings between U.S. officials and 
Taliban representatives from 2011 onwards. The Taliban also sent representatives to 
conferences on Afghanistan in France, Japan and Germany. In June 2013 the opening 
of a political office for the Taliban in Doha was meant to start direct negotiations 
between Taliban and representatives of the Afghan government, in addition to talks 
with representatives of the U.S. government. But President Karzai cancelled planned 
talks between members of the HPC and the Taliban in protest at the sign and the flag 
of the political office (which was the same as during the Taliban-ruled Islamic 
Emirate of Afghanistan). According to Karzai, this meant the movement pretended to 
be a government in waiting. Thus until President Karzai left office in September 2014 
no peace process was initiated.336 
 
The absence of a high-level process and the continuing war were the main obstacles 
for the successful reintegration of Taliban commanders and fighters, not the technical 
problems, which had partly been resolved by 2014. Or, as a former Taliban official 	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said: ‘As long as there are no negotiations with the Taliban leadership, reintegrating 
mid-level commanders or fighters will be ineffective’.337 There were several reasons 
for this: ties of loyalty and patronage within the Taliban movement; the risk of 
assassination by former comrades; and the fact that underlying drivers of the 
insurgency remained and therefore APRP participants had to return to the same 
situation that had compelled them to take up arms in the first place. 
 
According to current and former Taliban commanders and officials and experts on the 
insurgency, ties of loyalty and patronage within the Taliban movement made the 
engagement of high-level leaders a precondition for the reintegration of low-level 
fighters. Although men joined the insurgency for a variety of reasons, over time they 
became socially, financially, and ideologically integrated into the movement. Strong 
ties of loyalty existed between commanders and their men, and upward to the 
leadership.338 
 
Even if loyalty wore thin, defection carried enormous risks as long as Taliban leaders 
were not on board. Many insurgents who laid down their weapons chose to not go 
through the APRP, even if that meant they received no assistance. Instead they 
demobilised quietly, afraid of retaliation by their former comrades, who, as the case 
studies show, assassinated APRP participants and their relatives in the past. For 
example, in Kunduz former comrades killed ex-Taliban commander Maulawi 
Mohammad Nabi and four of his bodyguards in Imam Sahib district on May 9, 2011. 
In the first year of the APRP in Kunduz, three other reintegrated commanders were 
killed by either Taliban or nominal pro-government militias.339 Those who did 
participate often ended up in the ALP by way of protection, rather than finding a 
civilian job as the reintegration programme originally intended, as the case studies 
show. The Baghlan case study tells the story of Jumadin Kandak and Bismullah, two 
junior commanders who had joined the reintegration programme after temporarily 
fighting alongside the Taliban. They both sought to join the ALP for protection, but 	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were denied a place. Jumadin Kandak survived, but Bismullah was assassinated in 
May 2014 by former Taliban comrades, according to some local sources.340 Examples 
of APRP participants like Maulawi Mohammad Nabi and Bismullah, who were killed 
after joining the programme, obviously sent a negative signal to insurgents 
considering joining too.  
 
Ties within the Taliban movement—and, in turn, its ties with the Pakistani ISI—were 
not the only reason that reintegrating masses of low-level fighters was difficult. 
Without a peace process, the insurgency’s underlying drivers remained. The APRP 
could provide participants temporary assistance, to get them on their feet in civilian 
society. But only genuine political change at national level could reverse the 
politically exclusive character of local administrations. Because they did not have the 
political, economic, and military support of an established patronage network that in 
turn had ties in the local and national government, mid-level commanders and fighters 
could see no future for themselves in society.  
 
In Uruzgan a small group around Popalzai strongman and Karzai ally Jan Mohammad 
and his nephew Matiullah had usurped power after 2001. They had co-opted other 
powerbrokers, especially from the main Achekzai tribe. However, this had still left a 
substantial group of commanders, tribal elders and mullahs out of the local 
administration, some of whom had joined the Taliban. For them to participate in the 
APRP without any change at the top in the local administration meant their position 
would again be precarious, much as before they joined the Taliban – even if they were 
allowed into the ALP.  
 
In Helmand after 2001, several powerbrokers backed by SOF competed for the best 
government positions and for the biggest share in the drugs business. Many groups 
left out of local government and preyed upon by officials to relinquish their share of 
the drugs market had joined the Taliban. A high-level official in Helmand at the time 
said: 
 
Some of the Taliban that had peace talks with us were not sure if they would 
be safe after joining the peace programme [APRP] as long as people like [one 	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of the anti-Taliban powerbrokers] was in power. These Taliban commanders 
raised the concern during our discussions that their life would not be secure.341 
   
 
In Kunduz and Baghlan, the military campaigns against the Taliban after their 
resurgence in the northeast in 2008 and 2009 resulted in increased support, both 
international and from factions in the government in Kabul and locally, for strongmen 
and militia commanders whose predation had led many people to join the Taliban. 
The increased strength of their enemies in the local administrations naturally deterred 
Taliban commanders in Kunduz and Baghlan from participating in a reintegration 
programme. 
  
This problem for local Taliban is illustrated by the story of one Taliban commander in 
Qal-e Zal, who will remain anonymous for security reasons. He claims he started 
operating as an insurgent commander in the Kunduz district Qal-e Zal having been 
approached by a Taliban interlocutor from Pakistan, probably around 2008 or 2009. 
He said he joined the armed opposition because Pashtuns in Qal-e Zal were 
‘oppressed and harassed’ by Turkmen government officials after 2001. Prominent in 
this harassment, according to the Taliban commander and other locals, was local 
strongman Nabi Gechi, who led counterinsurgency efforts. Initially, Gechi had been 
paid by Turkmen communities fearful of the Taliban. But in 2011 Nabi Gechi became 
the first commander to be supported by the foreign-funded CIP- militia.  
 
International support for Nabi Gechi’s militia prompted the Taliban commander, who 
had already been approached many times by elders and local government officials to 
stop fighting, to join the APRP with eighteen fighters. However, with his main enemy 
still in place (the CIP programme stopped but Nabi Gechi and his militia still operated 
in the area), in a 2014 interview he said that he was disillusioned with the 
reintegration programme. ‘They had promised that they would take care of me and 
my people. They also promised that they would stop the arbakai to harass us. They 
said we would get a house and other benefits. But none of those promises 
materialised’.342  	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In sum, in the absence of a high-level political process resulting in a more inclusive 
government at national and local level the APRP offered insurgents only surrender to 
what was viewed as an unsavoury government – an offer that did not reflect the 
Taliban’s strength on the battlefield. Key elements of the APRP like amnesty and 
grievance resolution became meaningless without a political process including 
Taliban leaders. In these circumstances ‘reintegration’ could only be superficial; as 
long as APRP participants had no patrons in the local and national government their 
position would be fragile. They would be dependent on officials whose predation had 
led them to join the Taliban in the first place.  
 
Combined, these factors meant that few Taliban were interested in the APRP, which 
they saw as surrendering to a ‘puppet’ government and its international allies. ‘The 
government should not ask the Taliban to surrender’, a HPC member said in an 
interview. ‘That is not peace. Both the Taliban and the government should 
compromise’.343 Hakim Munib, the former deputy minister of Haj and Religious 
Affairs under President Karzai and a former Taliban official explained: 
 
Afghanistan needs a durable peace, which covers all the 
dimensions, including national, regional and international 
dimensions. The local dimension should also be addressed. The 
bulk of the Taliban movement consists of Afghan brothers with 




Most Taliban who did join the government did not go through the APRP, because this 
public route could draw attention to their defection and endanger their lives. In many 
places, officials used their own methods in reintegrating insurgents, who remained 
unregistered. In Uruzgan interviewees, including those from the peace council, agreed 
that the APRP had attracted fewer Taliban than informal routes, for example through 
tribal elders.345 In Helmand former Governor Gulab Mangal (2008-2011) claims that 
he was able to persuade more Taliban to lay down their weapons informally and go 
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  Derksen, “The Politics,” 20. 	  345	  200; 201; 224; 235.	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home than through the APRP.346 
 
Another informal reintegration route for defecting Taliban was to join an anti-Taliban 
militia. The ALP absorbed many Taliban, as did unofficial militia initiatives, 
including from NDS and police officials at the national and local level. In Kunduz, 
around three hundred Taliban reintegrated in 2010 not through the APRP but through 
an informal initiative of the then provincial police commander Sayed Kheili. He 
bought off Taliban commanders with his own money. After Kheili’s assassination in 
2011, these commanders and other noninsurgent militia commanders were employed 
in the foreign-funded CIP-militia.  
 
Research findings in Kunduz, Baghlan, Uruzgan and Helmand indicate that only very 
few long-serving Taliban commanders who were entrenched in the movement joined 
the APRP. So who were the participants? Most seem to have belonged to small 
militias, some of whom had temporarily joined the Taliban or Hezb-e Islami.347 The 
majority came from northern and western provinces, not the Taliban heartland.348  
 
The first group of APRP participants joined in Baghlan in March 2010. They were 70 
to 100 men under command of local commanders Sher and Nur-ul-Haq, who joined 
after losing a battle against the Taliban. They presented themselves at the time as 
Hezb-e Islami. Analysts, military officers and officials disagreed about their 
credentials – some observers claim they were pro-government forces, others believe 
their claims. One of the group’s commanders said that Hezb-e Islami was just a name 
they picked when they started operating north of Pul-e Khumri. Another review found 
that they appeared to be concerned mainly with extorting the local population.349  
 
By contrast, the main Taliban commanders in Baghlan in 2011 said they wanted 
nothing to do with the APRP as long as their leaders did not consent. A local mid-
level Taliban commander, reportedly fighting against Sher and Nur-ul-Haq, said, 
‘Taliban high-ranking people will not ask me to lay down my weapons. They will 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  346	  Derksen, “The Politics,” 32. 	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  See the case studies.  348	  Numbers from 2011, 2013 and from 2015.	  	  349	  Derksen, “Peace from the Bottom-Up?,” 14.  
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only do this when they are in negotiations with the government of Afghanistan and 
once the foreign troops leave. Then I am okay to lay down my weapons’.350  
 
Most interviewees claim that the APRP has attracted few genuine insurgents and that 
Afghan officials use its resources for their own patronage network (putting relatives 
in the local secretariat, taking money that is supposed to go to community 
development and including followers in the programme so they can get benefits such 
as the possibility to join the ALP).351  
 
Patronage drove the allocation of resources in the APRP on all levels, according to a 
mid-term evaluation in 2013.352 Although progress was made on the demobilisation 
phase, intelligence gathering and assessment for vetting took place in a ‘“black box”, 
hidden from scrutiny’. This opacity allowed political players to subvert the process.353 
Doubts were widespread on the extent to which local peace councils were genuinely 
working to reintegrate insurgents. ‘Peace is business’, was a recurring comment of 
well-informed Afghan officials and tribal elders. Many asserted that the councils’ 
main goal was to receive funds from Kabul. Those posing as Taliban also profited.354  
 
To conclude, the timing of the APRP, its design and its implementation was driven by 
the international military. The international military’s lead, the lack of buy-in from 
local partners and the fact that local peace councils and other elements of the 
programme’s infrastructure were not ready when the programme began delegitimised 
it from the start. Some of these problems were addressed at a later stage, as the 
programme became more ‘Afghan owned’. 
  
But a structural problem, one that could not be addressed within the confines of the 
programme itself, was the lack of high-level negotiations with Taliban leaders. 
Without their consent and with the war raging, prospects of surviving participation in 
the APRP for Taliban commanders were slim. The same officials who they had 
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  404; 324; 200; 201; 236; 412; 244; 407; 425; 506; 119, amongst others.	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  UN, “Mid-Term Evaluation Report”. 	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  UN, “Mid-Term Evaluation Report,” 6, 16.  354	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sought protection from still held power, limiting chances for durable reintegration in 
the civilian society or in the security forces. Key elements of the APRP such as 
grievance resolution, amnesty, security guarantees and employment opportunities 
became empty promises. 
 
Therefore, though on paper the programme offered insurgents and their communities 
comprehensive reintegration opportunities, in reality it came down to an offer of 
surrender to a government they viewed as unsavoury; an offer that was unpalatable 
for most Taliban. Without genuine insurgents joining the programme, Afghan 
government officials used resources to provide patronage to their followers. As a 
result the APRP ended up strengthening the establishment; an exclusive government 
including officials who still used the resources to fight the Taliban to target rivals, 
many of whom then sought protection in the insurgency. The APRP ended up 
aggravating the already precarious local conditions that fuelled the insurgency; it 
aggravating the problem it aimed to solve.  
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Chapter 4 DDR in the Northeast: Kunduz and 
Baghlan 
 
4.1. Background to post-2001 conflict dynamics 
 
Kunduz and Baghlan are among the provinces with the highest overall number of 
participants in the DDR programmes. By the end of the Karzai administration in 2014 
the failure of these programmes to genuinely demobilise and reintegrate armed men, 
however, was apparent in the strong insurgency, both provinces’ large and fragmented 
informal and semi-formal security sectors and the inability of government institutions 
to control roaming militias. Heavy fighting in both provinces in the summer of 2014 
preluded the Taliban takeover of Kunduz city a year later, which it held for two 
weeks.  
 
How did it come to this? What was the impact of the DDR programmes, if any? This 
introduction explores conflict dynamics in both provinces before 2001 and after the 
fall of the Taliban in 2001 in order to show the political context in which programmes 
took place. The Kunduz case study then explores the career of Mir Alam, the Tajik 
commander of the 54th Division that was the first division in Afghanistan to 
participate in DDR. It also explores the insurgency and effect of the APRP. The 
Baghlan case study follows the career of Amir Gul, the Pashtun commander of the 
AMF Brigade 733, who, like Mir Alam in Kunduz, participated in both DDR and 
DIAG. Then it examines the impact of the APRP programme in Baghlan, where it has 




Kunduz and Baghlan provinces are located in the northeast of Afghanistan in a fertile 
plain between the Amu Darya river to the north and the Hindu Kush in the south. 
They occupy a strategic position, connecting Kabul to Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. 
Until 1964 they were part of the same province, which was called Kataghan and 
which also included Takhar. Then and now Kunduz city is the main economic, 
political and cultural centre of the northeast, which also includes Badakhshan. 
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Compared to the southwest Kunduz and Baghlan have traditionally seen more 
involvement from the state and a higher level of socio-economic development. A 
basic infrastructure for health services exists in Kunduz and Baghlan, and the overall 
literacy rates are respectively 33 per cent and 21 per cent (against 5 per cent for both 
Helmand and Uruzgan).355  
 
Both provinces are mostly agrarian. Both have an abundance of fertile land. They 
have been major rice producers, next to wheat, cotton, melons, corn and other 
produces. There is a large amount of transit trade, and both provinces are on 
trafficking routes for the country’s opium. The area has also profited from 
industrialisation drives in the 20th century, which led to the establishment of several 
factories producing goods, including sugar, cement, textile and cotton.356 
 
Between the 1850s and early 1970s several immigration waves changed the 
demography of Kataghan, which before then had been thinly populated by mostly 
Uzbeks, Tajiks, Arabs and, in smaller numbers, Turkmen, Hazara and Aimaq. 
Pashtuns are now the largest ethnic group in Kunduz, and the second largest in 
Baghlan after settling there in several phases; in some cases voluntarily, in other cases 
forced by the government in the context of Pashtunisation policies. Repeated 
immigration waves (which also included non-Pashtun settlers, most notably in the 
1920s when Tajiks and Uzbeks fled to Afghanistan after the Soviet conquest of their 
homelands) triggered many of the area’s long running conflicts over land, water and 
political representation, which continue today.357 
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(accessed 12 August 2014). 356	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The competition over resources and political representation in the 19th century pitted 
Pashtuns against all others in the north, resulting in an informal alliance of Persian 
and Turkic speakers against Pashtu speakers. The former ‘felt threatened by the 
Pashtun immigrants not just because of the loss of their best agricultural lands, but 
also because the Pashtuns represented a tool for further control by the central 
government’, according to Christian Bleuer.358 This anti-Pashtun sentiment in the 
northeast, which was further fuelled under the Taliban regime in the second half of 
the 1990s, would come to play a major role in the rise of the insurgency in Kunduz 
and Baghlan in the second half of the 2000s.    
 
The 1970s and 1980s saw the emergence of commanders mobilising solidarity 
networks or qaums under the banner of various jihadi parties operating in this area. 
According to Rubin, by 1988, main jihadi parties in the northeast were Jamiat and 
Hezb-e Islami, with respectively 55 per cent and 25 per cent of the mujahedeen in the 
northeast thought to be affiliated with these two parties.359 Hezb-e Islami, led by 
Gulbuddin Hekmatyar (born in Kunduz district Imam Sahib), had a strong base in 
Pashtun dominated areas. Professor Buhanuddin Rabbani’s led Jamiat included a high 
number of educated Tajiks, Uzbeks and Turkmens. Like the pro-government parties, 
however, mujahedeen parties were generally multi-ethnic and party choice was 
mostly ‘based on local identity and family affiliation rather than broader ethnic 
identity’.360 Mobilisation occurred within an existing qaum or, alternatively, a 
commander mobilised several qaums.361 
 
Despite the ideological agendas of the mujahedeen parties, relations between local 
commanders and parties did not depend primarily on ideological identification, but on 
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Wahdat- Islami (Islamic Unity Party), Ittehad-e Islami bara –ye Azadi-ye Afghanistan 
(Islamic Union for the Liberation of Afghanistan), Harakat-e Inqilab (Islamic 
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  Bhatia and Sedra. Afghanistan, Arms and Conflict, 252.  361	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access to resources from abroad, according to Giles Dorronsoro. He argues that non-
material issues also played a role. Party affiliation provided protection and legitimacy 
in relation to other groups. Parties’ continuous striving to maintain their clientele 
stifled party discipline. Parties never succeeded in leaving behind the disunity 
between leaderships and commanders, and were therefore coalitions of commanders.  
Commanders switching parties was common. Their fighters (andiwal) usually went 
with them.362   
 
The fighting between Jamiat and Hezb-e Islami, which had started during the anti-
Soviet jihad, worsened during the civil war (1992-1996). The provinces experienced 
an increasing fragmentation of military control between commanders, including not 
only those of Jamiat and Hezb-e Islami but also Sayyaf’s Ittehad-al Islami and 
General Dostum’s Junbesh-e Milli. In Baghlan Ismaeli militias that had been 
previously allied with the communist party also played a major role during the civil 
war. By the mid-1990s, Hezb-e Islami’s influence had weakened.363 
 
The Taliban’s gained control in Baghlan and Kunduz by winning support among 
Pashtuns and by exploiting provincial-level divisions to persuade local commanders 
to defect. Many Hezb-e Islami commanders joined them; most prominently 
commander Bashir Baghlani (with his sub-commander Amir Gul) in Baghlan in 1998. 
These defections allowed the Taliban to infiltrate and then capture Kunduz. Several 
powerful Junbesh, Jamiat, Ittehad and Mahaz-e Melli commanders also entered into 
deals with the Taliban. Ethnicity played a role, as many of these commanders were 
Pashtun. For example, in Kunduz the main Jamiat commander and important Pashtun 
powerbroker Aref Khan joined the Taliban (allowing the Tajik Mir Alam to become 
the main Kunduz Jamiat commander). The Uzbek Hezb-e Islami commander Amir 
Abdul Latif Ibrahimi on the other hand first joined the Taliban but then switched back 
to Massoud’s forces.364 	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Ethnically heterogeneous militias quickly became mainly Pashtun upon joining the 
Taliban. Amir Gul’s force (he replaced Bashir Baghlani when Baghlani was arrested 
by the Taliban) initially included many different ethnicities. With the arrival of the 
Taliban, however, he reorganised his force around Pashtuns. Pashtuns also dominated 
the local administrations in Kunduz and Baghlan, replacing Tajik and Uzbek officials. 
‘The Taliban did not care about former affiliations as long as a person was Pashtun’, 
writes Nils Wormer.365 The opposite happened on the opposing side; the threat from 
the Taliban was an incentive to form multi-ethnic alliances. Bhatia and Sedra write: 
‘Rumours of Taliban atrocities, often relayed by the internally displaced, induced 
mass combatant mobilisation for village protection from the Taliban’.366 
 
4.1.2. Post-2001  
 
Kunduz City was the last place in the north to fall to the Northern Alliance in 
November 2001. The Battle for Kunduz (Kunduz City was encircled for eleven days 
between 13 and 24 November) was characterised by Jamiat-Junbesh rivalry. After 
Ahmad Shah Massoud’s assassination on 9 September 2001, two days before the 
attacks on the Twin Towers in New York, Fahim, Massoud’s former intelligence 
chief, became the military leader of Jamiat’s forces. Jamiat commanders under 
General Daud Daud competed with General Dostum’s Junbesh militias to enter 
Kunduz City first, and similar Jamiat-Junbesh competition played out in Baghlan’s 
provincial capital Pul-i-Khumri and other provincial capitals in the north.367  
 
The Jamiat-Junbesh rivalry also manifested itself in competing tracks of negotiation 
with the Taliban who were trapped in Kunduz (the total strength of the Taliban forces 
and their foreign allies, including Pakistani militants, Islamic Movement of 
Uzbekistan and al-Qaeda, was estimated at between 8,000 and 12,000 fighters). 
Finally a deal was reached on 22 November at Dostum’s headquarters in the Qala-ye 	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Jangi fortress close to Mazar-i-Sharif.368 The Taliban surrendered on 24 and 25 
November and on 26 November General Daud’s forces occupied the city center. 
Some prominent Taliban commanders escaped (including Mullahs Beradar and 
Daudullah); others were taken to Guantanamo, and others were killed in a helicopter 
crash together with a number of local mid-level commanders. Most Taliban foot 
soldiers (an estimated 3,000 to 4,000 fighters had held out) were taken prisoner by 
Dostum’s forces and part of this group perished in the ‘convoy of death’.369  
 
The international intervention reversed the power balance between the Pashtun 
powerbrokers who had ruled under the Taliban time and those who had been in 
charge before. The mainly non-Pashtun victors distributed top positions in the local 
administration amongst themselves. While the former jihadi parties had previously 
been ethnically heterogeneous, by contrast under the Karzai administration they 
became more ethnically homogenous (a trend that the DDR process, explored below, 
would deepen). Tajiks filled the top positions occupied by Jamiat, Uzbeks those by 
Junbesh and Pashtuns those by Hezb-e Islami, Ittehad-e Islami and Afghan Millat.  
 
Most security positions went to Jamiat, which was facilitated by Shura-ye Nazar 
members in top positions in the MoI and the MoD. General Daud Daud was appointed 
as the head of 6th Corps of AMF in the northeast. In Kunduz Mir Alam became the 
commander of the 54th Division, and in Baghlan Mustafa Mohseni became the 
commander of the 20th Division.  
 
Hezb-e Islami commander Amir Gul, who had been affiliated with the Taliban, 
quickly switched to Jamiat as the international intervention was underway, and was 	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subsequently appointed as commander of the AMF Brigade 733 in Baghlan. This was 
typical for the security sector’s set-up in Kunduz and Baghlan: Pashtun commanders 
who played their cards right like Amir Gul, whose defection had enabled Jamiat to 
enter Kunduz from his home district Baghlan-e Jadid, – mirroring Amir Gul’s former 
boss Bashir Baghlani’s switch to the Taliban in 1998, enabling them to infiltrate 
Kunduz – could win appointments, but only in subordinate positions to non-
Pashtuns.370 
The political marginalisation of Pashtun powerbrokers and harassment of Pashtun 
communities by non-Pashtun militias and officials is cited widely by interviewees as 
one of the main causes of instability during the Karzai years and a driving force of the 
growing insurgency in the 2000s. A tribal elder from Kunduz, recalls how revenge 
was taken on the Pashtuns in 2001. ‘Everyone was looking at the Pashtuns as 
Taliban’.371 Human Rights Watch found evidence of killings, sexual violence, 
beatings, extortion, and looting in Pashtun villages in the north in 2002. In 2004 it 
warned of pre-election violence by security forces affiliated with Jamiat, Junbesh and 
Hezb-e Wahdat. Over 50,000 Pashtuns were estimated to have fled and were living in 
the south.372 
Pashtun communities had few representatives in the provincial government they could 
turn to when under pressure. ‘Go to Kunduz and see who is in the key positions, and 
how many are Pashtuns’, said one official in Kabul. ‘Among the district governors, 
police chiefs and other officials you may find maybe two Pashtuns in key positions, 
but those Pashtuns are weak ones’.373 Pashtuns in leadership positions had to get the 
approval of Shura-ye Nazar, according to a tribal elder. The political marginalisation 
and abuse by non-Pashtun officials drove many Pashtun communities in the arms of 
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the Taliban. ‘The Taliban include different ethnic groups like Uzbeks and Tajiks, but 
the local support mainly comes from Pashtuns if I am honest with you’.374    
A second cause of instability under both Karzai administrations that played into the 
hands of the resurgent Taliban in the second half of the 2000s was the rivalry between 
local officials with links to factions in Kabul, leading to a very weak provincial 
government. With Shura-ye Nazar exercising significant influence over the security 
apparatus in Kunduz and Baghlan, Karzai, as a Pashtun president, tried pushing back 
by appointing proxies in government positions, usually Pashtuns from Hezb-e Islami 
or Sayyaf’s party Ittehad. This challenged Shura-ye Nazar but never succeeding in 
turning the tables. The competing local factions worked to undermine each other on 
important dossiers like the disarmament of illegal militias. Factional infighting badly 
affected the provincial government’s effectiveness.  
A third cause of instability was that the main factions, in Kabul and in the provincial 
governments in Kunduz and Baghlan, supported local militias to further their cause. A 
key moment, for example, was during preparations for the 2009 presidential elections, 
which coincided with the Taliban resurgence. Political factions used international and 
Afghan government funding for the anti-Taliban campaign to support loyal militia 
commanders. Shura-ye Nazar was again successful in this but other factions were in 
on it too. Some of these militias were illegal and others were part of official 
programmes, like the ALP. Discontent with the often-predatory militias became 
widespread, and also played in the hands of the Taliban, who in many places were 
seen as less predatory and violent than the militias.375   
 
4.2. Kunduz Province  
 
4.2.1. DDR and DIAG –  the case of Mir Alam  
 
Tajik commander Mir Alam’s appointment in 2001 as commander of the 54th 
Division of the AMF typified the beginning of Jamiat’s post-Taliban dominance of 
the Kunduz security sector. The AMF sub-commanders he appointed to districts were 
mostly Jamiatis, though some had not previously fought under his command. In the 	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54th division headquarters in Kunduz City, however, Mir Alam appointed loyal sub-
commanders who had fought alongside him in the jihad against the Soviets and had 
stayed with him over the past decades of war.376 
 
Mir Alam is Tajik, born around 1953 in Kunduz City, the son of a local dignitary. He 
trained as a mechanic. After joining the jihad in 1978 at he first fought for other jihadi 
parties including Harakat-e Inqilab, but in 1989 switched to the Shura-ye Nazar 
faction of Jamiat when he could not ‘receive enough weapons from abroad’ (a 
common reason for commanders to switch, as explored above). By 1992 he was ‘one 
of the key Mujahideen commanders who implement the strategy of the council 
[Supervisory Council or Shura-ye Nazar] in Kunduz’, according to a profile in 
AFGHANews, a newspaper published by Jamiat.377  
 
Though the 1992 profile is flattering, according to other sources Ahmad Shah 
Massoud did not like Mir Alam, suspecting him of involvement in drugs trafficking 
and having many ‘ghost soldiers’.378 Mir Alam became Shura-ye Nazar’s most 
important commander in Kunduz by default, after the defection of Jamiat commander 
Aref Khan to the Taliban in the second half of the 1990s. The province was not a 
traditional stronghold of Shura-ye-Nazar like the Panjshir Valley, and Mir Alam had a 
strong local network. This was also a key consideration of the Jamiat top command 
when it appointed him to command the 54th Division in 2001. In the words of a 
former official and high-ranking Jamiati, ‘there was no alternative’.379    
 
For Mir Alam, who had made his career on the battlefield and had a strong local base 
but lacked the respect of Shura-ye Nazar leaders in Kabul, the DDR process was 
especially threatening. In 2003, Kunduz was a ‘relatively benign area’, so the 54th was 
the first unit nationwide to be targeted by DDR.380 Mir Alam’s immediate question to 
visiting ANBP officials was whether only AMF commanders would disarm. For him, 	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this was a crucial question. Control over men and (even more importantly) weapons 
were his most important assets against rivals, both those from other former jihadi 
parties, but also those within Jamiat.381 
 
Many interviewees speak of tensions between Mir Alam and his boss General Daud 
Daud, the Tajik commander of the 6th Corps in the northeast, who was sixteen years 
younger, spoke some English, had little experience on the battlefield, but was well 
liked by foreign powers. In addition he had the credentials of having been a close 
confidante of Ahmad Shah Massoud. Once it was clear that the 6th Corps would 
participate first in the DDR process, General Daud Daud fought tooth and nail against 
the disarmament of the 6th Corps headquarters in Kunduz City. He showed little 
resistance, however, to the disarmament of the 54th Division of his rival Mir Alam 
(who appeared to visiting UN officials to see the writing on the wall and resign 
himself to his fate). In reality, DDR was much less of a threat for Daud than for Mir 
Alam. Daud’s close ties to the Shura-ye Nazar faction in Kabul meant he became the 
deputy minister for counter narcotics at the MoI, despite allegations that he was 
involved in the drugs trade. He left behind Mir Alam, whose ties to Shura-ye Nazar in 
Kabul were weaker, in Kunduz to face the music.382 
 
DDR in Kunduz started on 21 October 2003. In the first three days, 982 ex-
combatants handed in 901 functioning weapons, according to the official statistics. 
They paraded past President Karzai during the official launch of the ANBP on 24 
October. Present too were Defense Minister Fahim, Vice-President Khalili and the 
UN’s Senior Representative of the Secretary-General Lakhdar Brahimi.383  
 
Despite the high-level attendance – one former DDR official observed that it seemed 
the VIPs’ bodyguards had more weapons than were being surrendered – it was 
unclear who those parading were. The headquarters of the 54th in Kunduz was ‘quite 	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empty’ before the process, according to an observer who had visited in spring of that 
year.384 After the Taliban’s ouster from Kunduz many of the 54th Division’s foot 
soldiers, though they remained on the payroll, had gone home. ‘There was no army’, 
says a former high-level DDR official. ‘What were we disarming? A group of Afghan 
farmers who had been called to arms and since the fighting had gone back to farming. 
There was no certainty on who we were disarming’.385  
 
While foot soldiers returned to a life of farming and General Daud secured an 
attractive new government position (much like other corps commanders in the north 
and west, including Atta Mohammad Noor and Ismael Khan), the implications of the 
DDR process for Mir Alam and his sub-commanders were potentially disastrous. He 
hoped to be provincial police chief but another Jamiat commander, Motaleb Beg, an 
Uzbek, was appointed instead. Mir Alam handed a list of armaments to DDR officials 
that included only part of his arsenal. He kept secret weapons depots and maintained 
contact with his men, some of whom became illegal militias and some of whom he 
was able to move into Kunduz’ security forces. He made sure that only rival 
commanders were disarmed. In other words, he mirrored locally exactly what General 
Daud had done to him.386 
 
In sum, as explored in the first chapter, the DDR programme in Kunduz, the first 
province to go through the process, led to the appointment of the best-connected AMF 
commander to an attractive government position, while the lowest and weakest 
commanders were disarmed. Between them was provincial-level commander Mir 
Alam, who did not have the right connections to obtain a government position but was 
too powerful to be disarmed. He kept his weapons while moving the remainder of his 
network, his most trusted commanders, underground. The DDR process just made his 
network informal, while eliminating any control the central government may have had 
over it previously. Not only did DDR lead to the growth, overnight, of illegal militias, 
it also increased informal powerbrokers’ influence on the local government. In 
Kunduz Mir Alam gained influence over the local administration by moving some of 	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his followers into the security forces. As Philipp Münch notes by 2004 only 10 per 
cent of Kunduz’s 400 police officers were professionally trained, while none of the 
lower ranks were.387 
 
The DDR process also turned Mir Alam, like other former jihadi commanders who 
failed to obtain a government position, against the Karzai government. ‘Holding an 
official position in Kunduz province is regarded by the elites as a guarantee of power 
and as an important material as well as symbolic resource’, according to Conrad 
Schetter et al.388 Powerbrokers’ failure to obtain a government position can 
potentially contribute to instability, especially if the powerbroker in question is still 
armed as a result of an unsuccessful DDR programme. ‘(W)arlords who are not 
holding an office, regularly bring them[selves] to the attention of the public – often by 
the conscious use of violence and by fighting rivals, who do hold an office’.389 Mir 
Alam indeed seems to have pursued a tactic of deliberate destabilisation as a show of 
strength (just like Jan Mohammad in Uruzgan and in Helmand Sher Mohammad 
Akhunzada, Abdul Rahman Jan and Malem Mir Wali whose examples are explored 
below). Thus, for example, his fighters clashed with those of Motaleb Beg over an 
appointment that was not to Mir Alam’s liking.390  
 
President Karzai appointed Mir Alam to become the Baghlan police commander in 
June 2005. He had to hand over a cache of 765 weapons plus ammunition to Motaleb 
Beg as part of DIAG. The police chief position gave him a stake in the drugs routes 
passing through Baghlan, according to western officials. As mentioned earlier, many 
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former AMF commanders like Mir Alam ended up in the police through patronage, 
usually with their militias and command structures intact.391 
 
In 2007 Mir Alam was fired as part of a police reform process, according to the U.S. 
Embassy in Afghanistan having used his position ‘to engage in a broad range of 
criminal activity, including extortion, bribery and drug trafficking’.392 He returned to 
Kunduz, unemployed. His fortunes changed again in May 2007. As part of DIAG, he 
handed in the largest number of weapons (900) of all local Kunduz commanders, 
probably to show to the German PRT that he could be a trustworthy partner. This 
came two days after a heavy attack on foreign forces in Kunduz.393 
 
Until then the German PRT had little time for him. After the attack, however, and as 
the insurgency in Kunduz expanded, Mir Alam became a local intelligence source for 
German and American military forces. German attempts to recover weapons he had 
retained during DDR and DIAG yielded limited results. An operation to uncover Mir 
Alam’s suspected weapons depots in the Siah Ab area of Kunduz district failed, for 
example, perhaps because, following the official rules, foreign troops cooperated with 
the local NDS chief, who was a friend of Mir Alam.394  
 
The fight against the Taliban marked a new and profitable phase for former 54th 
Division commanders and other commanders connected to Mir Alam, many of whom 
Tajik, like Mir Alam, or Uzbek. DDR programmes and police reform had excluded 
them from government positions, while not disarming them or offering them 
alternatives to operating as illegal militias and profiting from the illicit economy. Now 
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rather than incorporating militias in the Afghan security forces to fight the Taliban, 
they were supported while continuing to operate illegally.  
 
In July 2009, a month before the presidential elections, Kunduz provincial governor 
Engineer Omar, asked the NDS to recruit and support local militias, or arbakai, to 
stem the insurgency’s rise and help secure the vote in Imam Saheb, Khanabad and 
Qal-e Zal districts. The NDS programme was headed by Mir Alam’s brother-in-law, 
General Mohammad Daud, and initially Mir Alam became its chief beneficiary. Later 
other commanders with ties to political patrons in Kabul also benefited. President 
Karzai, Jamiati powerbrokers and others vied for influence by giving or withholding 
support to local militias – similar to the competition in Kabul about the appointments 
in the local administration. The arbakai were the most successful militia initiative in 
pushing back the Taliban in Kunduz in 2009.395 
 
The insurgency’s growth in Kunduz and efforts to counter the Taliban by arming 
militias coincided with the political comeback of Fahim. In the northeast Fahim used 
his long time clients Mir Alam and other former jihadi commanders, like the Pashtun 
powerbroker Amir Gul in Baghlan (see below), to strengthen his own position. This 
familiar tactic of presenting himself as a key actor in the stabilisation – or, 
alternatively, the destabilisation – of the northeast is presumably at least part of the 
reason why he was included as vice-presidential candidate on Karzai’s ticket. Sources 
in Kabul and Kunduz (tribal elders and Afghan officials), confirm that until Fahim 
died in February 2014, he was Mir Alam’s main patron.396 	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Bismullah Khan, Fahim’s former chief of staff during his time as Defense Minister, 
became the minister of interior in 2010; General Daud Daud, another Tajik, returned 
as the 303rd Pamir Zone commander to the north for the ANP and General Abdul 
Rahman Sayed Kheili from the Shura-ye Nazar stronghold of Shomali became the 
provincial police commander in Kunduz. He paid commanders out of his own pocket, 
including defecting Taliban, to fight alongside him in Gore Tepa, Imam Saheb, Dasht-
e Archi and Chahar Dara districts. After Daud Daud’s assassination in March 2011 
these commanders were integrated in the German-led CIP. Bismullah allotted Kunduz 
1,125 ALP positions, which Sayed Kheili used to ‘establish a clientele’ of mostly 
non-Pashtun commanders.397 In sum, the fight against the Taliban and the rearmament 
of militias in northern Afghanistan strengthened the Shura-ye Nazar powerbrokers 
that the first DDR programme had aimed to weaken.398 
 
U.S. Ambassador Karl Eikenberry followed the proliferation of militias in Kunduz 
with concern.  
 
Beyond reversing even the limited progress toward disarmament made under 
DDR (Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration) and DIAG 
(Disbandment of Illegal Armed Groups) programs, the implications of 
supporting local militias to combat the insurgency are both complex and 
uncertain. In many cases, these militias are likely considerably stronger than 
the under-staffed and under-equipped police, which puts the official assertion 
of MoI/ANP control over the militias in doubt.399 
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He noted that while Mir Alam claimed that his 500-man militia was controlled by the 
NDS ‘he maintains operational control of the force and distributes its pay… Mir 
Alam’s Kunduz militia – ethnically divisive, controlled by one man, grounded in 
contempt for DIAG and the rule of law – exemplifies a quick fix with dangerous 
implications: tactical gains at strategic cost’.400  
 
Despite Eikenberry’s concerns, the short-term considerations of political patrons in 
Kabul wanting to expand their influence in Kunduz against rivals and of foreign 
forces seeking quick results against the Taliban continued to be prioritised. They 
resulted in Mir Alam becoming the main powerbroker in Kunduz through their 
support – in both the informal and the formal political order. The core of Mir Alam’s 
informal network of illegal militia commanders, included twenty to thirty of his 
‘bodyguards’, had served with him in the 54th division, with some even serving with 
him in the anti-Soviet jihad – showing the failure of DDR to disrupt the command 
structure.401  
 
He provided the militias with money, weapons and ammunition according to sources. 
A former government official said: ‘He still has a lot of weapons in storage’.402 The 
central government had little grip on Mir Alam’s expanding network. He appears by 
this time to have considered it an advantage to keep loyalists as informal militias. 
Although some of the commanders that were recruited into the ALP from November 
2010 onwards – a process in which SOF were involved – were reportedly connected 
to him, according to several sources he preferred to keep most of his men operating as 
arbakai so as to have more freedom.403  
 
Mir Alam had no formal government position. But according to most sources his ties 
to Fahim gave him a great deal of influence on local appointments. For example, 
when Mir Alam learned of Police Chief’s Samiullah Qatra intention to arrest militia 	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commanders Qadirak and Faizak for the killings in the village of Kanam-e Kalan in 
2012 (examined below), he reportedly requested Fahim to intervene. A few days later 
Qatra was fired. When his deputy chief of police, Ghulam Farhad, moved to arrest the 
two commanders he was also sacked, although there could also be other reasons for 
his firing.  
 
More than a year later, in November 2013, the Police Chief Khalil Andarabi was 
replaced with Mir Alam’s ally Mustafa Mohseni. The reason may have been 
Andarabi’s use of predatory illegal militias and ALP in anti-Taliban operations. It 
may, however, have also been because Andarabi was a rival of Mir Alam from his 
time as a police chief in Baghlan, and had made several appointments in the 
provincial security apparatus that were unfavourable to Mir Alam, including in the 
Kanam area of Kunduz City, which Mir Alam saw as his sphere of influence. Many 
sources claimed that Fahim and Mir Alam pushed Khalil Andarabi out with an eye to 
the 2014 presidential elections.404  
 
Two examples of violence generated by commanders with ties to Mir Alam show 
how, by the end of the Karzai administration, the central government had in 2014 no 
more control – actually probably less – over Mir Alam and his commanders than 
before DDR and DIAG. In one incident on 2 September 2012 twelve civilians were 
killed in a raid on the predominantly Pashtun village of Kanam-e-Kalan northeast of 
Kunduz City – a revenge attack for the killing of a militia member. The raid was 
reportedly carried out by Qadirak and Faizak, two commanders with ties to Mir Alam.  
Afghan officials trying to investigate, arrest or disarm Mir Alam’s sub-commanders 
after these incidents claim to have received phone calls from then Vice-President 
Fahim ordering them to stop.405 As explored above Mir Alam’s ties to Fahim also 
seems to have led to the dismissal of officials wanting to arrest the two commanders. 
A government commission sent by President Karzai to investigate the Kanam incident 
concluded:  
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  552; 005; 008; 009; Lola Cecchinel, “The End of a Police Chief: Factional 
rivalries and pre-election power struggles in Kunduz,” Afghanistan Analysts Network, 
January 31, 2014.  
405 179; 008; 009; 012; 014; 015; 025; 518. See also HRW, “Tomorrow We Shall All 
Die,” Human Rights Watch, March 3, 2015.  
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Mir Alam Khan is one of the influential irresponsible armed commanders in 
Kunduz. The Kunduz officials should have disarmed his irresponsible armed 
men (…) or his men should have been recruited into the ALP. As has been 
seen, these measures have not been taken.406  
 
 
The commission summoned Mir Alam to ask him questions about the incident but ‘he 
avoided to come for clarification’. Qadirak and Faizak remained free and kept 
operating as militia commanders. In early August 2014, however, Qadirak was killed 
by the Taliban in Kanam.407  
 
Another example was Khanabad, an ethnically mixed district, where the largest group 
is Pashtun. It was another main area of Mir Alam’s influence and extremely insecure. 
The district saw an enormous proliferation of militias after 2009. Afghan government 
officials estimated that by the end of the Karzai administration there were around 
2,300 members of illegal armed groups (or ‘irresponsible armed groups’, as they are 
locally known). About half were connected to Mir Alam, according to local sources. 
Those connected to him came from all ethnic groups but were mostly Tajiks, Aimaqs 
and Uzbeks and usually operated in groups from five to fifteen men.408 
 
The illegal armed groups carved out mini-fiefs. One of their main sources of income, 
next to robbery, kidnapping and drugs smuggling, was the taxation of villagers. ‘If 
people don’t pay the illegal armed groups they are expelled from their village’, said 
one government official. ‘They have no other option than to pay’.409 The militias also 
dominated village life in other ways. Villagers had to ask permission to local 
commanders for most major transactions, including for marrying off their daughters. 
The militias recruited boys by force, in some cases even exploiting them as sex 
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  Final report from the government commission investigating the Kanam incident, 
unpublished – in possession of the author.	  
407 Final report from the government commission investigating the Kanam incident. 
See also Lola Cecchinel, “Taleban Closing in on the City. The next round of the thug-
of-war over Kunduz,” Afghanistan Analysts Network, September 2, 2014; Ghanizada, 
“20 Civilians Killed Following Clashes in Kunduz,” Khaama Press, August 11, 2014.  408	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slaves. ‘They go to the villagers and tell them his son should be in their group’, said a 
tribal elder. ‘People are defenseless, they can’t do anything’.410  
 
The militias generated much general insecurity not only through their harassment of 
villagers but also by regular fighting with other militias and Taliban – usually over 
who could collect ‘tax’. Village elders tried to mediate but generally had little 
influence. Thanks to support from provincial and national government patrons, 
commanders operated with impunity. A local official recalled that commanders 
arrested for kidnappings or murder were later released because of Mir Alam’s 
influence. A tribal elder said: 
 
Just recently a few gunmen kidnapped a 13-year old child. They had trouble 
transporting him to another place so they just killed him. Luckily the 
kidnappers were arrested. But I am sure they will be released soon.411 
 
 
In 2011 and 2012 the government announced the disarmament of illegal militias but 
the weapon collection was very limited. The Taliban were even perceived as more 
supportive of the population’s needs than the militias, and therefore attracted growing 
support. The presence of illegal militias thus challenged government presence both 
directly and indirectly through fuelling support for the insurgency.412 
 
In sum, after the resurgence of the Taliban in Kunduz in 2008, Tajik powerbroker Mir 
Alam and his political patrons in Kabul used international support for anti-Taliban 
operations to strengthen their own positions. Though all political factions were in on 
this game, Shura-ye Nazar was especially successful in expanding its military 
presence in Kunduz, in both the formal and the informal security sectors. The 
increasing strength of informal militarised networks like that of Shura-ye Nazar was 
clearly at odds with DDR’s objective of bolstering government institutions.  
Mir Alam became a key player for Shura-ye-Nazar in the informal security sector. In 
spite of having participated several times in DDR programmes, his ties to his close 
commanders remained intact and he had kept weapons behind. When the Taliban 
resurfaced in Kunduz and international troops and local authorities turned to him and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  410	  013. 	  411	  013.	  
412 008; 010; 013; 017.  
© Linde Dorien Derksen 2017  159	  
his commanders to combat the insurgency, they did not formalise this arrangement by 
integrating him and his men into police and bringing them under institutional control. 
Instead they supported him and his men as illegal militias – directly contrary to the 
objectives of the DIAG programme, which at that time was still running. This allowed 
him to become the main strongman in Kunduz.   
  
If anything, his network profited from a weak government and continued violence in 
the province, which meant continued support for him and his militias and limited 
checks on illegal activities like taxation and drug smuggling. Enabled by the political 
and financial support from political patrons in Kabul, commanders connected to Mir 
Alam, who were mostly Tajik, Aimaqs and Uzbeks, aggressively sought to expand 
their area of control, including in Pashtun communities, some of whom sought help 
from the Taliban to counter this expansion – thus escalating violence in the province.  
 
4.2.2. The APRP  
 
The Taliban’s footprint in Kunduz and Baghlan had always been lighter than in 
Helmand and Uruzgan and it took longer for the insurgency to take hold in the 
northern provinces. It gathered pace in 2008 and 2009, mainly initiated from the 
outside, with arms and men coming from Pakistan and the south, according to 
Antonio Giustozzi and Christoph Reuter.413 Several factors conspired to increase local 
acquiescence to the Taliban.  
 
First, the weak local government was unable to provide basic public goods, 
particularly security and justice. This was partly the result of the competition between 
local factions linked to contesting Kabul politicians. Another reason was the influence 
over local governance of strongmen like Mir Alam, who had not been effectively 
disarmed nor reintegrated during the DDR process. The local administration fell into 
the clutches of informal networks that had no interest in addressing predatory militias. 
As a result, militias proliferated in the second half of the 2000s and generated 
enormous insecurity. This also alienated the local population from the government, 
creating an opportunity for the Taliban to move in.   
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The third main local driver of the insurgency was the political marginalisation and 
harassment of Pashtun communities, especially in districts where they were the 
largest ethnic group, like Aliabad, Chahar Dara and Dasht-e Archi. ‘Our rights have 
been trampled on at the local and national level’, said a Pashtun ALP official. ‘The 
police chief is not from us, the head of security is not from us, nor is the head of the 
justice department. This is one of the reasons behind the insurgency in Kunduz’.414 
The marginalisation of Pashtuns deepened with the proliferation of militias after 
2008. ALP militias became predominately non-Pashtun, even in districts where 
Pashtuns were in the majority. The ALP official said: ‘The distribution of weapons to 
the ALP in Kunduz is unjust if you look at it from an ethnic perspective. For example 
in Aliabad there are maybe thirty Pashtuns among 250 ALP’.415 
 
The proliferation of non-Pashtun militias increased the harassment of Pashtun 
communities, as shown in Kanam-e Kalan and Khanabad districts. In response, some 
communities turned to the Taliban. ‘Previously there were no tribal and ethnic 
differences in Kanam’, said a tribal elder. ‘They [militias tied to Mir Alam] made this 
into a problem between Pashtuns and non-Pashtuns. The Taliban have infiltrated 
Kanam now because of this ethnic division’.416  
 
In response to the burgeoning insurgency in late 2010, the U.S. deployed 4,000 troops 
to the region. This marked the start of an aggressive campaign to root out insurgent 
groups, which by that time included the Taliban, the Taliban-affiliated Haqqani 
network, Hezb-e Islami, Tajiks from Tajikistan and the Islamic Movement of 
Uzbekistan.417 Intensive counterinsurgency and kill-or-capture missions in Kunduz 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  414	  002. 415	  002. 416	  013. 	  417 According to Giustozzi and Reuter at that time the number of foreign fighters in 
Kunduz was limited. Giustozzi and Reuter, “The Northern Front,” 4. In later years 
increasing numbers of foreign fighters, including Chechens and al-Qaeda, were 
reported. See, for example, Dan Lamothe, “In Northern Afghanistan, a mix of 
Taliban, foreign fighters, and soldiers spread thin,” The Washington Post, November 
4, 2015 and Ayaz Gul, “Afghan Official: Over 1,300 Foreign Fighters in Kunduz 
Battle,” Voice of America, November 15, 2015. Other authors, however, noted that 
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from 2010 onwards, which were successful in pushing the Taliban back, were 
paralleled by and became linked to efforts to reintegrate insurgents under the APRP 
(though only Afghans were eligible).418  
 
By the spring of 2014 the APRP had registered 385 participants in the province. All 
were Taliban, according to Wahidullah Rahmani, the head of the local secretariat, 
although only fifty-five were ‘ideological’ and fully integrated into the movement.419 
This implies that the rest, a large majority, operated in the insurgency’s periphery. In 
fact the identity and numbers of participants were disputed, with well-informed 
sources claiming that the programme has attracted few genuine insurgents, and that at 
best participants were small commanders and fighters looking for benefits. 420 
 
One high-ranking official said: ‘What have we achieved so far? Nothing, absolutely 
nothing. In some cases Taliban have joined the HPC [APRP] but these Taliban are not 
ideological Taliban. These are the unemployed figures; when they see their interests 
are on the side of the government, they come to its side’.421 Another official 
concurred: ‘No real Taliban I know of have surrendered. Most of them were 
irresponsible armed men who had some kind of connection to the Taliban. But they 
were not Taliban. When the Taliban was weakened through military operations, they 
left them to get some benefits from the HPC’.422 
 
Moreover, of the 385 men listed as APRP participants in 2014, around 300 originally 
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Bleuer, “Chechens in Afghanistan 2: How To Identify A Chechen,” Afghanistan 
Analysts Network, July 3, 2016. 	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  It was not possible to track the participants of the PTS programme. However, as 
the PTS mainly operated in the time when there was very limited insurgency in 
Kunduz and Baghlan (donors started pulling out of the programme in 2008, and after 
that time until the start of APRP in 2011 the programme therefore mainly existed on 
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former police chief Sayed Kheili, who bought off Taliban commanders in Chahar 
Dara and Aliabad districts in 2010 with his own money.423 A former western official 
who was working in Kunduz at the time said: ‘It was Afghan reintegration, we were 
amazed by how quickly it went’. After Sayed Kheili’s assassination in 2011 these 
commanders (and other non-insurgent militia commanders) were employed in the CIP 
militia. But Karzai took steps to abolish the programme by the end of 2011.424 
 
The 100 or so that did reintegrate through the APRP were from the district of Imam 
Sahib, where Taliban fighters joined after an internal fight with members of al-Qaeda 
who reportedly were supposed to support them with military advice but were accused 
of instead stealing money. The local population withdrew support for the insurgency 
and the local Taliban commanders switched in December 2010. These first 
reintegration efforts were driven partly by ISAF, as the local peace council and 
secretariat had by that time not been set up. Little infrastructure was in place to 
support participants. ‘We started (the APRP) in the district Imam Sahib. We tried to 
get funding to get them a safe house, money, projects. This was in December, but 
we’re still waiting for Kabul’, said a western official in March 2011. Instead, with 
American funds (the U.S. created a special fund of $50 million to help APRP 
participants through an American National Defence Authorization Act) the 
participants received short-term aid, like rice and cooking oil.425 
 
In these circumstances guaranteeing their security was impossible. On 9 May 2011 
former comrades killed ex-Taliban commander Maulawi Mohammad Nabi and four 
of his bodyguards were killed in Imam Saheb. In the first year of the APRP in 
Kunduz, three other reintegrated commanders were killed, by Taliban or ‘pro-
government’ militias. As a result, high-level provincial officials withdrew support for 
the official programme even before its infrastructure was in place, and would only 	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  How the APRP numbers in Kunduz evolved is difficult to assess. The head of the 
provincial peace council Assadullah Omarkheil said in an interview in June 2014 that 
around 400 insurgents had reintegrated, which would correspond with the assessment 
of the head of the APRP secretariat. However, already in October 2011 Omarkheil 
had said to Pajhwok news agency that around 400 insurgents had reintegrated under 
the APRP, a number that was widely quoted at the time. Wahidullah, “Taliban Kill 
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cooperate with informal reintegration, away from media attention.  The German and 
American military also appeared to lose interest. A former western official who was 
working in Kunduz at the time said: ‘By the autumn of 2011 the APRP had basically 
ceased to exist in Kunduz. It was a child born dead’.426 
 
4.3. Baghlan Province 
 
4.3.1. DDR and DIAG – the case of Amir Gul 
 
Hezb-e Islami commanders in Baghlan who had defected from the Taliban to the 
Northern Alliance in 2001 found their position precarious after the Taliban regime 
fell. Their former patrons had fled to Pakistan, while their ties to new patrons in the 
local government and Kabul were fragile at best. They became, first, the main losers 
of the DDR programme. Later, when some of them were supporting the insurgency, 
they were main recipients of APRP and ALP resources aimed at winning back their 
loyalty – though these resources did not secure their commitment to the government. 
Therefore they are an important example of how and why DDR failed in 
Afghanistan.427  
 
When the AMF was established in 2002 the militias of the defected Pashtun 
commanders were absorbed into the 20th Division commanded by Mustafa Mohseni, a 
member of a powerful Tajik family from the district Andarab and supporter of the 
Shura-ye Nazar faction. Like elsewhere in the northeast the U.S.-led intervention had 
reversed the power balance between those who had backed the Taliban and Northern 
Alliance commanders, with the Shura-ye Nazar faction coming out on top – especially 
in the security sector.428 
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When the 20th Division was disbanded under the DDR programme in July 2004, 
Mohseni quickly found another lucrative position through his connections with the 
Shura-ye Nazar-dominated security ministries in Kabul. He first became police chief 
of Logar, then moved into the MoI as deputy head of Planning and Operations and in 
2013 became the police chief of Kunduz. Other former Northern Alliance 
commanders and their men moved into the ANP in Baghlan after DDR, especially 
Tajiks connected to Shura-ye Nazar. Mohseni and his men were thus reintegrated into 
the state apparatus, albeit not through the DDR programme but through patronage, 
which meant that their militias were not disbanded but entered intact.429  
 
Those with fewer connections in the new political order, especially Pashtun 
commanders who had been supporting the Taliban, lost out.430 The example of Amir 
Gul is instructive. He was the former leader of Hezb-e Islami in Baghan (having taken 
over from his predecessor Bashir Baghlani in 2000), whose support to the Taliban in 
the second half of the nineties had been key to the movement capturing Baghlan and 
Kunduz.431 He was a Pashtun from the Husseinkheil tribe that lived around the 
provincial capital Pul-e Khumri. As he had been operating in the former provincial 
capital Baghlan-e Jadid, he had moved there, taking some Husseinkheil families with 
him. As with many mujahedeen commanders he had become powerful in his area 
through his command of fighters in the jihad against the Soviets but he was not from 
the tribal elite, and interviewees point to another person as the head of the 
Husseinkheil tribe in Baghlan.432 
 
Instead, Amir Gul was a self-made man. His career was characterised by opportunism 
rather than ideological commitment. He had switched allegiances many times since 
taking up arms against the Soviets in the 1980s and had ended up throwing in his lot 	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  According to a U.S. Embassy Cable ‘Gul informed the Taliban that Baghlani had 
several secret weapons caches that he had no intention of giving up. Baghlani was 
arrested by the Taliban and ended up spending time in a Kandahar prison’. U.S. 
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with Shura-ye Nazar in 2001. In 2002 he was appointed as head of the 733 Battalion 
of the 20th Division, commanding a few hundred men.433 But after defeating the 
Taliban and having inserted prominent loyalists in the state apparatus, Shura-ye Nazar 
political patrons in Kabul had little use for Gul. He became unemployed; trying but 
failing to secure a position in the local government and being excluded from running 
in the 2005 parliamentary elections because of his links to illegal armed men. Though 
the allegation was correct according to interviewees and other sources, it also applied 
to many other candidates, and only resulted in exclusion under DIAG for those with 
the fewest connections in Kabul.434 
 
In 2006 he was arrested after a house search by ISAF and ANA forces, who suspected 
him of launching attacks against their troops, drugs smuggling and other criminal 
activities. During the raid, ISAF and ANA forces found not only bomb-making 
material but also several letters to the MoI requesting a position.435  
 
Similar to Mir Alam in Kunduz Amir Gul seems to have been actively destabilising 
Baghlan-e Jadid in order to draw attention to his unemployment after DDR and show 
there would be no security without him. Interviewees confirm that Amir Gul had 
indeed kept links with his men after DDR and that illegally armed commanders linked 
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extortion, robbery and drug trafficking’. U.S. Embassy in Afghanistan, “Bringing 
Down a Warlord”. Amir Gul claimed he had meant to hand over the weapons found 
in his compound during the raid to DIAG officials. He would hand over weapons to 
DIAG for the third time in 2008. In total he handed over more than 300 weapons, 
according to a DIAG official. 010; U.S. Embassy in Afghanistan,“Baghlan Warlord 
Amir Gul Released,” U.S Embassy Cable 06KABUL5920, December 21, 2006. 
Published by Wikileaks.org. See also Derksen “The Politics”. 
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to him were involved in criminal activities, including extortion, illegal taxation, drugs 
smuggling and kidnapping, mostly in Baghlan-e Jadid.436 An ALP commander said: 
 
Amir Gul has lots of armed groups in Baghlan-e Jadid. He tried to destabilise 
the situation so the government knew that as there was a lot of trouble, Amir 
Gul was the best guy to bring security, but in fact it was him who made the 
trouble. He funded different groups to attack the government, the police.437  
 
 
Much like with Mir Alam in Kunduz, and many local powerbrokers who had gone 
through DDR elsewhere in Afghanistan, Amir Gul’s approach to seeking employment 
in the new government paid off. Elders from Baghlan put pressure on President 
Karzai, who, despite protests from ISAF, the U.S. Embassy and UNAMA, released 
him from prison and appointed him as district governor in Baghlan-e Jadid in 2007.438  
 
Although he became district governor (in which position he was allowed at most a 
few armed bodyguards) interviewees claim he was able to keep his ties to his former 
commanders, whose involvement in criminal activities continued. He also reportedly 
kept links to former commanders who had obtained positions in the local security 
apparatus, while remaining loyal to him.439 Amir Gul claimed that he was an old man 
and not their boss. He also said, however, ‘[w]e have spent a long time together in the 
strongholds against Russians and Taliban. They are my own people from Baghlan and 
they support me and I support them’.440 
 
The main source of Amir Gul’s increasing formal and informal power in the second 
half of the 2000s was Fahim, with whom he reportedly shared a love for bushkashi.441 
Like Mir Alam in Kunduz, Amir Gul had become a part of Fahim’s expanding 
informal network in the northeast, which the Shura-ye Nazar leader used to revive his 
political career and become vice-president in 2009. Interviewees claim that Gul owed 
his six-month stint as commander of the 6th Brigade of the Civil Order Police, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  436	  129; 130; 425; 107; 127; 131; 132; 133. 437 120.	  438	  See Derksen “The Politics” and U.S. Embassy Cable, “Baghlan Warlord”. 439	  129; 130; 425; 108. 	  440	  Derksen, “The Politics,” 41. 	  441	  National sport in which horse-mounted players try to haul the carcass of a goat or 
a calf to the goal. 	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commanding 400 police, to Fahim.442 Gul, who claimed to have always been affiliated 
with Jamiat – and denied ever having had ties to the Taliban or Hezb-e Islami – 
described Fahim as a ‘sympathetic man, to me and to all people’.443 
 
A prominent Shura-ye Nazar figure from Baghlan said: 
 
Both Amir Gul and Mir Alam were commanders of Marshal [Fahim]. They 
supported him in his bad days, how could Marshal forget them?  Of course he 
defended them by all means, until the last minute of his life.444 
 
 
Amir Gul’s illegally armed network, which survived his participation in DDR and 
DIAG, and his ties to Fahim allowed him to pursue his own interests, even if they 
clashed with those of the government. This became clear after a much-publicised 
incident on 25 October 2012.  In the bazaar of Baghlan-e Jadid four Afghan Special 
Operations Forces attempted to disarm an illegally armed and uniformed bodyguard 
of Ridi Gul, a former jihadi commander close to Amir Gul. Police under the 
command of district police chief Mohammad Kameen, a former 733 Brigade sub-
commander who had remained a close ally of Amir Gul after DDR, arrived and 
stopped the soldiers who had continued their patrol. After an altercation, the police 
opened fire and killed three of the four soldiers. Kameen and Amir Gul were fired as 
police chief and district governor, but refused to leave.445  
 
In a second attempt to dislodge Gul and Kameen on 24 November 2012 provincial 
police chief Assadullah Shirzad went with twenty ANP to appoint a new district 
police chief. Fighting between Shirzad’s force and Amir Gul’s men raged from 
midnight, the deadline Shirzad had given Gul to surrender to him, until 4 am. Then 
Amir Gul and Kameen escaped to Kabul. The families of deceased soldiers accused 
the presidential palace of supporting them there. Senate leaders called on the 
government to prosecute the two in an open trial. But despite warrants having been 
issued for the arrest of Kameen for the killing of the Afghan SOF and the fight against 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  442	  They differ on when it happened, it seems to have been after 2009. 425; 129; 122; 
120; 011.  443	  Derksen, “The Politics,” 41.  	  444	  025. 	  445	  120; 101; 129. See also Derksen et al., “Baghlan on the Brink”. 
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the police, and against Gul for the latter incident, they remained free and returned to 
Baghlan-e Jadid.446 
 
The incidents surrounding the killing of the three Afghan SOF and the failure to arrest 
Gul then and his arrest and release in 2006 by international forces, convinced 
villagers in Baghlan-e Jadid that he was judicially untouchable. As one villager said 
about the 2006 arrest: ‘The Americans arrested him, but then he was released. This 
means the Americans were backing him’.447 Another said: ‘We can’t do anything, 
because we know he is backed by Fahim’.448  
 
The impunity of Amir Gul and commanders linked to him and their predatory tactics 
led to resistance among local communities, and therefore also indirectly contributed 
to the increasing instability security situation in Baghlan-e Jadid. From 2008 onwards 
many turned to the Taliban to express their discontent and protect themselves. 
‘Commanders and police linked to Amir Gul were stealing cars, kidnapping and 
keeping people in private jails’, said an elder from the village Mullahkheil in an 
interview in 2014. ‘So when the Taliban came [around 2008], we supported them 
rather than calling the police’.449 
 
Members of Pashtun Gadi tribe in Baghlan-e Jadid accused Amir Gul and Kameen 
and their men of harassing them. Their rivalry went back to the early days of the war, 
when prominent Gadi tribe members were part of the PDPA government and Amir 
Gul fought them as a Hezb-e Islami commander.‘The Gadi made the history of 
Baghlan but they have been so side lined that they now have no role in the local 
government’, said a tribal elder.450  
 
He recounted the story of Taliban commander Bor Jan: 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  446	  101; 011; 102; 107; 120; I also wrote about this story in Derksen “The Politics” 
and with co-authors in Derksen et al., “Baghlan on the Brink”; “Families of killed 
Afghan army officers demand justice,” Tolo Television, January 7, 2013 (BBC 
Monitoring).  447	  125. 	  448	  130. 	  449	  125; his allegations were also levelled by other interviewees, including 135, 102 
and 120.	  450	  148. 	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He is another victim of Northern Alliance atrocities. Amir Gul conspired 
against him and imprisoned him in the name of Taliban. He was then forced to 
go and join the Taliban.451 
 
 
Another former Gadi Taliban commander said: 
 
I was a miraw452 in my area, I was serving villagers. But some of the people 
who were working with me were shot dead by irresponsible armed people who 
were connected to Amir Gul and Kameen [when they were respectively 
district governor and district police chief]. Looking at that situation, I decided 
to pick up my gun and start jihad against those corrupt and criminal 
officials.453   
 
 
By November 2009 the Taliban insurgency had grown so strong that hundreds of 
fighters stormed the district center and the house of Gul, then district governor, in an 
attempt to takeover Baghlan-e Jadid. In spite of Gul’s assertions that he had fully 
complied with the DDR and DIAG programmes and was an old man not in charge of 
armed men, he was then able to quickly mobilise a few hundred loyal militia 
commanders and repel the attacks.454 
 
In sum, the failure of DDR and DIAG programmes to disarm Amir Gul’s militias or 
integrate them in the security apparatus resulted in his armed network continuing to 
exist but underground, making it harder for government institutions to control it. 
Much like what happened with Mir Alam in neigbouring Kunduz, his militias became 
a tool in Shura-ye Nazar’s expanding informal influence in the northeast, 
undermining the state’s institutional power that the DDR and DIAG programmes had 
sought to strengthen.  
 
After the 2014 electoral crisis, and the formation of a unity government between 
Ashraf Ghani and Dr. Abdullah Abdullah to succeed the Karzai administration, the 
new government appointed Amir Gul, who reportedly continued to receive support 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  451	  100.	  452	  Someone who distributes water for the irrigation of agricultural land.	  	  453	  004. 	  454	  Hakimi and Goodhand, “Counterinsurgency, Local Militias and Statebuilding,” 
27; Giustozzi and Reuter, “The Insurgents of the Afghan North,” 40.	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from high-ranking Jamiat figures after Fahim’s death, as the head of the provincial 
ALP – in spite of the allegations of links to illegal armed groups and involvement in 
anti-government activities. At best they secured his temporary loyalty – until 
resources run out. But his exclusionary and predatory rule is unlikely ever to 
contribute to stability, proof of which is Baghlan’s still fragile security situation.455 
 
4.3.2. The APRP 
 
Most attempts at reintegrating insurgents in Baghlan took place after 2010, when the 
insurgency picked up in the province. Most involved the APRP programme and, 
informally, the ALP. Much like in neighbouring Kunduz major drivers of local 
support or acquiescence to the Taliban were the weak government crippled by 
factional infighting, its support of predatory militias and the post-2001 
marginalisation of Pashtun communities.  
 
Some Hezb-e Islami commanders, unemployed after DDR, had started cooperating 
with the Taliban, which increased its activity in Baghlan after 2007.  A former jihadi 
commander said ‘after DDR at first security was good, but after a few years it became 
bad. Commanders had expected things from the government and rearmed again and 
worked with the Taliban and Hezb-e Islami’.456 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  455	  134; 122; 413; 004. 456	  106. The Hezb-e Islami commanders cooperating with the Taliban operated 
mainly in Baghlan-e Jadid and Dand-e Ghorie, the area between Pul-e Khumri and 
Baghlan-e Jadid. The other mainly Pashtun district in northern Baghlan, Dahan-e-
Ghorie, also became a Taliban stronghold. Though Pashtuns were the main supporters 
of the Taliban, they also gained ground among other ethnicities in other districts. The 
growing insurgency in the second half of the decade was initiated by Taliban 
operating in southern Afghanistan, according to Reuter and Giustozzi. Interviews with 
local Taliban commanders indeed confirmed help from commanders in the south. 
Many interviewees in Baghlan also accused ‘Pakistan’ of being behind the surge of 
violence in Baghlan. 103; 026; 120; 005; 006. 
In spite of the growing insurgency the Hungarian PRT was reluctant to engage the 
Taliban in fighting. The Hungarian troops, who took over the ISAF PRT in Baghlan 
from the Dutch in 2006, ‘had neither the resources nor the political will to control ... 
large parts of the province’, Giustozzi and Reuter stated in their 2011 report “The 
Insurgents of the Afghan North,” 40. This changed only after German and American 
troops started operating in Baghlan in 2009. Then in 2010, U.S. SOF started 
conducting capture-or-kill missions. These operations hit the Taliban badly, 
eliminating parts of their local command structure and taking away some of their 
territorial gains. Derksen et al., “Baghlan on the Brink”; U.S. Embassy in 
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After Hezb-e Islami’s initial cooperation with the Taliban, the two sides fell out in the 
winter of 2009 and 2010. Some interviewees say that the Taliban fought Hezb-e 
Islami over its taxation and harassment of villagers, but this may have been a pretext. 
While allying with Hezb-e Islami had initially been a way for the Taliban to access 
Baghlan, much like in the 1990s, by winter 2009-10 the Taliban had grown strong 
enough to operate by itself. Moreover, say some, the Taliban accused Hezb-e Islami 
of collaborating with the government, which may have been true. Trying to challenge 
Shura-ye-Nazar power in Baghlan, President Karzai had been appointing Hezb-e 
Islami officials in the province.457 The Fahim-backed remobilisation drive in the 
northeast before the 2009 presidential elections had also prompted President Karzai’s 
camp to support the rearmament of Hezb-e Islami militias in Baghlan and 
neighbouring Kunduz.458 Mediation attempts by tribal elders failed. ‘Hezb-e Islami 
was ready to make peace but not the Taliban’, said one tribal elder from Baghlan-e 
Jadid.459 
 
Fighting started that winter between the two groups in the north of Baghlan (including 
Baghlan-e Jadid). The dual pressure of Taliban attacks and intensified U.S. operations 
led Hezb-e Islami commanders in an area north of Pul-e Khumri called Shahabuddin 
to panic and surrender to the government. This group of an estimated 70 to 100 men 
became the first group nationwide to enter into the APRP, even before it had been 
officially established by presidential decree (which happened in June 2010). Although 
the programme had only just been announced at the London Conference, SOF 
operating in the area were keen to start reintegrating insurgents and proceeded.460  
 
Without any infrastructure to accommodate and protect them, however, participants 
were determined to remain armed. When the ALP programme was rolled out in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Afghanistan. “Bringing Down a Warlord”; Giustozzi and Reuter, “The Insurgents of 
the Afghan North,” 40.  457	  126; 430; 114; 115; 119; 557; Giustozzi and Reuter, “The Insurgents of the 
Afghan North,” 3,19, 21. 	  458	  126; 430; 114; 115; 119; 557; 413; 103; 122; Giustozzi and Reuter, “The 
Insurgents of the Afghan North,” 3,19, 21. See also Derksen, “The Politics”.	  459	  135. 	  	  460	  535; Ulrike Demmer, “The Battle of Shahabuddin, Under Fire in Afghanistan’s 
Baghlan Province,” Der Spiegel, October 13, 2010. 	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Baghlan in February 2011, SOF ensured that APRP participants Hezb-e Islami 
commander Sher and his men were enrolled (in September 2011 commander Sher 
was killed and the group split, with his brother taking some fighters and another 
commander called Nur-ul-Haq, who assumed command of the ALP in Shahabuddin, 
the remainder).461 
 
Whereas in Kunduz local powerbrokers, including Jamiat loyalists, had been 
successful in exploiting the ALP programme, in Baghlan SOF and the faction around 
President Karzai used ALP resources to lure Hezb-e Islami commanders away from 
the insurgency, at least temporarily (in fact they continued to switch their loyalty back 
and forth between the government and the Taliban). The ALP programme’s initiation 
in Baghlan (in the three Pashtun dominated districts) therefore partially offset Pashtun 
marginalisation in the province. A Pashtun powerbroker argued that the formation of 
the ALP ‘changed the structure and balance of power, because now we have a few 
Pashtun officials in Baghlan’.462 An ally in the provincial council, also a Pashtun, 
said: ‘Pashtuns are in a better position now than they used to be. It is not as easy now 
to arrest Pashtuns as it was in the past’.463  
 
Until the Ghani government – when Jamiat gained control over the ALP with the 
appointment of Amir Gul as ALP chief – the ALP programme favoured Pashtun 
powerbrokers who had previously been excluded. Examples included members of the 
Gadi tribe in Baghlan-e Jadid and Amir Gul’s rivals, who were quoted above, and 
Hezb-e Islami powerbroker Mullah Alam in the Dand-e Ghori area of Pul-e Khumri.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  461	  According to a local source Nur-ul Haq was a former sub-commander of former 
Hezb-e Islami commander Mullah Alam, whose career is explored below. 425. 
International observers were however divided on the question if his group was a 
Hezb-e Islami outfit or a pro-government militia. They may have been switching back 
and forth before joining the APRP. Derksen, “Peace from the Bottom-Up”, 14. 
According to Giustozzi and Reuter the Hezb-e Islami fighters received asylum at the 
district police headquarters in Pul-e Khumri and then relocated to a private building, 
provided mainly with food by UNAMA and USAID until July 2010. Giustozzi and 
Reuter, “The Insurgents of the Afghan North,” 43. 462	  103.  463	  122. 	  	  
The inclusion of marginalised Pashtun powerbrokers in the ALP was the result of a 
campaign of fellow-Pashtuns in the local government on their behalf. 111; 196; 165. 
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Mullah Alam had been a kandak (battalion) commander in the AMF after 2001 and 
had been left unemployed by the DDR programme.464 By the end of 2010 Interior 
Minister Hanif Atmar reportedly gave permission and support to arm 120 of Alam’s 
men, to fight with the government against insurgents. The Baghlan police commander 
at the time, General Abdul Rahman Rahimi, who was trying to counter the Jamiat 
influence in the provincial security sector, supported this initiative.465 In 2011 under 
SOF supervision, Mullah Alam’s fighters were integrated in the ALP. Although 
Mullah Alam had no official position he exerted influence over ALP appointments 
under the Karzai administration, especially in the Dand-e Ghori of Pul-e Khumri.466   
 
The ALP became a major source of hope for unemployed Pashtun commanders in 
Baghlan, and Nur-ul Haq’s much-publicised enrollment in the militia programme 
through the APRP had a significant impact on their perceptions of the APRP. Many 
small-time Pashtun commanders (usually with 5-20 fighters) tried to get into the 
programme in 2011 with the hope of enrolling into the ALP. Most knocked on the 
doors of police chief Rahmani and NDS chief Mohammad Hafiz. However, more 
often than not, they languished in police stations and in NDS offices (as, much like in 
other provinces, the APRP infrastructure took some time to set up) and could not get 
into the ALP.467 
 
As with the first DDR programme, receiving an attractive job in the security sector 
depended on connections. In this case this usually meant ties to SOF (who, for 
example, favoured Nur-ul Haq in Shahabuddin over his rival Jumadin Kandak; 
another unemployed former AMF commander who had turned to the Taliban and then 
enrolled in the APRP in the hope of getting into the ALP), President Karzai or 
Minister Atmar (with whom Mullah Alam had good connections, but many of the 
smaller local commanders who joined the APRP did not).  
 
This deterred many insurgent commanders from participating in the APRP. A former 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  464	  According to a friend Mullah Alam ‘handed over only the weapons that were 
unusable, as a symbolic gesture to show that he had participated in DDR’. 126.  465	  413; 103; 150.	  466	  103.	  467	  111; 114; 128.  
© Linde Dorien Derksen 2017  174	  
Hezb-e Islami commander from Baghlan-e Jadid, who had joined the Taliban, wanted 
to join the APRP in 2013 but could not, according to a tribal elder. ‘He had been in 
prison in Bagram because he was with the Taliban but last December [2013] he was 
released. He did not want to go back to the Taliban or Hezb-e Islami, but he said he 
needed weapons for his own protection and wanted to enroll in the ALP but no one 
accepted his request. Now he is back with the Taliban and he has recently returned to 
Baghlan. As soon as he came back he captured four police check points’.468  
 
The perceived link between the ALP and the APRP also led to concerns in the Shura-
ye Nazar faction, which was afraid to lose its influence over the local security sector. 
Shura-ye Nazar powerbrokers denounced the APRP, while at the same time trying to 
insert allies into it.469 For example, Pamir Zone 303 police commander Daud Daud, 
the former AMF 6th Corps commander for the northeast, in 2011 tried to inject a 
commander in the APRP who was tied to him and had no insurgent links, with around 
hundred of his men.470 Right before enrolling in the APRP Mohammad Gul Arab had 
been fighting alongside General Daud Daud in a military operation in the Burka 
district.471 ‘General Daud Daud reintegrated [into the APRP] 200 to 300 illegally 
armed people from Jamiat to counterbalance the Hezb people’, said a high-ranking 
official in Kabul.472 Other interviewees saw the problem in terms of ethnicity. 
‘General Daud Daud wanted to select Tajiks and some Pashtuns to work against other 
Pashtuns’.473 A member of the local peace council said at the time: 
 
Now in Baghlan there is a big problem between the Tajiks and Pashtuns 
because of reintegration. Because Tajiks think that most of the Pashtuns join 
with the government. They think that again they get weapons and they become 
powerful in the area, so Tajiks are trying themselves to get more power.474  
 
An UN-official working in the area said: 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  468	  148.	  469	  509. 	  470	  121; 510; 421; 140; 149; a member of the local peace council said that though they 
were admitted into the APRP, SOF prevented Mohammad Gul Arab from joining the 
ALP (122).   471	  121.	  472	  413.	  473	  129; also 435. See also Luke Mogelson, “Bad Guys vs Worse Guys in 
Afghanistan,” New York Times, October 19, 2011. 474	  Derksen, “Peace from the Bottom-Up,” 18.	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The authorities here are confused about the APRP and the ALP because they 
were launched at the same time. It sent the wrong message. It took a long time 
for authorities here to understand that the APRP was not a channel for the 
ALP.475 
 
In sum, the APRP’s perceived link with the ALP made it an attractive but 
controversial programme in Baghlan. The ALP, while in effect functioning as an 
informal reintegration programme, was only accessible to those with good 
connections to SOF or the faction around President Karzai that was keen to empower 
Pashtun loyalist powerbrokers in the province.  
 
Arming APRP participants through the ALP also had other negative side effects. Old 
rivalries were not only perpetuated but entered a new phase, as one side suddenly had 
more arms and the might of the SOF behind it, as was the case for Nur-ul Haq versus 
Jumadin Kandak in Shahabuddin. Although the ALP programme lessened Pashtun 
marginalisation, this led not to a more inclusive local government but to two parallel 
security sectors, with both sides having an interest in ‘durable disorder’, rather than in 
a strong and inclusive government.476  
 
In the absence of high-level reconciliation and a more inclusive local government, 
security remained a pressing issue for APRP participants, especially for the majority 
that did not get into the ALP. Commander Bismullah claimed to have joined the 
Taliban in 2008 in Baghlan-e Jadid after death threats by a local Junbesh commander. 
He was then caught up in the fight between Hezb-e Islami and the Taliban in the 
district. He fled to Chahar Dara district in Kunduz, where some of his fighters were 
killed in a bombardment. He and the surviving fighters then joined the APRP and 
were given jobs maintaining a road. But in May 2014, Bismullah was killed. After his 
death, his remaining fighters were fired.477   
 
Bismullah’s friends think the Taliban killed him. ‘It was a revenge of the Taliban’, 
said an elder of Bismullah’s home area. ‘Taliban said that he defamed them by joining 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  475	  509.	  	  476	  Goodhand and Hakimi, “Counterinsurgency,” 31.  477	  114; 115; 119; see also Derksen, “The Politics”. 
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to peace programme. He was very active. He had brought other Taliban as well to the 
peace programme. He brought four or five groups of Taliban to the government 
side’.478 
 
The former miraw in Baghlan-i-Jadid, who claimed to have turned to the Taliban for 
help after some of the people working with him were killed by ALP commanders 
linked to Amir Gul, is concerned about his security after joining the APRP but failing 
to enter into the ALP, according to him because the then district governor Amir Gul 
and district police chief Kameen prevented it. In a 2014 interview he said:  
 
I joined the APRP in 2011 at the request of police chief Rahmani [General 
Abdul Rahman Rahmani]. He called on Haji Nezam [leader of the Gadi tribe 
in Baghlan-e Jadid, rival of Amir Gul and ally of the miraw], Amir Gul and 
Kameen and told them they had to support the peace programme. But since 
this time some of the reintegrated Taliban commanders were shot dead, like 
Bismullah and a commander called Nazir. I don’t think the Taliban have killed 
them. I think the personal rivalries have started again. I don’t know what I am 
supposed to do and how to protect myself.479 
 
 
Without the type of inclusive government in Baghlan that could only result from high-
level political reconciliation, it was difficult, if not impossible, for Taliban and Hezb-e 
Islami commanders to successfully participate in the APRP or another reintegration 
programme. Unsurprisingly, APRP participants in Baghlan interviewed for this PhD 
seemed to belong mostly to small militias, some of whom may have joined the 
insurgency only temporarily. By contrast, the main Taliban commanders in Baghlan 
in the early years of the programme said they wanted nothing to do with the APRP 
without their leaders’ consent. A local mid-level Taliban commander, reportedly 
fighting against Sher and Nur-ul Haq, said: 
 
Taliban high-ranking people will not ask me to lay down my weapons. They 
will only do this when they are in negotiations with the government of 




The provincial peace council has been accused by many, including some involved in 	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the APRP, of awarding jobs to friends and relatives rather than reintegrating Taliban 
commanders. The same allegation has been leveled against provincial peace councils 
in many other provinces. APRP officials deny the allegations. But Baghlan in 2014 
had one of the highest numbers of participants in the country, despite concerns 
expressed by a peace council member that the council ’s members did not have the 
backgrounds or contacts to reach out to the Taliban.481 ‘Most of them are from Jamiat, 
and there are just a few Pashtuns. But they are for show’.482  
 
In sum, as a result of the first participant Nur-ul Haq joining the ALP through the 
APRP, the two programmes became connected in the perception of many local 
powerbrokers. This led to a number of problems and the APRP became controversial, 
with non-insurgent powerbrokers denouncing it and inserting their own followers at 
the same time. In the absence of high-level reconciliation with the Taliban and a more 
inclusive government both nationally and locally, security remained a major problem 
for commanders joining the APRP, most of whom could not get into the ALP. As a 
result, the programme mainly attracted small-time militia, some of who had been 
switching back and forth to the insurgency, not the main local Taliban commanders. 
Moreover, allegations were made that the APRP’s local management used resources 
to distribute patronage to followers.  
 
4.4. DDR deepens political exclusion in the northeast 
 
The DDR, DIAG and APRP programmes in the north were initiated in the context of 
the exclusionary post-2001 political order, which they reflected and deepened. This 
was especially problematic since the loyalty of armed commanders to the government 
after 2001 was primarily dependent on their access to government resources, which 
were distributed through factional senior officials in the government. The post-2001 
domination of non-Pashtun powerbrokers in Kunduz and Baghlan and the exclusion 
of Pashtun communities from representation in the local administration was a crucial 
factor in the resurgence of the Taliban after 2008. Without the inclusion of more non-
Jamiat affiliated Pashtun powerbrokers in the local administration – which, in turn, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  481	  115; 119; 161; 147; 510; 129. In Spring 2014 there were 740 APRP participants in 
Baghlan – one of the highest numbers in the country. 	  482	  109. 	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would have necessitated a change at the national level – the APRP could not provide 
Taliban commanders a real alternative and was thus unsuccessful in attracting them. 
Resources mostly went to the APRP administration, which was made up of people 
who were already part of the establishment.  
 
The DDR and DIAG programmes were almost entirely shaped by patronage from the 
Jamiat establishment in Kabul. Commanders with good connections, like 6th Corps 
chief General Daud and 20th Division Chief Mustafa Mohseni won attractive 
government positions after DDR. Those with weaker connections, who did not get 
local positions, like 54th Division commander Mir Alam and 733 Battalion 
commander Amir Gul, started agitating against the government, to show that they 
were key to the province’s stability. This proved an effective tactic and they were 
rewarded with government positions. They were eventually removed, but retained 
informal influence.  
 
In their capacity as strongmen they became key players in Jamiat’s informal 
militarised network in the northeast, exerting influence on local government 
appointments and heading the expansion of illegal armed groups, especially after the 
Taliban’s resurgence in 2008 and Fahim’s comeback in Kabul. DDR had originally 
played a significant role in pusing local armed groups underground and making them 
informal and more dependent on political patrons in Kabul, instead of integrating 
them into the government and bringing them under institutional control. The 
programme thus paradoxically contributed to a strengthening of Shura-ye Nazar’s 
militarised network in Kunduz and Baghlan at the expense of a strengthening of 
government institutions – exactly the opposite of what it was meant to do.  
 
The ALP and militias with ties to local strongmen appeared to help the government 
successfully push back the local Taliban after their resurgence in Kunduz and 
Baghlan in 2008. Below the surface however, things were less clearcut. It appeared 
that these local armed groups – ALP, arbakai and Taliban – were primarily fighting 
over control over villages in order to win local disputes over land, water and other 
issues and to be able to force people to pay taxes. They also fought for control over 
smuggling routes to Central Asia.  
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Loyalty to the government only lasted as long as it could pay for weapons and 
ammunition – with many commanders switching back and forth to the Taliban. 
Following this logic, the remobilisation of militias after 2008, and, to a lesser extent, 
the APRP worked as reintegration programmes – reintegrating commanders who 
would otherwise turn against the government. But provided their militias were not 
fully integrated into the government apparatus, with command structures weakened, 
their loyalty would always remain with the local strongman, who could turn against 
the government again as soon as resources dried up.  
 
The militias’ increased strength meant that by 2014 government institutions had less 
influence over armed men in Kunduz and Baghlan than at any point of time since the 
international intervention in 2001. Men operating in the fragmented informal and 
semi-informal security sector and in the insurgency greatly outnumbered the security 
forces. In most villages, it seemed, they dominated daily life and had taken over the 
state in core tasks such as mobilising men to fight, security provision, taxation and 
justice – such as they existed.483 
 
The general insecurity grew, and the local population often did not regard the Taliban 
insurgency as its primary cause. Many villagers had become increasingly alienated 
from the government, which was associated with predatory militias. This provided 
space for the Taliban to increase its presence and a year after the end of the Karzai 
administration it managed to take Kunduz City and hold on to it for two weeks. New 
President Ashraf Ghani’s first response was to request the international community 
for 15,000 more ALP.484 
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  According to a senior provincial official in May 2014 there were 1,000 to 1,300 
Taliban operating in Kunduz and 3,000 to 5,000 illegal militia. The number of ALP 
was 1,350 (300 in Dasht-e-Archi, 300 in Imam Saheb, 200 in Aliabad, 300 in Char 
Dara and 250 in Kunduz City). The number of ANP was 2,700. 023; 027; 025. 	  484	  Alissa J. Rubin, “For Afghans in Kunduz, Taliban Assault Is Just Latest Affront,” 
New York Times, October 7, 2015; Mujib Mashal, “Afghan Plan to Expand Militia 
Raises Abuse Concerns,” New York Times, October 16, 2015.  
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Chapter 5 DDR in the Southwest: Uruzgan and 
Helmand 
 




Uruzgan and Helmand are part of Greater Kandahar (Kandahar, Helmand, Zabul and 
Uruzgan), with ‘the main tribal, political and economic networks transcending the 
current administrative boundaries’. Helmand was established as separate province in 
1960, Uruzgan in 1964.485 Politically speaking, Greater Kandahar has historically 
been of great significance, as ancestral home of many Afghan kings and leaders, 
including the late Taliban leader Mullah Omar and former President Karzai.  
 
Socio-economically, however, the area has traditionally been less developed than 
Kunduz and Baghlan. Both provinces score very low on development indicators. For 
example, literacy rates in Helmand and Uruzgan were only 5 per cent mid-2000. The 
two provinces rank the lowest country-wide in primary school attendance (Helmand 
worst, Uruzgan second worst). Under-five mortality rates are high; Uruzgan ranks as 
the second highest province, Helmand is also among the top ten.486  
 
Local economies are still mostly agricultural. Inhabitants mainly rely on the 
production of wheat, corn, maize, vegetables, orchard crop and opium and on animal 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  485	  Martine van Bijlert, “Unruly Commanders and Violent Power Struggles – Taliban 
Networks in Uruzgan” in Antonio Giustozzi ed., Decoding the Taliban – Insight from 
the Afghan Field, (London: Hurst & Company, 2009), 155.	  486	  Stuart Gordon, “Winning Hearts and Minds? Examining the Relationship between 
Aid and Security in Afghanistan,” Feinstein International Center, April 2011, 10; 
“Best Estimates Fact Sheet – Uruzgan/Daikunde,” date unknown. Available at 
http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/files/Best_Estimates_Fact_Sheet_-
_Uruzgan.PDF. UNICEF; “Best Estimates Fact Sheet – Helmand,” UNICEF, date 
unknown. Available at 
http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/files/Best_Estimates_Fact_Sheet_-
_Helmand.PDF.  
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husbandry. A major source of water is the Helmand river, containing around 40 per 
cent of Afghanistan’s surface water.487 
 
Migration brought major changes in the local population over past centuries in both 
provinces and has been, much like in the northeast, a cause of local conflict. Uruzgan 
was originally inhabited by Hazaras. They were expelled in the 18th and 19th centuries 
by Pashtun kings, who gave their lands to Pashtun tribes. Currently only around 10 
per cent of the local population is Hazara (living mostly in districts Khas Uruzgan and 
Gizab) and the rest is Pashtun. The majority of the Pashtuns are Durrani, which is one 
of the two main Pashtun kinship units; the other being the Ghilzai. Around 40-45 per 
cent of the population belongs to the Zirak branch of the Durrani confederation (tribes 
are Popalzai, Barakzai, Achekzai, Mohammadzai and Alikozai) and 30 per cent 
Durrani Panjpaj (main tribes are Noorzai and Khugiani). Around 15 per cent of the 
population are Ghilzai (mainly Tokhi and Hotak tribes).488 
 
In Helmand, Durrani tribes were given lands previously belonging to Ghilzai tribes by 
Afghan kings in the 18th century (Helmand was then called Puhst-e Rud, or 
transriver). Under Popalzai ruler Ahmad Shah Durrani, the Barakzai – a large Durrani 
tribe – secured central Helmand, which includes the best land on the alluvial plains of 
four rivers. When Barakzai ruler Dost Mohammad usurped the Popalzai throne in 
1826, the tribe gained in power in relation to other tribes. From this time stems the 
rivalry between the Barakzai and the Alizai tribes, who had obtained Zamindawar 
(northern Helmand) from Ahmad Shah Durrani. Under Abdur Rahman many Ishaqzai 
and Noorzai from the Panjpaj branch of the Durrani, who had also received lands in 
Helmand from Ahmad Shah Durrani, were induced to move to populate the 
northwest. The move was not a success however. Many returned, but this time to 
marginal lands in Helmand. Mike Martin sees this event as the foundation of the 
Ishaqzais’ and, to a lesser degree, Noorzais’ disenchantment with the government.489 
 
Another major migration that would influence conflict dynamics in Helmand was the 
move of mainly Ghilzai tribes to Nad-e Ali and Marjah, two areas in central Helmand 	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  Gordon, “Winning Hearts and Minds?,” 9. 488	  Van Bijlert, “Unruly Commanders,” 155; 218. 489	  Martin, Intimate War, 25. 
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that were reclaimed from the desert through canal projects in the 1950s with 
American aid. Though the immigration of non-Helmandis negatively affected the 
power of the Barakzai, the real losers were the other Helmandi tribes, including the 
Alizai, the Ishaqzai and the Noorzai, whose lands did not benefit from the same socio-
economic modernisation – reinforcing their suspicions that the government was not 
interested in helping them. Currently the main tribes in Helmand are the Barakzai (32 
per cent), the Noorzai (16 per cent), the Alikozai (9 per cent) and the Ishaqzai (5.2 per 
cent).490 
 
Reflecting the main tribal dynamics in greater Kandahar, in Uruzgan and Helmand the 
disputes between the Durrani and Ghilzai tribal confederations and between the Zirak 
and Panjpaj branches of the Durrani have been ‘revisited under every regime’.491 In 
Uruzgan other power struggles have been between Popalzai and Barakzai 
powerbrokers (two tribes within the Zirak that have historically competed for the 
throne) and between the Hazaras and the Pashtuns in Gizab and Khas Uruzgan. A 
multitude of bloody clashes between rival commanders, have also been fought ‘over 
resources or prominence within the (sub)tribe’.492 In Helmand power struggles have 
likewise been over prominence within the (sub)tribe and resources, with the opium 
trade a particular nexus for conflict dynamics. With comparatively fewer Popalzai 
than in Uruzgan the main elite rivalry was between Alizai and Barakzai 
powerbrokers.493 
 
During the fight against the Soviets and the PDPA government, whose land reform 
was especially unpopular in the south, commanders from these tribes in many cases 
joined rivalling jihadi parties, which led to a new cycle of the conflicts.494 As Martin 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  490	  Martin, Intimate War, 17-35; Stuart Gordon, “Aid and Stabilization, Helmand 
Case Study,” The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 2010, 6.	  491	  Martine Van Bijlert, “The Taliban in Zabul and Uruzgan,” in Talibanistan: 
Negotiating the Borders Between Terror, Politics and Religion, ed. Peter Bergen. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 98.  492	  Van Bijlert, “The Taliban in Zabul and Uruzgan,” 98. Unpublished study for the 
Dutch government on Uruzgan, The Liaison Office, 2006, 13, 24, 25. 	  493	  Stuart Gordon, “Aid and Stabilization,” 17. 	  494	  During the jihad against the Soviets local commanders mobilised fighters from 
their solidarity networks or qaums. These solidarity networks, which were always 
shifting, could be based on shared experiences, for example having fought on the 
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argues, the narrative of the mujahedeen resisting the Soviets is only partially true for 
the Helmandis (and the same can be said for the Uruzganis), who in reality primarily 
‘fought each other utilising and manipulating external ideologies in an attempt to 
leverage local disputes’.495 These local armed conflicts continued after the departure 
of the Soviets and the collapse of the PDPA government, and spilled over into an all-
out civil war; though with fewer external resources than before, as the Americans 
were no longer interested in Afghanistan.  
 
The Taliban arrived in Uruzgan and Helmand shortly after the movement was 
established in neighbouring Kandahar in 1994. Its rule in both provinces was 
relatively quiet. Martin attributes it to the Taliban’s knowledge of local politics, 
which was good as many Taliban high-level figures came from Uruzgan and 
Helmand. Although they often favoured supporters from the heavily clerical 
mujahedeen party Harakat-e Enqelab, they were flexible enough to support Jamiatis 
or Hezbis if this was more opportune. Though some people objected to their strict 
social mores, their introduction of basic law and order after a turbulent time was 
widely appreciated. Also, as the Taliban movement originated from Kandahar their 





	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
same side in the past, having grown up in the same village, or having attended the 
same school. Alternatively, they could revolve around religious or economic 
networks. But the most important focus of loyalty, conflict and obligations of 
patronage in the south were tribal and sub-tribal affiliations. This was especially the 
case for provincial-level strongmen, according to villagers, who in interviews 
emphasized that for them (the villagers) their tribe or sub-tribe was not important to 
their identity, even in interaction with people from other tribes. However, strongmen 
usually enlisted the help of fellow-tribesmen in their power struggles, thus reaffirming 
local political divisions along tribal and sub-tribal lines. 200; 201; 202; 203; 205; 210; 
212; 213; 215; 223; 224; 236; 232; 528. Derksen, “The Politics”. On affiliations in the 
south see also Van Bijlert, “The Taliban in Zabul and Uruzgan,” 97-99 and Van 
Bijlert, “Unruly Commanders,” 156.  495	  Martin, Intimate War, 40, 49. Likewise, Van Bijlert writes about Uruzgan that 
‘much of the combat activities concerned inter-factional fighting’. Van Bijlert, 
“Unruly Commanders,” 157. 	  496	  Martin, Intimate War, 94-105, Van Bijlert, “Unruly Commanders,” 157.	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Much as elsewhere in Afghanistan, the U.S.-led intervention in 2001 had a major 
impact on local power relations in Uruzgan and Helmand. Though the Taliban had 
presented itself as a detribalised organisation, and had actively tried to weaken tribal 
leaders, during its rule powerbrokers from formerly marginalised tribes such as the 
Ghilzai and the Durrani Panjpaj had had more opportunities to gain power than in 
previous times (especially compared to the former monarchy, with its strict tribal 
hierarchy). After 2001 many of these powerbrokers were again marginalised with the 
comeback of former jihadi commanders, quite a few of whom belonged to the old 
Durrani Zirak tribes (though it should be noted that by 2001 more than two decades of 
war had weakened tribal leaders, and many of the jihadi commanders, including those 
featuring in the Uruzgan and Helmand case studies below, were self-made men and 
not from the old tribal establishment).497 
 
Long-running conflicts entered into a new phase, and were heavily influenced by the 
distribution of resources (money, weapons, government positions) by U.S. Special 
Operation Forces hunting the Taliban and al-Qaeda, and by President Karzai. Karzai 
(a Popalzai) sought to boost the profile of allied Popalzai strongmen, many of them 
former jihadi commanders, against former Barakzai and Achekzai jihadi commanders 
seeking a position in the new government. This anti-Barakzai and anti-Achekzai 
agenda of the Karzai faction was clearly visible in Uruzgan, Helmand and, though not 
studied here, Kandahar. Whereas in Uruzgan the president could count on the support 
of Popalzai strongman Jan Mohammad and his nephew Matiullah, in Helmand there 
were few Popalzai and he allied himself with Alizai strongman Sher Mohammad 
Akhundzada. In Uruzgan SOF tended to follow Karzai’s lead in choosing their main 
partners for military operations, but in Helmand they followed a different course and 
supported Barakzai powerbrokers.498 
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  Anand Gopal argues that in Kandahar powerbrokers from the Ghilzai tribes and 
the Panjpaj Durrani tribes and –sub-tribes, some of whom had been empowered 
during the Taliban regime, were weakened. Strongmen of the Zirak Durrani tribes, the 
traditional elite were strengthened. However, the Taliban should not be seen as a 
primarily tribal movement, according to Gopal, who points to the diverse membership 
of the movement. These findings are supported by research for this thesis in Uruzgan 
and Helmand, both part of ‘Greater Kandahar’: 200; 201; 202; 203; 205; 210; 212; 
213; 215; 223; 224; 236; 232; 528; Gopal, “The Battle for Afghanistan,” 11, 12.  498	  200; 201; 204; 212; 213; 224; 419; 431; 418; 400; 402; 303; 549.	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Already in 2004 recruitment for the insurgency was gathering pace. It was managed 
from Quetta, where Taliban leaders were reorganising. Exploiting safe havens in 
Pakistan – whose military establishment was looking for a way to regain its influence 
in Afghanistan – Taliban leaders reached out to marginalised powerbrokers and 
communities. Many, though by no means all, had previously supported the Taliban 
regime.499 That the insurgency against the Karzai government and its international 
allies started in the south is unsurprising given that Greater Kandahar had been the 
Taliban heartland, making it relatively easy for the movement’s leaders to revive their 
networks, whereas in the northeast their footprint had always been more limited. Also, 
in the south new powerbrokers’ targeting of former Taliban and personal rivals who 
they conveniently labelled as Taliban was continuously fuelled by resources from 
foreign military and international companies implementing reconstruction projects; 
resources that were much less available to powerbrokers in the northeast. 
 
DDR programmes reinforced this dynamic of the exclusion of certain powerbrokers 
and their patronage networks from local political orders. Both DDR and DIAG 
offered the political establishment the opportunity to have their rivals disarmed and 
demobilised, thus rendering them vulnerable. The Taliban reintegration programmes, 
PTS and APRP, offered local elites the opportunity to capture resources that were 
meant for excluded local powerbrokers, and thus strengthen their own position 
instead. Uruzgan and Helmand are, in different ways, clear examples of the adverse 
effects of DDR in the midst of conflict.  
 
5.2. Uruzgan Province 
 
5.2.1. DDR – the case of Jan Mohammad and Matiullah 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  499	  ICG, “Talking about Talks,” 9. On Pakistan’s role in the insurgency see Abubakar 
Siddique, “Aziz admits Pakistan housing Taliban Leaders,” Dawn, March 3, 2016; 
Quie, “Peacebuilding and Democracy Promotion,” 562; “Key Quotes From the 
Document”, BBC, September 28, 2006 (available at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/newsnight/5388426.stm); Omer Aziz, “The 
ISI’s Great Game in Afghanistan,” The Diplomat, June 9, 2014; Claudio Franco, “The 
Evolving Taleban: Changes in the Insurgency’s DNA,” Afghanistan Analysts 
Network, May 19, 2013.	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Uruzgan illustrates how formal and informal DDR could be used by powerbrokers 
with support from political patrons in Kabul and international military to sideline 
rivals and strengthen their own position. Jan Mohammad, a former jihadi commander 
from the Popalzai tribe who had reportedly once saved the life of Hamid Karzai (also 
a Popalzai), was in the comfortable position after 2001 of having both the support of 
the new president and of SOF operating in the province. He had however been absent 
from the province for years because he had been a prisoner of the Taliban in 
Kandahar. Thus, once Karzai had negotiated his release with the high-level Taliban 
figures he was meeting in Kandahar in December 2001, he needed to secure his 
position as Uruzgan’s main powerbroker.  
 
The main competition came from former jihadi commanders from the Achekzai and 
Barakzai elite tribes, who outnumbered the Popalzai in Uruzgan. In Jan Mohammad’s 
absence, Karzai had turned to some of these powerbrokers when he came to Uruzgan 
in October 2001 (and Jan Mohammad was still in a Taliban jail) to start a ‘tribal 
uprising’ against the Taliban with U.S. support (an endeavour that met with little 
success until U.S. airstrikes started). After Karzai became president in December 
2001 and the AMF was established in the following year, he rewarded these men with 
the command of Uruzgan’s AMF 593 Brigade and the police force. Jan Mohammad 
was appointed as provincial governor, a position he had held during Burhanuddin 
Rabbani’s government in the early 1990s.500  
 
With Karzai’s backing he made sure that he appointed loyal district governors. In 
non-Popalzai areas he cleverly adopted a policy of divide and rule by nominating 
friendly powerbrokers from the Achekzai, Barakzai and other tribes, which triggered 
internal conflicts as those that felt more entitled to those jobs were dissatisfied. In the 
security sector the DDR programme came to his aid. The programme was rolled out 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  500	  In spite of his civilian position he also commanded various militias. Estimations of 
the size of Jan Mohammad’ militias vary from 800 men according to Van Bijlert in 
Decoding the Taliban to 2000 according to a “Commander Chart” of the DIAG 
programme dated 25 January 2005 (unpublished). The Liaison Office estimated in 
2006 in an unpublished survey for the Dutch Embassy in Kabul that the Popalzai 
made up 10,5 per cent of the local population, the Barakzai 9 per cent and the 
Achekzai 35 per cent. The latter two tribes (who are thought to have once been one 
tribe, and whose members still often work together) are thus together much bigger 
than the Popalzai in Uruzgan.	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in Uruzgan in 2004 after Jan Mohammad had already headed informal rounds of 
disarmament in previous years, during which, according to some sources, he had 
managed to obtain useable weapons from the 593 Brigade led by former jihadi 
commander Sultan Mohammad Barakzai and left them the unusable ones. The official 
DDR programme disbanded three AMF-units, while a fourth one, around 200 to 300 
fighters under command of Jan Mohammad’s nephew Matiullah, was left intact and 
rebranded as Highway Police.501 
 
Former shopkeeper and taxi-driver Matiullah, at that time in his early thirties, had 
little fighting experience. He had been too young during the jihad. Under the Taliban 
regime he had been conscripted and sent to other parts of Afghanistan to fight, but as 
a lowly foot soldier. But now, with his uncle in a powerful position, he quickly 
climbed the provincial security sector ladder, at the expense of the more battle-
hardened Barakzai and Achekzai commanders. The DDR programme was pivotal in 
this process.  
 
Former Barakzai and Achekzai AMF commanders hold bitter memories from DDR. 
‘DDR was a political move’, says one. ‘It was a programme against the Pashtuns in 
general and specifically against these two tribes. Our kandaks were disbanded and we 
became unemployed. But the president and Jan Mohammad Khan gave permission to 
Matiullah Khan to change his kandak into Highway Police, so he could keep his 
weapons’.502  
 
Police chief Rozi Khan, a former jihadi commander and member of the Barakzai 
tribe, was dealt with during the police reform in 2006, when President Karzai fired 
him and tried to have him replaced by Matiullah.503 However, in that year the Dutch 
government deployed troops to Uruzgan as part of the expanding ISAF-mission and 
not only insisted that Jan Mohammad be removed from his position as governor 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  501	  Outside the central areas that were directly under his control, like the provincial 
capital, Jan Mohammad often relied on allies from other tribes, ruling by dividing 
them; 218; 532; 419. See also Gopal, No Good Men, 119. 	  502	  224. 	  503	  431. The police pay and rank the reform process started in 2005 and aimed at 
“reducing the top-heavy officer class while vetting and testing five tiers.” ICG, 
“Reforming Afghanistan’s Police,” International Crisis Group, August 2007, 12. 
Rozi Khan was accidentally killed by Australian forces in 2008. 
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(President Karzai appointed him as ‘tribal adviser’ in Kabul instead), but also vetoed 
Karzai’s initiative for Matiullah to become Uruzgan’s next police chief. This was 
indicative of the way DDR and SSR often worked: it was not the procedures of a 
programme but rather Afghan and international actors that decided what happened to 
whom. The most powerful local powerbrokers were able to get rid of rivals through 
these mechanisms. Despite not becoming the provincial police chief until after the 
departure of the Dutch from Uruzgan in 2010, Matiullah would become one of the ten 
most influential commanders in Afghanistan, according to former DIAG officials, 
through the combined support of the Karzai family and the foreign forces in 
Uruzgan.504  
 
5.2.2. Growing insurgency, the PTS and informal Taliban reintegration 
 
The PTS programme was a response to a growing insurgency in the southern Pashtun 
areas from 2004 onwards, including in Uruzgan. Local support for the expanding 
insurgency was driven by the exclusive and predatory new provincial government, 
which could operate with impunity because of the support it enjoyed from foreign 
forces and President Karzai.  
 
Those who had been marginalised by Jan Mohammad through various means, 
including the first DDR programme and informal disarmament, or badly treated by his 
militias, often looked to the Taliban. Village or family feuds further fuelled the 
insurgency, as did other dynamics. Ideological considerations played a role but were 
often secondary to more pragmatic grievances. The growing insurgency in Uruzgan 
was further facilitated by the fact that many Taliban leaders came from the province 
and by its general socio-economic backwardness, with the central government having 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  504	  A U.S. Embassy Cable called Matiullah in 2006 a ‘semi-literate’ former militia 
commander who ‘operates protection rackets, skims from the AHP [Afghanistan 
Highway Police] payroll and is involved in the narcotics trade’. At the same time, the 
cable continued, Matiullah was ‘particularly adept as Taliban fighter’, concluding: 
‘For this reason we may need to support his retention as AHP Chief to the short-term, 
in the interest of stability, but he will need to be replaced once the political situation 
in Uruzgan has become more stable’. U.S. Embassy in Afghanistan, “PRT/Tarin 
Kowt – Security Programs”. According to a former DIAG official Matiullah appeared 
on a short list of the ten most influential commanders in Afghanistan in 2007: 302.   
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seemingly neglected it after it came to power in 2001, leaving many young men 
unemployed or underemployed.  
 
As the Taliban’s presence grew, communities in areas under its control often had to 
join; not from their own will but to survive. A tribal elder from Mehrabad, an area 
east of Tirin Kot, a former hotbed of the insurgency explained: ‘Once the Taliban had 
established a foothold in our area, thousands of them came in and out [this is probably 
an exaggeration; the numbers would have been in the hundreds]. It became a centre 
for the Taliban. They became so strong in Mehrabad that they started beating people 
who did not cooperate, even executing them’.505 
 
The insurgency in Uruzgan stayed relatively consistent in its composition over the 
decade, with its core members hailing from the same armed networks Jan Mohammad 
and Matiullah targeted after 2001. Jan Mohammad dealt with his powerful Achekzai 
and Barakzai rivals mostly through political manoeuvrings, as explored above, and 
the insurgency in their areas Khas Uruzgan, Gizab and Chora started later than 
elsewhere; mainly driven by sub-tribal conflicts some of which had been fuelled by 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  505	  213. Some analysts, including Thomas Ruttig and Martine van Bijlert, suggest that 
the Taliban follow a model of concentric circles with an inner ring of indoctrinated 
and highly ideological madrassa students and an outer ring of local fighters who have 
joined the movement for a variety of non-ideological reasons. Van Bijlert, “Unruly 
Commanders,” 159; Thomas Ruttig, “Die Taleban nach Mullah Dadullah,” Stiftung 
Wissenschaft und Politik, June 2007, 2-3. This thesis takes the view that locals join 
the Taliban mostly join for non-ideological reasons but that ideology can become a 
more powerful motivation as they become embedded in the organisation. This view is 
based on interviews for this thesis (212; 213; 200; 419; 204; 013; 324; 332; 333) and 
on other studies in southern Afghanistan. A Department of International Development 
study found that religious messages did have resonance for the majority of the 
respondents, who talked about a western ‘crusade’ against Islam and Afghan 
traditions. ‘However, our assessment is that this is primarily because they were 
couched in terms of respondents’ two more pragmatic grievances: the corruption of 
the state and the occupation by foreign forces’. In addition, most radicalisation 
‘appears to happen after young men join a Taliban group’; Sarah Ladbury and 
Cooperation for Peace and Unity, “Hypotheses on Radicalisation in Afghanistan; 
Why Do Men Join the Taliban and Hizb-i-Islami? How Much Do Local Communities 
Support Them?,” Study commissioned by Department of International Development 
(DFID), 2009, 7, 11, 16 and 17. Anand Gopal points out that initially it was not the 
existence of the Afghan government or the presence of the foreign troops that drove 
Taliban leaders back to the insurgency, but their behaviour; Anand Gopal, “The 
Taliban in Kandahar,” in Talibanistan: Negotiating the Borders Between Terror, 
Politics and Religion, ed. Peter Bergen (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 29.  
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Jan Mohammad’s divide and rule tactics.506 He took a different approach to the 
weaker commanders in the Ghilzai areas of Mehrabad and Darafshan in the Tirin Kot 
district and in the Panjpai areas of Char Chineh and Deh Rawod. From the beginning 
of his rule he labelled them as Taliban to U.S. forces – knowing those forces would 
target them – and used the imperative of disarming Taliban commanders as an excuse 
to raid their homes (Jan Mohammad proudly described himself as a ‘governor in flak 
jacket’507).  Many of those targeted were not former Taliban, and of those that were 
most seemed willing to disarm voluntarily by handing in weapons to the governor, his 
proxies in the districts, or a trusted tribal elder who could plead their case with him.508 
 
However, Jan Mohammad and his men kept harassing them, sometimes together with 
SOF, who had little idea of local politics and let themselves be guided by Jan 
Mohammad’s intelligence. ‘All these Taliban became ordinary people but because of 
Jan Mohammad and the foreigners they had to escape to Pakistan’, said a tribal 
elder.509 
 
A tribal elder from the Hotak tribe in Mehrabad recalls: 
 
Mullah Qaher and Mullah Razaq [two Taliban commanders from Mehrabad] 
secretly came to our village and stayed here. They sent us [the interviewee and 
another elder from the village] a message that we should talk with Jan 
Mohammad on their behalf. They said that the only thing they wanted was to 
be safe. They promised to live like normal civilians and to not resort to any 
violence. We went to Jan Mohammad and shared the message with him. I told 
Jan Mohammad that if he would agree to this it would prevent them going to 
Pakistan. I asked his view. Jan Mohammad said that he would let us know by 
8 am the next morning. However, right after our discussion he sent his forces 
to Mullah Qaher and Mullah Razaq’s houses and raided them. Both mullahs 




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  506	  419; 431; 218; Van Bijlert, “Unruly Commanders,” 158.	  507	  Derksen, “The Politics,” 23. 	  508	  200; 201; 212; 213; 214; 227; 564. Jan Mohammad seems to also have tried to 
brand the main Achekzai/Barakzai powerbrokers as Taliban, but was generally less 
successful there.	  	  509	  419.	  510	  084.	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Particularly haunting for former Taliban commanders was the fate of Mullah Pai 
Mohammad, who had also surrendered to the government and had reportedly handed 
in around sixty weapons. In spite of Jan Mohammad’ promises that he would be safe, 
he was harassed and his home was raided. According to two elders from the area he 
had started fighting the government due to his continual harassment, and was 
wounded in an air strike. Then he was shot and killed, and his body was hanged in 
Tirin Kot, according to the tribal elders ‘to show people that they should not resist the 
government’.511 In short, local Taliban saw that they had no place in the new political 
order, while at the same time their former leaders were reorganising in Pakistan.  
 
The insurgency could also draw from the alienation of powerbrokers who had not 
supported the Taliban regime but were bullied by Jan Mohammed and his allies, 
usually because of tribal issues or competition over land and opium. In Deh Rawod 
district Khalifa Sadat, district governor and Jan Mohammad ally, competed with Haji 
Gholam Nabi over who would lead the Babozai tribe. Their rivalry dated back to the 
anti-Soviet jihad. Eventually Ghulam Nabi had managed to become the leader. That 
changed in early 2002, when Jan Mohammad was appointed as governor. He started 
backing Khalifa Sadat, probably in order to weaken the Babozai. ‘Khalifa Sadat came 
to Gholam’s house every day and eventually the police and the army arrested him and 
took him to Bagram’, says one former government official from Deh Rawod. ‘When 
he came back he started supporting the Taliban, even though he had not been with the 
Taliban before’.512 
 
In other instances militias connected to Jan Mohammad harassed locals. Many of 
these worked as Afghan Security Guards (militia) for SOF, which signalled to locals 
that they enjoyed the support of the U.S. and could act with impunity. For example in 
Deh Rawod, a group connected to Jan Mohammad and Matiullah that included 
Afghan Security Guards commanders and local government officials, used U.S. 
support to hunt rival powerbrokers and thus expand their poppy business, by labelling 
their competitors Taliban.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  511	  213. Also 212. In another example, Janan Agha, a former Taliban governor, had 
married into the Barakzai and was able to live for some time near Tirin Kot under 
protection of police commander Rozi Khan. But when Rozi Khan was fired in May 
2006 this protection fell away and he went to Pakistan. 419; 212; 213; 528.  512	  210.This story is confirmed by others; 229; 232.	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The case of Mullah Anwar is illustrative. He was the owner of Deh Rawod bazaar, a 
centre of the drugs trade flowing through Deh Rawod, which was located on a major 
trafficking route in southern Afghanistan, and thus was an attractive target for Jan 
Mohammad’s allies. In what was according to sources a set up an improvised 
explosive device was found near his house in 2008 and he was held responsible. SOF 
and Afghan Security Guards raided his house. Mullah Anwar, who reportedly had no 
previous links with the Taliban, then reportedly joined the insurgency. In another 
example, Mullah Abdul Wali from a village near Deh Rawod, reportedly had an 
argument with Jan Mohammad about tax on his poppy production. In the ensuing 
fight his brother was killed by militia connected to Jan Mohammad. He subsequently 
joined the Taliban (and was killed in August 2008).513 
 
In other cases powerbrokers pressured by Jan Mohammad simply left their area, 
leaving the Taliban free to enter. A former jihadi commander and prominent member 
of the Tohki tribe in Dahrafshan recalls that Jan Mohammad disarmed him, but didn’t 
believe he had fully disarmed and put him in prison, where he was tortured.  
 
I had come back to Uruzgan from exile after the fall of the Taliban to work for 
Karzai, but I saw that everything was divided between a single family and that 
the new government was taking revenge from its tribal rivals. When Jan 
Mohammad released me from prison my brother and I left for Pakistan. We 
stayed for six years.514 
 
 
All in all, Jan Mohammad’s governorship saw many rival powerbrokers either killed, 
flee their area leaving it open for Taliban to enter and revive their networks, or join 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  513	  326; 329; 076. SOF operating in Uruzgan in the early years after 2001 seemed to 
have little knowledge of the local conflict dynamics. The ASG or ASF (Afghan 
Security Force – meaning the same as ASG, Afghan Security Guards) provided base 
security and also often acted as a source of intelligence and assisted in military 
operations. About the close relationship between the ASF and the American troops 
former U.S. Department of State political adviser to the American PRT Daniel Green 
writes: ‘The ASF (…) were very much part of our life’. Daniel R. Green, The Valley’s 
Edge: A year with the Pashtuns in the Heartland of the Taliban (Sterling: Potomac 
Books, 2012), 24. 514	  200. Other sources claimed that the family, while it had not been supporting the 
Taliban regime, started actively supporting the Taliban after Jan Mohammad had 
mistreated them. 528; 548.   
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the insurgency. Once they had fled or become insurgents, winning them back to the 
side of the government was difficult. From 2005 onwards a series of Taliban 
reintegration efforts under the umbrella of the PTS and later the APRP have attempted 
to do so, as have informal attempts by foreign troops, local officials and tribal elders. 
But without a fundamental change at the international, national and local levels 
towards a more politically inclusive and just government, it was difficult to convince 
insurgents to lay down their weapons.  
 
By 2006 foreign troops in Uruzgan had become more aware of the destabilising 
effects of Jan Mohammad’s rule. Relations between him and the SOF cooled – 
although the Americans would remain very close to his nephew Matiullah. When the 
Dutch government deployed troops to Uruzgan, they conditioned the deployment in 
the summer of 2006 on Jan Mohammad’s removal (he was assassinated in Kabul in 
2011). His replacement Mullah Hakim Munib, a former Taliban deputy minister, was 
a positive change, according to elders from marginalised Ghilzai tribes, who say he 
reached out to them. Munib said about the challenges:  
 
In Uruzgan, we had two major issues to deal with. One was reintegration of 
Taliban and the second was tribal differences and disputes. Tribal feuds had 
paved the ground for insecurity. If one tribe was friendly with the government, 
the rival tribe was against the government. As I got appointed, I managed to 
bring unity among tribes.515 
 
 
However, the broader political context remained adverse to Taliban members laying 
down their weapons. While the governor and the PTS programme aimed to reintegrate 
low-level insurgents, neither the national government nor its international allies had 
tried to engage the Taliban leadership in peace talks.  
 
The complicated and fragile local security situation was clear after the arrival of the 
Dutch troops in Uruzgan, and their establishment of Kamp Holland in Tirin Kot. To 
take only the examples shown above, by then former Taliban commanders like 
Mullah Qaher and Mullah Razaq mentioned earlier had rejoined their former 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  515	  Derksen, “The Politics,” 24. Other sources support his claim that Munib tried to 
include some marginalised powerbrokers, though that he was to weak in this position 
to really change anything. 232; 212.	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comrades and started fighting against the government in Mehrabad; the 
aforementioned powerbrokers of the Tokhi tribe in the area Dahrafshan just north of 
Tirin Kot had left for Pakistan and according to some had started collaborating with 
the Taliban, and in Deh Rawod Babozai powerbroker Gholam Nabi reportedly 
supported a large-scale Taliban offensive in the winter of 2007/2008, even though he 
had not supported them before 2001. These men had had all been harassed and 
marginalised by Jan Mohammad and his local allies.516  
 
To make matters worse, Jan Mohammad also seemed intent on destabilising the 
province further from Kabul, to show that there could be no security without him at 
the helm in Uruzgan – similar tactics to those of Mir Alam and Amir Gul in the 
northeast, and those of Helmandi powerbrokers discussed in the next chapter. For 
example, in the spring of 2007 Haji Oibadullah, a Jan Mohammad loyalist and the 
district governor of Chora, fled as the Taliban approached the district north of Tirin 
Kot, leading to suspicions that he had invited insurgents on the order of his patron in 
Kabul.517 
 
In response to the escalating violence, ISAF and Operation Enduring Freedom forces 
launched aggressive military operations. In this environment, persuading Taliban 
commanders to disarm and seek tribal unity was almost impossible. Munib gives an 
example: 
 
Malem Farooq was a Hizb-i-Islami commander in Khas Uruzgan when he 
joined the reconciliation programme [PTS]. His participation was accepted by 
the international forces and the government in Kabul and in Uruzgan. But 
when he came he was arrested and imprisoned in Bagram. He spent a month in 
Bagram and due to our efforts, we could get him out. He must be somewhere 
in Afghanistan now.518 
 
 
In 2008 Munib was replaced by Governor Assadullah Hamdam, with the consent of 
Jan Mohammad, who held sway over him from Kabul. Governor Hamdam organised 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  516	  232. 517	  U.S. Embassy in Afghanistan, “PRT/Tarin Kowt: Governor Monib’s Tenuous 
Grasp on Uruzgan Province,” U.S. Embassy Cable 06KABUL2178, May 14, 2006. 
Published by Wikileaks.org. 431; 432; 218.  518	  Derksen, “The Politics,” 25.  
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in 2008 a ‘Peace Jirga’ described in the introduction, attended by hundreds of tribal 
elders from the province. However, the majority were probably primarily connected 
with the local government rather than with the Taliban. As described, Matiullah 
provided security, and former governor Jan Mohammad played a prominent role in 
proceedings. During lunch at the governor’s compound, he took the seat reserved for 
the governor at the head of the table, an important sign of who was the boss. A plea 
by an elder from the marginalised Hotak tribe in Mehrabad to the local government to 
stop targeting only their poppy fields for eradication and instead apply the same 
measures to everyone fell on deaf ears.519 
 
Hamdam also claims to have reintegrated 252 low-level fighters under the PTS 
programme with support from the Dutch PRT, mostly by offering them jobs in 
Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development projects, which included building 
schools, bridges and roads. However, as Hamdam was widely seen as under the 
influence of Jan Mohammad, he was not able to reintegrate Taliban commanders. 
 
There was direct and indirect contact between the foreign forces and some Taliban 
commanders. ‘Foreign troops were negotiating independently with the Taliban’, said 
Hamdam. ‘For example, X was exchanging messages with the Dutch. I also heard that 
Y had links with Australians. Z was another Taliban commander who had contacts 
with the Americans. The foreign forces didn’t share these things with us. I was not 
happy from this and neither was the [national] government.’520  
 
The Dutch PRT, which was responsible for the Jan Mohammad’s exit as governor, 
seems to have been especially keen on bringing in disenchanted powerbrokers and 
Taliban commanders. A tribal elder from Mehrabad recalls that the Dutch asked him 
to talk to a Taliban commander from the same tribe. ‘They wanted to ask him to leave 
the area. I sent my brother to talk with him. He did not disturb our area after that’. In 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  519	  Author’s observation, March 2008 Tirin Kot. 	  520	  Derksen, “The Politics,” 25. Full names have been replaced with random letters 
for security reasons. Hamdam’s assertions are confirmed by some of those involved in 
these contacts; 229; 548; 227; 238; 212; 213.  
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Deh Rawod the Dutch also made contact with a Babozai Taliban commander. He had 
joined the movement in 2007 after the Americans had raided his house.521 
 
However, without the approval of the Americans the Dutch efforts soon faltered. 
Efforts to persuade disenchanted elders to return to Uruzgan from exile led to the 
return of Hashem Khan Tokhi and Mohammad Nabi Khan Tokhi, two tribal elders 
who had been wrongfully accused by Jan Mohammad of being Taliban in 2001. In 
June 2010, however, Hashem was killed in his village by local Taliban, possibly hired 
by others. Mohammad Nabi was still alive in 2014 and benefitted from a project 
asphalting a road from Tirin Kot to Chora, as well as other reconstruction projects. 
But a close family member, who also fled, said in a 2014 interview that the family 
was still furious with the local government, which was then dominated by Matiullah. 
‘The ruling people have succeeded in excluding all other tribes, including only one 
tribe and some individuals loyal to their interests’.522  
 
In sum, local powerbrokers in Uruzgan as in other provinces, the support of foreign 
forces on the ground was a crucial factor in their access to power and resources in the 
post-2001 political order. Jan Mohammad’s grip on Uruzgan politics would not have 
been possible without the support of the U.S.-led coalition troops in the first years 
after 2001. However, over time, especially after ISAF expanded to the south in 2006, 
the provincial PRT in Tirin Kot seemed to have become more aware of local political 
dynamics. This resulted in efforts to reintegrate Taliban commanders and foot 
soldiers, and to get tribal elders to return from exile, as shown above. Reconstruction 
projects were also implemented in insurgency-affected areas as an incentive to 
support the government.  
 
However, even if some ISAF and U.S. officials realised what had gone wrong in 
Uruzgan and worked to achieve a more equitable distribution of power, it was 
difficult to fundamentally change anything for several reasons. First, they had 
different agendas regarding Taliban reintegration. While some Western officials 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  521	  Name withheld for security reasons, but known by author.	  The Dutch efforts to get 
in touch with Taliban commanders is also confirmed by other sources, including in 
the Taliban; 354; 232; 227; 238; 212; 213. 	  522	  200; Van Bijlert, “Zabul and Uruzgan,” 123.	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worked to establish a more inclusive local government, others were merely 
preoccupied with luring Taliban commanders off the battlefield with the goal of short-
term stabilisation.  
 
Second, there was a lack of consensus on how to proceed and a lack of coordination 
between different countries, and even between different departments within a country. 
Everyone had their own ‘tribal darlings’. Australians and SOF worked with 
Matiullah’s militias, but the U.S. Department of State was at times quite critical of 
him. The Dutch PRT officially didn’t talk to him and even supported Barakzai 
powerbroker, Matiullah rival and former police chief Rozi Khan to become district 
chief of Chora in 2007. After Rozi Khan was accidentally killed by Australian forces 
in 2008, they supported the appointment of his son Daoud Khan (who was 
assassinated after the Dutch left in 2010 and the U.S. took over the PRT, showing the 
difficulty of shaping the local political arrangements when not everyone was on the 
same page).523 
 
Third, although ISAF’s mandate included extending the central government’s 
authority in the provinces, in reality the PRT and President Karzai often clashed in 
their approach. While at first U.S. and Karzai’s interests aligned, when the Dutch 
arrived in 2006, forced Jan Mohammad’s removal as governor and vetoed Matiullah’s 
appointment to provincial police chief, a gap opened up between the president’s 
interests and those of the PRT. Karzai continued to support Matiullah and, most of all, 
Jan Mohammad, who actively sought to destabilise Uruzgan. Karzai also did not 
support foreign initiatives to talk with Taliban commanders, perhaps feeling that it 
undermined his own leverage with the movement.   
 
Last and most important, while the expansion of ISAF to the provinces after 2003 
resulted in lead-nations wanting to put their own stamp on ‘their’ areas, the broader 
national and international environment limited what they could achieve. In Uruzgan 
nothing fundamental would change without political changes in Kabul towards a more 
inclusive government. This was partly dependent on the nature of the international 
intervention that included a military campaign against the Taliban but not a strategy to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  523	  Author’s personal observation, March 2008, Tirin Kot. Susanne Schmeidl, 
“Matiullah’s Dream Come True,” Afghanistan Analysts Network, August 8, 2011. 	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politically accommodate insurgent leaders. As a former senior provincial-level 
official said: ‘Uruzgan is just one among many provinces. There was no strategy for 
peace either at the local level, the national level or the international level. This was a 
big obstacle’.524 
 
5.2.3. DIAG – the case of Matiullah 
 
On 18 January 2007 Matiullah handed in 264 weapons under the DIAG programme. 
This happened shortly after the disbandment of the Highway Police in Afghanistan in 
2006, and was thus presumably meant to mark the end of his job as highway 
commander, six months after the Dutch troops’ arrival in Uruzgan. At that time he 
commanded around 370 men. Official statistics logged this as a successful case of 
disbandment, and the ANBP paraded his participation proudly in its monthly 
newsletter. DIAG’s managers had included Matiullah in their top ten most influential 
commanders in Afghanistan so his participation in the programme seemed a great 
achievement.525 
 
In reality nothing much changed for Matiullah. When asked in an interview in 2013 
about his participation in DIAG he said he did not remember it. He had little reason 
to. He and his men were not genuinely disarmed. Some of the weapons he handed in 
were so old that an American officer reportedly asked to take an antique Enfield rifle 
home with him as a souvenir. For commanders like Matiullah, participating in DIAG 
was a way to get registered as having had their militias disbanded, while continuing 
business as usual, according to a former DIAG official. In some ways, it was thus a 
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  432.	  	  525	  502; 244; 528, Afghanistan New Beginnings Programme, “ANBP newsletter issue 
5,” United Nations, January 2007, see also Derksen “The Politics”. The American 
embassy in Kabul wrote in a 2006 cable ‘The Afghan National Police (ANP) and 
Afghan Highway Police (AHP) were thinly disguised militias with primary loyalty to 
their former mujahideen commanders’. U.S. Embassy in Afghanistan, “PRT Tarin 
Kowt – Governor Monib’s Militia,” U.S. Embassy Cable ID 06KABUL5421, 
November 10, 2006. Published by Wikileaks.org. The Afghan Highway Police (AHP) 
was disbanded nationwide because of the ‘massive rates of corruption’. Cyrus Hodes 
and Mark Sedra, “The Search for Security in Post-Taliban Afghanistan,” 
International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2007, 39.	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convenient charade for all sides. Matiullah could claim to have participated, and 
DIAG officials could log him as a successful case.526 
 
Foreign troops in Uruzgan also had a keen interest in not changing the status quo, 
especially as violence increased. Matiullah thus continued as de-factor highway 
commander on the Kandahar – Tirin Kot road. His main job was to protect military 
and civilian convoys against Taliban attacks. Many sources, including at the Dutch-
led PRT, suspected him of running a protection racket and organising attacks when 
someone tried to organise their own protection. His control over that road made him a 
rich man, as everyone paid him handsomely. This included the Dutch government, 
which officially denied having anything to do with him.527 
 
To create the impression that his armed group was a legal outfit Matiullah’s militia 
was renamed Kandak-e Amniat-e Uruzgan (KAU). The Dutch government wrote in 
2011:  
 
Since 2007 the men of Matiullah Khan (the Kandak Amniante Uruzgan – 
KAU) did not formally exist and should be part of the Afghan police. In 
practice Matiullah Khan’s men functioned like a militia that controlled the 
main roads in and to Uruzgan and which helped him to generate a high 
income. The men were not controlled by the Afghan government. At the 
national political level there was unfortunately not enough Afghan political 
will and courage to put an end to the militia of Matiullah Khan and the way 
was free for him to continue with his own policy and activities.528 
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  502.	  527	  His income from providing security to foreign military convoys was estimated at 
some $340,000 each month (based on the report that Matiullah protected 200 trucks 
per month going from Kandahar to Camp Holland near Tirin Kot for $1,700 per 
truck). According to informed observers other sources of income were opium, 
construction companies in the name of relatives and getting paid for ‘ghost soldiers’. 
An U.S. embassy cable from 2006 stated: ‘Credible accounts indicate that Matiollah 
operates protection rackets, skims from the AHP’s payroll and is involved in the 
illegal narcotics trade’. U.S. Embassy in Afghanistan, “PRT/Tarin Kowt – Security 
Programs Getting Traction in Uruzgan Province,” U.S Embassy Cable 
06KABUL1669, April 12, 2006. Published by Wikileaks.org; see also Schmeidl “The 
Man Who Would Be King”; 2012; Jeremy Kelly, “The Long Road to Tarin Kowt”, 
The Australian, 28 April 2009; Bette Dam, “The Story of ‘M’: US-Dutch Shouting 
Matches in Uruzgan”, Afghanistan Analysts Network, July 10, 2010; 531; 548; 530. 528	  Translated from Dutch by the author. “Eindevaluatie Nederlandse bijdrage aan 
ISAF, 2006-2010,” Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken en Ministerie van Defensie, 23 




This lack of ‘Afghan political will’ was only part of the explanation of Matiullah’s 
ability to continue his armed activities despite of not having official status as security 
provider. Foreign forces, apart from being dependent on him to keep their convoys 
safe, disagreed on how to deal with him. The Dutch PRT officially wanted nothing to 
do with him, and had vetoed his appointment as police chief in 2006, as mentioned 
above. On the other hand, SOF, who still operated in Uruzgan and whose main base 
was next to Camp Holland in Tirin Kot, saw in him an energetic and effective Taliban 
hunter. While they had given up Jan Mohammad, they continued supporting 
Matiullah, who was much more attuned to the demands of foreigners than his uncle. 
In sum, individual actors, President Karzai, the Dutch PRT and the U.S. troops, 
followed their own, often competing, agendas instead of DDR or DIAG procedures. 
The end result was that Matiullah’s network continued to exist, even expand, but 
moved into the informal sphere, beyond the control of government institutions.529 
 
Matiullah’s assistance to SOF operations against the Taliban meant that he could 
expand his influence province-wide. His transition from highway commander to 
provincial powerbroker was also facilitated by Jan Mohammad’s transfer to Kabul in 
2006. Matiullah gradually took over Jan Mohammad’s network, which included the 
Afghan Security Guards working alongside SOF in various parts of the province, and 
reorganised it to include personal allies.  
 
The top tier of his illegal armed network became dominated by Popalzai from his own 
village. In a second tier he included Barakzai and Achekzai commanders, replicating 
Jan Mohmmad’s divide-and-rule policy. He included however few Ghilzai and 
Panjpai commanders, who continued to be marginalised. Although he did include a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
september 2011, 56. “Final evaluation of the Dutch contribution to ISAF, 2006-
2010,” Dutch Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defence, September 23, 2011), 56.	  529 420; 550. Around 2008 the Dutch government and MoI minister Hanif Atmar 
looked at bringing Matiullah’s militia fully under MoI control, but came to the 
conclusion that it would be too expensive (531). Apparently at this point Matiullah 
also resisted institutional oversight, preferring instead to remain independent, just like 
his fellow-militiamen Mir Alam in Kunduz and Amir Gul in Baghlan. Dexter Filkins, 
“With US Aid, Warlord Builds Afghan Empire,” The New York Times, June 5, 2010). 	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few of Jan Mohammad’s old allies, Matiullah’s network, which thus centred around 
friends from his village, became even more exclusionary than Jan Mohammad’s, who 
had relied on the old province-wide jihadi network. Again, international military 
support and political backing from Kabul enabled a provincial powerbroker to 
establish a predatory and exclusive rule.530  
 
The Dutch troops’s departure from Uruzgan in 2010 left the way free for Matiullah to 
become provincial police chief. His appointment, in 2011, merely formalised his 
expansive informal powers in the security sector. Despite being provincial police 
commander, he retained a militia of 800 men outside the MoI structure, until 2014.531 
He further strengthened his dominance in the security sector by disarming rivals 
informally, or preventing them from getting weapons, thus employing the same tactics 
as his uncle Jan Mohammad who had also used the DDR programme for this purpose. 
Several tribal elders saw their contingents of bodyguards reduced when Matiullah 
believed their loyalty lacking. One complained that Matiullah had prevented President 
Karzai from giving him permission to form a 300-men militia in his area. Matiullah 
also disarmed his own commanders if they had fallen from grace – for example by 
becoming too powerful – knowing they could not survive long against Taliban 
revenge attacks.532 
 
He also exerted considerable informal influence over the civilian administration, and 
most appointments in the local government had to be approved by him. For example, 
when the provincial council chairman did not closely follow his agenda, he ensured 
his replacement with a loyalist. He even ousted a provincial governor Amir 
Mohammad Akhunzda who competed with him on ‘the signing of contracts’ for 
construction work according to local sources; in other words a rival for bribes from 
contractors eager to win the contracts.533  
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  In 2014 Matiullah claimed that the MoI – presumably with the 2014 presidential 
elections in mind – paid for all his men, including 950 of the 1583 ANP that he still 
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President Karzai at that time openly deliberated if he should fire Matiullah. Perhaps 
this was only an empty gesture to the ousted provincial governor, who was a brother 
of his long-time ally senator Sher Mohammad Akhundzada from Helmand. It is 
therefore unclear how serious he was about firing him, but Matiullah’s continued 
tenure as provincial police chief could be interpreted as a sign that the central 
government had little influence over an increasingly powerful provincial strongman 
with his expansive formal and informal powers. In any case, the successor to the 
ousted governor seemed more pliable.534 
 
By 2013, however, Matiullah, in his new role as police chief, appeared to have made 
Uruzgan more secure than at any other point in the previous years. A tribal elder from 
Mehrabad, who claimed that his men deliberately drove over four villagers in 2002 
and had usually been extremely critical of Matiullah since we first met in 2006, said: 
 
The Taliban are at the gates. If you bring in a weak commander they can come 
in. We need someone strong to defend us, to be like a dictator. When we are 
sure that the security is fine we can ask for an educated man.535 
 
This sentiment was shared by many interviewees in 2013 and 2014, including some of 
Matiullah’s long-time enemies. On the surface it seemed that his reign had led to 
more local stability. Not only did he keep the Taliban out, his men also were no 
longer seen to be torturing or killing innocent people as they had in the early years 
after 2001. He even issued apologies for his previous behaviour and established a 
provincial shura to mediate in local disputes; the shura included many Achekzai, 
Barakzai, Panjpai and Ghilzai powerbrokers. In other words, his inclusion into the 
government appeared to have led not only to improved security but also to a more 
inclusive and less predatory style of governance.  
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  The villagers in the 2002 event were killed, according to the tribal elder. His 
story was confirmed by a villager who was interviewed separately and said he had 
also witnessed this event, which he described in the same way; 223.	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However, below the surface a different picture emerged. Many interviewees said that 
part of the reason why the province was more secure, was because Matiullah himself 
had ceased destabilising it. A local official said: 
 
It was a good idea for Matiullah to become police commander. He would not 
allow anyone else. With someone else he would create insecurity to show that 
he should be the commander. He would cooperate with the opposition. Now 
he is a police chief the situation is stable. When he was not a police chief the 
security was very bad. Now it is better.536 
 
 
In interviews with locals it also became clear that Matiullah’s rule in reality was no 
less predatory or exclusionary than before. His new profile was more about optics 
than genuine change. Soon after he had become police chief he disbanded the 
provincial shura, claiming a lack of money. Shura participants suspected him of 
having used it as a tool to claim local legitimacy in his bid for the position, and said 
that in any case his followers in the shura had usually settled disputes in favour of 
Popalzai powerbrokers. Many interviewees claimed that Matiullah’s men still tortured 
and killed innocent people, or that they made them ‘disappear’. For example, in 
Mehrabad tribal elders claimed in 2013 that a particularly notorious commander Shah 
Mohammad had killed an unarmed man who was a personal rival and had no links to 
the Taliban, despite Shah Mohammad’s claims to the contrary. Not long afterwards, 
Shah Mohammad was severely wounded when he drove on an IED, reportedly in 
retaliation for the killing of the unarmed villager.537  
 
The government in Uruzgan was thus still the personal rule of a strongman with his 
clique of followers. Local Taliban were his rivals who had been excluded, and, in 
many cases, harassed. Disarmament, both through DDR programmes and through 
informal disarmament activities, had been key in this dynamic.  
 
But even this was not the full story. Government officials, including Matiullah, also 
sometimes cooperated with the Taliban. Interviewees argued that ‘everyone has his 
own Taliban’, meaning that in the same manner everyone in the province tried to get 
into government they also had connections to the insurgency. Depending on the 	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situation they used their connections, which often ran along tribal lines, to one side or 
the other to get what they wanted. As one tribal elder said: ‘The Taliban are not 
outsiders, they are made of the tribes and people of Uruzgan. Every tribe has their 
own tribal Taliban’.538 
 
When commander Shah Mohammad in Mehrabad had killed one of their own, 
villagers knew there was no hope of justice – Shah Mohammad was the law.539 The 
only way to get some kind of justice was to organise a ‘Taliban attack’, laying the 
IED that wounded him. In short, whenever anyone needed to do anything that could 
not be done under the government label, they used the Taliban label.  
 
Matiullah himself also had close ties to the insurgency, according to well-informed 
sources. ‘Like everyone else’, said a tribal elder. ‘They are Popalzai Taliban from 
Kandahar’.540 It gave him deniability when he wanted to do something illegal, 
according to a local official. As mentioned above foreign troops suspected Matiullah 
of using the Taliban to stage attacks on convoys that had not paid him protection 
money.541  
 
In sum, the failure of the Afghan government and its international allies to bring local 
powerbrokers under institutional control owed much to their lack of interest in 
genuinely pursuing the disbandment of local militias or integrating them into the 
security forces. Instead they relied on some local strongmen while demobilising 
others. Powerbrokers on all sides used the threat of insecurity and alliances with the 
Taliban to pursue their personal interests.542   
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  538	  233. Also 214; 200; 210; 528; 418; 236; 232.	  539	  Literally. In order to try and have a working relationship with Shah Mohammad 
the villagers had proposed a weekly shura; an idea he had accepted. During this 
weekly shura local disputes were settled, with Shah Mohammad in the role of judge. 
212; 213; 215. 	  540	  210. Also 214; 200; 210; 528; 418; 236.	  541	  232; 200; Dam, “Shouting Matches”; Filkins, “Warlords Builds Afghan Empire”.    542	  By the time Matiullah was appointed as provincial police chief, he had already 
amassed so much informal power that the central government had little influence over 
him.	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Matiullah’s example is instructive. His close alliance to SOF and patrons in Kabul 
and Kandahar meant he did not need to nurture local support and legitimacy, in 
contrast to what tribal leaders had traditionally needed to do in the years before the 
war. Like Karzai, Matiullah was ‘a puppet of the foreigners’, in the words of his 
Taliban enemies. His network was, therefore, not fully integrated in either the 
government or the local community. When he was assassinated in 2015, any 
temporary stability he may have brought to the province in previous years evaporated.   
 
5.2.4. The APRP 
 
In 2011, the year that Matiullah became the provincial police chief, the APRP was 
rolled out in Uruzgan. Three years later, by the end of the Karzai administration, the 
provincial peace council and its secretariat seemed to be in operation and included 
twenty-five elders and five support staff. The programme offered many incentives for 
Taliban to join the programme, according to the head of the secretariat, Amir 
Mohammad Muzafar. Transitional financial assistance was available, including 
special allowances for senior commanders ($200-400 a month). After the first phase 
temporary job opportunities were available to participants in development projects 
from the line ministries, such as the building of dams or mosques and road 
construction. Another APRP official also mentioned the ALP as a possible option. 
‘The ALP is a good place for them to be hired, because they know fighting’.543  
 
In a poor province like Uruzgan, where many are unemployed or underemployed, 
such incentives should have seemed attractive. However, interviewees, including in 
the peace council, said that the number of Taliban that had laid down their weapons 
through informal channels was actually higher than the number that had gone through 
the APRP. According to the local secretariat the APRP reintegrated 137 Taliban 
commanders and fighters by spring 2014. But interviewees said that hundreds of 
Taliban rank and file had stopped fighting outside the programme, especially in areas 
around Tirin Kot. They received no benefits from the APRP, and had to find their 
own way back into their communities.544 
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  242; Derksen, “The Politics,” 27. 	  544	  235; 204; 212; 213.	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Even the number of 137 APRP participants – significantly lower than in Kunduz and 
Baghlan – was disputed. ‘I am Uruzgani, but no one knows them [the APRP 
participants] except for a few’, said one tribal elder and member of the peace council. 
‘The programme is a failure.’545 Matiullah also called the programme a failure and 
added: ‘As far as I know, no more than ten real Taliban have joined. Some of the 
others are in the police force with us’.546 There were allegations of fraud. A peace 
council member said: ‘APRP officials make lists of ghost Taliban and send them to 
Kabul to get money’.547 APRP officials denied this. They were, however, able to only 
name a few Taliban commanders; making the claim of 137 Taliban participating in 
the APRP dubious.548  
 
Mullah Samad was the local poster child for the APRP in Uruzgan. He joined in 2012 
with twenty-five fighters and then became an ALP commander in his district of Khas 
Uruzgan. But other APRP participants were less well looked after. An APRP 
participant from Shahidi Hassas district in western Uruzgan, claimed that he joined 
the programme with fifty-eight Taliban in 2012 but that he and his group were 
neglected. ‘The government promised us a piece of land and employment but none of 
these promises were fulfilled. The government did nothing for us, apart from 15,000 
Afghanis [around $220] that we were paid in the first three months. Honestly, we 
can’t invite other Taliban that we know to come and join the peace programme, if the 
government doesn’t keep its promises’.549 According to local APRP officials, the 
participant introduced himself as a foot soldier to the programme, afraid to be 
prosecuted if he said he was a commander, and was therefore not eligible for more. 
The participant claimed police chief Matiullah gave him seventeen ALP positions, but 
that he took them away as the news of his reintegration faded away in the local 
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media.550 He sounded bitter and disillusioned when he spoke about the APRP. ‘The 
government betrayed us’.551 
 
While the APRP did not deliver on its promise of employment for everyone who 
joined, risks involved in joining were considerable.  Most interviewees agreed that the 
lack of security guarantees was the APRP’s most problematic aspect. ‘The most 
important thing that insurgents want is security, and many times the government is 
unable to provide that’, said a member of the peace council.552 Another member 
explained that this was the reason why the APRP attracted fewer Taliban than 
informal channels: ‘Going through the peace council [the APRP] is risky because of 
the media. They think that exposure in the media puts their life in danger. They don’t 
want to risk their life for the small amount of money that the peace council pays them. 
Their AK-47 is far more expensive’.553 APRP participant Akhundzada said: ‘We are 
between two rocks: the government on one side and the Taliban on the other. They 
both cause insecurity. We want protection’.554 
 
Akhundzada’s concerns about his security exposed a structural problem that the 
APRP could not resolve and that affected other provinces too. As long as the Taliban 
leadership was not on board with the reintegration of its rank and file, it would keep 
targeting APRP participants – threatening their safety. But at the same time the local 
government was also not going to facilitate the real reintegration of Taliban 
commanders and fighters in the security forces, which would have been the only way 
to keep them safe in the midst of conflict – as the example of Matiullah and 
Akhundzada and the ALP shows. As long as Matiullah was in charge he would resist 
appointing rival commanders and fighters in the ALP or the ANP. This was the 
logical place for reintegrating Taliban; especially outside the province’s centre. As the 
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previous section showed, though Matiullah had made some cosmetic changes to 
include marginalised powerbrokers, in reality little had changed.555 
 
When asked about the APRP, interviewees recited the names of local commanders 
who had joined the insurgency because they had been marginalised and harassed by 
Jan Mohammad, Matiullah and their sub-commanders. They emphasised that these 
were local people, who should be accommodated in the local political order and who 
would create trouble as long as they were not. But they also said that there was little 
chance of political accommodation as long as Matiullah was in power and had filled 
the local administration with his followers. As one tribal elder and peace council 
member said: ‘Even in the provincial peace council there are people who say that 
Taliban should be killed on the spot, because they have killed one of their relatives. 
Such comments stop any progress in the peace efforts’.556 
 
Most interviewees added that shifts in the local power structure could only come 
about through changes in the wider political environment, specifically in Kabul. Many 
also mentioned Pakistan’s influence and that it needs to make peace with the United 
States. ‘The Taliban are used and manipulated by regional countries, particularly 
Pakistan’, said one tribal elder.557 ‘The leadership is not in Uruzgan’. A member of 
the Peace Council said: ‘The peace programme [the APRP] was a failure from the 
beginning. Peace is in the hands of Pakistan and the U.S., but neither of them want 
peace in Afghanistan’.558 
 
Uruzgan is an example of a province where DDR, especially the first DDR 
programme and informal DDR efforts, served to concentrate power in the hands of 
one family and its patronage network by disarming their rivals, some of whom joined 
the insurgency. As long as this family remained in power and could resist sharing 
resources with its rivals thanks to backing from Kabul and international support, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  555	  Khas Uruzgan, where Mullah Samad was appointed as ALP commander, was in 
the periphery of Matiullah’s influence. Moreover, in that particular district the 
tensions between the Pashtuns and Hazaras – which was not the case in other districts 
– could have made more attractive for Matiullah to appoint a Pashtun.  556	  212. 	  557	  201. 	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reintegration programmes for Taliban would be unable to genuinely integrate 
insurgents into society. The fact that Taliban leaders had not given their consent, 
made joining the APRP programme a risky move for their rank and file. Most Taliban 
who wanted to lay down their weapons chose to do so quietly, without the media 
attention that came with the APRP. Much of the PTS and APRP resources thus ended 
up in the hands of the establishment.  
 
DDR programmes that strengthened the predatory and exclusionary local political 
order responsible for much of the violence instead of integrating ex-combatants into 
civilian society and diminishing violence thus reflected the wider political context. 
With the U.S. prioritising counterinsurgency and counterterrorism over reconciliation 
with the Taliban, and Afghan allies such as President Karzai using this agenda to prop 
up loyal strongmen in the provinces, none of the DDR programmes could have 
fulfilled their official goals. Instead, the programmes became tools to further 
objectives in line with the real agendas of the most powerful actors, including 
President Karzai and U.S. forces. This was especially problematic in those areas, like 
southern Afghanistan, that they focused on right from the start, as the examples of 
Uruzgan and, in the next chapter, Helmand, show.  
 
5.3. Helmand Province 
 
5.3.1. DDR and DIAG – the case of Malem Mir Wali part 1 
 
The initiation of DDR and DIAG programmes in Helmand, as well as attempts to 
reintegrate Taliban commanders and fighters, took place amid competition between 
powerbrokers over government positions, access to foreign funds, and domination of 
the poppy trade. After the Taliban’s ouster in 2001, the best government positions in 
Helmand were distributed to four main strongmen who had risen to prominence 
during the anti-Soviet jihad. Sher Mohammad Akhundzada (from the Alizai tribe) 
became provincial governor; Abdul Rahman Jan (Noorzai) took over as police chief; 
Dad Mohammad (Alikozai) aka Amir Dado became chief of the National Security 
Directorate; and Malem Mir Wali (Barakzai) took charge of the 93rd AMF Division.  
The four competed fiercely with each other, employing every possible means, 
including denouncing rivals as Taliban to SOF and collecting bounties. Their 
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struggles, which manifested themselves in low-level violence rather than open 
warfare, became linked with the objectives and operations of foreign troops in the 
province, especially U.S. SOF (from 2003), the British Army (from 2006), and the 
American Marines (from 2009).559   
In this context, disarmament was a major threat to the strongmen and their men, as 
rivals could use any resultant vulnerability to attack them. Staying armed was 
necessary at all costs, even if it meant joining or supporting the insurgency. The 
example of Barakzai power broker Malem Mir Wali and the resurgence of the Taliban 
in ‘his’ district, Nahr-e-Saraj, is instructive.560 
A few weeks after the fall of Kabul in November 2001, Malem Mir Wali assumed 
command over what would become the 93rd Division, a collection of militias with its 
headquarters in Gereshk, the former capital of Helmand and a traditional stronghold 
of Barakzai power brokers. Malem Mir Wali, who had originally trained as a teacher 
(malem) in Kandahar, had fought with Hezb-e-Islami against the Soviets, like many 
of his fellow-tribesmen. Though Malem Mir Wali claimed that he was inspired by 
religious fervour when he joined Hezb-e Islami, the party’s provision of weapons and 
other forms of support that could be used in local conflicts certainly played a role. His 
pragmatism was also clear from his switching sides and joining Najibullah 
government’s National Reconciliation Programme when he faced pressure from his 
arch enemy Alizai leader Nasim Akhundzada, Sher Mohammad Akhundzada’s uncle, 
who commanded the local Harakat-e Enqelab force. When the Taliban came to 
Helmand in the 1990s, Malem Mir Wali fled to Iran and later went to the Panjshir 
Valley, where he joined Jamiat’s Shura-ye Nazar leader Ahmad Shah Massoud.561  
  
He claims he was involved in the liberation of Kabul in November 2001 and Fahim 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  559	  The ISAF deployment increased from 3,300 British troops in 2006 to 30,000 
troops from the United States,  UK, Denmark, Georgia, and Estonia in 2010 and 2011. 
The Danish battle group was in command of the district Nahr-e-Saraj from 2007. 
Christian Dennys, Military Intervention, Stabilisation and Peace: The Search for 
Stability (New York: Routledge, 2014); Martin, An Intimate War, 123. See also 
Derksen, “The Politics”. 560	  The author is grateful to Mike Martin for his suggestion to explore this example. 561	  342; 341; Deedee Derksen, “Armed, disarmed and rearmed: How Nar-e-Seraj in 
Helmand became one of the deadliest districts in Afghanistan,” Afghanistan Analysts 
Network, January 6, 2014.  
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subsequently rewarded him with the command of the 93rd Division. Support from 
SOF in Helmand was also crucial for Malem Mir Wali’s success in becoming division 
commander. In 2003 Malem Mir Wali’s deputy Haji Kaduz’s brother Idris and sixty 
members of the 93rd Division began to secure Camp Price, where SOF were based, 
and assist them in combat operations against the Taliban.562 
 
Malem Mir Wali leaned heavily on his old Hezb-e Islami network and his own 
Barakzai clan for the recruitment of commanders and fighters for the 93rd Division. 
But the division was, nonetheless, a mixed group, including Ishaqzai and Noorzai 
commanders and commanders from other Barakzai clans. They had self-mobilised in 
2001 and in several gatherings in Gereshk accepted Malem Mir Wali as their leader. It 
was a time of ‘tribal rapprochement’, in the words of former British officer and 
cultural adviser Mike Martin, who also points to the many Taliban fighters who had 
switched sides during the U.S.-led intervention in 2001 and joined Sher Mohammad 
Akhundzada’s militia.563 ‘When the Taliban was ousted from Helmand province, the 
top commanders went to Pakistan but the rank and file were left in Helmand, they 
could not escape to Pakistan’, explained a parliamentarian from Helmand. ‘For their 
safety they joined with Malem Mir Wali and Sher Mohammad Akhundzada’.564 Most 
reintegration of Taliban commanders and fighters since 2001 thus probably happened 
in this period. 
 
But there were also many who, already in those early years, lost out and were preyed 
upon by those in power. Among the main losers in the post-2001 political order were 
the Ishaqzai in Sangin, the Kharotei in Nad-e Ali, and the Kakars in Garmsir. Thus, 
whereas former 93rd Division members looked back at that time as a period of 
stability, most other interviewees thought differently. They recalled 93rd Division 
commanders fighting each other and establishing fiefs (‘every commander was king 
of his district’565) and preying – by looting, kidnapping and illegal taxation – on 
communities not represented in the local government.566‘The division was not a real 
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division, it was a bunch of militias’, said one villager. ‘They were the main reason for 
crimes’.567 
 
He, like other victims, joined the Taliban, who were reorganising in 2003 and 2004 to 
launch an insurgency and were looking for recruits. ‘We saw a lot of cruelties from 
Sher Mohammad Akhundzada, Malem Mir Wali, Dad Mohammad Khan, and 
Daoud’, a former Taliban commander from Qala-e Gaz village in the Upper Gereshk 
Valley said in an interview. ‘They kept asking for money. I was just a farmer. I had 
not been with the mujahedeen or the Taliban before. I had to join the Taliban to 
defend myself’.568 
 
Much of the competition between the Helmandi powerbrokers and their predation on 
those not represented in the local administration revolved around the lucrative opium 
and heroin trade, in which everyone was involved, including division commanders. 
The division’s headquarters in Gereshk was ideally located for it. ‘Gereshk is the 
money centre of Helmand and its economy revolves around trade, especially drugs’, 
said a former British officer. ‘When you go from Iran to Pakistan you need to go 
through Gereshk, and a lot of money is made on the checkpoints’.569 
 
The Ishaqzai villages in the Upper Gereshk Valley and the Lower Sangin Valley were 
known to harbour major drug smugglers. The Mistereekhel clan in the Upper Gereshk 
Valley was protected by having commanders in the 93rd Division. However, the 
Chowkazai clan in the Lower Sangin Valley suffered at the hands of both the 93rd 
Division Barakzai commanders and the brother of Alikozai power broker Dad 
Mohammad, Sangin district governor Daoud.570 In response, they joined the Taliban. 
An Ishaqzai elder explained: 
 
I am not saying that all Ishaqzai are with the Taliban. Some are with the 
government. But it is true that most are with the Taliban and that some high-
ranking commanders come from our tribe. That is the situation now. Up to 
2005 there was no Taliban in our area. The Ishaqzai elders invited them in, 	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because the Alikozai and Barakzai people were in the government and they 
misused their power.571 
 
 
The disbandment of the four powerbrokers’ militias, which were vital for the 
protection of their opium interests against their competitors, resulted in major 
deterioration of this already precarious security situation, right around the time of the 
arrival of the British troops in 2006. The removal of the power brokers from their 
positions and the disbanding of their militias took place unevenly; different 
powerbrokers were targeted at different times. The first was Malem Mir Wali, in the 
autumn of 2004. As the commander of an AMF division, he was expected to take part 
in the first DDR programme. His rivals Sher Mohammad Akhundzada, Abdul 
Rahman Jan, and Dad Mohammad stayed in power, however, and remained armed. 
For Malem Mir Wali and his men the incentive to remain armed was strong. The 
opportunities to remain armed were, however, dependent on connections to 
international forces, Kabul factions and the re-organising Taliban movement. 
Therefore the first DDR programme affected 93rd Division commanders and fighters 
in different ways. At the top of the division the most notable difference was between 
Malem Mir Wali and his deputy Haji Kaduz.  Although Malem Mir Wali participated 
in DDR, the militia of his deputy Haji Kaduz did not.572 
Soon after the establishment of the 93rd Division tensions had arisen between Malem 
Mir Wali and Haji Kaduz (who were from different Barakzai clans and had supported 
different jihadi parties) over a land issue. Malem Mir Wali claims that Haji Kaduz 
used his absence during a trip to Kabul to win the trust of SOF. As mentioned earlier, 
a group of sixty members of the 93rd Division under command of Kaduz’ brother Idris 
began securing their base Camp Price in 2003 and also started assisting SOF in 
combat operations. They also provided local intelligence on rivals, including on 
Malem Mir Wali, who lost U.S. support, which had been his main source of power in 
Helmand. Because Kaduz’s brothers and their fighters had been put on the SOF 
payroll, it appears they were taken off the AMF list before the DDR process in 
Helmand got under way.573 	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Malem Mir Wali, on the other hand, no longer had SOF protection. At the same time 
President Karzai was backing his long-standing rival, Sher Mohammad Akhundzada. 
Malem Mir Wali had no choice but to disband the 93rd Division and leave Helmand, 
afraid for what Akhundzada—governor at the time—and the Taliban might do to him. 
His vulnerability was on public display when, during the DDR ceremony, he 
complained to a DDR official that he could no longer defend himself. In response, the 
official took a Swiss pocketknife from his pocket and gave it to him.574  
 
Malem Mir Wali’s vulnerability was thus lost on DDR’s managers. They had, 
however, since the first rounds of DDR in Afghanistan, recognised that mid-level 
commanders needed a different reintegration package than the rank-and-file. Malem 
Mir Wali was sent on an ANBP sponsored trip to Japan and probably received enough 
money to tide him over. On his return, he received financial support from the deputy 
chairman of the National Security Council to run for parliament (though that probably 
happened as a result of personal connections rather than DDR procedures, as this was 
not part of the standard ANBP package for commanders). In 2005 he won one of the 
eight Helmand seats in the lower house of parliament. He did so despite his continued 
links to militias in Helmand, which was against the electoral law. From Kabul he tried 
to regain his power in Helmand, explored in the last part of this section.575 
 
With Haji Kaduz and his men under U.S. patronage, and Malem Mir Wali in Kabul, 
what happened to the division’s rank-and-file? One group of 93rd Division members 
found new paymasters in international companies working on reconstruction. Only 
121 of the 677 soldiers who existed on paper in the 93rd Division turned up for DDR. 
A former official compared the plan for DDR in Kabul with the reality in Helmand. 
‘We were trying to squeeze a bunch of farmers, who were organized along tribal 
lines, into a formalised process. We had sheets of paper with names, but half of them 
could turn up for the day for all we knew. It was a well thought out plan in Kabul, but 
the mechanisms at the local level did not exist’.576 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  574	  411. 	  575	  342. 	  576	  519. 	  
© Linde Dorien Derksen 2017  215	  
Many of the supposed soldiers who appeared told him that it did not matter that they 
were handing in their weapons: They had just signed a contract to provide security on 
the reconstruction of the ring road between Kandahar and Herat, therefore would be 
rearmed as security guards. ‘USPI, a Louis Berger subcontractor, was at that time 
working on the ring road between Kandahar and Herat [that runs through Helmand] 
[and] had a massive camp in Gereshk. The people we disarmed said, “We will start 
tomorrow with USPI”’.577 
Another group of former 93rd Division members—according to some sources as 
many as 40 per cent—joined the Taliban and therefore also remained armed.578 That 
the other strongmen in Helmand, Sher Mohammad Akhundzada, Dad Mohammad 
and Abdul Rahman Jan, were still armed was especially problematic for division 
commanders from marginalised tribes, such as the Ishaqzai, who had few patrons in 
the local and national government and thus few alternatives. One Ishaqzai elder said: 
‘The Ishaqzai have been refused assistance at all times, no one has cared about us. 
The government doesn’t accept us, nor do the foreigners. What should I tell you? The 
Ishaqzai have been kicked and our men have been killed’.579 
As long as Malem Mir Wali’s 93rd Division had existed certain Ishaqzai families in 
the Upper Gereshk Valley, who were prominent drugs smugglers, had been protected 
against the predation of the likes of Dad Mohammad and Sher Mohammad 
Akhunzada. The Mistereekhel clan was linked to Malem Mir Wali through ties from 
the jihad, when they were his subcommanders in Hezb-e Islami and fighting against 
the Chowkazai clan. When the 93rd was disarmed, their protection fell away. They 
became easy targets for Dad Mohammad and Sher Mohammad Akhundzada, who 
disbanded their militias only later. (Dad Mohammad did so because he wanted to 
participate in the parliamentary elections in 2005; Sher Mohammad Akhundzada 
when he was removed as governor in December of the same year.) Malem Mir Wali’s 
Ishaqzai commanders Qari Hazrat and Lala Jan, for example, who operated in Qala-e 
Gaz northeast of Gereshk, joined the insurgency to protect their interests. This was 
made easier by the fact that in Quetta high-level Taliban commanders from the 
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Ishaqzai were reorganising and contact was made along these tribal lines.580 
In the Ishaqzai’s lower ranks, other considerations than the protection of opium 
interests played a role. When they lost their income from their employment in the 
93rd, rank and file soldiers had to return to their villages, in many cases under Taliban 
control. To survive they had to join the insurgency. ‘What should they have done?’ a 
resident of Qala-e Gaz asked. ‘They did it for their own security’.581 The Taliban also 
offered new ways of making money. ‘The Ishaqzai have a big problem and that is that 
the canals in their areas are all blocked and their agricultural land is infertile’, a thirty-
year-old resident of Qala-e-Gaz explained. ‘[Ishaqzai members of 93rd Division 
militias] joined the Taliban because they became jobless. The division had kept them 
busy’.582  
All told, many former 93rd Division commanders and fighters joined the Taliban. The 
two main Taliban commanders operating in Nahr-e Saraj in 2010 had both been in the 
93rd (one came from Qala-e Gaz). This was true not only in the Ishaqzai-dominated 
villages north of Gereshk but also in other remote areas in Helmand.583 Instead of 
trying to prevent his former fighters from joining the Taliban Malem Mir Wali 
‘allowed this to happen and took advantage of it’, possibly to show that there could be 
no security in Helmand without him at the helm.584 A local source close to the Taliban 
said: ‘A lot of people who were first with Malem Mir Wali in Hezb-e Islami and then 
in the 93rd Division ended up in the Taliban. They still have a connection with 
him’.585 
 
Similar patterns were reported when Sher Mohammad Akhundzada (governor from 
2001 until 2005) and Abdul Rahman Jan were removed from their positions. Once 
they were no longer part of the provincial government, and their militias were 
disbanded, they reportedly started working against it.586 A former 93rd Division 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  580	  315; 300. 	  581	  333. 	  582	  332. 	  583	  303; 305; 320; 322; 342. 	  584	  Martin, An Intimate War, 151.  585	  300, also confirmed by 341. 	  586	  ‘When I was no longer governor the government stopped paying for the people 
who supported me’,  Akhundzada himself said in an interview with the Daily 
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commander explained: ‘The insecurity in Helmand is the result of four people, Mir 
Wali, Abdul Rahman Jan, Dad Mohammad, and Sher Mohammad Akhundzada. All 
four had their own Taliban. They wanted a force on the government side and on the 
Taliban side’.587 
 
In sum, the local political context in Helmand after 2001, with the powerbrokers 
vying, through low-level violence, for government posts, a stake in the local opium 
market and resources from SOF, meant that the incentive to remain armed was strong. 
When their militias were threatened with disarmament, their men tried to find new 
paymasters, including, in many cases, the Taliban. The strongmen allowed their 
fighters to join the Taliban to show that there could be no security without them in 
charge.  
 
Therefore, DDR programmes and the ad hoc firing of strongmen and the 
demobilisation of their militias, led a new wave of recruits to join the growing Taliban 
movement; a movement that had a few years earlier been recruiting groups who had 
been preyed upon by the same strongmen. This diffuse picture of the origins of the 
insurgency in Helmand showed how loyalties were fluid. Often pragmatic not 
ideological reasons motivated recruitment. This was in sharp contrast to the 
perspective of SOF, who divided the local political landscape into pro-government 
armed groups versus ideologically-motivated Taliban and thus had little knowledge of 
local politics or their role in shaping it.  
    
5.3.2. The PTS and the APRP 
 
The label Taliban masked numerous different groups and motives, as the above 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Telegraph in 2009 (Damien McElroy, “Afghan Governor Turned 3,000 Men Over to 
the Taliban,” Daily Telegraph, November 20, 2009). ‘I sent 3,000 of them off to the 
Taliban because I could not afford to support them but the Taliban was making 
payments. Lots of people, including my family members, went back to the Taliban 
because they had lost respect for the government’. Former provincial police 
commander Abdul Rahman Jan’s men attacked the British troops in Nad-e Ali after 
an eradication campaign had targeted poppy fields belonging to him and his 
followers. He also reportedly invited Taliban into the area. Dad Mohammad disarmed 
voluntarily in 2005 through the DIAG programme in order to run in the parliamentary 
elections. Martin, An Intimate War, 174.  587	  341. 	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showed. For local Taliban exclusion was, however, an important common 
denominator. The movement attracted many local actors who were unable to secure 
protection, jobs or prestige through government-related patronage networks. As local 
strongmen’s militias were disbanded under the DDR and DIAG programmes and 
local competition over contracts with international troops, government positions and 
the opium business intensified, more and more people fell by the wayside and joined 
up.  
 
Much of the violence thus had little to do with the Taliban movement directly, let 
alone its ideology. Insurgent leaders in Pakistan, however, recognised the opportunity 
to exploit local conflicts and grievances against the new government and recruited 
from the local population. Communities that provided fighters also acted as a support 
network, giving them food, accommodation, and intelligence. The Taliban functioned 
as a ‘catalyser for many grievances that existed among the population’.588 
 
The PTS and APRP programmes strove to reintegrate Taliban commanders and 
fighters and thus create a more inclusive society. However, as the previous chapters 
have shown, neither programme could singlehandedly roll back the dynamic of 
political exclusion created by the absence of Taliban leaders at the Bonn Conference. 
Without a political agreement leading to the establishment of a more inclusive 
government at the top, supported by the U.S. government, it was going to be difficult 
to create a more inclusive political order in Helmand. Instead, the continuing military 
operations against the Taliban provided local powerbrokers with the means to exclude 
their rivals, as the previous section showed. The PTS and APRP offered insurgents 
little more than surrender or co-optation, which in many cases meant participants 
would return to the situation that had led them to join the Taliban in the first place. 
 
Though DDR, DIAG and other measures had removed strongmen from their official 
positions in Helmand, they continued to exert influence informally. From Kabul they 
found new ways to undermine or co-opt their successors in the local administration, to 
resist the inclusion of their local rivals in government and even to support the 
insurgency – to show that there could be no security without them. As in Kunduz, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  588	  Theo Farrell and Antonio Giustozzi, “The Taliban at War: Inside the Helmand 
Insurgency, 2004–2012,” International Affairs 89: 4 (July 2013): 845–871.  
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Baghlan and Uruzgan, the DDR and DIAG programmes in Helmand had not 
fundamentally changed the local political order by effectively removing strongmen 
from the scene. If anything, they had inadvertently helped move local politics beyond 
the grasp of state institutions.  
 
Former governor (2001-2005) and Karzai ally Sher Mohammad Akhundzada 
influenced the PTS and the APRP from Kabul by having friends appointed in the 
local management of both programmes. In the case of the APRP this was presumably 
facilitated by his own appointment in 2010 as member of the High Peace Council. A 
well-informed local observer of the PTS and APRP said: ‘The management of these 
programmes was made based on friendship and connection. Peace is being inherited 
in Helmand, it goes around with Sher Mohammad Akhundzada. But he can’t even go 
to his own district, so how can they make peace with the Taliban?’589 
 
The fact that the programmes were part of Sher Mohammad Akhundzada’s patronage 
network was mentioned as one of the main reasons why they did not attract many real 
Taliban.590 ‘Sher Mohammad Akhundzada disturbed people, people joined the 
Taliban because of him’, said one source close to the programmes. ‘If they see this 
kind of person in the peace programme, they are not going to come’.591  
 
Of the six mid-level Taliban commanders interviewed in Helmand for this thesis, only 
one was interested in participating in the APRP. Five mentioned the lack of 
legitimacy of the government, next to the continued presence of foreign forces, as the 
main disincentive for joining the APRP. One of them said:  
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  400. Also asserted by 321.  590	  The former head of the PTS in Helmand claimed to have registered 327 
participants. However, he added that, following instructions from Kabul, they were 
‘not very strict on the details’. ‘As long as the ones who wanted to join presented 
themselves as Taliban we would register them (321) Another former PTS official 
said: ‘We couldn’t bring in any Taliban’. (400) In September 2015 the Joint 
Secretariat in Kabul counted 216 APRP participants in Helmand. Joint 
Secretariat,“Reintegrees and TA Progress Sheet 18-08-2015,” Islamic Republic of 
Afghanistan, unpublished. However, apart from some of the programmes’ officials 
most interviewees said the programmes had attracted few genuine Taliban. 400; 341; 
312; 313; 315; 316; 324.  591	  340.  
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What has changed in the government that we should join the APRP? When I 
joined Taliban, government officials disturbed people. What has changed? 
Nothing has changed. We are fighting for change.592 
 
 
In this situation, with their rivals still in the local and national government and the 
Taliban leadership not consenting to the demobilisation of their troops, those Taliban 
commanders and fighters who were interested in the PTS and the APRP faced 
considerable physical risks. The only protection the APRP could offer participants 
was through them joining the ALP, though even this was not on offer for everyone. ‘I 
myself would like to join with the Afghan government in this process, but who 
guarantees our life?’, said one Taliban commander. ‘Many Taliban have joined the 
Afghan government, but some of them were killed by Taliban again. It means that 
Afghan government can not ensure our security’.593  
 
A former Taliban commander, who chose to not go through the APRP when he lay 
down his weapons because he was afraid that the public ceremony would draw 
attention to him, said that the lack of security guarantees might have held back many 
insurgents. ‘There might be a lot of Taliban who think about leaving, but what should 
they do? The government is not powerful enough to protect them. If they stay with 
Taliban they are in mountains and fighting. But the government is not able to take 
their security. They want to join with a powerful government’.594 Other interviewees 
commented along the same lines.595 One former PTS official said: ‘The fighting 
Taliban do not come to make peace. The issue is that neither side wants peace. Most 
importantly, Pakistan and the U.S. are not cooperating’.596  
 
Gulab Mangal, Helmand governor from May 2008 until September 2012, argued that 
no insurgents joined the PTS or the APRP while he was in office, because they did 
not trust the government. He preferred an informal process that, according to him, 
yielded ‘thousands’ of genuine Taliban, who were ‘tired of fighting’ (thousands 
seems an exaggeration, but it would be safe to assume there were more than those in 	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the APRP). 
 
The people who came [through the APRP] and were exposed to the media 
were part of a symbolic process. The symbolic Taliban found a few weapons, 
then they contacted the peace council and then the media were invited to show 
off the programme. It was more or less like a business in Afghanistan. There 
were people who joined once in one province and then the same people went 
to another province to join again, to get more benefits.597 
 
 
The programmes’ managers were reportedly more interested in lining their own 
pockets than in bringing in genuine Taliban. Local managers complained about 
corruption in Kabul (‘For the HPC in Kabul, peace is a business, a way to make 
money’, said an APRP official. ‘They’re making fun of us’598). Others claimed that 
local managers were also involved in fraud.599 In the absence of a broader shift in the 
national and local political order and in an economy kept afloat by foreign donors, the 
internationally funded PTS and APRP seemed to have become not much more than 
yet another way of making money for the establishment.  
 
5.3.3. Local deals and informal Taliban reintegration 
 
There were also efforts in Helmand to reintegrate Taliban informally, with foreign 
involvement, in the districts of Musa Qala and Sangin, both in northern Helmand. 
When the British deployed to Helmand in 2006 they moved into small outposts in 
district centres in the north of the province. Once there, they were drawn into what 
one general described as the most intense fighting the British Army had seen since the 
Korean War in the 1950s.600  
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  Derksen, “The Politics,” 32; 339. The ALP served as one channel to informally 
reintegrate Taliban commanders, and NDS militias were another. According to 
Mangal, most informally reintegrated Taliban joined the ALP, making the militia 
programme the main track for informal reintegration. Around 80 per cent of those 
Taliban joined the ALP, he asserted, and only 20 per cent of APRP participants joined 
the militia programme; 037. Mike Martin writes that ‘The [ALP] programme recycled 
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In the fall of 2006, exhausted British forces backed a deal brokered by then governor 
Mohammad Daud and elders from Musa Qala. The British moved out of the district in 
return for the Taliban pledging not to attack the district centre. A few months later, 
however, the deal collapsed after a bombing raid of the U.S. forces just outside the 
five-kilometre exclusion zone that had been agreed upon, and the Taliban recaptured 
the town. Only in December 2007 would coalition forces recapture Musa Qala. The 
‘rapid and relatively bloodless success’ of that operation was partly due to ‘a 
coordinated operation to talk Taliban commanders out of the fight’, according to then 
EU Special Representative deputy Michael Semple, who was involved in motivating 
commanders to reconcile.601  
 
Semple and MoI and NDS officials in Kabul also planned to set up a demobilisation 
and reintegration camp for former Taliban fighters. Member of Parliament Jabbar 
Qahraman, working with Semple on the idea, had already brought in former 93rd 
Division Taliban commanders from Qala-e Gaz and Shurakhey in Nahr-e Saraj who 
could enrol in the programme and then work as an auxiliary force of the local police 
under directions of the district police chief, who was also interested in the plan. 
However, the provincial governor of the time, Assadullah Wafa, opposed it and the 
government expelled Semple and a colleague from the UN, who had accompanied 
him on a visit to Helmand. Semple maintains his claim that the government had 
approved the initiative.602 
 
The events surrounding the 2006 Musa Qala deal and all that followed illustrate the 
lack of coordination and different agendas of the Afghan government and 
international community, and of the U.S. and the U.K., reportedly ‘at loggerheads’ 
over the deal. On 1 February 2007, the day that Taliban forces recaptured Musa Qala 
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Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 45.  601	  Suhrke et al., “Conciliatory Approaches”, 41.   602	  Suhrke et al.,“Conciliatory Approaches, 32. This is confirmed by Sherard Cowper-
Coles in his memoir, Cables from Kabul, (New York: Harper Press, 2012), 129-130. 
Stephen Grey, Operation Snakebite: The Explosive True Story of an Afghan Desert 
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General Dan McNeill, who ‘opposed the kind of local agreements that Richards 
favoured’. Whatever Karzai’s reasons were for opposing the Musa Qala deal, he was 
clearly not on board, and without his approval no local peace initiative stood a 
chance.603  
 
After Musa Qala, the British were less active in reaching out to insurgents, and 
emphasized that any initiatives had to be ‘Afghan-led’.604 They did, however, 
gradually come to better understand local dynamics and, although their emphasis 
remained on trying to beat the insurgency militarily, made modest efforts to reach out 
to low-level fighters. A British officer who served in 2010 in central Helmand said: 
 
From 2006 to 2008 the British didn’t know about the issues, we didn’t 
understand that by what we were doing we were favouring some tribal 
interests. Now we are much more attuned to local politics. We understand that 
for the people in Helmand there is no political distinction between the Taliban 
and the government. Everybody is on both sides and no sides. Most are 
somewhere in the middle.605  
 
 
He explained too how the British supported low-level reconciliation.  
 
We looked at the population, broke them down in groups and gave each group 
a shade according to how close they are to the narrative of the government of 
Afghanistan. The hard-core commanders you can only get if they are 
incorporated in a wider political dialogue higher up. We concentrated on the 
lower level people. Local Afghans usually would take the lead in this type of 
reconciliation. We just set the conditions. For example, we made sure that the 
guy in question could be sure of his security. Or we offered reconstruction 
projects.606 
 
Most encounters with insurgents, however, remained on the battlefield, or, at best, 
lines were drawn around outposts to mark respective areas. ‘We heard them talking 
on the radio and we shouted to them on loud speakers’, said an officer who was based 
in Nad-e Ali in 2009 about his communication with the Taliban. ‘We also left night 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  603	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letters in their compound, which said: don’t come here or I will kill you. I drew my 
battle lines, and I allowed them to operate beyond them’.607 
 
Any agreement between opposing forces remained fraught with difficulties, as 
multiple international and local actors with different agendas operated in any area 
where such an agreement might take place. In 2008, for example, British troops went 
into Nad-e Ali after letting the tribal elders know that they were coming, so there 
would not be any fighting. ‘We sat down with elders. They said: please give us our 
poppy back. We said that we were not interested in taking your poppy. Then the PEF 
[an American-led poppy eradication force] came in and overnight the area became 
one of active insurgency’.608 
 
The American-led military and civilian surge under the newly-elected Obama 
administration brought 10,000 Marines to Helmand in early 2009. Although the 
Obama administration was more interested in reconciliation with high-level Taliban 
than its predecessor, it planned to pressure the Taliban militarily first, as explored in 
chapter 3. American efforts in Helmand overwhelmingly went to the battlefield. The 
Taliban suffered greatly from the kill-or-capture campaign, which killed many mid-
level commanders – fracturing the movement. There appears to have been no 
comprehensive drive to reconcile local Taliban.  
 
In the Alikozai-dominated area of Sarwan Qala in Sangin, however, in late 2010 
Alikozai elders brokered a deal with the then provincial governor under the auspices 
first of the British and then the U.S. troops (as Theo Farrell writes, the formal 
agreement was signed on 1 January 2011, witnessed by the head of the British PRT 
and the U.S. Commander of Regional Command Southwest).609 According to an 
ISAF press release, ‘insurgent fighting would cease against coalition forces and 
foreign fighters would be expelled from the area’ in exchange for reconstruction and 
development projects and the participation of Afghan forces in searches of 
compounds and patrols. Seven Taliban commanders signed the document outlining 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  607	  520. 	  608	  549. 	  609	  For a detailed examination of the Sangin peace deal see Theo Farrell, Unwinnable: 
Britain's War in Afghanistan, 2001-2014 (London: The Bodley Head, forthcoming 
2017), chapter 10. 
© Linde Dorien Derksen 2017  225	  
the deal that elders presented to the U.S. troops.610 One of the Alikozai Taliban 
commanders said: 
 
We fought the government and the foreigners because of the elders, so that the 
Americans would not come inside their village and search their houses. But 
one day the elders came to us and said that while they agreed that we were 
fighting against the foreigners it had led to the deaths of innocent people and 
to the destruction of houses. They requested us to stop fighting. I replied that 
if we stopped fighting the Taliban itself would punish us. I proposed to 
negotiate a ceasefire, which would allow us to keep our weapons. The elders 
accepted that.611   
 
 
The Alikozai communities in the Upper Sangin Valley did not constitute the core of 
the insurgency in Sangin, however. There are conflicting reports on how they had 
ended up supporting the Taliban, but most agree the relationship was not close.612 
Plus, in the spring of 2010, those communities also began to fear the cruelties of 
Taliban commanders who were outsiders, and reached out to the British PRT and the 
district governor Mohammad Sharif. It seems, therefore, that the chances of local 
authorities and foreign troops reaching a deal with these Alikozai communities were 
more feasible than their reaching a similar deal with villages with traditionally closer 
ties to the movement, like those in the Ishaqzai communities.613 
 
But even among the Alikozai the deal soon faltered. The promised stabilisation 
projects of the British PRT failed to come through. U.S. Marines started patrolling 
deep in Alikozai heartlands ‘to test the deal’.614 The Taliban leadership reacted by 
intimidating Alikozai elders and sending in foreign fighters. In May 2013 Sarwan 
Qala was the scene of a major Taliban operation and that year the Pentagon listed 
Sangin as one of Afghanistan’s most violent districts. After the surge of violence it 
appeared the Afghan army commander brokered a cease-fire and turf-sharing deal that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  610	  ISAF Joint Command – Afghanistan, “Afghan, Coalition Leaders Broker Peace 
Deal in Sangin,” International Security Assistance Force, 2011. 058; 059; 041; 323.    611 328. 	  612	  One western source involved in the deal even said: ‘The Alikozai tribe don’t 
consider themselves as Taliban’. 525. 	  613	  326; 327; 525. 	  614	  Julius Cavendish, “Snatching Defeat From the Jaws of Victory: How ISAF 
Infighting Helped Doom Sangin to its Ongoing Violence,” Afghanistan Analysts 
Network, July 23, 2014.  
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provided some temporary respite. In the spring and summer of 2014 Sangin was, 
however, again a major battleground.615   
 
The failure to negotiate a sustainable peace deal with the Alikozai was due partly to 
what Julius Cavendish sees as its main cause: Western powers’ ‘infighting and 
internal agendas’ which undermined the coalition’s broader goals.616 More important, 
however, was the overall prioritisation of the military campaign over a political 
approach that tended to doom such initiatives. It meant that the wrong type of 
foreigner and unit were deployed. 
 
Under the command of General Mills, the U.S. Commander of Regional Command 
Southwest, a meeting was bombed in November 2010 that, according to Julius 
Cavendish, might have expanded a peace deal from a purely Alikozai affair to one 
with wider support. The meeting included tribal elders from the Barakzai, Noorzai 
and Ishaqzai and had been called by the main Taliban commander in the district. After 
the attack, only the Alikozai continued their negotiations with the local government 
while the others left.617 In 2011 a local Barakzai Taliban commander from the Sarwan 
Qala area said:  
 
The elders came to me, but I rejected them. I told them that until the time 
these foreign troops are in Afghanistan and until the time that Mullah Omar 
tells me to stop fighting I will continue my fight. We have talked with Mullah 
X [the Alikozai commander quoted earlier] to bring him back. If he doesn’t 
return to us we will attack Sarwan Qala.618 
 
 
In sum, efforts were made to reintegrate Taliban informally, with foreign 
involvement, in the districts of Musa Qala in 2006 and Sangin in 2010, both in 
northern Helmand. But the military campaign against the Taliban, which included air 
strikes and aggressive patrolling by foreign troops, always took priority over a 
political approach aimed at either getting the Taliban leadership on board or gradually 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  615 “Report on Progress Towards Security and Stability in Afghanistan,” Report to 
Congress, Department of Defense, November 2013.  Azam Ahmed and Taimoor 
Shah, “Local Turf-Sharing Accord With the Taliban Raises Alarm in Afghanistan,” 
New York Times, December 18, 2013. 616	  Cavendish, “Snatching Defeat”. 617	  Cavendish, “Snatching Defeat”. 	  618	  311. 	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expanding local ceasefires and, ultimately, at creating a more inclusive government 
nationally and locally. This tended to scupper any local initiatives, though they also 
suffered from a lack of coordination and infighting between Western troop 
contingents.  
 
5.3.4. Reversing DDR and DIAG — the case of Malem Mir Wali part 2 
 
Much as Sher Mohammad Akhundzada continued to exert informal influence in 
Helmand after losing his position in the local administration, so did the Barakzai 
powerbrokers in Nahr-e Saraj district in central Helmand. Former 93rd Division 
commander Malem Mir Wali eventually recovered his influence on the local security 
sector in Nahr-e Saraj from Kabul, where he became a member of parliament first in 
2005. He was re-elected in 2010. This happened despite his unpopularity among the 
local population – many complain that ‘he only works for himself’, either meaning 
that he did not distribute his resources or that he did not have resources to distribute. 
Numerous sources claim his election was due to fraud. But, as many emphasise, the 
seat in parliament, which offers lawmakers the possibility to influence government 
appointments and also allows them to keep a finger in their provinces’ pie, permitted 
him to manipulate government affairs in Helmand.619 After his second election he 
scored two important victories.  
 
The first was the ALP programme that was rolled out in January 2011 in Helmand. 
Malem Mir Wali was able to quickly move many of his allies – disgruntled former 
93rd Division commanders and fighters – into the militia programme, thus boosting 
his popularity. Notwithstanding the provisions in the electoral law forbidding 
members of parliament from having ties to armed groups, Malem Mir Wali himself 
claimed that some 250 former 93rd commanders and fighters linked to him joined the 
500-strong ALP. This apparently included some of those who had previously joined 
the Taliban.620 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  619	  417; 318; 341; 317; 325; 504. 	  620	  342; Derksen, “The Politics,” 34. The formation of the ALP in Helmand basically 
rehatted the old militias. Although officials claimed that the ALP programme 
improved security by keeping Taliban out, often it simply involved ‘paying many 
Talibs not to fight because they were members of the ALP’. (Martin, An Intimate 
War), 252.  
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Like elsewhere the ALP thus functioned as an informal reintegration programme; 
getting disenchanted former mujahedeen, in this case former 93rd Division 
commanders and fighters, some of who had joined the Taliban after DDR, back on the 
government side. Asked if he still thought DDR was a mistake, Malem Mir Wali said: 
 
If it was not a mistake why did they make the ALP? What is the difference 
with the old militias? The old militias defended the villages. I would like to 
add that the old militias that got DDR-ed were much better organised and they 
knew how to be nice with the villagers. They were much better than the 
current militias. The old militias were not addicted to drugs. The ALP has no 
knowledge, they are into narcotics. The old militia were 100 per cent better.621 
 
 
Malem Mir Wali’s biggest triumph, however, was the appointment in 2013 of his son 
Hekmatullah as Nahr-e Saraj district police chief in command of 510 ANP and the 
ALP.  
 
In contrast to Malem Mir Wali, Hekmatullah was a professionally trained police 
commander. Some locals said that he kept people safe, and he seemed to enjoy more 
popularity than his father, whose reputation was tainted by the crimes of the 93rd 
Division in the early years after the fall of the Taliban regime.622 ‘The highway 
security is much better [since Hekmatullah is police chief], there are check posts in 
most places’, said one villager. ‘Before he came it was very insecure’.623   
Others complained that Hekmatullah as district police chief brought no change. Some 
locals claimed that a network of a few strongmen in Nahr-e-Saraj could do what they 
wanted and that people who challenged them in court were intimidated. They said 
they were less afraid for the Taliban after the foreign forces left than for local 
officials, who according to them were corrupt and engaged in drug trafficking.624 
 
Haji Kaduz, Malem Mir Wali’s former deputy in the 93rd Division, also remained 
influential. After DDR, he became district police chief for a year before being charged 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  621	  Derksen, “The Politics,” 34. 	  622	  417; 317; 318; 325; 332; 333; 504.	  623	  325. 	  624	  332; 333.	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with security on the highway from the provincial capital to Gereshk until 2008. When 
the government stopped paying him, Malgir and Babaji south of Gereshk fell to the 
Taliban; he claimed because he had left the area. In 2013 he commanded fighters in 
his area of Chargandaz in Malgir.625  
 
The main basis of Haji Kaduz’ family’s influence in Gereshk after the DDR 
programme, however, was its work with foreign troops, first SOF and, after 2006, 
ISAF forces. The construction company of Kaduz’s brother Mullah Daoud was 
involved in the construction of Camp Bastion. After another brother of Kaduz, Idris, 
who was in charge of base security for Camp Price, was assassinated Mullah Daoud 
reportedly took over until the contract ended in 2011. They employed about 110 
fighters, many of whom were former members of the 93rd. As mentioned earlier, they 
were not disarmed under the DDR programme, presumably because they had been 
taken off the MoD payroll beforehand. They also seem not to have participated in 
DIAG, at least not to the extent that their militia was effectively disbanded. Although 
they were prominent militia commanders in Nahr-e-Saraj at the time, neither Kaduz 
nor Mullah Daoud appeared on an internal DIAG chart of commanders from 2007 
that included a section on illegal armed groups in Nahr-e Saraj.626 
 
The decade that passed between the first DDR programme and the end of the Karzai 
administration thus had not seen a diminishing of the Barakzai strongmen’s influence 
in Nahr-e-Saraj.627 If anything, they and their followers were more armed than after 
disbandment in 2004 as a result of the introduction of militia programmes such as the 
ALP, unofficial attempts by U.S. troops and the NDS to arm militias, and the growth 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  625 341. 	  626	  341; Afghanistan New Beginnings Programme, “Chart of Commanders,” dated 27 
January 2005. 	  627	  Though they had become more fragmented compared to right after the fall of the 
Taliban regime, which in many ways was even worse for security. During provincial 
council elections in 2009 the Barakzai fielded 27 candidates in Helmand. In the year 
before Hekmatullah’s appointment as district police chief of Nahr-e Saraj, the 
Barakzai stronghold, the position had changed hands seven times.  
Malem Mir Wali and Haji Kaduz remained at odds, in spite of several reconciliation 
attempts. In the spring of 2013 Haji Kaduz was chosen as the head of a local 
(informal) council in Gereshk; a few days later Malem Mir Wali announced himself 
the head of a rival council. His son, the district police chief, Hekmatullah was 
assassinated in 2015. 	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of the insurgency. 
  
Informal rearmament on the government side (next to the appointment of Barakzai 
powerbrokers in the ANP), which in some cases meant re-hatting Taliban as pro-
government militias, reflected the necessity of accommodating the Barakzai 
strongmen and their followers in the local political order. By not offering them 
integration into the new army immediately after the disbandment of the 93rd Division 
in 2004 under the first DDR programme, an opportunity was missed to try and impose 
more institutional control. Instead, the Barakzai strongmen’s influence in Helmand 
was as informal in 2014 as it had been a decade earlier, and government institutions 
still had as little control over them.  
 
5.4. DDR deepens political exclusion in the southwest 
 
DDR programmes in Uruzgan and Helmand thus reflected the political context in 
which they were initiated and deepened the pattern of political marginalisation in 
place since 2001 – like in the northeast. The exclusion of Taliban leaders from the 
post-2001 political order in both provinces meant that the international troops 
supported exclusionary and predatory local administrations made up of anti-Taliban 
strongmen and their militias and that foreign resources poured in to hunt al-Qaeda and 
the Taliban. Moreover, in the first years after the fall of the Taliban regime there was 
no internationally-supported mechanism for the surrender of local Taliban 
commanders and their reintegration into civilian society. Kabul factions, especially 
the group around President Karzai, used the international anti-Taliban agenda to 
further their own interests by supporting allies in local administrations.   
 
While international troops viewed the local political landscape in Uruzgan and 
Helmand through the lens of an internationally-supported Afghan government versus 
the Taliban, split along an ideological dividing line, local actors saw it differently. 
They rarely, if ever, competed for ideological reasons. Instead they battled each other 
for government positions, international resources and a stake in the local opium 
business.  
 
In these circumstances disarmament was a terrible threat. It removed a powerbroker’s 
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main asset in his competition with others and it was an indicator of the loss of 
international and factional support. Disarmament was not a neutral exercise. Access to 
military force had always been essential to the survival of any group at any time. The 
past decades of war only reinforced its importance. Those involved in the competition 
for resources in Uruzgan and Helmand were mainly former jihadi commanders, 
whose careers had been made on the battlefield. Unsurprisingly DDR was viewed 
negatively.  
 
The case studies above show how, in Uruzgan and Helmand, DDR and DIAG 
impacted the targeted groups according to three scenarios. The first was that 
powerbrokers were able to switch from a government position, in which they were 
targeted, to international patronage. It seems that especially those commanders who 
were not weak but also not the most visible were able to do this: kandak commander 
Matiullah in the case of the AMF brigade in Uruzgan and 93rd Division deputy Haji 
Kaduz in Helmand. Under the patronage of SOF they could keep access to armed 
force and even expand it, especially in the case of Matiullah in Uruzgan. In that 
province the Barakzai and Achekzai commanders who at first lost out because of 
DDR, were later able to benefit from Dutch and Australian patronage.  
 
The second scenario concerned the strongmen at the top: Jan Mohammad in Uruzgan 
and Malem Mir Wali in Helmand (and also Sher Mohammad Akhundzada and Dad 
Mohammad). Either through DDR, DIAG or other measures they were removed from 
the local administrations and brought to Kabul, where they obtained a position in the 
national government. However, instead of making sure that ties to their home 
provinces were effectively cut, including by insisting on them breaking their links to 
local armed groups, the Karzai government allowed them to maintain an informal 
network in their provinces, including armed groups – which was, in the cases of Jan 
Mohammad and Sher Mohammad Akhundzada, to the advantage of President 
Karzai’s faction, which could retain its influence in the area. This meant that instead 
of the government institutions achieving control over informal networks, in fact those 
informal networks penetrated government institutions. The strongmen were also one 
of the driving forces behind the violence that hit the southwest as they departed, 
which was their way of showing that there could be no security and stability without 
them.  
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Thus, in the first two scenarios, international troops and Kabul factions allowed (and 
even helped) provincial strongmen to remain armed, and to profit from it. In an 
increasingly volatile security environment, no one was really serious about disarming 
what were seen as either anti-Taliban or pro-Karzai militias. Many rank-and-file also 
ended up as security guards for construction companies.  
 
In the third scenario, those without direct connections to the government or 
international troops joined the Taliban to protect their opium interests, for a new job, 
or simply because the insurgents had taken over their village and they had no other 
choice. The fate of many 93rd Division commanders in Helmand is illustrative. Many 
had some link to the Taliban, either because they had supported the movement before 
2001 or because they were tribally linked to leading insurgents. Again, personal 
connections were all that mattered.  
 
There are thus many similarities between what happened in Uruzgan and Helmand 
around the issue of DDR. In both cases Karzai-supported governors (respectively Jan 
Mohammad and Sher Mohammad Akhundzada) pursued similar tactics in ridding 
themselves of rivals. Weak rivals were labelled as Taliban, which opened the way for 
predation and informal disarmament. Barakzai rivals were attacked in a more covert 
way, and both governors profited from the demobilisation under the first DDR 
programme of Barakzai strongmen, before having to disband their own militias when 
they were fired from their positions. This uneven disbandment in the midst of intense 
competition for government positions, international contracts and opium created extra 
tension and instability in both provinces.  
 
But there were also differences. In Uruzgan, a demographically, geographically and 
economically smaller province, Jan Mohammad’s successor as main provincial 
powerbroker, Matiullah, enjoyed the support from both U.S. troops and the Karzai 
government, and was thus able to achieve a near monopoly on violence on the 
government side, at least in the province’s center. Formal and informal disarmament 
of rivals was an important mechanism for Matiullah in achieving this.  
 
In Helmand, international and factional patronage was more fractured amidst an 
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already crowded political landscape. The first DDR programme led to more 
fragmentation, as can be seen in the example of the 93rd Division of the AMF. While 
it had held together a diverse group of commanders, after DDR they went in different 
directions and violence between them increased. Sher Mohammad Akhundzada and 
other powerbrokers temporarily profited from DDR but then left for Kabul.  
 
The end result for the security situation thus differs, though in both cases a strong 
insurgency caused major instability. In Uruzgan Matiullah became the main informal 
and formal powerbroker in the security sector. However, there had been no serious 
attempt to bring him and his men under institutional control. This meant that any 
security that he created was temporary and evaporated when he was assassinated in 
early 2015.  
 
Helmand’s security landscape stayed crowded, with some strongmen profiting from 
informal or semi-formal militias, while the provincial police operated among different 
lines of command. In Nahr-e Saraj the diverse security systems temporarily 
overlapped in the person of Hekmatullah, the son of Malem Mir Wali. In early 2015 
he was however also assassinated.  
 
Throughout the period that this thesis covers there was no real interest in peace by the 
main parties to the war – the Taliban, the Karzai government, the U.S. and Pakistan – 
and the political situation thus remained the same. The Taliban increased their 
activities over the years, and, recognising this growing security problem, Western 
governments operating in Afghanistan supported reintegration programmes for mid-
level Taliban commanders and their fighters, but without engaging in peace talks with 
Taliban leaders.   
 
If the programmes had been a success, the highest numbers of participants should 
have been in areas where the insurgency was fiercest, which included southwestern 
Afghanistan. However, Uruzgan and Helmand both saw low levels of participation, 
and there were widespread doubts as to the identity of those who did sign up.  
 
In both provinces the legitimacy of the programmes suffered because in many cases 
they did not offer much more than surrender to a local government whose behaviour 
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had motivated those fighting with the Taliban to take up weapons in the first place. 
Even if insurgents were interested in surrendering, possible revenge from the Taliban 
added to the risks. In the absence of any real interest from Taliban, the PTS and 
APRP became just another way for the local establishment to make money.   
 
Internationally-supported informal attempts to make deals with Taliban (which 
usually did not amount to surrender, but to ceasefires) were undermined by infighting 
among international actors and between international actors and Karzai government. 
However, the main underlying problem remained the prioritisation of a military 
campaign against the Taliban over political efforts to create more inclusive national 
and local governments.  
 
Taliban reintegration attempts thus did not change the local political orders in 
Uruzgan and Helmand. Instead it strengthened them by, ultimately, reinforcing the 
establishment instead of those excluded. The battle lines had been drawn and they 
would not change without the willingness of the main warring parties to reconfigure 
the political landscape, in Kabul and the provinces.  
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Chapter 6 Conclusion 
 
Ten years ago Dutch troops deployed to Uruzgan to help with ‘post-war 
reconstruction efforts’. As a foreign desk reporter for the Dutch newspaper De 
Volkskrant I was sent to Afghanistan to report on this deployment. Although by this 
time it was becoming increasingly clear that the troops would also face a growing 
insurgency, the Dutch government’s emphasis lay on ‘winning the hearts and minds’ 
of the Uruzganis and on helping them rebuild their province after 25 years of war. 628 
 
These were the main topics of conversation during visits to the Dutch embassy in 
Kabul, a majestic white house surrounded by neatly kept lawns, and to the Dutch PRT 
in Uruzgan’s provincial capital Tirin Kot, a collection of white containers secured by 
Hesco walls in desert like surroundings. In both places I encountered tall and slightly 
sunburnt Dutch officers and soldiers in sparkling new desert uniforms, full of 
optimism about helping to strengthen the Karzai government. They talked about 
‘sustainability’, ‘accountability’ and ‘capacity building’.629 
 
The contrast with what was happening outside the walls of the embassy in Kabul and 
the PRT in Uruzgan could not have been starker. In Kabul, a visit to the pink-painted 
house of former Uruzgan governor Jan Mohammad, opposite ISAF headquarters, 
revealed how influential he still was in the province. Despite the fact that the Dutch 
government had conditioned its troop deployment on his removal and that he was thus 
no longer acting in official capacity, Uruzgani parliamentarians, senators, and 
officials working in the provincial administration still frequently visited his house to 
receive instructions. His power in the province was clearly greater than that of any 
official.630 
 
Moreover, after having been exiled to Kabul he was reportedly involved in actively 
destabilising the province to show that without him at the helm there would be no 
security. His deliberate destabilisation of Uruzgan came after four years of having 	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  Personal observations of the author, summer 2006. See also Goodhand and Sedra, 
“Rethinking International Peacebuilding,” 245; Derksen, “Thee met de Taliban”. 	  629	  Personal observations of the author, summer 2006. See also Derksen, “Thee met 
de Taliban”.	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driven many personal rivals of relatively weak tribes in the arms of the insurgency 
through predatory tactics; tactics inadvertently supported and legitimised by the U.S. 
troops’ fight against the Taliban. In short, Jan Mohammad was bad news for the 
Dutch agenda of ‘post-war reconstruction efforts’. He was an important part of the 
reason why there was more war than post-war in Uruzgan; more fighting than 
reconstruction.631 
 
There was, however, little the Dutch could do about it. Jan Mohammad enjoyed the 
full support of President Karzai, whose very government the Dutch were supposed to 
strengthen by demobilising warlords such as Jan Mohammad. Although SOF had by 
2006 given up on Jan Mohammad, a visit to Tirin Kot showed that they still fully 
supported his nephew, militia commander Matiullah, who was seen as an energetic 
Taliban fighter. Symbolically, he resided right next to Camp Holland and Firebase 
Ripley, the SOF’s main base. The Dutch tried to ignore him. But gradually Matiullah 
became Uruzgan’s most prominent powerbroker (much to Jan Mohammad’s chagrin, 
who had been Matiullah’s main local supporter previously, but had also wanted to 
stay the province’s number one powerbroker), even though he had no official position 
until after they left.632  
 
The Dutch ostensive state building agenda was thus undermined by actions of SOF 
and by the Karzai government itself, who had different agendas. SOF wanted to fight 
the Taliban; the Karzai faction wanted to strengthen itself, not the whole government. 
These forces were stronger than the Dutch, who could do no more than lodge 
complaint after complaint and try to support alternative powerbrokers in Uruzgan.633 
Moreover, although many individual Dutch officers, soldiers and officials, like their 
American counterparts, were fully committed to the state building agenda, the Dutch 
government’s real interest also lay elsewhere. First and foremost, it deployed troops 
to show commitment to its transatlantic relations with the U.S. and to show it was a 
trustworthy NATO partner. This meant that, in spite of differences of opinion with the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  631	  See chapter 4. 	  632	  Personal observations author, summer 2006. See also chapter 4. 	  633	  Dam, “The Story of ‘M’”.	  
© Linde Dorien Derksen 2017  237	  
Americans about the general approach in Uruzgan, the Dutch stayed until 2010 and 
worked within the framework that their stronger partners had defined.634 
 
The story of the power relations between international troops, the Afghan government 
and warlords in Uruzgan around 2006, and what this meant for state building efforts 
such as DDR, which is told in greater detail in chapter 4, tells us more about the three 
points of departure for this thesis as outlined in the introduction: first, that the main 
focus of militarised patronage networks is inclusion in the patrimonial state; second, 
that the U.S. government, the main international actor in Afghanistan, prioritised the 
fight against the Taliban over state building, which led to the creation to an 
exclusionary and predatory political order; and, third, that affiliations are fickle and 
powerbrokers not included in the post-2001 political order were liable to become 
spoilers. Events in Uruzgan around 2006 as recounted above and in chapter 4 support 
all three points. What does the rest of this study say about these assumptions? And 
what did these points, if true, mean for the four DDR programmes that were initiated 
in post-2001 Afghanistan?  
 
6.1. International intervention and DDR 
 
The first part of this thesis examined the political context in which the DDR 
programmes were initiated, and how the timing, design and initiation of these 
programmes reflected this context. The U.S., the main international actor operating in 
Afghanistan after 2001, prioritised the military campaign against the Taliban (which 
led to their exclusion from the Bonn Conference and, subsequently, from the post-
2001 political order) over the international state building agenda. DDR was made to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  634	  Reluctance to blame the U.S. for the failure to address warlordism in Uruzgan 
becomes clear, for example, from the Dutch government’s final assessment on why 
Matiullah kept armed and operating as militia commander after the Highway Police 
was disbanded. “At the national political level there was unfortunately not enough 
Afghan political will and courage to put an end to the militia of Matiullah Khan and 
the way was free for him to continue with his own policy and activities.” Italics added 
by the author. “Eindevaluatie,” Ministeries van Buitenlandse Zaken en Defensie, 56 
(“Final evaluation,” Dutch Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defence), 56. Personal 
observations of the author, summer 2006; see Dam, “The Story of ‘M’”. 	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work for the military campaign, which is clear from the timing of the programmes, 
their design and the way they were implemented.  
 
The military campaign morphed over time from being an invasion to oust a sitting 
regime, to hunting members of that regime and their allies (counter terrorism) to 
trying to fight back a growing insurgency (counter insurgency). Military imperatives 
thus changed over time. What did not change, however, was their continued 
domination of the overall U.S. agenda in Afghanistan. The state building agenda was 
not only pushed aside when it was inconvenient for the military campaign, but this 
study contends that insofar as it was implemented it was made to work for the military 
campaign, even if on paper many of the respective goals clashed. This thesis shows in 
detail how that happened.  
 
Chapter 2 showed that the first DDR programme, despite being part of the 
international community’s state building agenda on paper and despite it being 
presented in state building language, was in fact less about long-term aims like 
building up the state’s ability to achieve a monopoly on the use of force, and more 
about short-term political expediency, like securing the elections. This is clear from 
internal memos and from the fact that DDR was hastily initiated while the other 
‘pillars’ of the state building agenda, which, according to the main state building 
policies that nominally informed the intervention are mutually reinforcing and should 
be initiated in tandem, were neglected.  
 
This less-than-ideal situation from a state building perspective could, however, 
perhaps still be chalked up to the inescapable gap between theory and reality that all 
international interventions face. From this viewpoint, one could conclude, as many 
have done, that the state building agenda was simply too ambitious for the messy and 
incoherent reality of international coalitions operating in fragile states.  
 
But when one also takes into account the political implications of the timing of the 
programme, its design and the way it was initiated, it becomes clear that ultimately 
the state building was always subordinate to the U.S. military campaign against the 
Taliban. By targeting only the AMF, and by excluding the large majority of 
reintegration participants from entry into the new ANA, the first DDR programme 
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was clearly designed to disband and render harmless the U.S.’s erstwhile allies, the 
former Northern Alliance factions. This could make sense from a state building 
perspective, as the programme aimed to disband militias and warlords standing in the 
way of strengthening state institutions. But this could only happen because once the 
Taliban were ousted, the U.S.’ northern partners were no longer militarily useful. At 
the same time, the U.S. resisted the initiation of DDR in the south, where some AMF 
militias were still militarily useful. The targeting for disarmament of only some armed 
actors while other actors remain armed made sense from a narrow military 
perspective but not from a state building perspective.  
 
The second part of chapter 2 examined the Afghan–led DIAG programme advocated 
by a westernised faction of the Karzai government. Their push for the disbandment of 
illegal armed groups was motivated by a commitment to the state building agenda, the 
advancement of which would make their own position stronger vis-a-vis other Kabul 
factions. It would also see the Afghan government wrest back control over militias 
from international patronage.  
 
DIAG however encountered serious resistance. Some came from other Kabul factions 
and subnational officials and strongmen, who either opposed the programme as a 
whole or the targeting of specific figures. Another important challenge was the 
resistance of the international military, which was also reluctant to help the 
programme succeed. Not only were international military generally afraid to rock the 
boat in an already insecure situation, they were also protecting specific militias, 
namely those working alongside them. Chapter 2 details how they tried to keep ‘their’ 
militias exempt from DIAG, which means that the main legacy of DIAG is ironically 
the legitimatisation of (some) militias. As with DDR, overall military considerations 
clearly trumped state building considerations among key international actors.   
 
Chapter 3 showed how the PTS and APRP programmes were both also primarily 
viewed as national security instruments by their main international backers, ‘expected 
to deliver military and intelligence benefits, but wrapped in a language of peace and 
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reconciliation’.635 International military considerations thus drove foreign support for 
Taliban reintegration programmes much as they had undermined earlier efforts to 
demobilise non-Taliban networks. To a great extent they also similarly determined 
their timing, design and implementation.  
 
The U.S. government’s wish to redeploy troops based in Afghanistan to Iraq triggered 
its support for the PTS. Foreign backing for the reintegration component of the APRP 
was motivated by a surge of military troops into Afghanistan, and a need in that 
context for a new surrender mechanism for insurgents. In terms of implementation the 
PTS was mostly an Afghan affair, apart from its prisoner release programme. The 
international military was however deeply involved in the implementation of the 
APRP, especially when the programme was first rolled out in northern provinces. 
Though on paper the APRP was the most elaborate DDR programme and included 
elements like grievance resolution, in reality just like the PTS it offered insurgents 
little more than surrender into the same political system that had led them to take up 
arms, though in some cases participants were integrated in the ALP or given other 
employment.  
 
In sum, the post-2001 political context that the DDR programmes reflected was 
dominated by the political exclusion of the Taliban and the fight against them. The 
state building agenda’s institution building approach, while focusing more on the 
technical and less on the political aspect of post-war reconstruction (the what but not 
the who), should, on paper, be politically inclusive by seeking to install a liberal 
democratic political system. It seeks to demobilise all warlords and strongmen and 
help them make the transition of armed groups into political parties.  
 
A military campaign, on the other hand, is politically exclusive. It divides the political 
landscape into enemies and allies; enemies are fought, allies supported as long as they 
are useful. This was especially so in Afghanistan, where the Taliban were viewed as 
irreconcilable: thus during the greater part of the period this study covers the military 
campaign was not part of a broader political strategy geared towards reaching a 
settlement with the insurgents. Insurgents were offered the opportunity to surrender 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  635	  Suhrke et al. “Conciliatory Approaches,” 9.	  The same was true for the APRP as 
explored in chapter 4.  
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and be demobilised at best, while, at the same time, allies were armed. Strongmen 
who were no longer useful could be demobilised.  
 
6.2. Local impact of DDR  
 
The second part of this thesis explored how DDR – best seen as part of the 
international military campaign and as an uneven process that targeted different 
groups in different ways and at different times – played out on the ground in the 
provinces. How did it impact the various armed powerbrokers? What did it mean for 
the power relations between them?  
 
The case studies showed that on the whole Afghan powerbrokers in the provinces 
exploited the limited understanding their international counterparts had of local 
politics. This allowed them to capture the DDR process and limit its negative effects 
(like giving up arms or demobilising men) or, in some cases, even made it work for 
them. Many if not most commanders were able to keep their weapons after ousting 
the Taliban, and quite a few high-level powerbrokers in charge of or with close links 
to militias won prestigious positions in the ANP, ANA, the subnational government 
or parliament. The PTS and the APRP programmes were captured in the sense that 
most resources went to the pro-government establishment instead of to former 
Taliban, making it yet another money making venture emerging from the international 
intervention. Though this thesis is the first study to comprehensively examine the 
whole DDR process in Afghanistan since 2001, the assertion that Afghan actors 
captured (part of) this process has been made in other studies.636  
 
This study, however, goes further by focusing on armed networks in the provinces, 
following the careers of individual commanders. Through this another picture 
emerges. There were vast differences in how DDR impacted particular commanders. 
Programmes deepened the pattern of political exclusion in place since 2001. 
Generally this caused a great increase in violence and instability and even played a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  636	  Barnett and Zuercher, “The Peacebuilders Contract”. Antonio Giustozzi, 
“Bureaucratic Façade and Political Realities of Disarmament and Demobilisation,” in 
Reintegrating Armed Groups After Conflict; Politics, Violence and Transition, ed. 
Mats Berdal and David H. Ucko (Abingdon/New York: Routledge, 2009), 79, 83.	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major role in the growing insurgency after 2005. DDR not only reflected but also 
deepened an exclusionary and predatory political order, which was shaped both by the 
international military campaign against the Taliban and by local allies using this 
narrative to advance the interests of their militarised patronage networks to the 
exclusion of others.  	  
6.2.1. Armed strongmen compete for government positions 
 
To assess the impact of DDR on the ground, the provincial case studies examined 
how the international agenda in Afghanistan played into local politics. Crucially, 
internationals and locals had radically different perceptions of the local political 
landscapes. The international narrative was shaped by the U.S.-led 2001 intervention, 
dividing the political landscape in allies and enemies. After the ousting of the Taliban 
regime the allies became ‘the government’ and the enemies ‘the insurgents’. In this 
post 9/11 War on Terror narrative there were thus only two camps: a democratically-
elected government on one side and religious extremist insurgents on the other. The 
ideological dividing line implied that loyalties were more or less a given.  
 
Afghans, by contrast, saw a very different landscape, with a multitude of 
powerbrokers struggling for control; struggles that in some cases originated centuries 
back but that had turned especially violent in the past decades of war and now entered 
a new phase in the age of the War on Terror. These struggles reflected the many 
divisions in Afghanistan: along ethnic, tribal or sub-tribal, or religious lines; or 
between different regional and provincial warlords and strongmen. They showed 
tensions between tribal and religious codes of conduct and between urban centres and 
the countryside. These divisions played out on every level, from Kabul to small 
remote villages in Uruzgan. They intersected with global political developments, from 
British-Russian tensions in the 19th century to the Cold War in the 20th century and to 
the U.S. response to 9/11 in the 21st century. Resources provided by external donors 
to local allies fuelled divisions, tipping power struggles in one direction or the other.  
 
Most Afghans, especially in the countryside, navigated this landscape by relying on 
patronage from power brokers higher up the food chain. Links could be forged along 
ethnic or tribal lines, or could be based on origins in the same village or having fought 
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in the same jihadi group. They were, however, rarely fixed. Clients tended to 
approach these links entrepreneurially, moving from one patron to another, depending 
on who could provide the best resources, whether financing, access to positions in the 
government or security forces, weapons or protection.  
 
From this perspective the international intervention in 2001, just like previous 
international involvement in Afghanistan, offered enormous opportunity for patronage 
– but on an unprecedented scale. Power brokers at all levels, national, regional and 
local, jockeyed for a piece of the pie. The two main ways to obtain resources were 
through direct international funding (for example militias fighting the Taliban) or 
through a position in the internationally-funded government.  
 
Locals could however only access these resources by playing into the War on Terror’s 
international narrative and manipulating it for their own ends. They presented 
themselves as loyal allies against the ideologically-driven Taliban enemy.637 Their 
foreign allies did not understand that their loyalty was conditioned on continued 
international resources. From the Afghans’ perspective, however, this was implied in 
patron-client relationships. Relationships were fluid and a client could approach 
another patron at any time, if there was a better deal on offer. 
 
The provincial strongmen featured in this thesis illustrate this dynamic. Like their 
counter parts elsewhere, they aimed to win government positions after the 2001 
ousting of the Taliban. They were partly motivated by the immediate gains of 
capturing a share of the international resources flowing through the state, which could 
be used to rebuild patronage networks, particularly for the many of them that had 
been in exile. Partly they were motivated by the possibility such a position offered to 
stake a claim to long-term inclusion in the post-2001 political and military order. My 
findings support the assertion – outlined in the introduction – that Afghan 
powerbrokers are focused on inserting their militarised patronage networks into the 
state. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  637	   See also on this dynamic Mike Martin’s excellent account of the history of 
Helmand province, An Intimate War.	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Not only Jan Mohammad in Uruzgan, but also Mir Alam in Kunduz, Amir Gul in 
Baghlan and Malem Mir Wali in Helmand elbowed their way into government 
appointments; the first as provincial governor under the patronage of President Karzai 
and the others as commanders in the AMF under the patronage of Defense Minister 
Fahim. Their respective positions offered them prestige, protection (both physical and 
of their illegal business ventures), easier access to international contracts and a way to 
distribute patronage to followers. Access to weapons and retaining the option of 
mobilising armed men was key, even though violence was rarely used openly. It was 
by virtue of maintaining the threat of violence that strongmen could retain power and 
avoid challenges from rivals.  
 
Having presented themselves as loyal allies against the Taliban, strongmen also 
manipulated the international narrative to exclude weaker personal rivals from the 
government. They denounced competitors as Taliban, regardless of whether they had 
been or not. International troops often acted on their intelligence. Countless examples 
illustrate that many wrong people were arrested, with some sent to Guantanamo, or 
bombed.  
 
In other cases, strongmen pursued rivals themselves, often justifying that by labelling 
them as Taliban who still had weapons and had to be ‘disarmed’. These rounds of 
informal disarmament were often accompanied by harassment and even killings. But 
international support meant that strongmen operated with impunity. Provincial 
administrations became exclusionary and predatory, serving only a few powerbrokers 
and their followers, while making life increasingly difficult for the rest. 
Unsurprisingly, many of those targeted for ‘disarmament’ in these early years, joined 
Taliban leaders who were reorganising their movement across the border after 2004. 
Those joining up included many who had not supported the Taliban before 2001, 
illustrating the fluidity of loyalties.  
 
Connections to the new Kabul government and to the international troops were key. 
The first years after 2001 led to the exclusion of those with the weakest ties by those 
who were best connected. In the northeast, Pashtun communities lost out. They had 
been favoured by the Taliban regime and opposed by non-Pashtun powerbrokers. The 
latter now used their ties to Panjshiri patrons in Kabul to gain positions in the 
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provincial administration. Pashtuns were cast as ‘Taliban’. In the southwest the same 
was true for some sub-tribes and clans.  
 
6.2.2. Demobilised strongmen become spoilers 
 
As described above, in a first phase of the international intervention (fall and winter 
2001/2002) local political landscapes were divided into ‘allies’ and ‘enemies’, while 
in a second phase (2002) respective positions were consolidated as ‘government’ and 
‘terrorists’ (later called ‘insurgents’). The first DDR programme, starting in 2003, 
marked a third phase, namely of state building. This envisaged, in the security sector, 
militias making way for a new and professionally trained army untainted by jihadi 
allegiances.   
 
On paper it looked like a natural next step. The previous government had been 
overthrown and in its wake a collapsed state needed to be constructed. The U.S.-led 
coalition overthrowing the Taliban regime had not planned for ‘the day after’. The 
liberal state building agenda that had dominated recent international interventions 
elsewhere filled the vacuum. In Kabul, international and Afghan officials discussed 
‘transitional justice’; ‘security sector reform’ and ‘disarmament, demobilisation and 
reintegration programmes’.   
 
The reality in the provinces was different, both from the perspective of international 
troops and that of their Afghan allies. The military campaign and its narrative of the 
fight against the Taliban continued to dominate the international troops’ agenda. State 
building imperatives, such as demobilising non-state armed actors, received much 
shorter shrift. Naturally, their local allies had little incentive to demobilise. If 
anything, they were determined to keep their weapons and government positions, as 
they saw their rivals remain armed.    
 
From the international perspective, by 2003 the needs of the military campaign had 
shifted, however.  After the Taliban’s defeat, its opponents – Northern Alliance 
commanders – in Kunduz and Baghlan had outlasted their original military purpose. 
In Helmand and Uruzgan the situation was different. The hunt for ‘remnants of the 
Taliban and al-Qaeda’ continued, with local strongmen and their militias needed for 
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military operations. Yet as the U.S. had delayed the initiation of DDR to 2004 there 
had to be some form of compliance with the programme, including in the southwest.   
 
International military moved militias they could still use from the AMF to the 
irregular Afghan Security Guards, Highway Police or elsewhere. Those no longer 
useful could stay in the AMF and face DDR. In the northeast that meant most of the 
international forces’ local allies from the 2001 intervention were given up for DDR, 
whereas in the southwest only some had to enter the programme.  
 
In these early years, to avoid DDR through international military support local allies 
had to keep manipulating the narrative of the fight against the Taliban. In Uruzgan, 
AMF sub-commander Matiullah’s family ties with strongman governor Jan 
Mohammad, who international troops saw as the main bulwark against the enemy, 
were crucial in his becoming Highway Police commander. In Helmand Haji Kaduz 
positioned himself to aid international troops in their hunt for Taliban. Naturally it 
was easier to adopt this strategy in the Taliban heartland of the southwest than in the 
northeast, where by 2003 AMF militias were openly fighting each other and were 
seen as the main security problem.  
 
Connections to patrons in Kabul offered another way of politically and militarily 
surviving DDR, either through an appointment in the police or in the civilian 
administrations. 6th Corps commander General Daud Daud obtained an attractive 
position in the Ministry of Interior as deputy minister for counter narcotics. In 
Baghlan 20th division commander Mustafa Mohseni became Logar police chief.  
 
In short, connections to international troops and national government patrons were 
again critical for local powerbrokers to survive DDR with their influence and – in 
many cases – their militias, intact. Those that had strong connections even profited as 
their less well-connected rivals were demobilised. In Uruzgan Jan Mohammad saw 
his position strengthened by the demobilisation of his Barakzai rivals. In Helmand 
Sher Mohammad Akhunzada and Haji Kaduz profited from Malem Mir Wali’s 
demobilisation. In the northeast General Daud Daud’s rival Mir Alam was 
demobilised. Although demobilisation as such did not mean much – everyone 
retained weapons and ties to armed men or militias – the loss of a government 
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position severely undermined the ability of those targeted to dispend patronage. 
Without resources it was difficult to mobilise men, who would seek another 
paymaster.   
 
Much like the informal, disarmament rounds in 2001, the first official DDR 
programme strengthened those with strong ties to patrons in Kabul and international 
forces, and excluded those who did not. It deepened the pattern of political exclusion 
set in motion by the military campaign that was characterised by an international 
narrative of the fight against the Taliban and local allies’ manipulation of that 
narrative to exclude personal rivals in decades-old power struggles.  
 
Around 2005, when the DIAG programme started, alliances between international 
troops and local allies shifted again in the southwest. The deployment of non-U.S. 
forces to Helmand and Uruzgan was conditioned on the removal of local strongmen 
from their positions. Moreover, SOF had started to realise that these strongmen, 
despite positioning themselves as bulwarks against the Taliban, actually behaved in 
ways that made them part of the problem. In Uruzgan Jan Mohammad was fired, as 
was Helmand governor Sher Mohammad Akhunzada and police chief Abdul Rahman 
Jan. Helmandi National Security Directorate Chief Dad Mohammad demobilised 
under DIAG so as to take part in the 2005 parliamentary elections. The removal of 
strongmen from provincial politics (some of whom were appointed in the national 
government) broke some of the strongest patronage relationships that had been 
established between international troops and local allies after 2001.  
 
After demobilising under DDR or DIAG programmes or being fired from a position 
in the provincial government, erstwhile local allies started looking elsewhere for 
paymasters and protectors to compensate for the loss of international patronage – in 
keeping with a tradition of fluid relationships that was well understood by Afghans 
but not by Westerners. The Taliban leadership in Pakistan offered an alternative. 
Some men completely switched sides but most hedged their bets and kept ties on both 
sides. This was especially true for strongmen who were still solidly supported by 
patrons in the Kabul government.  
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Different motivations played a role at different levels. For the rank-and-file it was 
often about keeping a job and an income, or about following a commander who had 
decided it was time to find a new paymaster. For district-level commanders the loss of 
prestige and the need to keep opium interests and other illegal business ventures 
protected were often important. For provincial-level strongmen strategic 
considerations came into play. If their provinces were destabilised, international 
troops would have no other choice than to seek their support anew.  
 
Interestingly, the shift of allegiances that took place in these years, partly as a result of 
DDR programmes, did not challenge the international narrative. On the contrary, 
Afghan allies again used that narrative to their advantage, strengthening it in the 
process. If Taliban were what international troops wanted, then Taliban they would 
get. In previous stages local allies had branded their rivals ‘Taliban’, but now the 
former allies who had been cast aside, either through DDR programmes or because 
their dismissal had been requested by non-U.S. NATO members, started operating 
under that flag themselves or helping those who did.  
 
The strongmen’s strategy, based on long experience in dealing with national and 
international patrons, was successful. As ‘the Taliban’ grew in the southwest after 
2005 and in the northeast after 2007, so did the international troops’ desire to fund 
irregular militias to counter them, including through the semi-formal ALP 
programme. In Kunduz Mir Alam made a successful come back, as did Amir Gul in 
Baghlan and Malem Mir Wali in Helmand (even if, in the case of Mir Wali, behind 
the scenes). In Uruzgan, where Matiullah had outmanoeuvred his uncle Jan 
Mohammed, he profited immensely from the Taliban making inroads into Uruzgan.  
 
In the years since the removal of some strongmen from their provincial government 
positions, through DDR, DIAG and ad-hoc firings, more professionally trained 
government officials without jihadi backgrounds had been appointed from outside the 
provinces. Without local clout they were, however, still beholden to the old jihadi 
establishment, part of which had moved into the national government (for example 
Jan Mohammad, Sher Mohammad Akhunzada and General Daud Daud) and part of 
which operated underground (those with weaker connections such as Mir Alam and 
Amir Gul).  
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The new official, semi-official and irregular militia initiatives that sprang up after the 
insurgency spread across Afghanistan after 2008 proved to be an enormous boon for 
this old establishment. The establishment had more resources than at any time since 
the 2001 intervention to hunt down rivals by labelling them Taliban, especially in the 
northeast. Strongmen even profited from the well-funded Taliban reintegration 
programme APRP, as the example of Sher Mohammad Akhunzada in Helmand 
shows.  
  
This meant that even if provincial administrations in some cases appeared slightly 
more inclusive, in reality local politics became more exclusionary, further deepening 
the pattern of political exclusion set in motion by the military campaign against the 
Taliban. Unsurprisingly, while ‘Taliban’ were beaten back temporarily in many 
places – partly because strongmen’s followers switched sides again and started 
operating as part of the anti-Taliban militias – they returned in larger numbers once 
the ANP, ANA and militias retreated.  
 
To summarise the above, neither the international military operating in provinces nor 
their local allies, nor their patrons in Kabul, had much interest in demobilising militias 
under internationally-funded DDR programmes. The use of specific militias for 
international troops however shifted along with changes in the military campaign 
against the Taliban. From the international perspective local allies who were no 
longer useful could be demobilised. This policy however did not take into account the 
fact that discarded allies unable to compensate for the loss of international patronage 
with support from patrons in Kabul, would look towards the insurgency for resources. 
Provincial strongmen in many cases combined support from patrons in Kabul with 
ties to the insurgency, so as to deliberately destabilise what they considered as ‘their’ 
areas, leaving international troops no choice but to ask them back.  
 
This illustrates the superficiality of the War on Terror narrative, which drew a line in 
the sand between the government and the Taliban in what was in fact a fragmented 
and crowded political landscape. To some extent these two camps gradually became a 
reality as the U.S. and its allies funded ‘the government’ and other countries and 
private donors who opposed the new Afghan government started funding Taliban 
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leaders in Pakistan. Afghan powerbrokers pursuing U.S. resources flowing in after 
2001, and resources offered by the Taliban leadership in Pakistan after 2004, 
strengthened these two power centres. Just below the surface, of course, the two 
“camps” comprised many different factions or patronage networks that forever shifted 
in strength as the sources of and access to resources changed.  
 
This meant, paradoxically, that while the international narrative of the two camps – a 
democratically elected and foreign backed government being challenged by a 
religious extremist Taliban insurgency – became reality in the sense that Afghan 
powerbrokers flocked to the resources that the respective camps offered, the exact 
opposite was also true. To hedge against resources in one camp drying up it was 
necessary to have a foot in both camps. Ties between the two camps often ran along 
the traditional lines of kinship, coming from the same village or having a shared 
battlefield experience, and could be strengthened or loosened according to 
circumstances. DDR programmes played a key role, even if only in a psychological 
sense, in ensuring that no one put all his eggs in one basket. International military 
troops, by trying to demobilise those who were no longer deemed useful in the fight 
against the Taliban, alienated their clients and created more armed resistance.   
 
6.3. Impact of DDR on state formation 
 
The last question to be addressed here is how the local impact of DDR programmes in 
turn influenced state formation; a long-running project that after 2001 became heavily 
interlinked with the international project in Afghanistan. The conventional wisdom on 
DDR as a function of state building is that by demobilising warlords, insurgents and 
other non-state armed actors, or integrating them into state security forces, it helps 
them become invested in the state, deals with potential spoilers, strengthens state 
institutions and gives the state a monopoly on the use of armed force.  How did DDR 
as a function of a military campaign against the Taliban impact state formation in 
Afghanistan?  
 
Among the main challenges to the Afghan state in the period this study covers was the 
insurgency, which grew stronger over time. As discussed above, those excluded from 
the post-2001 political order tended to become spoilers and perpetrate anti-
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government violence whereas powerbrokers included in that order had an interest in 
supporting it. Inclusion or exclusion was partly managed through DDR programmes. 
 
Those included were not, however, necessarily state builders, just as those excluded 
did not always become Taliban. Many powerbrokers included in the government 
ended up preying on and excluding rivals and their communities, generating local 
support for the insurgency, and thus indirectly undermining the state. In Uruzgan 
DDR for example strengthened the hand of governor Jan Mohammad, who played a 
major part in triggering the violence that soon engulfed his province. Nor did many of 
those excluded from government end up with the insurgency, but instead chose to 
operate in pro-government militias. In Kunduz, for example, after the growth of the 
insurgency in 2008, strongman Mir Alam mobilised men to fight the Taliban, even 
though he had no official position.  
 
My findings suggest that a key factor in motivating sub-national actors was the level 
of support by Kabul political factions or international troops; a factor that DDR 
programmes reflected in their impact on particular powerbrokers. High levels of 
outside support, though they could nominally tie powerbrokers to the state, tended to 
be detrimental for state formation in that they removed incentives for them to bargain 
with the local population and win their support. This was the case both for those who 
had government positions and those who commanded pro-government militias.  
 
Jan Mohammad in Uruzgan and Sher Mohammad Akhundzada in Helmand were 
close allies of President Karzai, who consistently backed them. In addition, SOF were 
still active in this area and supported both governors’ militias. In Helmand they also 
supported the militia of Malem Mir Wali, the commander of the 93rd Division. It is no 
coincidence that these men established highly predatory and exclusionary local 
political orders, which were soon challenged by the insurgency: both operated in a 
framework determined by outsiders and disconnected from the local population’s 
wishes and needs.  
 
After the ousting of the Taliban regime many Afghans hoped for law and order and 
predictable dispute resolution. International actors, however, focused on fight against 
the Taliban. Allied local strongmen exploited this agenda to eliminate personal rivals. 
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Political factions in Kabul sought to strengthen only their own patronage networks, 
which the strongmen again used to get rid of competitors. As a result, the strongmen 
obtained capital and had coercive power but their local support was limited – because 
they were not forced to win local communities over – and their local administrations 
were soon challenged by a growing insurgency. 
 
Armed powerbrokers who were excluded from the government and who did not want 
to demobilise faced the choice of continuing to operate as pro-government militia 
commanders or to join the insurgency. Again, a key factor in considerations of sub-
national actors was the level of support from political factions in Kabul and from 
international forces. Mir Alam is a good example of someone who profited from both 
sources of external support – government and foreign troops – when he expanded his 
militia around 2008.  
 
His reliance of outside support meant, however, that his militia did not contribute to 
state building. Because of outside backing for Mir Alam’s militias, villagers were 
unable to negotiate with them and the armed men could prey on locals with impunity. 
Their predation – including illegal taxation, kidnapping, rape and killings, the general 
violence generated by their presence and fighting with other militias about the right to 
tax communities, as well as the lack of options for legal redress for the villagers in the 
face of political backing for the militias from Kabul officials – resulted in increasing 
local support for the insurgency.  
 
In his book on the making of national states in Europe between 990 and 1992, Charles 
Tilly writes that capital and coercion were key factors, which included the 
disarmament of the local population and the creation of a standing army under 
government control. However, these elements, capital and coercion, only led to the 
formation of national states because the state was forced to bargain with its citizens to 
draw resources from them to wage wars. The monopolisation of armed force could 
only happen through the monopolisation of taxation, which necessitated bargaining 
with citizens. Credit, including from bankers abroad, also played a role.638 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  638	  Tilly, Coercion, Capital, 85, 86. 
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The play of alliances and the attempt to draw resources from relatively 
powerful or mobile actors promoted the state’s involvement in protection, 
checking the competitors and enemies of selected clients. As extraction and 
protection expanded, they created demands for adjudication of disputes within 
the subject population, including the legal regularization of both extraction 
and protection themselves. Over time, the weight and impact of state activities 
... – adjudication, production, and distribution – grew faster than those at the 
top: warmaking, statemaking, extraction, and protection.639  
 
 
States’ pursuit of war and military capacity, ‘after having created national states as a 
sort of by-product’, paradoxically ended up creating predominantly civilian 
governments in Europe. Tilly himself already noted that this was not a standard 
trajectory and pointed to the external imposition of army models, aid and training in 
the ‘Third World’ as a key factor changing the outcome there, and increasing 
instability.640 
 
Where the ability or rulers to draw revenues from commodity exports or from 
great-power military aid has allowed them to bypass bargaining with their 
subject populations, large state edifices have grown up in the absence of 
significant consent or support from citizens. Lacking strong ties between 
particular state institutions and major social classes within the population, 
those states have become more vulnerable to forcible seizures of power and 
abrupt changes in the form of government.641 
 
 
Since Tilly’s book, much research has examined the distortionary influence of 
external ‘rent’ on state formation.642 Barnett Rubin and Astri Suhrke examined the 
topic in the context of state formation in Afghanistan. Rubin argues that from the time 
Afghanistan entered the international state system after the second Anglo-Afghan 
War (1878-1870) the consolidation of the central state depended on foreign aid. This 
meant that ‘the old regime was hardly accountable to the state’s citizens: there was 
little taxation and little representation’. It focused on expansion of the state and on 
redistributing resources to clients. Social and economic integration remained low, and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  639	  Tilly, Coercion, Capital, 97.  640	  Tilly, Coercion, Capital, 122, 206.	  	  
641 Tilly, Coercion, Capital, 207, 208.  642	  See, for example, Deborah A. Bräutigam and Stephen Knack, “Foreign Aid, 
Institutions, and Governance in Sub-Saharan Africa,” Economic Development and 
Cultural Change 52:2 (January 2004): 255-285.  
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social structures in Afghanistan ‘are local and based on kinship or religious 
distinctions’.643 
 
Suhrke examined the impact of aid on the post-2001 international state building 
project, for which, according to her, the key pillars were coercion, capital and 
legitimacy. Of these pillars legitimacy, or ‘the enhanced power of rulers to access 
[coercion and capital] by appearing as legitimate’, was seen as ‘particularly valuable 
because it facilitates non-coercive compliance by generating normative support’. 
Suhrke argues that the fact that the ample capital and armed force was supplied by 
external powers, however, created a deficit of legitimacy.644 
 
This study confirms that the post-2001 Afghan state lacked legitimacy, though not 
primarily as a result of international state building efforts but as a result of the 
military campaign against the Taliban (in which state building efforts such as DDR 
played a key role). The continuous flow of foreign funds to officials, who used those 
funds to pursue personal goals through the externally imposed anti-Taliban agenda, 
alienated the population from the government in the provinces. This alienation 
generated local support for an insurgency that became the main challenge to the state, 
and to attempts to control the means of coercion.   
 
As foreign powers began to perceive the Afghan state as failing in establishing 
legitimacy, around 2008 their rhetoric moved away from focusing on strengthening 
state institutions to strengthening informal actors. They funded new militia 
programmes such as the ALP and attempted to foster informal justice initiatives. In 
academic and policy-oriented literature, there was a parallel shift around the same 
time to a revalorisation of informal actors and bottom-up initiatives as opposed to the 
state-centric and top-down state building agenda.645 
 
This study argues that these international initiatives to support informal actors, 
initiatives that in reality had existed since the ousting of the Taliban regime, suffered 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  643	  Barnett Rubin, “Rentier State Building, Rentier State Wrecking,” International 
Journal of Middle East Studies 24:1 (1992), 79, 82.	  	  644	  Suhrke, When More is Less, 118, 148, 154. 	  645	  Goodhand and Hakimi, “Rethinking Liberal Peace Building,” 243.  
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from the same problems as foreign-funded initiatives to strengthen the state. Informal 
powerbrokers were accountable to the external donors that paid them, not to the local 
population. Though in the distant past informal actors such as tribal leaders in the 
south and khans in the north may have had much local legitimacy (a history that 
international actors eagerly seized on to legitimise their ‘bottom-up’ initiatives), they 
owed this to the fact that they were primarily accountable to their communities. The 
decades of externally-funded war had produced different types of local leaders, men 
who were focused on capturing external revenue, and who could enforce their will on 
their communities. Local councils such as the jirga and shura, were no longer 
platforms for establishing consensus, but served to add a superficial layer of 
legitimacy to strongmen’s decisions. The massive post-2001 flow of external funds to 
these strongmen resulted in their violent suppression of dissent and in widespread 
resistance against them.   
 
The legacy for state formation of DDR programmes, which were one of the 
mechanisms through which outside support to particular groups was given or 
withheld, is thus highly problematic. Many of those who lost their government 
position due to DDR began to operate against the state. But those who were well-
connected and thus moved into attractive government posts and saw their positions 
strengthened because rivals were disarmed, or profited from resources that DDR 
programmes such as the APRP generated, also did not help to strengthen the state. On 
the contrary, they used the state’s resources to distribute patronage to followers while 
excluding rivals and even persecuting them as part of the international military 
campaign; actions that contributed to the growing insurgency.  
 
In sum, local powerbrokers’ reliance on the international rent, whether through the 
Afghan state or directly, combined with foreign troops’ support, provided them with 
capital and the means of coercion. But it undermined their legitimacy as it took away 
the need to bargain with the local population. This inherently distortionary quality of 
international rent, access to which was partly regulated through DDR programmes, 
was aggravated by the fact that most foreign funds were spent on a military campaign 
against the Taliban; a campaign that local partners used to establish predatory and 
exclusionary provincial administrations. As the state could neither suppress excluded 
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groups nor was willing to accommodate them, many turned to the insurgency, which 
became the main challenge to strengthening the central state.  
 
It is not surprising that today the foreign military involvement in Afghanistan – with 
local alliances managed partly through DDR programmes – seems to have become an 
important point of contention between the government and the Taliban. The side that 
profits from having foreign troops in Afghanistan wants to keep them; the side that 
has suffered as a result of it wants them out. Formal and informal talks between the 
two sides are stranded partly due to differences on this point; differences that seem 
unbridgeable.646  
 
It was not always so. Anand Gopal points to the fact that in 2001 Taliban leaders were 
initially not against the Karzai government and the presence of foreign troops and 
(apart from Mullah Omar) were willing to negotiate a deal (surrender and 
disarmament in return for amnesty). It was the behaviour of the new leaders – who 
abused former Taliban under the pretext of disarmament – and foreign troops that 
turned Taliban leaders against foreign involvement. The Taliban regime in the 1990s, 
for example, though it did not request the presence of foreign troops, did actively seek 
foreign aid.647  
 
Thus the real issue between the two sides revolves not around ideological differences 
on the involvement of ‘infidels’ in Afghanistan. Instead it hinges, at least partly, 
around the uneven access to foreign support, including funds; funds that to a large 
extent are contingent on having foreign troops present. This is not to say that the 
Taliban will now suddenly accept foreign military involvement if they can benefit 
from it – their harsh rhetoric against foreign occupiers would make that difficult – but 
at its core the conflict is about political not ideological differences.  
 
As mentioned in the introduction, Mats Berdal points to the importance of a political 
settlement that takes into account the formal and informal distribution of ‘power, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  646	  Borhan Osman and Anand Gopal, “Taliban Views on a Future State,” Center on 
International Cooperation, July 2016.	  	  647	  Gopal, “The Taliban in Kandahar”.	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influence and resources within society’.648 This study wholeheartedly supports this 
assessment. Its main focus, however, is different. Berdal and others critique the state 
building approach that focuses on strengthening state institutions and formal actors. 
They argue that in weak states like Afghanistan, instead, there should be much more 
attention to informal actors. The findings in this study – which does not cover the 
whole state building effort like Berdal, Suhrke and other authors, but nevertheless 
examined in depth an important component of it, namely DDR – support the notion 
that foreign donors should pay more attention to informal actors, or formal actors that 
also have much informal influence, as they often hold the real power. At the same 
time, these informal actors often suffer from the same lack of legitimacy as the state.  
 
What is critical, this study contends, is that political settlements in weak states are 
inclusive. The Afghan state never had a choice but to balance between different 
armed groups, since it has lacked both strong and credible state institutions and the 
state-supporting institutions of civil society that could provide alternative sources of 
authority to local leaders, as well as the armed forces to crush opponents. This means 
that it has to find a way to accommodate the main militarised patronage networks, 
which, in Afghanistan, includes the Taliban – even though accommodating them may 
carry risks, including for democracy, as Marissa Quie and others argue. 649. 
International actors viewing groups like the Taliban as irreconcilable and continuing 
the military campaign against them without a broader political strategy geared 
towards an inclusive settlement will only generate more violence against the state.  
 
The Taliban, just as many other armed groups labelled as ‘terrorist’ or ‘violent 
extremist’ would not be able to operate without significant local support and without 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  648	  Berdal, “Afghanistan and After” in Rethinking State Fragility, 12.  649	  This study examines the issue of inclusivity from the viewpoint of how to advance 
demilitarisation. Many in Afghanistan and outside are, however, concerned that 
including Taliban in the government will negatively affect democratic politics (see, 
for example Marissa Quie’s insightful study on the Afghanistan Peace and 
Reintegration Programme, Quie, “Peacebuilding and Democracy Promotion”). This 
study has not explored the Taliban’s stance towards democratic politics, but other 
authors have done so – recently for example Osman and Gopal (Osman and Gopal, 
“Taliban Views”). The case studies show, however, that many of those currently in 
the government are unfortunately not necessarily more democratically minded than 
the Taliban (though they may hold more liberal views regarding women’s rights and 
the implementation of Sharia law). 	  	  	  
© Linde Dorien Derksen 2017  258	  
help from regional powers. In analysing the insurgency that currently challenges 
Afghan state building, this study focuses on local support. It argues that the political 
exclusion of major communities in Afghanistan after 2001 has made them turn 
towards the insurgency for protection, prestige and profit. This dynamic can also be 
observed in other parts of the world, and should remind international actors 
intervening in weak states that political accommodation is key.  
 
6.4. The future of DDR in Afghanistan 
 
Between 2001 and 2014 – the period that this study covers – DDR was, on paper, part 
of the international state building project; in reality, however, it was used to further 
the military campaign against the Taliban. DDR programmes were utilised to regulate 
access to foreign funds and support, by aiming to demobilise some armed groups, 
while at the same time others were armed. This meant that it was an uneven process, 
targeting different groups in different ways and at different times. As commanders 
knew that rivals remained armed, and felt unjustly targeted, they resisted disarmament 
and, instead, sought new paymasters to expand their armed groups. 
 
DDR is now a tainted concept in Afghanistan. At the same time, the current level of 
militarisation will make it difficult to forge a sustainable peace. Even if real 
demilitarisation will not happen for many years, and possibly never fully, a political 
settlement – however distant the prospect for one including the Taliban currently 
appears – will need to address the issue of demilitarisation, even if indirectly. 
 
The primary way it can do so is by being inclusive. Second, though, any provisions on 
demobilisation should be framed in a manner acceptable to the main militarised 
patronage networks. Armed groups should not have to demobilise before their rivals. 
This would be a departure from previous approaches. Opportunities to integrate into 
the national and subnational government, or to keep government posts – the main aim 
of militarised patronage networks – could be conditioned on demobilisation of non-
state armed groups (including state-sanctioned militias). The security forces, which 
could at first be kept at maximum capacity so as to serve as a reintegration vehicle, 
would likely have to be reorganised to include groups that have previously been 
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excluded. Integration should to the degree possible happen individually instead of 
collectively, so as to break patronage networks that could split the army in the future.  
 
This study shows that demobilisation can happen fast in Afghanistan, but that 
remobilisation can happen just as fast. Even if affiliations are never static, 
powerbrokers retain connections to their former fighters, also in peacetime. Some 
connections run along tribal lines, others are based on shared time in the trenches – 
during the mujahedeen era, years of Taliban rule or post-2001 fighting – on village 
ties or, most often, on some combination of these. In times of need, or when there is a 
new paymaster, former fighters can be quickly gathered for another fight.  
 
At the same time, my research findings show that when powerbrokers integrate into 
the government and feel their interests are better served in the civilian rather than 
military sphere, these connections can weaken over time. This also means that 
especially mid-level commanders with few connections to political patrons in Kabul 
and no experience off the battlefield will feel threatened and need to be taken care of, 
probably by integrating them in the army or the police. If demilitarisation ever 
happens in Afghanistan, it will be a long process, which will depend on political 
inclusivity – giving enough people a stake in the state.   
 
6.5. How the Afghan DDR experience can inform future demilitarisation 
elsewhere 
 
While this thesis aims to contribute to the debate on how to eventually demilitarise 
Afghanistan, it can also inform DDR elsewhere. Of course, extracting from a 
particular situation general rules that are then applied more broadly, in radically 
different settings, requires caution. The Afghan DDR experience is a case in point: 
programmes, especially the first one, were modelled on DDR experiences from Africa 
in the 1990s. This was problematic because not only were the interests of foreign 
donors, the nature of armed groups and the global and normative environments 
radically different, but also DDR in the way it had been applied in Africa in the 1990s 
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had already been a case of ‘doctrinal stretching’.650 Nor had lessons learned from 
Africa in the 1990s necessarily been the right ones, even there.  
 
That said, DDR in Afghanistan does offer lessons that might serve as a starting point 
for a new debate on demilitarisation in war-torn states. This debate may seem remote 
from the wars now raging across the Middle East and North Africa, but it will at some 
point become relevant in that region, as current levels of armament there are as are 
unsustainable for long-term peace as those in Afghanistan. A debate on 
demilitarisation in war-torn countries might even help force a rethink of the DDR 
concept laid out in documents such as the IDDRS.   
 
My overarching finding is that DDR is shaped by the main contours of the political 
context in which it is initiated and, in turn, deepens them. The current DDR concept, 
as laid out in the IDDRS, harks back to the European experience of demobilising 
conventional armies after inter-state wars. Then in the 1990s DDR programmes took 
place mostly after peace agreements between warring parties in African, Latin 
American and Asian civil wars. While programmes suffered many flaws, if done well 
they offered a way to reinforce the new peace by disarming and demobilising 
potential spoilers and by offering them alternative employment.  
 
But times have changed. The recent peace agreement between the FARC (Fuerzas 
Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia or Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) 
rebels and the Colombian government, which contains provisions on DDR, nowadays 
seems the exception rather than the rule. More often today DDR programmes are 
initiated in the midst of wars with no end in sight – witness those in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo, Iraq, Libya, Mali, Somalia and the Sudans as well as Afghanistan. 
In these countries, DDR in effect means that armed groups are asked to lay down their 
weapons while fighting continues, or while there is a major risk that it will resume. 
This is a radically new environment for DDR.  
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  ‘[T]he creation of distortions by applying an aspect of doctrine developed in a 
specific historical and organizational set-up to new contexts’. Mutengesa, “Facile 
Acronyms”. Berdal and Ucko, “Introduction – The political reintegration,” 2, 3, 8. 	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In this environment – DDR programmes in the context of continued war – those 
programmes that have proven particularly problematic are those taking place in places 
where political exclusion is severe, for example in those countries on the sharp end of 
the war on terror – Afghanistan, of course, but also Iraq, Somalia and, to some degree, 
Libya. As the Afghan example shows, local allies of international forces can exploit 
foreign funded DDR programmes to rid themselves of rivals – deepening the existing 
pattern of political exclusion. Understandably those targeted resist disarmament, and 
will try to find alternative ways to defend themselves and remain armed, including by 
joining anti-government forces. In this way, DDR – used to strengthen those winning 
and demobilise those losing – promotes not peace, as some foreign donors expect, but 
war. This study shows that the first Afghan DDR programme after the ousting of the 
Taliban regime, despite on paper pursuing the laudable goal of demobilising warlords, 
played a major role in driving the insurgency in the mid-2000s.  
 
Many of the war-ravaged states in which DDR now takes place are too weak to 
permanently exclude large groups without international support (and the recent 
advances of the Taliban, the Islamic State and al-Shabaab show that even with foreign 
support it is difficult). These states are unlikely any time soon to enjoy a monopoly on 
the use of armed force. Some have traditionally always negotiated with armed groups 
in their peripheries.  
 
To survive they will have to accommodate all the main militarised patronage 
networks on their territory, including those labelled as ‘terrorist’ or ‘violent 
extremist’. These networks will not easily give up their ability to defend themselves 
and pursue their interests by force. At the same time most still tend to want a stake in 
the state, for the access to resources this offers and to be able to expend formal and 
informal power. This provides a bargaining chip for the state; a possibility to request 
demobilisation. International policymakers supporting weak states would thus be 
wiser to err on the side of political inclusivity rather than an agenda of war against 
certain groups and their permanent political exclusion. Only then is there a chance of 
demilitarisation.  
 
DDR, in other words, needs to be supporting and supported by the creation of an 
inclusive political order.  
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ANNEX 1 – Interviewees 	  
 
Below are general descriptions of interviewees (who are anonymous for a variety of 
reasons, including security considerations and institutional restrictions on officials 
and former officials). They are categorised by province (Kunduz, Baghlan, Uruzgan, 
Helmand and Kabul) and nationality (Afghan and non-Afghan). Also included is the 
ethnicity of Afghan interviewees in the northeast and their tribal affiliation in the 




001 Former 54th Division commander in Kunduz (Tajik).  
002 ALP official (Pashtun).  
003 Member of the Lower House of the Wolesi Jirga from Kunduz (Pashtun).  
004 Former national government official from Kunduz (in Karzai administration 
2004-2009) (Pashtun). 
005 Local Pashtun powerbroker and militia commander in Khanabad.  
006 ALP commander in Aliabad district.  
007 Former 54th Division commander in Kunduz (Tajik). 
008 Former high-ranking provincial official in Karzai administration 2009-2014.  
009 Tribal elder from Kanam village near Kunduz City (Pashtun).   
010 DIAG official operating in northern Afghanistan.  
011 Independent Directorate of Local Governance official from Kunduz province.  
012 Ministry of Interior official from Kunduz (Pashtun).  
013 Tribal elder from Kunduz province (Pashtun).  
014 Inhabitant of Hazrat-e-Sultan village near Kunduz city (Pashtun).  
015 Inhabitant from Aleke Kanam village near Kunduz city (Pashtun).   
016 Former 54th commander and jihadi commander from Chahardara district (Tajik).  
017 High-ranking provincial official (Pashtun).    
018 APRP official in Kunduz.  
019 High-ranking official in national government from Imam Saheb (Uzbek).  
020 ALP commander in Aliabad (Pashtun).  
021 APRP participant from Qala-e Zal district (Pashtun).  
022 Security official from Khanabad district, Kunduz province (Tajik).  
023 High-ranking ALP commander in Kunduz City (Pashtun).  
024 Official in Khanabad district (Tajik).  
025 High-ranking provincial security official linked to Shura-ye Nazar faction Jamiat-
i-Islami (Tajik).  





100 Taliban commander operating in Dahan-e Ghori district.  
101 High-ranking provincial official (Pashtun).  
102 ANP official in Baghlan-e Jadid (Pashtun).  
103 Tribal elder from Dahan-e Ghori, former jihadi and AMF commander (Pashtun). 
104 Former Hezb-e Islami  and AMF commander in Baghlan-e Jadid (Pashtun).  
105 Former Hezb-e Islami and AMF commander in Baghlan-e Jadid (Pashtun).  
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106 Former jihadi commander in Baghlan-e Jadid (Tajik).  
107 Former jihadi and AMF commander in Baghlan-e Jadid, now provincial official 
(Pashtun).  
108 Local informal powerbroker affiliated with Jamiat-e Islami.   
109 Member of the provincial peace council (APRP).  
110 APRP participant from Dahan-e Ghori district (Pashtun).  
111 APRP participant from Pul-e Khumri district (Pashtun).  
112 Taliban commander operating in Baghlan-e Jadid (Pashtun). 
113 Shadow district chief for Taliban in Dahan-e Ghori district.  
114 APRP participant from Baghlan-e Jadid, assassinated in 2013 (Pashtun).  
115 Relative of APRP participant (Pashtun). 
116 Taliban commander from Dahan-e Ghori.  
117 APRP participant from Dahan-e Ghori.  
118 Member of the provincial council (Tajik).   
119 Village elder in Baghlan-e Jadid.  
120 ALP commander in Baghlan-e Jadid (Pashtun). 
121 APRP participant. 
122 Member of the provincial council (Pashtun). 
123 Local journalist.  
124 Provincial security official.  
125 Tribal elder from Baghlan-e Jadid (Pashtun).   
126 Tribal elder from Dand-e Ghori.  
127 Provincial-level official and former jihadi and AMF commander in Baghlan-e 
Jadid.  
128 APRP participant from Baghlan-e Jadid.  
129 Government official from Baghlan province.  
130 Tribal elder from Baghlan-e Jadid (Pashtun).  
131 ALP commander in Baghlan-e Jadid.  
132 Former jihadi commander, now businessman from Baghlan-e Jadid (Tajik).  
133 Tribal elder in Baghlan-e Jadid.  
134 Doctor from Baghlan, working in Kabul hospital.  
135 Tribal elder in Baghlan-e Jadid (Pashtun).  
136 ALP commander from Baghlan-e Jadid. 
137 Member of provincial council (Pashtun).  
138 High-ranking provincial official.  
139 APRP participant from Baghlan-e Jadid.  
140 High-ranking provincial official (Pashtun).  
141 High-ranking provincial official (Pashtun).   
142 Shadow district chief of the Taliban in Dahan-e Ghori (Pashtun). 
143 Taliban commander in Dahan-e Ghori (Pashtun). 
144 Former shadow governor Taliban Baghlan.  
145 Taliban commander in Baghlan-e Jadid 
146 Tribal elder from Dand-e Ghori area of Pul-e Khumri.  
147 Tribal elder in Dand-e Ghori area of Pul-e Khumri. 
148 Tribal elder from Dand-e Ghori area of Pul-e Khumri.  
149 High-ranking provincial security official.  
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200 Tokhi tribesman, former jihadi commander.  
201 Member of the provincial peace council (Tokhi), killed in 2016.  
202 Provincial-level official from Deh Rawod.  
203 Alikozai tribesman.  
204 Member of the provincial peace council (Popalzai).   
205 Popalzai tribesman and former jihadi commander.   
206 Former NDS official.  
207 ALP official (Popolzai)  
208 Former NDS official.   
209 District-level official in Shaheed Hassas (Noorzai). 
210 Former member of the provincial council and former jihadi commander from Deh 
Rawod (Popalzai).  
211 Provincial-level official from outside Uruzgan.   
212 Hotak tribesman from Tirin Kot district.   
213 Hotak tribesman from Tirin Kot district, killed in 2015.  
214 Provincial level official (Achekzai).  
215 ANP commander in Tirin Kot district (Popalzai).  
216 Barakzai tribesman, former jihadi commander.  
217 District-level official in Shaheed Hasas (Noorzai). 
218 Barakzai tribesman from Chora district, killed in 2014.  
219 Former high-ranking provincial official from outside Uruzgan.  
220 Barakzai tribesman from Chora district.  
221 Provincial-level official from Tirin Kot district.  
222 Provincial-level security official from Tirin Kot district.  
223 Villager from Tirin Kot district (Hotak).  
224 Barakzai tribesman and former jihadi commander.  
225 ALP commander from Shaheed Hassas.  
226 High-ranking provincial official (Hazara).  
227 Taliban commander operating in Tirin Kot district.  
228 ANP official (Achekzai).  
229 Former high-ranking provincial official from outside Uruzgan.  
230 ALP commander and former Taliban commander from Gizab district (Achekzai).  
231 Hotak villager in Tirin Kot district.   
232 Alikozai tribesman from Deh Rawod district.   
233 Alikozai tribesman from Deh Rawod district.   
234 ANP commander in Tirin Kot district.  
235 Member of provincial peace council (Barakzai).  
236 Barakzai tribesman from Tirin Kot district.   
237 Hotak villager from Tirin Kot district.  
238 Taliban commander operating in Deh Rawod district.  
239 Tokhi villager in Tirin Kot district.  
240 Tokhi villager in Tirin Kot district.  
241 Son of Alikozai tribesman and former district-level official in Deh Rawod 
district.  
242 APRP official.  
243 APRP participant.  
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300 Inhabitant of Nahr-e Seraj district (Achekzai).  
301 Former Hezb-e Islami commander from Nahr-e Seraj district (Barakzai).  
302 Villager in Nad-i Ali district (Kharoti).  
303 ANP official from Nahr-e Seraj district, killed in 2015.  
304 District-level official from Nad-e Ali district.  
305 Taliban commander from Nahr-e Saraj district (Ishaqzai).  
306 District-level official from Nad-e Ali district.  
307 APRP official.  
308 Taliban commander in Sangin district.  
309 Taliban commander in Sangin district (Alikozai).  
310 Taliban commander in Sangin district (Alikozai).  
311 Taliban commander in Sangin district (Barakzai).  
312 Taliban commander in Nad-e Ali district (Noorzai).  
313 Taliban commander in Nad-e Ali district (Noorzai).  
314 APRP participant.   
315 Taliban commander in Nad-e Ali district (Kharoti).  
316 Taliban commander in Nad-e Ali district (Alizai).  
317 Barakzai tribesman in Nahr-e Saraj district.  
318 Barakzai tribesman from Nahr-e Saraj district.  
319 Barakzai tribesman from Nahr-e Saraj district. 
320 ALP commander operating in Nahr-e Saraj district.  
321 Former PTS official in Helmand province.  
322 Former Hezb-e Islami and 93rd Division commander.  
323 Former Hezb-e Islami and 93rd Division commander.  
324 Taliban commander in Nahr-e-Seraj district.  
325 Provincial-level official from Nahr-e-Seraj district.  
326 Alikozai tribesman from Sangin district.  
327 Alikozai tribesman from Sangin district.  
328 Former high-level provincial official.  
329 Alikozai tribesman from Sangin district. 
330 Alikozai tribesman from Sangin district.  
331 Taliban commander from Sangin district.  
332 Ishaqzai tribesman from Nahr-e-Seraj district.  
333 Ishaqzai tribesman from Najr-e Seraj district.  
334 Local journalist.  
335 ALP commander in Nahr-e-Seraj district.  
336 Member of the provincial council.  
337 Member of the provincial council. 
338 Member of the provincial council.  
339 Member of the provincial peace council.  
340 Former PTS official. 
341 Former high-ranking 93rd Division commander and former Hezb-e Islami 
commander (Barakzai). 





400 Member of parliament for Helmand.  
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401 Former Taliban official.  
402 Former MoI official. 
403 Former member of Hezb-e Islami party.  
404 Member of the High Peace Council.  
405 Member of the High Peace Council.  
406 NDS official in Kabul.  
407 Member of parliament for Kunduz.  
408 Former Taliban official.  
409 Member of parliament for Kunduz.  
410 APRP official in Kabul.   
411 APRP official in Kabul.  
412 Senior government official. 
413 Senior government official, previously involved in the DIAG programme.  
414 Former senior MoI official.  
415 Former Taliban official.  
416 Governor of a northern province.  
417 Member of parliament for Helmand.  
418 Member of parliament for Uruzgan.  
419 Member of parliament for Uruzgan province.  
420 Former Ministry of Interior official.  
421 Member of parliament for Baghlan.  
422 Member of parliament for Kunduz.  
423 Member of parliament for Kunduz.  
424 Former senior official in Kabul.  
425 Member of parliament for Baghlan.  
426 Former senior MoI official.  
427 Senior member of one of the former Northern Alliance parties.  
428 Senior member of Shura-ye Nazar and former Ministry of Defense official.  
429 Former Taliban official.  
430 Analyst at research organisation.   
431 Member of parliament for Uruzgan.  
432 Former high-ranking Taliban official.  
433 Senior ALP official.  
434 ALP official from General Directorate ALP in Kabul.  





500 Former DDR official. 
501 Former UN official.  
502 Former DIAG official.  
503 British ministry of Foreign Affairs and Commonwealth official. 
504 Former British officer.  
505 EU official in Kabul.  
506 ISAF officer in Kunduz.  
507 Senior U.S. Embassy official.  
508 UK Embassy official.  
509 UN official in Baghlan.  
510 USAID official in Baghlan.  
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511 Former DDR official.  
512 Former senior DDR official.  
513 Former DDR official.  
514 Former DIAG official, former analyst for policy research organisation.  
515 UNAMA official. 
516 Senior ISAF official working in the Force Reintegration Cell.  
517 Former DDR official.  
518 Human Rights Watch researcher.  
519 Former DDR official. 
520 British officer.  
521 Former DDR official.  
522 ISAF PRT official in Uruzgan.  
523 Former DDR official.  
524 Former DDR official.  
525 Former British officer.  
526 Analyst for non-governmental organisation.  
527 Analyst for non-governmental organisation.  
528 Dutch Ministry of Defense official.  
529 UNAMA official.  
530 Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs official.  
531 Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs official.   
532 Dutch Ministry of Defense official.  
533 Dutch Embassy in Kabul official. 
534 Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade official. 
535 U.S. Special Operations Forces officer.  
536 UN official in Baghlan.  
537 ISAF official working in the F-RIC. 
538 ISAF official.  
539 Analyst for a non-governmental organisation. 
540 Former senior UN official. 
541 Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs official.  
542 Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade official. 
543 Analyst based in the U.K. 
544 Analyst based in the U.S.  
545 ISAF official working in the Force Reintegration Cell. 
546 ISAF official working in the Force Reintegration Cell. 
547 Former senior DDR official.  
548 Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs official.   
549 Former cultural advisor for the British army in Helmand.  
550 U.S. Special Operations Forces commander.  
551 Analyst for a non-governmental organisation.  
552 Analyst based in Germany.  
553 Analyst based in the U.K.  
554 Former U.S. Department of Defence official.  
555 Analyst based in Canada.  
556 Analyst based in the U.K.  
557 Analyst based in Kabul.  
558 Former USAID official.  	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